Would-be assassin injured Republican candidate Donald Trump, and President Biden ended his re-election bid.

Trump survived assassination attempt at campaign rally. Lone gunman 13 July shot at former president and Republican party nominee Donald Trump during campaign event in state of Pennsylvania. Shooter, whose motives remain unclear, pierced Trump’s right ear, killed one spectator and injured two others before being killed by snipers. Trump steered clear of escalatory rhetoric in immediate aftermath of attack, 14 July saying “it is more important than ever that we stand united”, but subsequently resumed confrontational attacks on his opponents; President Biden, meanwhile, 14 July urged country to “lower the temperature” amid deepening polarisation ahead of Nov presidential election.

Biden abandoned his presidential campaign. Biden 21 July announced he was withdrawing from presidential race and immediately endorsed VP Harris as his successor. Announcement followed weeks of mounting pressure to step down amid concerns about his fitness for another term. In 24 July address, Biden said move was “the best way to unite our nation”, while vowing to see out his term.

China maintained naval activities around disputed waters, while rival maritime exercises strained Japan-China relations. 

Beijing maintained maritime presence around disputed waters. Three Chinese Coast Guard ships 2-4 July entered Japan’s 12-mile territorial limit near disputed area off Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, while in pursuit of Japanese fishing boats; Chinese Coast Guard Bureau claimed fishers “illegally” entered waters, warned they would continue to protect their jurisdiction through enforcement activities. In two further incidents, two Chinese Coast Guard vessels repeatedly 10-11 July entered disputed waters near Ootsuri Island, and again, five days later, near Taisho. Tokyo 5 July confirmed presence of Chinese-installed buoy in high seas over Japan’s southern continental shelf, Pacific Ocean. As of 29 July, 100 Chinese vessels had been present in Japanese contiguous waters for 25 days and 18 vessels had stayed in Japanese territorial waters for seven days during month.

China-Russia held joint military patrol, Japan-Taiwan conducted joint drill. Commencing their fourth joint annual Asia-Pacific maritime patrol, Russian and Chinese combined flotilla 4-5 July transited Japan’s Osumi Strait. Japanese warship 4 July sailed into Chinese waters off eastern Zhejiang province, near Taiwan, ignoring Chinese no-sail zone for live-fire drill; Beijing conveyed serious concerns, leading to Japanese Defence Ministry investigation into warship captain and crew. Taiwan and Japan coast guards 18 July conducted joint drill in Japan’s Boso Peninsula, Chiba prefecture, and in waters near Izu Oshima; in protest, Chinese Foreign Ministry urged Japan to “stop disrupting cross-strait peace and stability and China-Japan relations”. Japan 12 July released defence white paper saying that “the possibility of ‘serious situation’ akin to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine occurring in East Asia cannot be ruled out”, highlighting fears of conflict over Taiwan.

Diplomatic channels remained open. Japan and Chinese Vice Foreign Ministers 22 July convened in Tokyo for first strategic dialogue in four years.

Washington and Seoul signed new nuclear deterrence deal prompting condemnation from Pyongyang. 

U.S. and South Korea entered nuclear deterrence pact. U.S. and South Korean defence officials 11 July signed joint nuclear deterrence guidelines on sidelines of NATO summit, Washington, D.C., reaffirming U.S. commitment to defend South Korea using all available capabilities, including nuclear weapons. U.S. President Biden and South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol authorised guidelines, while commending “tremendous progress” since establishment of joint Nuclear Consultative Group. Meanwhile, North Korean Defence Ministry 13 July warned that “hostile states” would “pay an unimaginably harsh price” for increased nuclear cooperation; in response, South Korean Defence Ministry next day said that North Korean regime “will not survive after using nuclear weapons”. 

Cross-border tensions continued. South Korea 18 July resumed broadcasting K-pop songs, news and other messages critical of North Korea on loudspeakers at major sections of inter-Korean border, 21 July further expanded operations; responses occurred as more North Korean trash-filled balloons flew around capital city, Seoul. 

In other important developments. South Korean newspaper 16 July reported that senior North Korean diplomat Counselor Ri Il-gyu defected in Nov 2023, citing his “disillusionment” and “bleak future” under northern regime. Meanwhile, New York grand jury 16 July indicted former CIA analyst and prominent North Korea expert Sue Mi Terry for failing to register as South Korean foreign agent; case fuelled broader concerns in Washington and Seoul about security of classified information and integrity of individuals handling such sensitive data.

Taipei staged major simulation exercise in case of Chinese invasion as Beijing maintained high military activity around island. 

Taiwan held major simulation operation to prepare in case of Chinese invasion. Taiwan 22-26 July held largest annual Han Kuang war games as troops simulated “real combat” aimed at resisting hypothetical Chinese invasion; exercises included intensified night-time activities, operations with severed command lines and Wan’an civilian evacuation air defence drill, while live-fire drills took place in outlying islands, Kinmen and Matsu. 

Beijing maintained intense maritime activity around Taiwan. As of 30 July, Taipei recorded 397 Chinese aircraft either crossing “unofficial” median line or entering Taiwan’s de facto air defence identification zone (ADIZ). Taiwan Ministry of Defence 11 July detected 66 Chinese warplanes near island, representing highest number in 24-hour window this year. Meanwhile, tensions near Kinmen Islands persisted as three Chinese Coast Guard vessels 2 July stopped Taiwan-registered fishing boat outside of Taiwan-controlled waters near Kinmen; Taiwan’s Coast Guard dispatched two vessels to retrieve fishermen, but stopped pursuit to “avoid escalating conflict” after spotting more Chinese vessels; fishing boat and six crew members were escorted to Fujian province, China, for further investigation. Taiwan 11 July reported intrusion of four Chinese Coast Guard vessels into Taiwan-controlled waters around Kinmen islands. 

U.S.-China tensions over Taiwan remained high. Newly appointed director of American Institute in Taiwan Raymond Greene 10 July met with Taiwan President Lai Ching-te at presidential office, Taipei, and reiterated U.S. commitment to boosting Taiwan’s self-defence capabilities. Meanwhile, Chinese Foreign Ministry 17 July confirmed pause on nascent nuclear non-proliferation talks with U.S., saying that Washington’s arms sales to Taiwan were “seriously undermining the political atmosphere for continued arms control consultations”.

Tensions with Pakistan remained elevated amid cross-border attacks from militants; authorities sought to clamp down on IS-KP activity.

Authorities targeted IS-KP, implemented poppy eradication campaign. Taliban forces 7 July killed Zakir, senior Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP) commander in Nangarhar province; 13 July Taliban raided IS-KP hideout in capital Kabul and arrested several suspects for allegedly planning attack during Ashura, day of commemoration held by Shia Muslims. Amid ongoing poppy eradication campaign, authorities 17-23 July arrested at least seven people during narcotic raids in Badakhshan province, leading to tensions with local communities. 

Relations with Pakistan remained strained. UN 10 July released document labelling Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) “largest terrorist group” in Afghanistan. Report stated that group received increased support from Taliban authorities to conduct cross-border attacks against Pakistan. It blamed Taliban authorities for being “unable or unwilling” to curb TTP activities whose attacks have increased in recent years. Pakistan Foreign Ministry 17 July said it summoned senior Afghan diplomat in Islamabad after suicide bombing attack in Pakistan’s Bannu city killed eight soldiers two days before; Pakistan accused Afghanistan-based TTP’s Hafiz Gul Bahadur Group for violence, demanded Kabul to take “immediate, robust, and effective action” against attackers. Taliban authorities did not respond immediately. Pakistan 21 July reopened Chaman border crossing with Afghanistan after nine months of closure. 

Iran deported over 2,000 Afghan migrants. Amid rising anti-Afghan sentiments, local residents 19 July in Iran’s Khur city torched homes of several Afghans following killing of Iranian man by alleged Afghan teenager; Iran same day sent back 2,212 migrants to Afghanistan.

In other important developments. Central Asian delegations and investors 3 July attended Afghanistan-Uzbekistan Trade Coordination Forum to explore business opportunities around Afghanistan. Taliban Emir 6 July made another round of changes to cabinet and replaced central bank governor, mines and petroleum minister. Authorities early July held series of meetings with Shia leaders to impose restrictions on Shia Ashura celebrations, including by restricting gatherings to places of worship, and prohibiting public displays such as flags.

Violent crackdown on student protests left at least 200 killed and thousands injured; Myanmar’s conflict fuelled further instability in refugee camps. 

Anti-government protests turned deadly, with over 200 killed. Public university students 1 July launched protests against High Court ruling which reinstated quotas for entry level govt jobs, including 30% for children and grandchildren of “freedom fighters” from 1971 Liberation War. Protests turned violent after PM Sheikh Hasina 14 July called protesters “razakars”, derogatory term for collaborators with Pakistani military in 1971 war; notably, pro-govt supporters from Chhatra League and police next day used deadly violence against protesters, killing six people. As more protesters took to streets, violence spread across country and took a turn for the worse on 18 July as police attacked demonstrators, killing dozens of mainly young men and protesters vandalised govt buildings and metro stations in capital Dhaka; authorities subsequently switched off internet nationwide and deployed military, giving shoot-on-sight orders. Supreme Court 21 July scaled back quotas to 7% and student leaders 22 July announced pause. Situation remained stable by end of month, with curfew and internet restrictions relaxed and businesses resuming operations; more than 6,000 have reportedly been arrested nationwide, many from opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party and Jamaat-e-Islami. Police by end of month continued to break up small demonstrations.     

Myanmar’s developments created instability at border. As Arakan Army (AA) inched closer to capturing Rakhine state’s Maungdaw city, regime personnel, civilians, and Rohingya armed groups sought refuge in Bangladesh; Bangladeshi authorities who had previously repatriated junta personnel and their family members back to Myanmar 14 July changed course, refusing two boats carrying 60 Myanmar regime personnel. FM Hasan Mahmud 12 July discussed with regime counterpart Than Swe proposal to start Rohingya repatriation as soon as possible. 

Rohingya refugee camps saw more clashes. Refugee camps remained restive with renewed clashes between Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) and Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO), which left at least six people killed in first ten days of July. Increase is likely related to developments in Rakhine state as ARSA and RSO, who are fighting alongside Myanmar’s military, returned to camps. 

Manipur ethnic conflict persisted, security forces killed at least 22 suspected Maoists in centre, and India-China border tensions continued.

Violence persisted in Manipur. PM Modi 2 July addressed Manipur conflict at lower house of parliament for first time in almost a year, underlining govt’s efforts to ensure return to peace and calling for cooperation with opposition. In Manipur’s Jiribam district, suspected Kuki militants 6 July allegedly killed Meitei man, triggering clashes and violence, fuelling displacement to Assam state; 14 July killed security personnel and injured two. In Assam’s Cachar district, authorities 16 July killed three Hmar youths whom they accused of being militants; Hmar Students’ Association next day claimed those deceased were “village volunteers” defending community from Meitei militants, called for investigation. In Manipur’s Imphal East district, Kangleipak Communist Party militants 20 July shot down Meitei man. 

Anti-Maoist operations continued. In Chhattisgarh’s Narayanpur district, security forces 2 July killed five militants during operation. Security forces 8 July killed Maoist in Madhya Pradesh’s Balaghat district; 9 July shot down militant in Chhattisgarh’s Kanker district. In Maharashtra’s Gadchiroli district, security forces 17 July killed 12 militants during operation, which also left two security personnel injured. In Chhattisgarh’s Bijapur district, IED blast on same day killed two security personnel and injured four others; security forces 19 July shot down Maoist. Authorities 20 July killed suspected Maoist in Chhattisgarh’s Sukma district; 25 July shot dead another suspected Maoist in Telangana state.

India-China border relations remained tense. Indian FM Jaishankar 4 July met Chinese counterpart at Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit; both agreed to intensify talks to resolve border issues, noting that prolongation of current situation is not in interests of either side; gap in readouts, however, indicates that normalcy in bilateral ties will likely remain elusive. Reuters 9 July reported India was planning to invest $1bn in construction of 12 hydropower stations in north-eastern state of Arunachal Pradesh, claimed by China to be South Tibet; Chinese Foreign Ministry 10 July described project “illegal and invalid”, said “South Tibet is China’s territory”. Indian and Chinese FMs 25 July met at ASEAN-related meetings in Laos, stressed importance to resolve border issue at Line of Actual Control.

Militants ramped up attacks against security personnel in Jammu, driving instability, while central govt expanded its policing and public order powers in Jammu and Kashmir. 

Militant attacks continued to drive insecurity. Militants drove attacks against security personnel in Jammu. Notably, militants 7 July attacked security post in Rajouri district and injured one soldier; 8 July ambushed and killed five security forces personnel on hill tract in Kathua district; and 15 July, ambushed and killed five security forces personnel during security operation in Doda district. Lesser-known militant group, Kashmir Tigers, believed to be front for Jaish-e-Muhammad, took responsibility for attacks on 8 and 15 July. In Kashmir region, different but simultaneous security operations 6-7 July in Kulgam district killed six militants and two soldiers. In Kupwara district, security forces 14 July killed three militants allegedly infiltrating from Pakistan; 23 July killed alleged militant during operation which also killed one soldier, 27 July killed alleged Pakistani intruder, leaving one soldier dead and five injured. Though militant attacks are generally lower in Jammu than in Kashmir, bold nature of attacks and ambushes in Jammu caused serious concern. Security forces ramped up their presence while militants reportedly drew in soldiers with fake intel alerts and carried out pinpointed ambushes. Lack of intelligence from local populations, such as nomadic tribe of Gujjars who are unhappy with govt, has become crucial factor.

Govt expanded powers of Lieutenant Governor over policing and public order. In anticipation of regional election announcement, home affairs ministry 13 July amended and expanded powers of Lieutenant Governor of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) to give appointee sole discretion over policing and public order. Opposition Congress party immediately criticised decision saying it would undermine state govt’s executive power. Former Chief Minister Omar Abdullah also criticised move and sought “restoration of full, undiluted statehood for J&K [as] prerequisite for [upcoming] elections”. 

In other important developments. Chief cleric, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq 19 July called on judges of J&K and Ladakh High Court to intervene against unjust arrests of senior lawyers; move follows High Court’s recognition of pro-govt Kashmir Advocates Association as new lawyers’ body on 29 June.

Security forces continued to undertake anti-militant operations, straining ties with Kabul amid delicate internal political situation. 

Domestic political situation remained volatile. Pakistan and International Monetary Fund 12 July reached staff-level agreement for $7bn bailout, easing concerns about risk of sovereign default. Meanwhile, Supreme Court 12 July issued ruling in favour of Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) by granting it 22 seats reserved for women and minorities in federal legislature, paving way for PTI to return to parliament as largest party with 114 seats. 

Security operations against militant groups continued. Sindh counter-terrorism department 13 July arrested suspected commander of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)’s Karachi chapter; TTP took responsibility for 8 July killing of senior counter-terrorism official. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province near Afghanistan witnessed several deadly attacks, including one officer and four soldiers killed 9 July during security operations in North and South Waziristan and Lakki Marwat districts. Ten militants 15 July targeted Bannu city cantonment, killing eight soldiers in suicide car bombing; military killed all ten militants and attributed attack to TTP’s Afghanistan-based Gul Bahadur group. Two soldiers and five civilians, including two women health workers, next day killed in militant attack in Dera Ismail district. Meanwhile, local anti-TTP “peace march” 20 July turned violent in Bannu city, KPK, leaving one dead and dozens injured; three Baloch protesters killed 28 July in clashes with security forces in various Balochistan cities.

Tensions with Kabul over TPP activity persisted. After Bannu attack, military 16 July blamed Afghanistan for allowing TTP to operate within its borders, said Pakistan would take all necessary measures against such threats emanating from Afghanistan. Foreign Ministry 17 July said “strong demarche” had been delivered to Afghan deputy head of mission. Blaming Gul Bahadur group for attack, ministry called on Kabul “to fully investigate and take immediate, robust and effective action” against those responsible. After protesters bearing Afghan flags 20 July attacked Pakistani consulate in Frankfurt city, Germany, defence minister said Islamabad would have to rethink its “hospitality” to Afghan people; comment came after Islamabad allowed “legal” refugees to stay in country following visit from UN Refugee Agency chief Filippo Grandi 7-9 July. 

