In the wake of mass protests that forced President Gotabaya Rajapaksa to resign in July 2022, Sri Lanka’s interlocking economic and governance crises remain acute. Austerity measures, introduced in part to win financial support from the International Monetary Fund and foreign creditors, have brought additional economic hardship for many Sri Lankans already struggling with collapsing living standards. Forthcoming economic reforms could provoke renewed protests. President Ranil Wickremesinghe’s reliance on Rajapaksa allies for his parliamentary majority will likely constrain fulfilment of promises to increase financial accountability, strengthen rule of law institutions, reduce impunity and corruption, ensure the rights of Tamils and Muslims, and address the legacy of the 1983-2009 civil war. Building on Crisis Group’s work during and after the war, we advocate for international humanitarian assistance, as well as inclusive governance reforms to strengthen democratic institutions and support a lasting, equitable peace.
The Sri Lankan government has long evaded the UN Human Rights Council’s requests that it hold accountable perpetrators of atrocities committed during the country’s 26-year civil war and since. Absent changes responsive to its concerns, the Council should keep up the pressure.
Date of presidential election announced but fears of possible electoral delay continued; meanwhile, government reached agreement in principle with international bond holders to restructure $12.5bn in debt.
Presidential election date announced amid continued postponement suspicions. Election Commission 26 July announced presidential election would be held on 21 Sept. President Ranil Wickremesinghe same day formally registered his independent candidacy. Sri Lanka Podujana Pera-muna (SLPP), controlled by former ruling Rajapaksa family, 29 July announced they would not back Wickremesinghe, who nonetheless retains support of some half of SLPP’s parliamentary. Former Army commander Sarath Fonseka and Wijeyadasa Rajapakshe, who resigned as justice minister 29 July, also announced their candidacies. Worries of possible poll postponement remained widespread, even after Supreme Court dismissed separate petitions which 8 and 15 July requested election delay; President’s challengers Sajith Premadasa of Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) party and Anura Kumara Dissanayake of National People’s Power (NPP) party 3 and 11 July accused Wickremesinghe of attempting to delay elections, but asserted attempts at postponement will be defeated. PM Dinesh Gunawardena’s 26 July said govt rejected as illegal 24 July Supreme Court decision temporarily barring Deshabandu Tennakoon from serving as Inspector General of Police, fuelling fears of potential constitutional crisis; Bar Association next day “strongly condemn[ed]” govt’s decision as effort to “subvert the course of justice”.
Govt achieved long-sought bond restructuring, but public discontent remained. Govt negotiators 4 July announced they reached framework with commercial creditors to restructure $12.6bn of International Sovereign Bond, proposing 28% cut on face value and 11% reduction on past interest; International Monetary Fund 11 July confirmed they were still evaluating agreement. Public discontent with economic hardship resulted in public sector strikes for higher pay with 1mn public sector employees 8-9 July holding two-day national strike. New electricity tariffs 16 July came into effect, reducing rates overall by 22.5% and offering relief to consumers using less than 90 units of electricity.
Commissions of inquiry and ad hoc committees have been used for decades as a way of obscuring the truth and avoiding accountability [in Sri Lanka].
For more than ten years, the [UN Human Rights] Council has pushed Colombo to hold accountable perpetrators of atrocities during the [Sri Lankan] civil war.
[Sanctions for Sri Lankan officials] are a timely reminder that continued impunity will bring increasing costs to the government’s international reputation.
Sri Lanka's interlocking economic and political crises remain acute. In this excerpt from the Watch List 2022 – Autumn Update, Crisis Group lays out what the EU and its member states can do to mitigate the risks of needed reforms.
Originally published in The Hindustan Times.
Crowds of ordinary Sri Lankans stormed the presidential residence on 9 July, compelling President Gotabaya Rajapaksa to flee the country. In this Q&A, Crisis Group expert Alan Keenan lays out the background of these events and looks at what the immediate future may hold.
Sri Lanka is embroiled in nationwide protests amid deepening economic woes and increasing political volatility. In this Q&A, Crisis Group expert Alan Keenan analyses the implications of the crisis, which could have lasting political and economic effects.
Sri Lanka’s president has named a veteran anti-Muslim agitator to head a legal reform task force. Critics have called the move “incomprehensible”, but it is readily understood as a way to divert discontent among the government’s Sinhala Buddhist base toward an embattled minority.
The UN Human Rights Council will soon discuss Sri Lanka, where the new government has scotched truth and justice efforts related to the 1983-2009 civil war. The Council should demand accountability for past crimes but stress that Colombo’s present policies may spark further deadly conflict.
The politically-motivated Presidential Commission of Enquiry has been distorting politically-connected criminal suspects into victims, and investigators and legal reformers into criminals.
Twice postponed because of COVID-19, Sri Lanka's parliamentary election finally took place on 5 August. The SLPP's electoral victory should be understood not simply as a result of dissatisfaction with rival party UNP, but of the failure of its internationally-backed liberal reform agenda to gain lasting traction with Sri Lankan voters.
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