June 2024

Political tensions heightened amid implementation of national dialogue’s proposed reforms.

Constitutional revision process received mixed reactions within political class. Recommendations from April national dialogue that political parties be suspended, and that former ruling Democratic Party of Gabon leaders have three-year ineligibility from office imposed, remained contentious; opposition parties argued measures exceeded legal bounds. Meanwhile, revision of electoral roll ahead of upcoming 2025 elections began 24 June, sparking opposition calls for transparency in process. Opposition accused interior ministry – which national dialogue recommended be in charge of running elections – of bias in favour of transitional President Nguema. Amid growing concerns, PM Ndong Sima 18 June affirmed efforts to implement as many dialogue recommendations as possible ahead of pivotal Dec 2024 constitutional referendum, but stated enacting “all” will be impossible, while Institutional Reform Minister 28 June stated govt already implementing some recommendations and would not reverse course.

In another important development. Main opposition figure Albert Ondo Ossa 11 June called for release of “genuine” results of Aug 2023 presidential election, asserting himself as rightful winner and denouncing perceived authoritarian tendencies during transition; coup d’état occurred shortly after announcement that incumbent President Ali Bongo Ondimba had won re-election. 

Junta kept tight control over political parties and media, while forcing aside former military ally; Russia sought further influence over Conakry.

Junta tightened control over political parties and media. Govt 19 June began evaluation of political parties’ compliance with rules on their activities including financing, only one year after last assessment; in lead up, opposition Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea (UFDG) VP Fodé Oussou Fofana 6 June described process as “way of keeping busy, of distracting, of finding alibis to avoid getting to essential issues” and voiced fears govt might ban main opposition parties, while UFDG leader and former PM Cellou Dalein Diallo same day expressed doubts about junta’s intention to restore constitutional order. Media regulatory body 13 June suspended two of its commissioners after they accused President Col. Doumbouya of giving money to media owners to gain favours; latter same day filed defamation complaint against suspended commissioners. Against backdrop of restrictions on press freedom, Guinean Social Forces Forum, comprising civil society actors, 22 June called for civil disobedience and strike action until restoration of media rights and release of jailed journalists.

Authorities imprisoned former army chief of staff Sadiba Koulibaly, who later died. Military court 14 June sentenced Koulibaly, previously prominent Doumbouya ally, to five years in prison for “desertion and illegal possession of weapons” and removed him from army; junta same day dismissed 40 officers and non-commissioned officers for desertion. Govt 25 June announced Koulibaly had died in prison of cardiac arrest, but lawyers’ union 27 June called for independent investigation as much remained unclear about circumstances surrounding death. Case raised speculation that ruling elite may be concerned about internal discord and threats to Doumbouya’s position.

Govt enhanced ties with Russia. Russian FM Lavrov 3 June began Africa tour with visit to capital Conakry, meeting Doumbouya and FM Kouyaté; both sides expressed commitment to strengthening security, diplomatic and economic cooperation, although Doumbouya also said “Guinea remains an open, sovereign country that cooperates with everyone”.

Nationwide unrest over finance bill left dozens of protesters dead as demonstrators stormed parliament, with hundreds injured or detained; police mission to Haiti began deployment.

Unrest erupted as thousands demonstrated over proposed tax increases. Spontaneous protests, largely driven by middle-class youths organising themselves on social media, 18 June erupted in capital Nairobi against controversial finance bill containing new taxes that many fear will raise already high cost of living and cause job losses; police arrested dozens and used tear gas and water cannons, wounding several demonstrators. Parliamentary finance committee same day announced it would drop certain clauses, although many controversial levies remained including on cancer treatments and female sanitary products. As protests 20 June resumed and spread to towns and cities nationwide, clashes with security forces reportedly left 200 injured; in Nairobi, police allegedly shot and killed one protester, while another reportedly died when hit by tear gas canister. Demonstrators 25 June stormed parliament after lawmakers passed bill, setting fire to parts of building; medic groups said at least 23 killed as police allegedly shot live-rounds to disperse demonstrators. President Ruto next day said he would not sign bill into law and would engage in dialogue with youth. Protests persisted 27 June, albeit at smaller scale, with some members of defence forces deployed in Nairobi to ensure calm.

Attacks bearing Al-Shabaab hallmark persisted in north east. Gunmen 2 June killed village elder in Malamande village in Lamu county, while police 5 June discovered explosive device at border point with Somalia in Mandera county, and assailants 7 June killed four construction workers near border in Garissa county. 

Nairobi-led multinational police mission to Haiti arrived after delays. Amid domestic opposition challenging legality of deployment of 1,000 Kenyan police to lead UN-backed mission to Haiti, Kenyan police chief 18 June met Haitian counterpart to assure him of support, while U.S. same day authorised over $100mn to support mission; first batch of several hundred Kenyan officers 25 June arrived in Haiti (see Haiti). 

Ruling coalition secured majority in parliament in May legislative elections, but political climate remained tense with reports of widespread fraud.