Date of presidential election announced but fears of possible electoral delay continued; meanwhile, government reached agreement in principle with international bond holders to restructure $12.5bn in debt.  

Presidential election date announced amid continued postponement suspicions. Election Commission 26 July announced presidential election would be held on 21 Sept. President Ranil Wickremesinghe same day formally registered his independent candidacy. Sri Lanka Podujana Pera-muna (SLPP), controlled by former ruling Rajapaksa family, 29 July announced they would not back Wickremesinghe, who nonetheless retains support of some half of SLPP’s parliamentary. Former Army commander Sarath Fonseka and Wijeyadasa Rajapakshe, who resigned as justice minister 29 July, also announced their candidacies. Worries of possible poll postponement remained widespread, even after Supreme Court dismissed separate petitions which 8 and 15 July requested election delay; President’s challengers Sajith Premadasa of Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) party and Anura Kumara Dissanayake of National People’s Power (NPP) party 3 and 11 July accused Wickremesinghe of attempting to delay elections, but asserted attempts at postponement will be defeated. PM Dinesh Gunawardena’s 26 July said govt rejected as illegal 24 July Supreme Court decision temporarily barring Deshabandu Tennakoon from serving as Inspector General of Police, fuelling fears of potential constitutional crisis; Bar Association next day “strongly condemn[ed]” govt’s decision as effort to “subvert the course of justice”. 

Govt achieved long-sought bond restructuring, but public discontent remained. Govt negotiators 4 July announced they reached framework with commercial creditors to restructure $12.6bn of International Sovereign Bond, proposing 28% cut on face value and 11% reduction on past interest; International Monetary Fund 11 July confirmed they were still evaluating agreement. Public discontent with economic hardship resulted in public sector strikes for higher pay with 1mn public sector employees 8-9 July holding two-day national strike. New electricity tariffs 16 July came into effect, reducing rates overall by 22.5% and offering relief to consumers using less than 90 units of electricity.

Armed ethnic groups renewed fighting, making critical headway against regime as army chief declared himself new acting president. 

In west, Arakan Army (AA) made territorial gains. AA 5 July confirmed capture of Thandwe airport two days earlier, said clashes left 400 regime casualties, but did not reveal its own losses. AA 9 July captured Light Infantry Battalion 55 base, last military base in Ngapali town, Rakhine state. Despite gains, AA’s aim to capture Maungdaw town remained challenging, while its battlefield victories fostered tension with other rival ethnic groups, including Rohingya and Chin armed groups. 

Three Brotherhood Alliance (comprised of TNLA, MNDAA and AA) made rapid advances. Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and its allies 25 July claimed seizure of Lashio town in northern Shan State, including Northeastern Military Command headquarters and airport; fighting, however, continued across multiple locations in Lashio as MNDAA attempted to clear out significant numbers of regime troops dispersed throughout town. Tens of thousands of residents had fled Lashio ahead of offensive. Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) also had series of victories, 10 July capturing Nawnghkio and Kyaukme towns along with Gokteik Viaduct bridge in Shan state, 25 July announced capture of Mogok town in Mandalay Region, major ruby mining centre; social welfare groups reported heavy civilian casualties with almost 60 bodies cremated in Kyaukme. TNLA’s move into low-lying valleys and urban areas in Shan state has created conflict with Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) as TNLA continued to take territory beyond upland areas where Ta’ang populations mostly live. Consequently, SSPP 5 July responded with two deadly attacks against TNLA, killing several high-ranking officers. 

In other important developments. Myanmar state-run MRTV 22 July reported acting president, Myint Swe is unable to perform his duties for medical reasons, with military chief Min Aung Hlaing appointing himself to role. Announcement came week before state of emergency was renewed on 31 July. 

Peace process remained on track in Bangsamoro region while authorities pursued anti-communist measures. 

Implementation of MILF peace process continued in Bangsamoro region. Illegal gun dealer 12 July killed police informant during buy-bust operation in Sultan Kudarat town, Maguindanao del Norte. Thus far, peace process stayed on track in Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) as authorities 17 July facilitated dispute settlement between two groups of Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), ie, Muslimin Yasil of NDBC-MNLF and Barah Barahim of Samideen-MNLF. Dialogue marked significant peacebuilding breakthrough in Basilan province. Senior officials of Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)’s United Bangsamoro Justice Party 20 July told local reporters that they aimed to continue Mindanao peace process and resolve conflict between Moro and non-Moro peoples on island. 

Security operations against communist rebels continued in Luzon and Visayas islands. Counter-insurgency operations against communist rebels continued. Notably, soldiers 8 July apprehended two senior communist leaders in Baguio city, Luzon, under terrorism and arson charges. Military 25 July killed platoon communist leader in clash in General MacArthur municipality, Eastern Samar. Former communist rebels continued to surrender as army 14 July reported that 300 former members of Communist Party of Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) registered in govt amnesty program from 5-12 July. 

In other important developments. President Marcos 30 July welcomed U.S. Sec of State Antony Blinken and U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin to capital Manila; U.S. officials announced $500mn in foreign military aid toward “confronting Chinese aggression” (see also South China Sea).

Philippines and China signed temporary pact to mitigate growing tensions amid strengthening security ties between Manila and allies.

Temporary agreement reached with Beijing to stem maritime tensions. Manila and Beijing 21 July reached deal to “deescalate situation in South China Sea”. Philippine Foreign Ministry said agreement would not compromise geopolitical positions of either side, but neither party released official text. Deal comes at time of increasing confrontation between sides about territorial delineation, particularly around Second Thomas Shoal. Notably, Manila 9 July deployed BRP Jose Rizal Sabina Shoal after sightings of Chinese vessels near region to mark show of force for sovereignty rights but may fall short because Manila lacks ability to maintain naval presence across contested waters. Shortly after, Russian and Chinese navies 16 July carried out live-fire exercises in South China Sea to strengthen bilateral capacity of responding to “maritime security threats”. Beijing and Manila subsequently disagreed publicly about details of 21 July agreement, with Philippine Foreign Ministry 22 July denying it includes prior notification and “on-site verification” as China’s Foreign Ministry asserted earlier same day. Philippine forces 27 July resupplied BRP Sierra Madre.

Philippines deepened defence cooperation with U.S. and Japan. U.S. Department of Defence 11 July stated Washington is set to approve General Security of Military Information Agreement with Manila to facilitate timely exchange of classified information. U.S. military chair of Joint Chiefs of Staff 16 July inspected selected U.S. military bases, prerequisite for approving new intelligence sharing framework. U.S. and Philippines 21 July completed Marine Aviation Support Activity where U.S. Marines dropped guided bombs on targets near Western Luzon. U.S. 30 July announced $500mn in foreign military aid to Manila during high-level visit. Meanwhile, Japan and Philippines 8 July held “2+2” foreign and defence meeting in Manila to discuss regional security matters, signed Reciprocal Access Agreement that would allow respective militaries to visit each other’s soil, as part of efforts to counter China’s growing aggression in region. 

Tensions between Vietnam and China persisted. Vietnam 17 July submitted claim to UN to extend its continental shelf in South China Sea, prompting strong opposition from China. 

Election Commission approved new Senate and violence continued in deep south.

Election Commission endorsed new senators. Election Commission 10 July confirmed election of 200 new senators for five-year term, replacing 250 senators appointed by National Council for Peace and Order in 2019; despite electoral process designed to prevent politicisation of Senate, over 60% of new senators are affiliated to Bhumjaithai Party, member of govt coalition with close ties to army and monarchy, while 12 senators are aligned with Pheu Thai party and 18 with Move Forward Party (MFP). Constitutional Court 24 July said it will rule on case concerning impeachment of PM Srettha Thavisin on 14 Aug. 

Violence continued in deep south, Malaysia appointed new facilitator to support peace dialogue. Malaysia 1 July appointed Datuk Seri Mohamad Rabin Basir as new Malaysian Govt Facilitator for southern Thailand peace dialogue process; new round of official talks between Thai govt and main separatist group Barisan Revolusi National due in mid-Aug. Meanwhile, violence in deep south persisted. In Pattani’s Mae Lan district, gunmen 3-4 July shot down village head. In Narathiwat’s Sri Sakhon district, rangers 4 July clashed with militants, leaving some injured. Militants disguised as rangers 9 July carried out raids in districts of Krong Pinang, Yaha and Muang, in Yala province, stealing weapons. In Pattani’s Nong Chik district, assailants 12 July shot down defence volunteer. Roadside IED attacks 22 July wounded six police officers in Nong Chik district, Pattani province, and 23 July four police officers in Thepa district, Songkhla province. Security forces and militants 27 July clashed in Khok Pho district, Pattani, resulting in two soldiers wounded and one killed by grenade. Two suspected militants 28 July killed man in Pattani’s Panareh district. 

In important international developments. Bank officials 11 July appeared before House committee on national security after UN Human Rights report 26 June alleged Thai lenders were responsible for half of Myanmar’s arms and materiel procurement in 2023; committee chairman and Move Forward MP Rangsiman Rome 19 July said he had no evidence banks broke law; Foreign Ministry 24 July announced creation of task force to investigate and prevent such transactions. 

Deadly riots triggered by France’s proposed voting reforms appeared to subside.

Isolated incidents persisted despite overall lull in violence. Authorities early July started to lift roadblocks linking south of New Caledonia to capital Nouméa, including in pro-independence stronghold of Saint-Louis in Mont-Dore commune, prompting violent incidents. Notably, security forces 10 July killed man in alleged exchange of fire with rioters in Mont-Dore, bringing death toll since unrest started in May to ten people. Attackers 16 July targeted Saint-Louis Catholic church in Mont-Dore; 18-19 July vandalised another landmark Catholic mission in Vao village on Isle of Pines; 21-22 July vandalised Kanak memorial in La Foa area. Curfew remained in place by late July, though authorities relaxed it starting 22 July; authorities maintained roadblocks between Mont-Dore and Nouméa throughout month, with maritime shuttles allowing some movement between the two. 

Local figures called for calm, regional body endorsed crisis resolution mission. In France’s snap legislative elections held late June-early July, pro-independence Kanak candidate elected 7 July as MP, first time pro-independence candidate chosen since 1986; Emmanuel Tjibaou said his election amounted to “distress call”, urged for “re-creation of the conditions for dialogue”. Pro-independence leader Christian Tein, incarcerated since late June in metropolitan France, 17 July called for appeasement, while warning of lack of political response due to vacuum following legislative elections. Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) 23 July said high-level delegation will visit New Caledonia in August, seeking “long-lasting resolution” to political crisis; Paris had yet to accept request by end of month. President Macron 25 July said provincial elections scheduled by end of 2024 would be postponed. 

Gang launched series of attacks in country’s north, killing 26 people.

Young men from gang called “I don’t care” 16-18 July attacked villages of Tamara, Tambari and Agrumara in Angoram district, East Sepik province, killing at least 26 people, including 16 children, according to authorities; UN human rights chief Volker Turk 24 July said that death toll could exceed 50 and attacks were motivated by “dispute over land and lake ownership and user rights”. Brutality of attack, including reported beheading, sexual violence and village burning, prompted some 200 people to leave province. Authorities 26 July arrested five people linked to attacks; more perpetrators are believed to be in hiding still. East Sepik governor Allan Bird reported that there were only 20 police officers for 100,000-strong population of Angoram district. 

Inflammatory rhetoric soared as Cyprus marked 50th anniversary of Turkish troop presence.

Anniversary of Turkish troop presence highlighted persistent gap between parties. “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”) and Republic of Cyprus (RoC) 20 July held separate ceremonies to mark 1974 arrival of Turkish soldiers in Cyprus. In “TRNC” ceremony, Turkish Cypriot leader Ersin Tatar reiterated “equal sovereignty and equal international status” must be granted to RoC and “TRNC” as condition for return to formal talks; Turkish President Erdoğan said federation was no longer possible and expressed support for international recognition of “TRNC”. In RoC commemoration, President Christodoulides denounced “barbaric Turkish invasion”, while Greek PM Mitsotakis expressed Greece’s “unwavering support” for unified, bizonal, bicommunal federation. Erdoğan 21 July accused Greece of planning to build naval base in Cyprus, saying Türkiye was ready to construct base and naval structures in north. “TRNC” Foreign Ministry 30 July said U.S. warships that arrived in RoC port of Limassol 27 July served “no purpose other than increasing tensions”, adding it viewed U.S.-RoC military cooperaion as “threat”. Earlier in month, Greek Defence Minister Nikos Dendias 15 July visited capital Nicosia, condemned “illegal presence for half a century of Turkish invasion army”; Turkish defence ministry 17 July called Dendias’ statement “false and slanderous”.

UN Secretary General personal envoy’s mandate expired. Mandate of UN Sec Gen personal envoy María Holguín Cuéllar 5 July ended; in parting letter, Holguín 7 July called for Cypriots to “think differently” to find solution to Cyprus problem. Greek and Cypriot media reports in July speculated Holguín was pursuing efforts to hold three- or five-member summit in Sept.

Anti-Syrian violence erupted across country, inflammatory rhetoric over Cyprus and military manoeuvres in eastern Mediterranean slowed détente with Greece.

Violent anti-Syrian riots erupted. After nationalist mobs late June attacked Syrian-owned shops, homes and vehicles in Kayseri province amid reports of Syrian refugee sexually abusing child, riots early July spread to cities of Şanlıurfa, Hatay, Bursa, Kilis, Konya, Adana, Gaziantep, Izmir, and parts of Istanbul; no casualties reported. Calm returned around 2 July. In response to violence and talks of normalisation between Türkiye and Syria, large-scale anti-Türkiye protests 1 July erupted in Syria’s north west (see Syria). Nevertheless, President Erdoğan 7 July said Ankara will invite Syrian President Assad for talks to “restore Türkiye-Syria relations to the same level as in the past”.

Détente with Greece faced challenges. Erdoğan and Greek PM Mitsotakis 10 July met on sidelines of NATO summit in U.S. capital Washington, D.C., reportedly agreeing that positive momentum in Türkiye-Greece relations should prevail. Inflammatory rhetoric over Cyprus intensified, however, around 50th anniversary of Türkiye’s troop presence (see Cyprus). Tensions heightened in south-eastern Aegean Sea as Türkiye and Greece 22-23 July sent warships to disputed continental shelf after Greece announced exploratory work for future deployment of undersea electric cable in area; intense diplomacy between Ankara and Athens 25 July eased tensions.

Operations continued against Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Islamic State (ISIS). Amid ongoing operations against PKK in south-eastern Türkiye, northern Iraq and Syria, Erdoğan 13 July reiterated plans for major offensive, saying Ankara will soon be “locking down the area of operation in northern Iraq” and will complete “missing links of the security belt” along Syria-Türkiye border (see Iraq, Syria). Meanwhile, authorities in July detained at least 170 individuals on ISIS-linked charges. Notably, police 5 July detained 45 suspects in 16 cities, 25 July detained 72 across 13 provinces including suspected perpetrator of Moscow attack in March 2024. 

In other important developments. Erdoğan 28 July for first time suggested Türkiye could consider using military force against Israel in support of Palestinians, sparking war of words with Israeli officials. Turkish and Armenian special envoys 30 July met at shared border to resume discussions aimed at normalising ties.

State-level Constitutional Court temporarily suspended controversial Republika Srpska (RS) election law, as concerns about RS secession persisted. 

Constitutional Court temporarily suspended RS election law. Self-governing RS entity’s election law, which RS National Assembly adopted on 19 April, 17 July entered into force after RS Constitutional Court 25 June ruled law does not violate vital national interests; Ambassadors of Peace Implementation Council’s Steering Board day prior warned law could establish parallel legal and electoral system that “pose risks to the conduct of the upcoming elections”, and said “the international community retains the necessary instruments” to protect Bosnia and Herzegovina’s (BiH) sovereignty and territorial integrity. State-level Constitutional Court 24 July held extraordinary plenary session where it temporarily suspended election law while it assesses constitutionality concerns.

RS govt circulated proposal for “peaceful separation” from BiH. RS govt 2 July published proposed agreement on entity’s “peaceful separation” from BiH, which RS National Assembly was scheduled to discuss on 9 July, though session was cancelled at last minute. Earlier, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan 1 July said U.S. is “concerned by the increased threats” to BiH’s “territorial integrity from Republika Srpska President Dodik”.

Normalisation efforts with Serbia remained stalled.

Pristina’s and Belgrade’s chief negotiators 2 July held trilateral meeting with EU Special Representative Miroslav Lajčák in effort to resume normalisation talks, but did not reach agreement. PM Kurti 17 July discussed opening bridge across Ibar River, which divides Serb-majority North Mitrovica and Albanian-majority South Mitrovica, during meeting with QUINT (U.S., UK, Germany, France, Italy) and EU ambassadors; Kurti later said bridge could serve as “symbol of normalisation”, facilitating free movement and economic development. Meanwhile, President Osmani 31 July brought together various parliamentary political parties to discuss possible date for elections in early 2025; representatives from neither ruling party nor Serbian List – largest Serb political party in Kosovo – attended. 

Efforts to reinvigorate deadlocked peace talks with Azerbaijan foundered, while tensions along border persisted; relations with West deepened. 

Baku accused Yerevan of provocations at border amid faltering peace talks. U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 10 July facilitated meeting between his Armenian and Azerbaijani counterparts on margins of NATO summit in U.S. capital Washington, D.C.; meeting only lasted 30 minutes, however, and led to no announcements or detailed follow-up statements amid reports of opposition to talks from Baku, which wants to maintain bilateral format established after its victory in Nagorno-Karabakh. One week later, PM Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Aliyev were due to hold UK-facilitated meeting on 18 July, but talks fell apart at last moment. Baku subsequently started accusing Yerevan of “provocations” along border, including 21 July incident using heavy weapons in Kelbajar district and two incidents late July involving quadcopters in Tovuz and Lachin directions; Armenia denied allegations.

Sides remained at odds on peace treaty. Aliyev 20 July claimed 80-90% of draft peace treaty was ready but reiterated that Baku would only sign document if Armenia removes references to Nagorno-Karabakh in its constitution. With Armenia’s state commission expected to table new provisions by end of 2026, senior Azerbaijani official 21 July suggested sides could sign document outlining basic principles of future treaty as interim measure. Although Yerevan has never publicly rejected idea, it has signalled preference for clarifying provisions on more contentious issues before anything is signed, such as opening of road connecting Azerbaijan with its exclave, Nakhchivan. Meanwhile, sides late July reportedly finalised demarcation of small section of border, though concerns persisted about future of demarcation process amid stuttering peace talks and disagreement about what maps to use.

In other important developments. European Council 22 July endorsed talks with Armenia on visa liberalisation and provided Yerevan with €10mn in military assistance within framework of European Peace Facility. Armenia and U.S. 15-24 July held joint military drills. Turkish and Armenian special envoys 30 July met at shared border to resume discussions aimed at normalising ties.

Efforts to reinvigorate deadlocked peace talks with Armenia foundered, while tensions along border persisted; relations with Iran thawed.

Baku accused Yerevan of provocations at border amid faltering peace talks. U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 10 July facilitated meeting between his Armenian and Azerbaijani counterparts on margins of NATO summit in U.S. capital Washington, D.C.; meeting only lasted 30 minutes, however, and led to no announcements or detailed follow-up statements amid reports of opposition to talks from Baku, which wants to maintain bilateral format established after its victory in Nagorno-Karabakh. One week later, President Aliyev and Armenian PM Pashinyan were due to hold UK-facilitated meeting on 18 July but talks fell apart at last moment. Baku subsequently started accusing Yerevan of “provocations” along border, including 21 July incident using heavy weapons in Kelbajar district and two incidents late July involving quadcopters in Tovuz and Lachin directions; Armenia denied allegations.

Sides remained at odds on peace treaty. Aliyev 20 July claimed 80-90% of draft peace treaty was ready but reiterated that Baku would only sign document if Armenia removes references to Nagorno-Karabakh in its constitution. With Armenia’s state commission expected to table new provisions by end of 2026, senior Azerbaijani official 21 July suggested sides could sign document outlining basic principles of future treaty as interim measure. Although Yerevan has never publicly rejected idea, it has signalled preference for clarifying provisions on more contentious issues before anything is signed, such as opening of road connecting Azerbaijan with its exclave, Nakhchivan. Meanwhile, sides late July reportedly finalised demarcation of small section of border, though concerns persisted about future of demarcation process amid stuttering peace talks and disagreement about what maps to use.

In other important developments. Preparations for Sept parliamentary elections continued; in absence of free media and strong opposition, coupled with Aliyev’s popularity following victory in Nagorno-Karabakh, elections likely to deliver ruling party decisive victory. Azerbaijan 6 July hosted summit of Organization of Turkic States, focused on deepening cooperation in defence, energy and transportation between Turkic nations. Azerbaijani Embassy 15 July resumed operations in Iran as rapprochement gained momentum. 

Array of actors filed motions against contentious Foreign Influence law with Constitutional Court, relations between West and ruling party cooled, and electoral campaign kicked off.

Constitutional Court received legal challenges to Foreign Influence law. President Zourabichvili 15 July filed lawsuit in Constitutional Court against Foreign Influence law, which requires NGOs and media outlets that receive foreign funding to register with govt or face fines. 121 civil society and media organisations, over 30 opposition lawmakers, and largest opposition party United National Movement 17, 22 and 29 July respectively submitted similar appeals to Georgia’s top court, emphasising law’s incompatibility with constitution, which mandates constitutional bodies “take all measures […] to ensure the full integration of Georgia” into EU and NATO.

West imposed more punitive measures on ruling party due to Foreign Influence law. Notably, Head of EU Delegation to Georgia, Paweł Herczyński, 9 July announced EU had decided to freeze €30mn of military assistance and halt Georgia’s EU accession process; U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 31 July announced it was pausing over $95mn in assistance “that directly benefits the Government of Georgia”. Meanwhile, U.S. 5 July postponed annual Noble Partner military exercise, and for first time since 2008, declaration at 9-11 July NATO summit omitted traditional clause regarding Georgia’s membership, suggesting possible end to country’s decades-long security and defence cooperation with West.

Electoral campaign kicked off. As Oct parliamentary elections drew closer, fragmented opposition parties began forming coalitions, while Zourabichvili 11 July inaugurated civil society movement, dubbed Vote for Europe, to mobilise pro-EU voters. Georgian Dream’s founder, Bidzina Ivanishvili, 16 July launched ruling party’s campaign. Meanwhile, State Security Service 24 July announced investigation into alleged “plot” to assassinate Ivanishvili and overthrow govt involving “former high-ranking officials and former employees of law enforcement agencies in Ukraine”.

Putin reiterated maximalist demands for ceasefire in Ukraine as strikes into Russia persisted; courts handed down tough prison sentences to journalists as crackdown continued.

Putin reiterated conditions for holding ceasefire talks with Ukraine. President Putin 4 July said ceasefire talks with Ukraine would be “impossible” without “irreversible” agreement on latter’s demilitarisation. Hungarian PM Orbán next day held talks with Putin in capital Moscow on “ways to achieve peace”, having earlier visited President Zelenskyy in Ukrainian capital Kyiv (see Ukraine); Orbán admitted that sides’ “positions are very far apart” but promised to continue peacemaking efforts. In two letters sent 12 July to EU Council President Charles Michel but partially leaked to media, Orbán suggested EU leaders launch peace initiative without U.S. involvement and proposed dialogue with China about future peace conference. 

Ukraine continued to launch drones and artillery into Russia. Notably, attack in southern Krasnodar region 5 July hit power substation and apartment building, killing one; drones 20 July struck military airfield in Rostov region, while on 27 July Ukraine targeted three airfields in Saratov, Ryazan and Murmansk regions, including oil refinery in Ryazan. Drones 22-23 July also struck ferry in southern Port Kavkaz, killing one. Meanwhile, Belgorod region 23 July began restricting access to 14 settlements and installed checkpoints in effort to protect civilians from shelling.

Crackdown on dissent continued. Notably, court 8 July jailed playwright Svetlana Petrichuk and theatre director Yevgenia Berkovich for six years for “justifying terrorism” in play. Court 19 July convicted Wall Street Journal reporter Evan Gershkovich to 16 years in maximum penal colony for “espionage”. Kazan city court same day sentenced journalist Alsu Kurmasheva to over six years in prison for spreading disinformation about army. 

In important international developments. Washington and Berlin 10 July agreed to deploy long-range missiles to Germany from 2026; Putin 28 July warned that, in response, Russia would consider itself “free from our unilateral moratorium on deploying intermediate- and shorter-range strike weapons”. Russian and Chinese bomber aircrafts 24 July staged joint patrol over north Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea, coming within about 320km of U.S. coast. 

President Lukashenko released 19 political prisoners, Belarussian troops withdrew from Ukrainian border, and Minsk boosted ties with Beijing. 

Lukashenko signed amnesty law on prisoners’ release. President Lukashenko 2 July signed amnesty law allowing release of prisoners with serious health issues; as of 31 July, 19 political prisoners had been released. EU 4 July said it was “relieved” by the news, while calling for “unconditional release” of over 1,400 others still in prison. 

Troops withdrew from border with Ukraine. After Defence Ministry late June announced it was bolstering troops at border with Ukraine in response to stepped-up Ukrainian presence there, President Lukashenko 13 July announced tensions had subsided and that Belarussian troops were withdrawing.

Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) admitted Belarus as new member. SCO – Eurasian regional security organisation – 4 July admitted Belarus as its 10th member during 3-4 July summit in Kazakh capital, Astana; Lukashenko lauded “historic” move and declared need to “destroy the unipolar world”. China and Belarus 8-19 July conducted joint military exercises near city of Brest. 

Fighting raged in eastern Donetsk region as Russian forces targeted Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk towns, deadly airstrikes killed dozens of civilians across Ukraine, and NATO allies shored up military support. 

Russian offensive in east continued, while northern frontline stabilised. Eastern Donetsk region saw fierce fighting, with Kyiv 4 July announcing troop withdrawals from Kanal district of Chasiv Yar as Russia pummelled strategically important town. Russian troops also pushed toward Pokrovsk town, a key logistics hub, while heavy fighting continued around Toretsk city. In southern Kherson region, officials 17 July announced troops had abandoned vulnerable bridgehead at Krynky village on eastern bank of Dnipro River. Meanwhile, President Zelenskyy 18 July announced that Russia’s diversionary offensive in north east Kharkiv region had “failed” as frontline stabilised, though fighting persisted.

Russia continued strikes across Ukraine and pulled its Black Sea fleet from Crimea. Moscow continued striking critical infrastructure, killing civilians across Ukraine and causing rolling blackouts. Notably, Russia 8 July launched massive aerial attack, killing at least 37 and striking children’s hospital in capital Kyiv; authorities 31 July said Russia earlier had launched most extensive drone attack on capital in 2024. Meanwhile, Ukrainian Navy 15 July announced Moscow had relocated its last remaining Black Sea Fleet patrol ship from Russian-annexed Crimea following Kyiv’s concerted military campaign there.

NATO allies drummed up support for Ukraine, Hungarian PM visited Kyiv. NATO summit propelled Zelenskyy back onto world stage as alliance 10 July declared Ukraine was on “irreversible path” to membership, pledged $43bn additional military aid and opened new coordination centre to provide more reliable flow of assistance. Kyiv 31 July received first batch of long-awaited F-16 fighter jets. Meanwhile, Hungarian PM Orbán, EU’s biggest sceptic of military aid to Ukraine, 2 July travelled to Kyiv for first time since full-scale invasion, calling for ceasefire during talks with Zelenskyy; Orbán also made surprise visits to Moscow and Beijing in proclaimed “peace mission” (see Russia). 

In another important development. FM Kuleba 23-25 July visited China to press for “ways to stop Russian aggression”, 24 July said Kyiv was open to talks but saw no readiness from Moscow to negotiate in good faith.

UN Secretary General António Guterres expressed optimism about future Kyrgyz-Tajik border deal, and President Japarov attended various regional summits.  

UN secretary general expressed hope for Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan border deal. UN Sec Gen Guterres 2 July met with President Japarov in Cholpon Ata city as part of regional tour. Pair discussed progress on sustainable development goals and regional peace and security issues. Guterres praised Bishkek’s border delimitation deal with Uzbekistan in 2023 and expressed confidence in resolution of border issue with Tajikistan through diplomatic means. 

In important international developments. President Japarov 3-4 July attended two-day summit of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) – Eurasian regional security organisation – in Kazakh capital, Astana, which saw Belarus’ admittance into bloc; members also signed flurry of documents, including declaration lauding emergence of “fairer and multipolar world order”. Days later, Japarov 6 July attended summit of Organization of Turkic States in Azerbaijan’s Shusha city, which focused on deepening cooperation in defence, economy, energy and transportation between Turkic nations.

UN Secretary General António Guterres expressed optimism about future Tajik-Kyrgyz border deal, as Bishkek deepened ties with Beijing.

UN secretary general expressed hope for Tajikistan-Kyrgyzstan border deal. UN Sec Gen Guterres 2 July met with Kyrgyz President Japarov in Cholpon Ata city as part of regional tour (see Kyrgyzstan). Guterres praised Bishkek’s border delimitation deal with Uzbekistan in 2023 and expressed confidence in resolution of Tajik-Kyrgyz border issue through peaceful, diplomatic means. 

In important international developments. President Rahmon 3-4 July attended two-day summit of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) – Eurasian regional security organisation – in Kazakh capital, Astana, which saw Belarus’ admittance into bloc; members also signed flurry of documents, including declaration lauding emergence of “fairer and multipolar world order”. Following summit, Chinese President Xi Jinping 5-6 July visited capital Dushanbe, during which he announced boost in China-Tajikistan ties to comprehensive strategic partnership.

President Mirziyoyev attended various regional summits. 

President Mirziyoyev 3-4 July attended two-day summit of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) – Eurasian regional security organisation – in Kazakh capital, Astana, which saw Belarus’ admittance into bloc; members also signed flurry of documents, including declaration lauding emergence of “fairer and multipolar world order”. Days later, Mirziyoyev 6 July attended summit of Organization of Turkic States in Azerbaijan’s Shusha city, which focused on deepening cooperation in defence, economy, energy and transportation between Turkic nations.

Deadly Golan Heights rocket strike blamed on Hizbollah and assassination of Hamas political leader in Tehran risked further escalation; Israel continued assault on Gaza Strip and approved largest land seizure in West Bank since Oslo accords.

Deadly strike on Beirut and assassination of Hamas leader in Tehran risk igniting wider conflict. Rocket strike 27 July killed 12, including children, and injured over 40 in Israeli-occupied Golan Heights village of Majdal Shams. Israel and U.S. blamed attack on Hizbollah, which denied responsibility. In response, Israeli air raid 30 July killed top Hizbollah commander Fuad Shukr and five civilians in Lebanese capital Beirut, while injuring at least 74 others; Hizbollah vowed retaliation. Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh killed 31 July in Iranian capital Tehran. Hamas and Iran blamed operation on Israel as Hamas said killing would “take the battle to new dimensions” and Iran vowed “harsh punishment”. Qatar same day questioned potential for ceasefire negotiations – which had stalled earlier in month – following assassination. Earlier in month, Yemeni Houthi drone 19 July killed one and injured at least ten in Tel Aviv; in response, Israel next day struck Yemeni port of Hodeida, killing nine and injuring 87 (see Iran, Lebanon, Yemen).

Israel conducted major operations in Gaza. Israel continued aerial bombardment and major assaults on Khan Younis, Rafah and Gaza City. Notably, Israeli attack on humanitarian safe zone al-Masawi 13 July reportedly killed up to 100; week-long incursion into Khan Younis 22-30 July reportedly killed at least 255 and injured over 300. Operations in July killed over 1,500 Palestinians, bringing death toll since 7 Oct to over 39,400; medical journal The Lancet 5 July found total Gaza death toll (including deaths due to lack of food, healthcare and sanitation systems) could exceed 186,000. UNRWA head 28 July said only 14% of Gaza’s territory was not under Israeli evacuation orders.

Israel approved largest land seizure in West Bank in decades. Israeli NGO Peace Now 3 July reported Israel late June approved seizure of 12.7 square km in Jordan Valley, marking largest land annexation since 1993 Oslo accords. Meanwhile, settler violence, raids and airstrikes continued in West Bank, killing at least 37 Palestinians and bringing death toll since 7 Oct to at least 576. 

Risk of all-out war with Israel rose sharply after rocket strike killed a dozen youths in Golan Heights and Israel’s military killed top Hizbollah commander in retaliation; double executive vacuum and economic crisis persisted.

Hizbollah and Israel expanded range of cross-border strikes. Rocket strike 27 July killed 12, including children, in Israeli-occupied Golan Heights village of Majdal Shams. Israel and U.S. immediately blamed Hizbollah for attack, while Hizbollah denied responsibility. Israeli PM Netanyahu same day warned that Hizbollah would “pay a heavy price”, while U.S. diplomats reportedly urged Tel Aviv to exercise restraint to avoid full-blown conflict. Israeli air raid 30 July killed top Hizbollah commander Fuad Shukr and five civilians in Lebanese capital Beirut, while injuring at least 74 others; Hizbollah could retaliate severely, especially in light of Hamas political head Ismail Haniyeh’s assassination in Iran hours later (see Israel/Palestine). Earlier in July, Israel continued lethal aerial bombing campaigns across southern Lebanon, striking near cities of Saida and Tyre in south and Baalbek in east, while Hizbollah upheld trend of retaliating severely. Notably, Israeli drone strike 3 July killed Hizbollah commander Mohammed Naame Nasser near Tyre; Hizbollah 3-4 July responded by launching around 300 rockets into northern Israel. Hizbollah Sec Gen Hassan Nasrallah 17 July said cross-border attacks would hit new places in Israel after Israeli strikes 15-16 July killed eight civilians in Lebanon, including three children. Hizbollah 20 July for first time launched rockets at Israeli kibbutz Dafna in retaliation of same-day Israeli drone strike that injured civilians in Burj al-Muluk village. 

Political deadlock and economic crisis persisted. Double executive vacuum with no president and only caretaker govt persisted as leaders made no serious efforts to end political deadlock. Economic crisis continued without progress on International Monetary Fund’s conditions to unlock financial rescue package. Central Bank governor Wassim Mansouri early July travelled to U.S. capital Washington, D.C. to lobby U.S. officials not to place Lebanon on Financial Action Task Force’s “grey list” of countries insufficiently committed to combating money laundering and terrorism financing; final decision expected in Oct. 

Anti-Türkiye protests turned deadly in north west, where demonstrations against Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) continued; Iran-backed groups resumed attacks on U.S. bases.

In north west, anti-Türkiye protests turned deadly and protests against HTS continued. Following late-June attacks on Syrians in Türkiye, large-scale anti-Türkiye protests 1 July erupted in north west, with protesters removing Turkish flags and attacking Turkish military vehicles, bases, and checkpoints; Turkish forces killed seven protesters in Afrin city and one in Jarabulus city, both in Aleppo province. Amid widespread internet and communications’ service disruptions, Türkiye closed border for several days as military police of Türkiye-aligned Syrian Interim Govt 3 July launched arrest campaign (see Türkiye). Meanwhile, protests demanding resignation of HTS leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani and prison reform continued in Idlib and Aleppo provinces; notably, clashes 5 July erupted in Binnish town as HTS cracked down on protesters after they allegedly injured police officer. Protest movement, local community leaders and HTS-dominated Salvation Govt 17 July reached agreement to release some detainees and suspend protests in Binnish for three months; protests continued elsewhere.

Iran-backed groups and U.S. carried out tit-for-tat strikes. Iranian-backed groups 25-26 July fired missiles toward U.S. base at Conoco gas field, prompting U.S. to strike locations of Iranian-backed groups east of Deir ez-Zor city with heavy artillery shells. Meanwhile, Israel continued strikes, notably killing govt-affiliated business tycoon and militia leader Baraa al-Qaterji and his driver on Damascus-Beirut highway 15 July.

ISIS attacks persisted. U.S. Central Command 17 July noted uptick in Islamic State (ISIS) attacks in Syria and Iraq as part of group’s attempt to “reconstitute” capabilities. Notably, ISIS 3 July killed two shepherds and six govt forces searching for them in Raqqa province.

In other important developments. Clashes between local group Thuwar Kanaker and govt forces 2 July erupted in Kanaker town, Rif Dimashq province after latter arrested former commander of al-Furqan Brigades; govt forces same day shelled town, killing five civilians; parties next day reached ceasefire. Kurdish authorities in north east 17 July granted general amnesty to people “whose hands are not stained with blood of Syrians”, leading to release of hundreds of prisoners. Türkiye continued attacks on Kurdish militants (see Türkiye). 

Supreme Leader threatened retaliation against Israel after Hamas political leader killed in Tehran, as confrontations between Iran-aligned groups and Israel/U.S. rose; reformist Masoud Pezeshkian took office as new president.

Tehran vowed revenge against Israel after killing of Hamas leader. Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh killed 31 July in capital Tehran, reportedly prompting rare emergency meeting of influential Supreme National Security Council. Iran immediately blamed operation on Israel. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei same day vowed “severe punishment”, said it was Tehran’s “duty” to avenge Haniyeh’s death as it had occurred on Iranian soil, fuelling fears of Iranian-led Axis of Resistance coalition-wide retaliation – loosely or closely coordinated – against Israel/U.S. in coming days and weeks. 

Axis of Resistance launched strikes at Israeli, U.S. targets. Yemeni Houthis throughout month conducted regular drone and missile strikes against vessels in Red Sea, and 19 July struck Israel’s city Tel Aviv with drone, killing one; Israel next day retaliated with strike against Hodeida port. Amid daily cross-border exchanges between Israel and Hizbollah, including 27 July rocket strike on Israeli-occupied Golan Heights and 30 July Israeli air raid killing top Hizbollah commander, Iran repeatedly pledged support for Hizbollah in case of full-blown conflict. Series of drone and rocket attacks against bases hosting U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria in second half of July broke months-long lull in targeting of U.S. facilities there; Israel in July also intercepted multiple drones seemingly launched from Iraq (see Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen).

Iran elected first reformist president in two decades. After second round of presidential election held 5 July, reformist candidate Masoud Pezeshkian secured presidency with 53.6% of vote and was inaugurated 30 July. Pezeshkian’s campaign emphasised political cohesion, less restrictive social and cultural policies, enhanced economic management and improved relations with West; hardline conservatives will likely push back on his ambitions to change status quo, however.

U.S. imposed more sanctions on Iran-linked entities and individuals. U.S. 12 July designated one Iranian entity for involvement in proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; 18 July sanctioned two individuals and five entities for being associated with Houthi financing networks; and 30 July sanctioned five individuals and seven entities for facilitating Iran’s missile and drones program. 

Iran-backed groups targeted U.S. troops with drones and rockets after months-long hiatus, and Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) leader raised hopes of improved Erbil-Baghdad relationship.

Iran-backed groups, U.S. resumed tit-for-tat strikes. In first attack since March, armed drones by suspected Iran-backed groups 16 July targeted Ain al-Asad airbase housing U.S. troops in Anbar governorate; rockets 25 July again targeted base, with no U.S. casualties reported. In first known airstrike since Feb, U.S. 30 July targeted Hashd al-Shaabi base used by Iran-aligned militias in Babil governorate, killing four; Iraqi military next day denounced strike as “heinous crime” and violation of U.S.-led coalition’s mandate. Meanwhile, Tehran-aligned Islamic Resistance in Iraq 15 July reportedly carried out joint operation with Yemeni Houthis against ship in Mediterranean, and 19, 21 July claimed unconfirmed strikes on Israeli cities Haifa and Eilat.

Islamic State (ISIS) continued attacks, U.S. and Iraq discussed troop drawdown. Clashes between govt forces and ISIS 13 July killed four police officers in Khan Bani Saad town, Diyala governorate; U.S. Central Command 17 July noted uptick in ISIS attack in Iraq and Syria as part of group’s efforts to “reconstitute” capabilities. Iraqi and U.S. officials 22-23 July held second round of Joint Security Cooperation Dialogue to discuss transition from U.S.-led Global Coalition against Islamic State (ISIS) to bilateral security relationship. 

KDP submitted candidates for local elections and KDP leader visited Baghdad. Following latest of several extensions of registration deadline for candidates, KDP 18 July said it had submitted candidate list, removing last hurdles for Kurdistan legislative elections in Oct. Meanwhile, KDP leader Masoud Barzani 3 July visited capital Baghdad for first time in six years, said talks with PM al-Sudani represented “real breakthrough” in relations.

Türkiye operations against Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) continued in north. Turkish President Erdoğan 13 July claimed ground operation Claw-Lock against PKK in north would end “very soon”, hailing it as success. Meanwhile, clashes between PKK and Turkish forces early July reportedly caused evacuation of seven villages in Duhok governorate. Türkiye also continued anti-PKK strikes. Notably, Turkish Defence Ministry 30 July announced “neutralising” 13 PKK members in Gara and Haftanin regions.

Islamic State claimed killing several Shia worshippers in unprecedented attack in sultanate.

Gunmen 15 July carried out shooting in Shia mosque in capital Muscat’s Wadi al-Kabir neighbourhood, killing at least six people including police officer, injuring nearly 30 and briefly holding others hostage. Police shot all three assailants dead. Islamic State (ISIS) claimed responsibility, marking group’s first-ever attack in normally calm Gulf Arab state where significant Sunni, Shia, and Ebadi Muslim communities reside. 

Riyadh facilitated de-escalation of banking dispute between Yemeni govt and Houthis after latter threatened to renew cross-border attacks; Crown Prince congratulated Iran’s new president.

Houthis threatened to resume cross-border attacks over banking restrictions. Houthis around 7 July accused Saudi Arabia of being behind Yemeni govt’s newly-imposed ban on commercial banks in Houthi-controlled areas, threatening to resume cross-border attacks if they were not overturned (see Yemen); Riyadh reportedly facilitated 22 July agreement between Yemeni govt and Houthis to lift tit-for-tat banking restrictions.

Riyadh indicated willingness to strengthen relations with new Iranian govt. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman 6 July congratulated reformist Masoud Pezeshkian on election as Iran’s president and affirmed “keenness on developing and deepening the relations” between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Regional tensions remained elevated as Israel launched retaliatory airstrikes on Hodeida port after Houthi drone killed Israeli in Tel Aviv; govt and Houthis agreed on de-escalatory measures.

Israel struck oil and energy infrastructure in Hodeida after Houthi drone targeted Tel Aviv. Houthi drone 19 July struck Israeli city Tel Aviv, killing one Israeli and injuring at least ten. In response, Israeli airstrikes next day struck oil and energy infrastructure in Hodeida port, killing nine and injuring 87. UN Sec Gen Guterres 21 July warned of further regional escalation, calling for “utmost restraint” while Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi same day threatened “more attacks targeting Israel” (see Israel-Palestine, Iran). Meanwhile, Houthis in July stepped up attacks on shipping in Red, Arabian and Mediterranean seas, and Indian Ocean; notably, Houthis 1 July claimed four operations against U.S., UK, and Israeli ships; 15 July claimed attacks targeting three ships in Red Sea and Mediterranean.

Govt and Houthis agreed to de-escalate tit-for-tat banking restrictions. Govt-controlled Central Bank 7 July revoked licenses of six commercial banks for failing to relocate offices from Houthi-controlled capital Sana’a to Aden. Houthis around same day accused Saudi Arabia of being behind govt-imposed banking restrictions, threatening to resume cross-border attacks if they were not overturned (see Saudi Arabia). Govt and Houthis 22 July informed UN envoy Hans Grundberg that they had agreed to lift tit-for-tat banking restrictions and expand national airline Yemenia flights. 

Parties made progress on prisoners’ swap and UN renewed monitoring mission. Govt and Houthi representatives 6 July attended meeting of Supervisory Committee on the Implementation of the Detainees’ Agreement in Omani capital Muscat and reached “breakthrough” preliminary agreement on release of govt-aligned political leader Mohamed Qahtan, who has been detained by Houthis since 2015. UN Security Council 8 July extended mandate of UN Mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNHMA) until 14 July 2025; mission plays vital role in monitoring Hodeida port and implementation of Houthi-govt ceasefire and could potentially facilitate de-escalation in Red Sea.

Humanitarian situation continued deteriorating. World Food Programme 1 July said “severe food deprivation” had reached unprecedented levels in both northern and southern Yemen since May. 

Govt faced criticism from senior military figures about widespread insecurity and repression; diplomatic tensions heightened with Benin and Côte d’Ivoire.

Discord within military persisted over govt’s failure to address insecurity and shrinking space for dissent. Former President Lt. Col. Damiba 1 July sent letter to President Capt. Traoré raising alarm about challenges facing country, said “all-military strategy” had failed, and denounced violations of “elementary civil rights” amid ongoing repression and insecurity. Reports of internal discord within security forces continued; notably, gunmen 13 July abducted two senior military officers, including Damiba ally Lt. Col. Bamouni. Space for critics continued to be curtailed. Notably, at least four renowned journalists went missing from mid-June to late July, including unidentified armed men 13 July abducting radio journalist Alain Traoré. Govt 13-18 July also passed series of restrictive legislation criminalising homosexuality, allowing state to strip someone of nationality if they “act against the interests of the country” and permitting govt to take up to 15% stake in new mining projects.  

Insecurity continued across country. Al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) throughout month clashed with govt forces and military auxiliaries, with civilian fatalities recorded; notably, JNIM militants 12 July attacked Nagrabondi village (East region), reportedly killing 20 civilians. Thousands 17 and 20 July gathered in Bogande town (East) and Djibo city (Sahel region), respectively, to denounce govt’s inability to tackle deteriorating security situation.

Govt criticised Benin and Côte d’Ivoire, Alliance of Sahel States (AES) held summit. During 11 July speech which addressed security situation, diplomatic relations and plans for next five years, Traoré accused Benin and Côte d’Ivoire of hosting French military to train jihadist fighters; both immediately denied allegations and Benin 16 July summoned Burkinabé ambassador. Concurrently, Côte d’Ivoire 16 July expelled over 150 newly arrived Burkinabé refugees near shared border, heightening bilateral tensions. Meanwhile, AES – bringing Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger together – 6 July held summit in Niger’s capital Niamey to discuss joint military operations and reaffirmed decision to leave West African regional body ECOWAS (see Mali, Niger). 

Govt and Russian paramilitary forces suffered significant losses against separatists in north; crackdown on critics continued amid easing of restrictions on political party activities. 

Dozens of Russian forces reportedly killed in Kidal region, violence in centre continued. Govt with support from Russian paramilitary group Africa Corps (formerly Wagner Group) 22 July recaptured Inafarak town (Kidal) near Algerian border from separatist Permanent Strategic Framework (CSP) armed group coalition; troops pushed on to Tinzaouaten town but suffered heavy defeat in fighting 25-28 July; unconfirmed reports suggested dozens of Russian paramilitaries killed including local commander in perhaps deadliest incident to date for Russian forces in Mali. Meanwhile, local sources and civil society groups 5 July reported discovering mass graves containing dozens of civilian bodies near Abeibara village (Kidal) after military operations in late June. Also in north, Islamic State Sahel Province 1 July allegedly killed Ismaguil Ag Arahmat, pro-Bamako military leader of Movement for the Salvation of Azawad, in Gao town (Gao region). In Mopti region (centre), al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) fighters 1 July killed at least 21 civilians at wedding in Djiguibombo village; 21 July allegedly attacked Dembo village, killing 25 civilians. 

Repression continued as govt lifted three-month ban on political party activities. Court 8 July sentenced PM Maïga’s close aide, Boubacar Karamoko Traoré, to one-year imprisonment for “undermining the credibility of the state” for letter that criticised govt. Authorities 12 July arrested Youssouf Daba Diawara, associate of govt critic in exile Imam Mahmoud Dicko, and 15 July charged him with “opposition to legitimate authority”. Meanwhile, authorities 10 July re-authorised political party activities which had been suspended in April, same day invited parties to resume national dialogue; several party leaders 15 July said they would boycott consultations while their political partners remained in detention. 

Sahelian states reiterated break from ECOWAS. Alliance of Sahel States (AES) – bringing Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger together – 6 July held summit in Niger’s capital Niamey, to discuss joint military operations and reaffirmed decision to leave West African regional body ECOWAS (see Burkina Faso, Niger); President Col. Goïta named inaugural leader of rotating presidency of AES heads of states.

Efforts to repair diplomatic ties with Benin made progress as neighbours agreed to establish joint committee which may lead to wider agreement in August; detainees broke out of major prison housing jihadists. 

Diplomatic efforts progressed in Benin-Niger dispute. Following mediation initiative by two former Beninese presidents, including late June visit to capital Niamey, Beninese President Talon 1 July issued communiqué emphasising commitment to “swift restoration of dialogue” with Niger. Nigerien authorities next day proposed formation of joint committee to resolve differences. Interior Minister Gen. Mohamed Toumba 24-25 July visited Benin’s Cotonou city to meet Talon, as both sides reported positive meetings and progress. Talks could pave way to restoring ties, reopening border, and resuming oil exports through joint pipeline. Meanwhile, unidentified armed group 13 July attacked Niger-Benin pipeline near Muntseka village, Tahoua region (west), copying tactics employed by pro-deposed President Bazoum armed group Patriotic Liberation Front in June.

Violence in west and south west continued. In Tillabery (south west), military 4 July claimed to have killed “more than 100 terrorists” in response to June attack on Tassia village. Unconfirmed number of detainees 11 July escaped from Koutoukalé high-security prison in Tillabery, where dozens of jihadist fighters are detained; authorities 15 July said large number of escapees caught and three killed during search operations. Suspected al-Qaeda linked militants 21 July reportedly ambushed military near Tankadémi area in Tahoua; details and casualties remained unclear. 

Govt continued geopolitical realignment, including away from Western military support. Authorities withdrew permit of Canadian company GoviEx to exploit uranium deposit at Madaouela mine, Agadez region, after firm failed to meet 3 July deadline to begin extraction. Germany 6 July announced withdrawal of all 38 troops by 31 Aug, while U.S. forces next day completed troop withdrawal from base in Niamey, with its remaining forces in Agadez to leave by 15 Sept. Meanwhile, Alliance of Sahel States (AES) – bringing Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger together – 6 July held summit in Niamey to discuss joint military operations and reaffirmed decision to leave West African regional body ECOWAS; ECOWAS next day held meeting in Nigeria and designated Presidents Faye of Senegal and Gnassingbé of Togo as mediators with AES (see Burkina Faso, Mali).

Efforts to sideline opposition ahead of 2025 legislative elections continued amid further attacks on journalists, while economic situation remained dire. 

Opposition parties faced increased harassment. Local rights groups reported ruling-party youth wing Imbonerakure 2 July killed National Congress for Freedom (CNL) opposition party member in Isare commune and 4 July arrested and beat four people, including local CNL head, in Rubirizi area (both Bujumbura Rural province). Imbonerakure also blamed for harassment of other opposition parties including 7 July disruption to Patriots’ Council party meeting in Vugizo commune (Makamba province) and 6-7 July damage to Sahwanya-Frodebu party premises in Mitakataka area (Bubanza province). Unknown assailants 7 July kidnapped Sahwanya-Frodebu youth leader in Rumonge town (Rumonge province). 

Media freedom came under renewed attack. Imbonerakure 6 July attacked two journalists in Rumonge reporting on youth wing’s violence against suspected thief; police 13 July briefly detained another journalist in Bweru commune (Ruyigi province). Rights organisations at UN Human Rights Council meeting 4 July expressed concern over increasing threats ahead of 2025 elections including “hostile” environment for journalists and “harassment, intimidation, and reprisals against civil society actors”; UN rapporteur on human rights in Burundi, Fortuné Gaetan Zongo, same day said Imbonerakure have “free rein to terrorise the population, carry out arbitrary arrests, forcibly disappear people”.

Cross-border dynamics continued to strain perilous economic situation. FM Shingiro 1 July stated border with Rwanda will remain closed until Kigali extradites those responsible for 2015 coup attempt, heightening concerns among locals about worsening economic hardship. In response to severe fuel shortages in Burundi, authorities in Uvira city in neighbouring DR Congo 11 July lifted restrictions on trade of fuel trade via Rusizi River. 

Amid insecurity and tensions over conflict with M23 rebels, Kinshasa and Kigali agreed to ceasefire, raising hopes for greater calm in east in coming weeks. 

Rwandan and Congolese FMs signed ceasefire over situation in eastern DRC. Congolese FM Wagner and Rwandan counterpart Nduhungirehe 30 July agreed to ceasefire between “parties to conflict in east” during high-level meeting in Angolan-capital Luanda; ceasefire due to start on 4 Aug. While EU, UN and U.S. welcomed deal, which offers chance to halt fighting, much remained unclear about agreement including position of Rwandan-backed M23 who were not signatories to accord. Earlier, Washington 4 July brokered two-week humanitarian truce between govt and M23, 17 July announced extension until 3 Aug; sporadic fighting between M23 and pro-govt Wazalendo militias, however, continued in Masisi and Lubero territories. 

Authorities wrestled with political, security ramifications of M23 crisis. Recent M23/Rwandan northwards advance fuelled fears of social and ethnic tensions in North Kivu province after local youth 30 June killed two NGO staff in Lubero territory, identified as speakers of Kinyarwanda language dominant in Rwanda. Military tribunal in Butembo city 8 July sentenced 22 soldiers to death for fleeing during Kanyabayonga town’s fall to M23 in June. Military court in capital Kinshasa 24 July opened trial against Corneille Nangaa, head of pro-M23 politico-military group Congo River Alliance (AFC), and 24 others for “high treason”. Meanwhile, authorities 23 July arrested Jean-Bosco Bahala, govt disarmament program coordinator, after he led delegation that reportedly met M23 and AFC members in Uganda previous day. 

Other armed groups remained prominent. In Ituri in east, ethnic Lendu militia CODECO 13 July clashed with rival “Zaire” group in Djugu territory, leaving 26 dead. In North Kivu, Islamic State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces militants 16-18 July attacked Babila-Bakaiko locality, Beni territory, killing at least 37 civilians. In western Mai-Ndombe province near capital Kinshasa, intercommunal violence 13-14 July caused at least 72 deaths in Kinsele village. 

In important international developments. UN Security Council 8 July discussed situation in east amid high DRC-Rwanda tensions (see Rwanda). Meanwhile, UN and Kinshasa mid-July indicated UN mission MONUSCO would slow withdrawal from North Kivu and Ituri provinces given insecurity. 

Kinshasa and Kigali agreed to ceasefire under Angolan mediation, raising hopes for greater calm in eastern DR Congo (DRC) in coming weeks; President Kagame re-elected.

Rwandan and Congolese FMs signed ceasefire over situation in eastern DRC. Congolese FM Wagner and Rwandan counterpart Nduhungirehe 30 July agreed to ceasefire between “parties to conflict in east” during high-level meeting in Angolan-capital Luanda; ceasefire due to start on 4 Aug. While EU, UN and U.S. welcomed deal, which offers chance to halt fighting, much remained unclear about agreement including position of Rwandan-backed M23 who were not signatories to accord. Earlier, international involvement in crisis saw continued polarisation; during UN Security Council 8 July meeting on situation in DRC’s North Kivu province (see DRC), some, including France and U.S., openly criticised Rwanda for its role but others, including UK, avoided direct blame; Congolese representative called for sanctions on Kigali and withdrawal of Rwandan peacekeepers from UN missions, while Rwandan representative alleged Kinshasa’s persecution of Tutsis.

Rwanda vowed to defend against threats from DRC. Without confirming or denying presence of 3,000-4,000 Rwandan soldiers on Congolese soil reported in UN report made public early July, govt spokesperson Yolande Makolo 8 July argued Rwanda “will continue to defend itself”; Makolo also accused Congolese President Tshisekedi of publicly declaring Rwanda and Kagame as enemies and seeking to support Rwandans to oppose govt in Kigali; spokesperson cited UN report’s allegations that DRC army is collaborating with anti-Rwandan forces near Rwandan border including Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda militia, saying govt “takes these threats very seriously”.

President won fourth term in presidential poll. Following 15 July general elections, final results 23 July confirmed incumbent Kagame’s re-election with 99.18% of vote; ruling Rwandan Patriotic Front coalition party, however, saw slightly reduced representation in parliament, as it won 37 of 53 legislative seats, down from 40.

Despite series of arrests of officials for financial misconduct, protesters took to street to denounce corruption among lawmakers; military denied support toward M23 rebel group in DR Congo. 

Anti-corruption demonstrations erupted despite govt’s moves against graft. Authorities 18 July arrested Trade Ministry official Geraldine Ssali over allegations of financial mismanagement and of conspiring with MPs to steal compensation funds; various local officials also arrested during month. Eager to appear uncompromising, President Museveni 11 July requested courts deny bail to corrupt officials. Public remained largely unimpressed, however, and civil society activists 23 July marched to parliament in capital Kampala to denounce corruption among lawmakers, defying ban on protest. Police reportedly arrested three organisers and dozens of protesters. Protests 25 July resumed in Kampala; police next day said they had arrested 104 demonstrators during week, charging 100 with public order offences as U.S. urged govt to investigate allegations that some detainees had been assaulted. Meanwhile, court 29 July charged 36 opposition supporters with terrorism-related offences after they were detained when attending training course in Kenya; opposition activists alleged detainees physically abused.

Govt’s alleged support for M23 rebels in DR Congo continued to stir uproar. After UN report made public early July alleged Kampala’s support for M23 rebel group in DR Congo, military 10 July called claim “laughable” and “baseless”; however Congolese govt 19 July summoned Uganda’s chargé d’affaires over issue, while M23 5 July confirmed presence of some M23 commanders and representatives in Uganda, but denied they were using country as base. Meanwhile, Kampala 22 July reportedly hosted meeting between M23 and coordinator of Congolese govt disarmament program (see DR Congo).

In important international developments. Ugandan army 2 July handed over Bariire base to Somali army as part of AU mission drawdown but Ugandan troops remained target of Al-Shabaab as roadside bomb 8 July killed officer and wounded six others in Somalia’s Lower Shabelle region. 

Asmara banned Ethiopia Airlines and expelled Sudanese chargé d’affaires as regional tensions simmered.

Tensions with Ethiopia shaped Asmara’s regional foreign policy. Amid souring relations with Ethiopia over resolution of Tigray conflict, Eritrea’s Civil Aviation Authority 21 July advised Ethiopian Airlines that carrier would not be allowed to operate flights to country effective from 30 Sept. Meanwhile, Eritrea 24 July expelled Sudanese Chargé d’Affaires Khaled Abbas, giving him 72 hours to leave capital, Asmara, without providing reasons. Move came two weeks after Ethiopian PM Abiy visited Sudan and met with chief of Sudanese Army (SAF), General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, in apparent attempt to mend relations; this, alongside Tigray People’s Liberation Army’s alleged support for SAF, may have prompted decision.

Somalia’s president visited Eritrea for third time since January. Somali President Mohamud 8-9 July made third official trip to Eritrea this year, meeting with President Isaias Afwerki to discuss political and military cooperation. Mohamud also addressed Somali Air Force cadets undergoing training at Eritrean Air Force Training Centre, urging them to revive once-prominent Somali Air Force and to safeguard national unity. Visit took place in context of diplomatic disputes between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa, as Somalia opposes Ethiopia’s port deal signed in Jan with breakaway region of Somaliland.

Gunmen attacked Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia. Unidentified gunmen 6 July stabbed seven Eritrean refugees at Alemwach refugee camp, North Gondar Zone, in Ethiopia’s Amhara Region; Eritrean refugees had been relocated to Alemwach in 2021 after facing attacks in their previous camps in Tigray region. 

Fano militias continued to wreak havoc in Amhara, thousands of displaced Tigrayans returned to areas disputed between Tigray and Amhara, and Oromia insurgency took heavy toll on civilians.

Amhara insurgency continued despite peace initiative. After late-June formation of Regional Peace Council to facilitate talks with Fano militias, some factions 16 July formed Amhara Fano Popular Organization and elected as leader former journalist Eskinder Nega, who in June stressed need for united front before talks with govt can begin. Meanwhile, clashes between security forces and Fano continued in East, West and North Gojjam, North Shewa, North and South Wollo, and North, Central, South and West Gondar zones. Violence 5 July also broke out between Fano and ethnic Agaw militias in Quara woreda (West Gondar) after Fano asked Agaw to hand over weapons and stop supporting govt; Fano 9 July reportedly took control of area, while local authorities reported over 80 civilians killed and 10,000 displaced.

Tensions persisted over return of displaced Tigrayans to disputed territories. Some 15,000 internally displaced persons late June-early July returned to Tselemti district in Tigray’s North Western Zone after removal of Amhara administration, and to Alamata town in Southern Tigray Zone, sparking two-day protest from Amhara residents who said Tigray soldiers were among returnees. Resettlement in Western Tigray likely to face resistance from well-armed militias associated with Amhara administration there. Meanwhile, tensions between Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and federal govt, and divisions within TPLF leadership came to fore. Notably, PM Abiy late July threatened war if TPLF does not register with election board before it holds party congress, while Tigray Interim Administration President Getachew Reda 29 July accused TPLF leadership of corruption, mismanagement and jeopardising regional security.

Mass kidnapping highlighted insecurity in Oromia region. Clashes between Ethiopian military and Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) persisted across Oromia, including East and West Wollega, Horo Guduru Wollega, South West, West and North Shewa, Sheger City areas, and Guji zones. Assailants believed to be OLA members 2 July kidnapped over 160 students near Gebre Guracha town (North Shewa), though many were reportedly released in following days; OLA 11 July denied involvement and blamed govt. 

Talks between govt and holdout opposition groups stalled after VP Machar’s party withdrew from initiative, concerns about December election abounded, and violence persisted in several areas.

Machar’s party withdrew from Kenya-led “Tumaini” peace initiative. Talks between govt and several opposition groups who did not sign 2018 peace accord, dubbed Tumaini Initiative, early July continued in Kenyan capital Nairobi; parties 15 July signed protocols on security reforms, humanitarian access and confidence-building measures, among other things. Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-In Opposition (SPLM-IO) led by VP Machar (which forms part of govt delegation) 16 July withdrew from talks, however, saying initiative undermined 2018 peace deal. Decision brought dialogue to halt, and govt delegation returned to capital Juba for consultations.

Juba remained divided about how to proceed with December general election. Separate dialogue in Juba among 2018 peace deal signatories continued throughout July to clarify electoral process and address other unimplemented provisions of agreement. Tensions mounted between President Kiir’s Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and SPLM-IO, however, exacerbated by disagreement over Tumaini Initiative. Some fear Kiir will hold election without consensus among parties on process, further undermining peace deal and raising risk of political turbulence. Meanwhile, international actors remained concerned about poll, with U.S. official Elizabeth Campbell 22 July criticising govt’s “lack of progress” toward creating conditions for “genuine and peaceful elections”.

Security situation remained fragile. In Equatoria region, reports late June-early July emerged that rebel group National Salvation Front (NAS) led by Thomas Cirillo was actively recruiting in Western Equatoria State, while John Kenyi Loburon, who defected from NAS late June, reportedly recruited in Central Equatoria State; divisions within NAS, including risk of clashes between Cirillo’s and Loburon’s groups, could fuel instability in region. In Jonglei State (Greater Upper Nile region), clashes between Duk County and Twic East County communities 19 July killed at least nine. Meanwhile, Sudan’s paramilitary Rapid Support Forces made gains near South Sudanese border, raising concerns of spillover (see Sudan).

Economy continued to deteriorate. South Sudan’s main oil pipeline through Sudan remained in disrepair, shrinking govt revenues and fuelling inflation. Parliament 26 July summoned finance minister to explain delays in civil servants’ salaries.

Fighting between army (SAF) and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) persisted in multiple states, U.S. sought to revive peace efforts, and array of Sudanese actors gathered for political dialogues.

In east, RSF advance into Sennar state slowed as its forces eyed White Nile state. RSF early July gained more ground in Sennar, seizing military bases in al-Mazmoum, al-Suki, Wad al-Neiyal and al-Dinder towns, after its late-June capture of state capital, Sinja, and strategic Jebel Moya mountains. Fighting late July began to subside, however, primarily due to seasonal rains complicating military movements. Meanwhile, RSF attacked multiple locations in neighbouring White Nile state, including 29 July drone attack on army barracks in state capital, Rabak, indicating White Nile may be paramilitary’s next target. Hostilities persisted in El Gezira and Blue Nile states, and in and around capital Khartoum.

Clashes continued in western North Darfur and central West Kordofan states. RSF’s siege of North Darfur capital, El Fasher, persisted as battles raged across state; all sides targeted civilians allegedly supporting their opponents, threatening to exacerbate intercommunal conflict. Humanitarian crisis remained dire, with World Health Organization official 16 July saying fighting had made access to El Fasher “impossible”. In West Kordofan, RSF 3 July seized strategic town of al-Meiram near South Sudanese border as it consolidated control over almost entire state except Babanussa city. 

U.S. called for ceasefire talks. U.S. 23 July invited warring parties to Switzerland in Aug in effort to reinvigorate peace talks. RSF next day confirmed it would attend; Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s govt in Port Sudan 30 July signalled possible participation, though it remains unclear whether SAF will attend given Burhan’s later statements to his soldiers contradicting announcement. Burhan 31 July survived apparent assassination attempt. Meanwhile, Ethiopian PM Abiy 9 July travelled to Port Sudan city and met with Burhan to discuss “sustainable solutions for Sudan’s stability”.

Two political dialogues among Sudanese actors held. Cairo 6 June convened Sudanese civil society and political groups in attempt to achieve unified stance on resolving conflict. AU 10-15 July held preparatory meeting of Inter-Sudanese Political Dialogue with around 20 political and civil society groups in Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa; participants agreed to hold dialogue conference following ceasefire and establish interim caretaker govt. 

Govt forces continued to clash with Anglophone separatist rebels, while Boko Haram attacks in Far North persisted; political climate remained tense ahead of 2025 presidential vote. 

Govt-separatist clashes continued in Anglophone regions. Ambazonia Peoples Liberation Council militias 1 July ambushed and killed two soldiers in Munyenge area, Fako division (South West, SW). Local sources alleged at least two civilians killed 4-8 July in North West (NW) during participation in bomb searches as part of military operations to dislodge separatist rebels. Rebels 6, 11 and 25 July attacked army convoys in Boyo (NW), Lebialem and Fako divisions (both SW) respectively, with unknown casualties. Locals in Francophone community in Bangourain town in West region mid-July expressed anger following 10 July kidnapping for ransom of two Francophones; some local figures blamed abduction on Anglophone separatists in neighbouring NW and threatened retaliation, raising threat of intercommunal violence. 

Boko Haram attacks in Far North persisted amid security operations. Jihadists 1-14 July made half dozen incursions into Mayo-Tsanaga, Logone-et-Chari and Mayo-Sava divisions, looting food and goods; militants 14 July surrounded police post in Tourou town, burning vehicles and killing one gendarme, and next day killed four civilians in Sandawajiri town. Meanwhile, Multinational Joint Task Force continued Operation Lake Sanity to reclaim territory; 9 July said dozens of insurgents and their families had surrendered.

Ruling party tightened grip ahead of 2025 presidential elections. Authorities 4 July suggested main opposition figure Maurice Kamto might be barred from 2025 presidential race as his party lacks parliamentary representation. President Biya 24 July signed into law govt proposal to extend mandate of parliamentarians and councillors and postpone 2025 parliamentary and local elections until 2026; opposition heavily criticised bill. Pre-empting protests, official in capital Yaoundé 16 July threatened to temporarily ban from city govt critics or those calling for demonstrations. Meanwhile, authorities 31 July released on bail social media activist detained week earlier after encouraging voter registration in videos.

In another important development. Relations between Cameroon and Nigeria continued to improve over border demarcation after bilateral commission 27 June agreed to not refer three outstanding issues of disagreement to International Court of Justice to rule on.

Clashes between army and rebels continued as more militias disarmed; tensions around Oct local polls remained high and govt discussed budgetary aid with France. 

Military and rebels continued to fight in northern regions. Clashes between Russian paramilitary-supported army and rebels persisted; fighters from Return, Reclamation, Rehabilitation (3R) rebel group 2 July attacked army position in Ngoutéré village (Ouham-Pendé prefecture) and ambushed military convoy bringing reinforcements, in total killing three soldiers and three civilians. Military same day attacked position of Unity for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC) rebels in Ouadda town (Haute-Kotto prefecture), reportedly killing at least seven UPC fighters. 3R fighters 8 July ambushed convoy of Chinese mining companies near Baboua town (Nana-Manbéré prefecture), taking two Chinese nationals hostage. Army and Russian paramilitaries 23 July killed self-proclaimed anti-Balaka general and deputy in Bouca town (Ouham-Fafa prefecture); photos that circulated of the two decapitated bodies caused widespread indignation. Meanwhile, more militias continued to follow example of ethnic Azandé self-defence group in south east and voluntarily disarmed to integrate into army. Near Bossangoa town (Ouham prefecture), self-proclaimed anti-Balaka General Jabra 9 July disarmed with some 250 fighters, allegedly members of Coalition of Patriots for Change. But govt continued to lack financial resources to support further inclusion into army, which could lead to discontent.

Political tensions continued ahead of Oct local elections. President Touadéra 2 July promulgated new electoral code but opposition denounced provisions including definition of “indigenous Central Africans” and requirement to update electoral lists one year before each election. Head of opposition party Movement for Liberation of Central African People 5 July said composition of electoral commission favours Touadéra. While others suggested election postponement, main opposition platform Republican Bloc for the Defence of the Constitution continued to call for boycott.

France looked to resume budget support in sign of normalisation. French delegation 11 July met PM Moloua in capital Bangui to discuss new terms of budgetary aid, three years after suspending direct support amid anti-French propaganda fuelled by Russia.

In another important development. UN Security Council 30 July lifted arms embargo imposed in 2013 at start of civil war.

Social discontent continued in capital N’Djamena while diplomatic row broke out with France; army conducted operation against Boko Haram in west while farmer-herder violence persisted.

Authorities faced public criticism in capital. Police 17 July arrested members of Sabarna, platform of unemployed graduates, after they staged sit-in outside PM’s offices to demand integration into civil service; arrests came after late-June crackdown on peaceful protest by same group outside U.S. embassy. Meanwhile, frustration grew in N’Djamena over local govt’s measures to tackle traffic congestion, including among those whose makeshift stalls were demolished; traders at “Champ de fil”, country’s largest informal market for car parts, 11 July protested against forced evictions.

Govt conducted anti-militant offensive near Lake Chad. Army chief of staff 2 July said elite Rapid Intervention Force neutralised 70 Boko Haram militants in counter-insurgency operation; insurgents had taken refuge in Chad after campaign by Multinational Joint Task Force in Lake Chad region beginning May. 

Herder-farmer violence persisted in south. Notably, herders and farmers 2 July clashed near Goré town, Nya Pendé department (Logone Oriental region), leaving four people dead; Logone Oriental provincial governor 4 July dismissed prefect of Nya Pendé who accused farmers of being rebels. Also, violent clash 2 July near Pala town (Mayo-Kebbi Ouest region) after cattle crossed maize fields wounded three. 

President Déby postponed Paris visit amid diplomatic quarrel with France. Media 2 July reported French authorities in Jan had opened investigation against Déby for embezzlement of public funds. Amid reports French financial crime investigators may extend inquiries to include assets of president and close associates in France, Déby postponed planned 15 July visit to Paris to discuss future of French presence in Chad. Case provoked mixed reactions in N’Djamena. National coordinator of anti-corruption organisation Jacques Saham Ngarassal 3 July called for continuation of investigation to establish responsibility; but civil society organisation Chad Wahid Platform 6 July denounced investigation as tactic to put pressure on Chad after Déby’s rapprochement with Russia, while magistrates’ union 10 July described charges as violation of country’s sovereignty. Neither Paris nor N’Djamena mentioned case publicly.

Efforts to repair diplomatic ties with Niger made progress as neighbours agreed to establish joint committee which may lead to wider agreement in August; jihadist violence remained threat in north. 

Relations with Niger thawed amid former presidents’ mediation initiative. Benin’s former presidents Boni Yayi and Soglo 1 July met with current President Talon to discuss their late-June visit to Niger’s capital Niamey as part of efforts to solve year-long Benin-Niger tensions. In communiqué same day, Talon emphasised commitment to “swift restoration of dialogue” with Niamey, while Nigerien authorities next day announced formation of joint committee to resolve differences. Nigerien Interior Minister Gen. Mohamed Toumba 24-5 visited Benin's Cotonou city to meet Talon, as both sides reported positive meetings and progress. Talks could pave way to restoring ties, reopening border and resuming oil exports through joint pipeline. Meanwhile, govt 11 July dismissed Burkina Faso President Capt. Traoré’s allegations that Benin hosted French military bases as “disinformation” and 16 July summoned Burkinabé ambassador. 

Jihadist insurgency persisted in northern departments. Suspected al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims militants 24 July killed seven soldiers and five park rangers near Mékrou river in National Park W; meanwhile, amid concerns over impact of spreading insecurity along northern border, govt 21 July announced some 5,000 Burkinabé refugees had crossed border in space of two days. 

Former President Gbagbo began 2025 election campaign; tensions with Burkina Faso remained high.

Former President Gbagbo kicked off campaign for 2025 presidential election. Gbagbo from African People’s Party-Côte d’Ivoire (PPA-CI) party 14 July called for opposition to “unite” ahead of vote during speech in Bonoua town, former stronghold of party he founded in 1980s. Gbagbo’s candidacy, however, faces major obstacles including his age (79), ineligibility due to 2018 criminal conviction for looting Central Bank of West African States during 2010-2011 post-electoral crisis and competition from previous allies.

Ties with Ouagadougou remained strained. Burkina Faso’s President Capt. Traoré 11 July accused Côte d’Ivoire of hosting “centre of operations to destabilise” his country, following recent incidents along border. In interview with Jeune Afrique newspaper, Defence Minister Téné Birahima Ouattara 19 July denied accusations, saying any destabilisation would send people across its border. Meanwhile, govt 16 July expelled over 160 Burkinabé refugees who had just crossed border, as authorities appeared increasingly reluctant to accept refugees, seen as potential source of insecurity; country has hosted over 60,000 refugees from Burkina Faso since 2021.

Reports emerged of planned U.S. military base in north. Amid early-July reports that govt had agreed to establish American military base in Odienné town (north west), govt officials on several occasions throughout July said they were not “aware” of plans. Meanwhile, speaking to media in Abidjan city, U.S. commander for Africa Gen. Kenneth Ekman 24 July dismissed reports, saying “we have no plans to build a base”; U.S. would, however, continue working with Ivorian security forces to “consolidate existing partnerships”.

In another important development. Clashes 25 July erupted between residents and local govt officials backed by security forces in Adjamé Village neighbourhood in Abidjan following evictions linked to road construction project, reportedly killing two people.

Security forces continued operations against armed groups but jihadist, bandit, herder-farmer and separatist violence persisted.

Jihadist violence lingered in North East despite military efforts. Govt forces reported further gains against Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Boko Haram in Borno state. Notably, air force claimed it killed several insurgents, destroyed numerous hideouts and camps in 3 July airstrikes in Mandara mountains. Meanwhile, also in Borno, insurgent explosive devices 25 July killed at least seven soldiers on Monguno-Baga road and 31 July killed at least 19 civilians at teahouse in Kawuri village, Konduga area. Court 28 July sentenced 125 suspected Boko Haram members and financiers to various jail terms.

Bandits plagued North West and North Central zones, despite security operations. Notably, in Katsina state, bandits 6 July kidnapped 26 in Runka village, Safana area. In Zamfara state, armed group 14 July killed four and abducted about 150 from Dan Isa village, Kaura Namoda area. In Sokoto state’s Sabon Birni area, bandits 27 July seized local chief and six others, demanding over $300,000 ransom, and 30 July killed two, abducted 20. 

Herder-farmer crisis remained potent as govt announced new peace efforts. Armed groups attacked several farming villages in Benue state: 9 and 14 July killed 25 people in Agatu and Gwer West areas, locals blamed herders; 20 July killed 18 and abducted two in Katsina-Ala area as authorities blamed “local militia”. President Tinubu 9 July announced creation of new federal livestock ministry and committee to recommend measures to end herder-farmer violence.

Separatist-related violence continued in South East. Army 1 July said it killed a leader of separatist group Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) armed wing Eastern Security Network (ESN), and arrested two others during raids on forest camps in Imo state. Gunmen 29-30 July killed five police in Owerri and Mbaitoli areas of Imo; Finland-based IPOB factional leader, Simon Ekpa, claimed his Biafra Defence Forces were responsible.

In another important development. Govt and security forces ramped up efforts to prevent planned 1-15 Aug nationwide protests against rising living costs, including raising minimum wage and threatening crackdown on violence; but protest leaders remained adamant and tensions rose nationwide. 

Jihadist violence continued in north with assault on base that reportedly killed dozen troops.

Dozens of suspected al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) insurgents 20 July attacked military outpost in Kpinkankandi village near Burkina Faso border, Savanes region, reportedly killing at least 12 soldiers and holding base for several hours; 40 militants reportedly killed during attack. Assault came after suspected JNIM fighters 21 June killed two soldiers and wounded two others in attack on army patrol in Kpentendjoaga village and same day killed four civilians in Bamone village, both Savanes region.

Military authorities intensified crackdown on civil society opponents, as tensions rose over death of former junta ally, exposing rifts in ruling powers.

Authorities allegedly detained several activists, creating widespread uproar. In incident that highlighted mounting tensions between military govt and civil society, one of main civil society groups National Front for Defense of Constitution (FNDC) accused security forces of “kidnapping” three of their activists on night of 9 July – Foniké Menguè, Mamadou Billo Bah, as well as Mohamed Cissé, who was released following day; FNDC condemned arrest and claimed it was carried out “in violent manner” while activists’ lawyers said those who took them did not have warrant. In response, coalition of opposition parties and civil society groups Les Forces Vives de Guinée 13 July called for mobilisation to free activists, restore constitutional order and fundamental freedoms; lawyers’ union 16 July began two-week strike to protest arbitrary arrests. Attorney General 17 July denied junta’s involvement in disappearances and called for investigation; activists’ lawyers next day made “urgent” appeal to International Criminal Court. Arrests of opposition figures continued late month including of activist Simon Pierre Camara 27 July and politician Francis Haba next day. Security forces and demonstrators 30 July clashed in capital Conakry during anti-govt protests organised by civil society groups demanding activists’ release. Rights group Amnesty International 11 July said authorities have increased “crackdown on peaceful dissent” in recent months. 

Rumours of cracks within military emerged after former chief of staff’s death. Sudden death of former military head Gen. Sadiba Koulibaly in June continued to drive speculation of splits within army. Despite authorities maintaining Koulibaly – previously key ally of President Col. Doumbouya – had died of cardiac arrest, many details remained unclear; govt 5 July called on media to act responsibly over case and said victim’s family “could go before the courts to have the doubts removed” if they had uncertainty over cause of death. Case continued to raise speculation throughout month that govt remained worried over potential threats to Doumbouya’s position. 

In another important development. Govt 29 July presented draft constitution to be submitted to referendum before end 2024.

“Total peace” efforts continued to face ups and downs as govt ended ceasefire with one EMC faction and agreed to another with Segunda Marquetalia; President Petro addressed UN Security Council. 

Govt ended ceasefire with EMC’s largest faction. Govt 16 July announced end to ceasefire with largest faction of FARC dissident group known as EMC, led by Iván Mordisco. Faction had been in talks with govt until March 2024, when latter partially suspended ceasefire in three departments along Pacific Coast; military operations will now resume in all areas where group operates. Ceasefire will remain in place with smaller EMC faction led by alias Calarcá until Oct and talks are set to continue, though they hit another snag on 23 July when military in Antioquia detained vehicle carrying Calarcá and one other commander. Parts of govt had been aware of convoy, but poor internal coordination meant local officers were not informed; EMC also broke protocol by transporting weapons in vehicle. Commanders were quickly released, but incident undermined trust between sides.

Peace efforts with Segunda Marquetalia and ELN continued. Late-June talks between govt and another dissident FARC group, Segunda Marquetalia, led to unilateral ceasefire commitment; Petro did not issue presidential decree to de-escalate military operations, however, resulting in continued hostilities throughout July. Meanwhile, UN Special Representative Ruiz-Massieu 16 July urged govt and ELN to renew ceasefire agreement, set to expire 3 Aug.

President Petro addressed UN Security Council (UNSC). Petro 11 July presented report on progress of Colombia’s 2016 Peace Agreement with FARC to UNSC; Diego Tovar attended, marking first time demobilised FARC member had physically joined UNSC meeting. Petro promised to strengthen cooperation among state institutions to advance implementation of key issues, such as rural reform and integration of rural territories, and proposed seven-year extension to implement deal.

In another important development. U.S. and Panama 1 July pledged to work on “closing” Darien Gap in order to curb influx of northbound migration from South America; announcement raised concerns that migrants stuck on Colombian side of Darien could be vulnerable to human trafficking and exploitation by armed groups.

Violence persisted in drug-trafficking hotspots along Pacific Coast, prompting stepped-up regional cooperation on organised crime.

Efforts to tackle criminal violence persisted. President Noboa 2 July decreed state of exception in six provinces and one municipality with high levels of criminal violence, 17 July announced major security operation in canton of Durán, Guayas province. Security forces 3 July rescued 49 miners kidnapped by Los Lobos gang in Azuay province. In spate of killings targeting public officials, gunmen 2 July killed former Portoviejo mayoral candidate in Manabí province; 8 July killed district authority in El Oro province; and 10 July killed official from Santa Elena province’s Public Prosecutor’s Office. Meanwhile, National Assembly 8 July reformed penal code, notably introducing tougher sentences for crimes like drug and arms trafficking. 

Authorities suspended judicial personnel in corruption probe. Judicial Council 5 July suspended seven judges and one secretary from three provincial courts as part of “Plaga” investigation into high-level ties between organised crime and judiciary. 

Quito signed deals with foreign partners to boost cooperation on organised crime. Govt and EU 3 July inaugurated “Europol Unit of the National Police of Ecuador”, aimed at better coordinating efforts to tackle transnational organised crime. Noboa and Peruvian President Boluarte 4 July signed agreement to strengthen bilateral relations, with emphasis on security and defence. European judicial coordination agency Eurojust 10 July signed working arrangements with Ecuador, as well as Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica and Peru, aimed at enhancing strategic cooperation in fight against organised crime.

Nicolás Maduro claimed victory in presidential election, triggering fraud allegations, international outcry and protests that turned deadly; popular unrest could rise in coming weeks, increasing risk of violent repression. 

Maduro claimed victory in presidential poll disputed by opposition. Venezuelans 28 July cast ballots following weeks of intense campaigning by President Maduro and opposition candidate, Edmundo González, who was leading in polls despite govt’s unrestrained use of state resources and deliberate efforts to hinder opposition campaign. After polls closed, govt-controlled electoral authorities (CNE) went silent for hours before 29 July announcing that Maduro had secured over 51% of vote compared to 44% for González, but did not release vote tallies. Opposition later that day dismissed result as fraudulent, with González and banned winner of opposition primary María Corina Machado saying voting tallies gathered by opposition gave González a sweeping victory with over 70% of vote. 

Chorus of international voices called for transparent vote count. Actors from region and beyond, including Brazil, Colombia, Chile and U.S., called for transparency in vote count and urged CNE to publish precinct-by-precinct polling results; several international bodies echoed these appeals, including UN and EU. U.S.-based Carter Center, invited by govt to monitor elections, 31 July said election “did not meet international stands of electoral integrity and cannot be considered democratic”. Caracas 29 July recalled diplomats from Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Perú, Panamá, Dominican Republic and Uruguay in response to their scepticism about results and demanded they reciprocate. Meanwhile, Cuba, Nicaragua, Russia, Bolivia and Honduras congratulated Maduro on his victory.

Protests erupted but were forcefully put down by security forces, leaving 17 dead. Spontaneous demonstrations 29 July erupted across country in response to disputed result, with protesters reportedly toppling statues of former President Hugo Chávez, burning campaign posters of Maduro and attempting to block roads. Protesters also flooded streets of capital Caracas as police and military deployed in large numbers, accompanied by pro-govt para-police forces known as “collectives”; mostly peaceful demonstrations turned violent as police used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse crowds heading for presidential palace. As of 31 July, 17 deaths had been reported along with over 1,000 arrests. State repression will likely intensify in coming weeks should protests persist. 

Authorities renewed state of exception amid continued concern about arbitrary detention, torture and other ill-treatment under measure. 

Authorities renewed state of exception amid allegations of human rights violations. Legislative Assembly 8 July extended state of exception for 30 days as concerns about abuses continued. Notably, NGO Human Rights Watch 16 July released report documenting “severe” human rights violations under state of exception, including “arbitrary detention, torture and other forms of ill-treatment against children”. NGO Cristosal 10 July said at least 261 people have died in custody since measure came into place. Meanwhile, Minister of Security 24 July called upon Legislative Assembly to enact more reforms to penal code, including extension of pre-trial detention. 

Bukele made threats in response to steep inflation. President Bukele 5 July warned that heavy-handed approach used to address gang violence could be applied to wholesalers and distributers, who he blamed for sharp rise in prices of basic goods. While these increases are not enough to jail individuals under state of exception, Bukele alleged wholesalers engage in bribery, contraband and tax evasion, which could justify jail time.

President-elect Claudia Sheinbaum began appointing ministers as ruling MORENA party pushed for constitutional reforms; U.S. authorities apprehended Sinaloa Cartel leaders.

Sheinbaum began selecting candidates for key ministerial positions. Following her landslide electoral victory on 2 June, President-elect Sheinbaum 4 July designated Omar García Harfuch, public security secretary in Mexico City under Sheinbaum’s mayorship, as future security minister. Other key appointments reflected efforts to satisfy different MORENA factions and keep party stable after outgoing President López Obrador’s departure. Meanwhile, López Obrador and Sheinbaum continued work to enact constitutional reforms, which include overhaul of judiciary and eradication of several autonomous oversight bodies. While MORENA won majorities in both houses of legislature, it is three seats shy of super majority in senate needed for constitutional reforms, prompting party leaders in July to begin negotiations with opposition senators to secure votes. 

Criminal violence persisted at high levels following election. Violence continued to intensify in some areas, notably Guerrero state, as criminal groups and state forces renegotiated power arrangements following poll. Notably, National Public Security System data released 9 July found that June was deadliest month in 2024, with 23% increase in homicides since May; Acapulco city saw heavy violence amid competition between Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) and Los Rusos criminal group. In Michoacán state, journalists and inhabitants early July denounced repeated CJNG drone attacks in Aquila municipality; clashes between soldiers and alleged criminals 6 July killed seven in Tangancícuaro municipality. In Sinaloa state, confrontations 8 July between security forces and Sinaloa Cartel left four dead in Badiraguato municipality, Cartel’s core turf.     

U.S. arrested two Sinaloa Cartel leaders. U.S. authorities 26 July detained Vicente “El Mayo” Zambada, head of Sinaloa Cartel, and Joaquín Guzmán López, son of former Sinaloa leader Joaquín Guzmán Loera, in state of Texas, U.S., where they had flown by private jet. With Mexican govt 27 July saying it had no prior knowledge of U.S.’s plans, rumours began circulating about how arrests materialised, including possible betrayal from within cartel or pre-arranged surrender. Arrests could trigger factional fighting in coming weeks and months, particularly if narrative of an internal betrayal gains traction.

Govt continued to target civil society, journalists, political opponents and Indigenous communities. 

Clampdown on political figures continued. President Ortega’s political purges persisted, targeting not only opponents but individuals previously considered loyal to regime; notably, authorities mid-July arrested several high-ranking officials on corruption charges, including Vice Chancellor Arlette Marenco. Meanwhile, Mechanism for the Recognition of Political Prisoners 16 July reported that Nicaragua holds at least 147 political prisoners and that they are living in “deplorable” conditions. 

Crackdown on civil society, press and Indigenous communities persisted. Regime 9 July shuttered one Catholic radio station and 12 NGOs. Foundation for Freedom of Expression and Democracy’s 10 July report documented 34 cases of attacks on press freedom and 17 journalists exiled April-June 2024. According to watchdog Reporters Without Borders (RSF), authorities 12 July raided home of journalist and activist Fabiola Tercero Castro, who had been under house arrest; RSF said Castro was still missing by end of month. In session with Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Indigenous rights groups 11 July reported 643 violations of Indigenous rights, including forced displacement, arbitrary detentions, torture and killings, in first half of 2024. 

Kenya-led security mission continued deploying to Haiti as debates about talks with gangs heated up; tensions rose between PM Conille and Transitional Presidential Council (TPC). 

Kenya-led security mission continued to deploy without major spike in violence. Following late-June arrival of 200 Kenyan officers from foreign security mission, second contingent 16 July landed in capital Port-au-Prince and began conducting joint patrols and targeted missions against gangs. While their deployment triggered no major gang offensive, violence nonetheless persisted in several areas. Notably, mayor of Gressier town, south west of Port-au-Prince, 8 July stated that gangs now control around 75% of town amid ongoing clashes. In Ganthier town east of capital, members of 400 Mawozo gang 21 July set fire to police station, forcing thousands to flee. Meanwhile, PM Conille 17 July announced state of emergency in 14 gang-controlled communes in Ouest and Artibonite departments; police chief Rameau Normil 30 July announced police had subsequently killed 104 gang members during security operations in these areas.

Gang spokesperson floated possible dialogue with govt. Spokesperson for Viv Ansanm gang coalition, Jimmy ‘Barbecue’ Chérizier, 5 July said gangs would consider laying down arms and choosing one citizen from diaspora to facilitate dialogue with authorities; five prominent civil society organisations 11 July voiced opposition to any dialogue between govt and gangs. Meanwhile, gang leaders from capital’s Cité Soleil neighbourhood who are part of Viv Ansanm 24 July claimed to have reached peace agreement with Ti Gabriel, leader of Nan Brooklyn gang, which had cooperated with Viv Ansanm gangs but not fully integrated into the coalition; following agreement, gangs removed walls separating their territories. 

Tensions grew between PM Conille and TPC. Public dispute erupted between TPC and Conille around latter’s 28 June-5 July travel to U.S., where he met several top officials, including Sec State Antony Blinken, and addressed UN Security Council; when Conille 8 July met with TPC upon his return, members reportedly insisted diplomatic duties fall within remit of presidency, not prime minister. Meanwhile, secretariat of TPC around 8 July started sending letters to religious groups, workers and other civil society associations, asking them to nominate representatives for provisional electoral council.

President Tebboune officially announced candidacy for 7 Sept election, as opposition decried unfair voting environment amid wider crackdown; govt recalled ambassador from Paris.

President announced candidacy while opposition criticised conditions for poll. Incumbent Tebboune 11 July confirmed he will run for another term as president after months of speculation. Opposition continued to voice concerns over election process. Algerian Workers’ Party leader Louisa Hanoune, whose participation may have legitimised elections as democratic contest, 13 July withdrew from race citing unfair conditions and called on her party to boycott elections; 11 prominent opposition figures 21 July wrote open letter denouncing “authoritarian climate” surrounding upcoming elections and calling for democratic change. Although 16 candidates filed applications, election body 25 July announced only three had met requirements and would compete in poll – Tebboune, Front des Forces Socialistes national secretary Youcef Aouchiche and Abdelaali Hassani Charif of Mouvement de la société pour la paix.

Authorities arrested pro-democracy Hirak movement activists and journalists. In lead-up to vote, authorities cracked down on journalists and Hirak movement members. Police 8-15 July arrested 14 Hirak activists in Bejaia city and authorities placed eight of them in pre-trial detention, while releasing other six under judicial supervision. Associated Press 1 July reported arrest of journalists Sofiane Ghirous and Ferhat Omar in late June for broadcasting material that authorities claimed “constituted incitement and hate speech”. 

Algiers recalled ambassador from France over Western Sahara policy shift. Govt 30 July announced withdrawal of ambassador to Paris following France’s announcement same day it considered Moroccan plan for autonomy over Western Sahara “only basis” to solve conflict (see Western Sahara); move soured diplomatic relations with Algiers, supporter of Sahrawi independence. 

New govt sworn in amid economic crisis as Cairo continued to advocate for resolution to crises in Gaza and Sudan. 

Newly announced cabinet included personnel changes, kept previous priorities. New govt of PM Madbouly sworn in 3 July with new Defence Minister Abdel Megeed Sakr and FM Badr Abdelatty, alongside new heads of key economic ministries; President Sisi same day appointed Lt. Gen. Fathy Khalifa as new army chief of staff with former army head Osama Askar made presidential adviser. Madbouly 8 July presented govt program which pursues former priorities including preserving national security, promoting economic growth and implementing political reforms suggested by Aug 2023 national dialogue initiative. Amid electricity shortages due to economic crisis, Madbouly 17 July announced rolling blackouts would pause from 21 July until Sept. Meanwhile, rights group Amnesty International 18 July reported security forces detained over 100 people since month began for calling for protests against rising prices and power cuts.

Cairo continued to advocate for steps to address crises in Gaza and Sudan. Abdelatty 18 July met his Jordanian counterpart Safadi in Jordan’s capital Amman; both leaders reiterated rejection of Israeli offensive in Gaza Strip and mass displacement of Palestinians, and stressed harmful regional repercussions of war; Abdelatty 30 July reiterated need for immediate ceasefire during call with U.S. Sec State Blinken. Cairo 6 July hosted conference of Sudanese civil society and political groups, during which Abdelatty repeated call for immediate, sustainable cessation of hostilities; although FM said any solution should involve all Sudanese actors, Sudan’s two main warring parties did not attend.

In other important developments. Egyptian geologist 17 July claimed on social media that Ethiopia had begun new round of filling of Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) as govt remained opposed to project. In further sign of deepening relationship, Cairo 17 July hosted Egypt-EU dialogue on migration and investment.

Rival assemblies agreed on roadmap for unity govt, although tensions remained amid lack of budget compromise; UN human rights chief criticised rise in detentions and disappearances.  

Rival authorities agreed on forming unity govt and organising elections. Around 130 members from east-based House of Representatives (HoR) and Tripoli-based High State Council (HSC) 18 July met in Egyptian capital Cairo and announced they agreed on forming unity govt and organising legislative and presidential elections. Doubts persisted, however, over whether political deadlock had actually been broken as it remained unclear whether HSC as a whole had sincerely agreed to roadmap or whether HoR would take process forward in absence of UN endorsement. Meanwhile, selection procedures for potential new govt and election laws remained in limbo. 

Budget deadlock continued despite attempts at compromise. HoR Speaker Aguila Saleh 7 July met Central Bank Governor Sadiq al-Kabir to discuss steps to unify budget. HoR 10 July approved additional budget of $18.3bn to finance country’s east-based institutions; HSC next day rejected budget, criticising unilateral approach and large size of additional funds. 

International actors criticised arbitrary arrests and disappearances. UN human rights chief Volker Türk 9 July lamented stalled political process and deteriorating human rights situation, highlighting “escalation in arbitrary arrests and detentions, enforced disappearances”, especially of civil society activists and political opposition. Unidentified armed men 8 July abducted political activist Moatassim al-Areebi in Misrata city, releasing him 11 July after UN and U.S. called for his release. Authorities 11 July detained journalist Ahmed al-Sanussi, who reported on allegations of govt corruption, in capital Tripoli; police 14 July released Sanussi after UN, EU and others criticised arrest. 

In other important developments. Amid Italian seizures in June of Russian shipment of Chinese-made drones headed to eastern port of Benghazi in violation of arms embargo, U.S. military delegation 16-18 July visited PM Dabaiba in Tripoli and representatives of eastern commander Khalifa Haftar to discuss unification of military institutions. Court 28 July sentenced 12 officials to prison terms between nine and 27 years for culpability in Sept 2023 dam collapses amid floods in Derna city that killed over 5,000.

Post-election unrest left several dead as opposition contested re-election of President Ghazouani.

After announcement of provisional results showed incumbent President Ghazouani re-elected for second term in 29 June poll, demonstrators 1 July protested in opposition strongholds of Bogué, Kaédi and Nouadhibou cities as well as some neighbourhoods in capital Nouakchott; in Kaédi, security forces clashed with demonstrators as protests turned violent amid acts of looting and vandalism, arresting unconfirmed number. Interior ministry next day said three protesters had died, two while in detention and third later in hospital, without providing further details about their deaths. Constitutional Court 3 July confirmed Ghazouani’s win with 56.12% of vote. Opposition candidate and activist Biram Dah Abeid – who body said won 22.1% of vote – refused to recognise results, citing alleged irregularities including ballot stuffing and accusing electoral commission of giving Ghazouani thousands of extra votes. Although unrest died down in following days, authorities 1-24 July restricted access to mobile internet.

President Saïed set October election date amid deteriorating political climate for polls as authorities arrested several opposition candidates.

President set presidential vote and announced his candidacy. Incumbent Saïed 1 July scheduled presidential election for 6 Oct and 19 July confirmed his own candidacy; Saïed said he was answering country’s “sacred call” to keep up fight toward “national liberation”, raising concern he may intend to forcibly secure election (see below). Earlier, Saïed 5 July called for vigilance against destabilisation attempts in pre-election period. In likely attempt to win public support, president 9 July made new social welfare announcement with 33% increase in allowance for poorest families, affecting 310,ooo beneficiaries. Hundreds of pro-Saïed demonstrators 25 July marched in capital Tunis, as families of political prisoners same day gathered in capital to demand their release.

Govt continued to disqualify and imprison opposition candidates. Prosecutor 12 July banned presidential hopeful Abdellatif Makki, former leader of Islamist-inspired An-Nahda party, from travel and media appearances due to alleged involvement in 2014 death of businessman when Makki was health minister. Authorities next day arrested Sec Gen of An-Nahda Ajmi Ouirimi and two party members, fuelling concerns authorities may attempt to dissolve still-popular movement ahead of election. Authorities 13 July also arrested Yadh Elloumi for allegedly buying sponsorship for runner-up in 2019 presidential election, Nabil Karoui, as campaign official. Court 19 July sentenced Lotfi Mraihi, candidate for left-wing opposition Republican People’s Union, to eight months’ imprisonment and ruled him ineligible to run for office for life on charges of corruption and vote buying during previous candidacy in 2019. Rejected candidate Abir Moussi 29 July began hunger strike to protest her exclusion, while candidate Nizar Chaâri next day announced his campaign manager and member of campaign team had been arrested on accusations of forgery. Rights group Amnesty International 16 July and main opposition coalition National Salvation Front next day denounced crackdown, with latter claiming measures create impossible conditions for holding democratic elections. Meanwhile, court 6 July sentenced Saïed critic and prominent lawyer Sonia Dahmani, arrested early May, to one year in prison for spreading “false news”.

Figures of pro-independence Polisario Front openly challenged leadership; France adopted Moroccan autonomy plan.

Internal divisions within Polisario laid bare. Bachir Moustafa, brother of Polisario Front founder and candidate in latest leadership election in Jan 2023, 7 July publicly called for general congress to “take emergency measures” to save Front from downfall, heavily criticising Polisario leader Brahim Ghali and demanding more intransigence towards Morocco. Main Polisario body did not reply to attack or congress calls. Meanwhile, Oubi Bouchraya, Polisario representative in Geneva, 6 July took to social media to highlight growing tensions and protests in Tindouf refugee camps and denounced Polisario’s security-minded approach to protests, marking first time Polisario official admitted public security issues in camps. Over 100 Polisario fighters 16 July laid down weapons in front of Polisario general secretariat in Rabouni refugee camp in protest at corruption and leadership decisions regarding military appointments, further signalling rising discontent within independence movement.

France adopted Moroccan autonomy plan, shifting Western Sahara stance. In letter to Moroccan King Mohammed VI made public 30 July, French president Macron called Moroccan autonomy plan, which would give Rabat control over Western Sahara’s national security and foreign affairs, “only basis” to solve conflict; Polisario same day condemned move, saying it deprived Sahrawi people of “right to freedom and independence”; move marked notable policy shift and drew anger from Algeria which supports Western Saharan independence (see Algeria). Earlier, outgoing U.S. ambassador to Algeria Elizabeth Moore Aubin 18 July also reaffirmed U.S. support for autonomy plan.

Unrest over finance bill morphed into wider, anti-govt protest movement, shaking President Ruto’s administration, as security forces violently repressed demonstrations. 

Protests led to firing of govt and further domestic turmoil. After public-led, spontaneous demonstrations against controversial finance bill erupted nationwide in June, movement continued into July with biweekly protests across country to air grievances against, and often demand end to, Ruto’s govt. Ruto 11 July fired all but one minister from cabinet and vowed to set up “broad-based” govt. Numbers protesting decreased in following weeks but hundreds continued to take to streets. Security forces persisted with violently repressing protests and clashed with demonstrators, while press also remained vulnerable. Notably, journalist Catherine Wanjeri wa Kariuki shot three times by rubber bullets 16 July while covering protests in Nakuru county. National Commission on Human Rights same day said at least 50 people killed since protests began – including around ten in July – with over 400 injured, some 700 arbitrarily detained and dozens abducted. Police 23 July fired tear gas to prevent scuffles between protesters and govt supporters in capital Nairobi. Ruto next day gave four posts in new cabinet to opposition Orange Democratic Movement led by former PM Odinga, while reappointing around half of previous cabinet; protest movement figures criticised new govt as co-opting opposition instead of serving population’s needs and 25 July held march to commemorate those killed in demonstrations; police again detained several people.

Kenyan-led international security force continued to deploy to Haiti. 200 Kenyan police officers 16 July arrived in Haiti following first contingent’s landing in June; Kenyan and Haitian police next day patrolled in areas of capital Port-au-Prince abandoned by police for months. Doubts remained, however, over sustainability of mission.

Al-Shabaab-related insecurity persisted. Clash between Al-Shabaab insurgents and security forces 11 July left at least five militants and four police officers dead in El Wak area, Mandera county.

Islamic State militants remained active in northern Cabo Delgado province as Rwanda prepared offensive; election preparations continued. 

Jihadist threat persisted in Cabo Delgado despite fewer attacks. Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISMP) violence continued at lower level than previous months but militants remained present in province. Notably, militant activity reported in Palma district, home to multi-billion-dollar international gas project, for first time in 18 months, while ISMP 11-13 July clashed with security forces in Nangade district, leaving at least two insurgents dead. Lull in overall attacks may be due to insurgents regrouping in preparation for expected Rwandan offensive. Rwandan troops late month began deploying to Macomia district as campaign will reportedly focus on dislodging militants from strongholds including Catupa forest and coastal villages of district. Meanwhile, series of incidents highlighted troubled relationship between Mozambique military and local communities. Notably, after soldiers 8 July killed shop owner in Nanga neighbourhood of Macomia town, residents next day violently confronted army; clashes reportedly left several soldiers dead.

Regional mission concluded, bilateral deployments to fill vacuum. Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) 15 July concluded three-year deployment to Cabo Delgado; at official ceremony in provincial capital Pemba, Defence Minister Cristóvão Chume 4 July thanked mission but acknowledged insecurity continued in northern province. Bilateral deployments expected to fill vacuum after SAMIM’s departure; Rwanda in May announced additional 2,000 troops, while President Nyusi 1 July said Tanzania – which has several hundred troops in Nangade district – would continue to support fight against ISMP. Meanwhile, EU 3 July postponed decision on €20mn financial support to Rwandan troops in province amid some member states’ concerns over Kigali’s backing of Congolese rebel group M23. 

Preparations for Oct general elections continued. Electoral body 17 July removed recently formed coalition of opposition parties Coligação Aliança Democrática (CAD) from legislative and provincial ballot over alleged irregularities in registration for vote; CAD appealed in Constitutional Court while its candidate Venâncio Mondlane – formerly of main opposition RENAMO party – remained on ballot for presidential poll.

President Ramaphosa opened parliament and outlined agenda for govt of national unity; several officials working to investigate corruption killed. 

New govt promised to deliver growth and national unity. President Ramaphosa 18 July opened parliament and presented govt of national unity – comprised of African National Congress, centre-right Democratic Alliance and eight other parties; top priorities include driving inclusive economic growth, tackling inequality and developing capable state. Opposition immediately criticised address, with uMkhonto weSizwe party (MKP) spokesperson Nhlamulo Ndhlele labelling it “lies, lies, lies, continuous lies”. Earlier, MKP 3 July dropped its court challenge against results of May elections.

Gunmen targeted lawyer and officials tackling corruption. Two gunmen 18 July tried to assassinate lawyer in Durban city working for govt on high-profile tax inquiry; police minister 19 July promised swift action against “attack on our democracy”. Earlier in Johannesburg, gunmen 11 July killed local govt investigator working on corruption in municipality. 

In other important developments. U.S. 23 July announced sanctions against two South Africa-based individuals for enabling activities of Islamic State (ISIS) and its leaders in eastern, central and southern Africa; Washington accused them of transferring funds and serving as critical links between ISIS branches in DR Congo, Mozambique and Somalia, and ISIS cells in South Africa. Security forces 25 July raided suspected military training camp run by private security company near White River town, Mpumalanga province, and arrested 95 Libyan nationals for allegedly misrepresenting their visa status.

Ahead of annual regional SADC summit, authorities intensified repression against civil society and political opposition. 

Govt intensified repression of opponents and critical voices. Ahead of 17 Aug southern African regional body SADC summit in capital Harare, authorities cracked down on opposition, including with wave of arrests and detentions. High court 17 July denied bail to over 70 opposition party Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC) activists including interim party leader Jameson Timba; group charged in June with intent to promote public violence. Armed police 24 July reportedly raided National Students Union meeting in Harare, taking dozens into custody including union leader; union members reported security forces beat some students, causing injuries, and forced others to pay fines to secure release; police alleged that they were called in to “maintain law and order” after violent altercations broke out. Police 31 July arrested and detained 13 CCC party members, including MP John Houghton, in Kariba town, Mashonaland West province, for staging peaceful demonstration; security forces same day detained four human rights activists, forcibly removing them from plane they had boarded at Harare airport; Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights alleged activists were detained “incommunicado” for eight hours and said one was tortured. Earlier, police 3 July arrested, and later released without charge, six people associated with local media organisation Community Voices Zimbabwe during meeting in Gokwe town, Midlands province. Human rights organisations including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch decried increased repression of dissenting voices in build up to SADC meeting and called on body to speak out. Amid ruling ZANU-PF party’s unease over potential anti-govt protests at summit, President Mnangagwa 24 July called for “peace and stability” around event. 

In another important development. High court 22 July exonerated opposition leader Job Sikhala, clearing him of two criminal charges of inciting public violence and publishing falsehoods, for which he spent nearly 600 days in pre-trial detention.

Govt prepared to resume operations against Al-Shabaab as militants conducted further attacks; clan conflicts spiked, leaving dozens killed in Jubaland state. 

Preparations for counter-insurgency offensive continued. In build-up to long-promised resumption of military campaign against Al-Shabaab, President Mohamud early July held meetings with security officials and visited frontlines including Waragadhi area of Middle Shabelle region (centre). Smaller operations continued elsewhere including in Hirshabelle state (centre), as govt and allied clan militias 11 July seized Burweyn and Shaw villages east of Shabelle river in expansion of operations’ focus from river’s western bank. In Jubaland state (south) security forces 10 July captured Harbole and Miido villages between Afmadow and Kismayo towns; but Al-Shabaab continued to pose threat and 22 July attacked the two villages as well as recently recaptured town Buulo Xaaji; group, however, failed to defeat Jubaland forces, incurring heavy casualties. Militants also carried out attacks in capital Mogadishu including 13 July jail break attempt that left eight dead, and car bomb that killed five and injured 20 next day near Presidential Palace.

Clan violence remained high in several states. In Jubaland, clash between security units 5 July in Luuq district, Gedo region, in following days snowballed into clan-based conflict, killing at least 30 and displacing 42,000; state officials 9 July visited area and secured initial ceasefire ahead of further mediation. Clan violence also recorded in July along Galmudug-Puntland state border and in Lower Shabelle region (South West state). Meanwhile, local militia 15 July attacked convoy carrying armaments near Abudwaq town, Galmudug state (centre), killing at least ten and seizing heavy weaponry, raising concerns about arms proliferation.

Tensions continued ahead of federal member states elections. Ahead of federal member state elections, due in Nov but surrounded by uncertainty, Jubaland parliament 2 July amended state constitution to abolish term limits and pave way for incumbent state President Madobe to stand again.

Ankara attempted to mediate between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa. Amid continued tensions over Ethiopia-Somaliland port deal, Türkiye 1 July announced it had facilitated indirect talks between FM Fiqi and his Ethiopian counterpart; officials did not reach agreement but committed to further talks on 2 Sept. 

Authorities affirmed November schedule for party and presidential elections, while ties with Somalia remained strained.

Electoral preparations continued despite political tensions. Amid speculation govt was seeking to delay concurrent party and presidential elections, election commission 6 July and cabinet 10 July reiterated polls would be held as scheduled on 13 Nov; electoral body also cautioned against “interfering” with its work or “spreading false information” about election process. 

Tensions with Mogadishu remained high. Govt 16 July expressed “grave concern” over arms proliferation in Somalia and “Mogadishu govt’s apparent inability to secure its arms”, called for reinstatement of UN arms embargo after militia previous day seized heavy weaponry near Abudwaq town, Galmudug state (see Somalia). Hargeisa 23 July also reaffirmed “significance” of its deal with Ethiopia for diplomatic recognition in return for access to port, asserting its “sovereign right” to engage in relations and agreements with other nations.