Political tensions remained high in immediate aftermath of 29 May legislative elections. Notably, demonstrations 30 May broke out in Tsihombe municipality, Androy district, with electoral office set on fire as opposition denounced apparent irregularities in vote such as ballot stuffing; country’s largest electoral observation mission, Safidy Observatory, 1 June denounced “worrying incidents” during polls including distribution of money and food to voters by candidates, and questioned neutrality of National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI); candidates from President Rajoelina’s Irmar political alliance same day accused opposition of paying for votes. After CENI provisional results 11 June showed Irmar had won relative majority, High Constitutional Court 27 June rejected most opposition complaints and gave three additional seats to govt coalition, announcing Irmar had secured 84 out of 163 parliamentary seats, while main opposition alliance of two former presidents won 22. Meanwhile, authorities 17 June released under judicial supervision independent MP who had filed complaint about election-day irregularities and who police had arrested 31 May for allegedly organising protests in Tsihombe.

Industrial action compelled authorities to back down over union leader’s arrest; tensions rose among ruling powers.

Union action forced govt to reverse arrest, but civil liberties crackdown continued. Authorities 5 June arrested Hamadoun Bah, head of banking union and deputy leader of country’s largest union, on forgery charges amid union dispute; unions criticised arrest, which some see as likely tied to Bah’s criticism of justice system. Following arrest, bank and gas stations 6-10 June held strikes backed by other unions, demanding unionist’s release. After apparent intervention by President Col. Goïta, authorities 10 June freed Bah. Meanwhile, imprisoned former head of state security Kassoum Goïta and former colonel Alpha Yaya Sangaré remained missing; unidentified individuals 31 May abducted both men from cells. Security forces 8-27 June detained journalist after he covered small anti-govt demonstration in capital Bamako. Authorities 20 June arrested 11 political leaders at private meeting of alliance of political parties and civil society groups, following April suspension of political parties’ activities. 

Rifts between military authorities and civilian PM exposed. PM Maïga 18 June called for continued support to Goïta; in apparent sign of dissatisfaction, however, PM also endorsed M5-RFP political movement’s May statement criticising removal of M5-RFP ministers from office in July 2023 and military’s unilateral decision to prolong transition; move came after late May arrest of chargé de mission at Maïga’s office over his role in statement. Political tensions with opposition continued after govt-in-exile led by former supreme court lawyer Mohamed Chérif Koné formed late May, and Bamako court late May refused to dissolve opposition SADI party led by exiled activist Oumar Mariko; capacity for Koné and Mariko to mobilise major domestic opposition to military authorities remained remote.

Violence persisted across north and centre. Al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims 5 June claimed to have killed Islamic State Sahel Province commander in Fitili area, Gao region (north). Military 13 June reported repelling ambush near Douentza town, Douentza region (centre).

In another important development. Sweden 20 June announced closure of embassies in Bamako and Burkinabé capital Ouagadougou, establishing embassy covering regional activity in Senegalese capital Dakar. 

Islamic State militants remained active in northern Cabo Delgado province; tensions over general elections set for October continued to grow. 

Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISMP) militants remained threat in north. Insurgents continued to move freely around districts of Cabo Delgado including along coast in Macomia, Mocímboa da Praia and Quissanga, with several villages in all three districts left deserted as people feared for safety; reports of presence of group 19 June caused panic in Macomia town, which suffered large-scale assault in May. Violence continued as ISMP 19 June attacked Mbau town, Mocímboa da Praia, where Rwandan and local militia troops are stationed, reportedly killing four civilians; at least one soldier killed same day in Nambala village, Macomia, after triggering explosive device set by insurgents. ISMP also increased activity in Cabo Delgado’s southern districts of Chiúre, Mecufi and Metuge, raising concerns over potential attack near provincial capital Pemba; in Chiúre, residents of Mazeze town 18 June sought refuge in forest amid militant movement nearby. Threat of spillover to neighbouring Nampula province, where militants were spotted 18 June, also remained prevalent. Despite insecurity, govt continued to downplay severity of situation; President Nyusi 16 June said govt and international forces had managed to expel militants from district capitals and destroyed all of group’s permanent bases, although observers questioned assessment. 

Political tensions mounted ahead of Oct votes. Confusion and uncertainty around upcoming general elections remained high with parties and electoral commission differing on electoral calendars, campaigning rules and more. Nyusi’s 30 May veto of revision to electoral law that would have allowed district courts to order recounts fuelled concerns over potential restrictions on free and fair vote; electoral commission 10 June admitted it had inadvertently registered over 800,000 non-existent voters, primarily in ruling FRELIMO party strongholds. Meanwhile, thousands of voters in Cabo Delgado were unable to register or collect voting cards due to insecurity.

Tensions with Benin remained high, while armed groups supporting deposed President Bazoum launched attacks; govt continued reorganising foreign alliances.

Diplomatic standoff with Benin continued with arrest of Nigerien oil workers. Authorities during month persisted with refusal to reopen land border with Benin, while oil exports through shared pipeline continued to face blockages from both govts. Amid tensions, Beninese authorities 5 June arrested five Nigerien nationals working for Chinese-Nigerien operator of pipeline (WAPCo), alleging they fraudulently attempted to access oil terminal and accusing them of spying. Niamey next day blocked oil exports in protest and 8 June reiterated allegations French forces in northern Benin were training “terrorists” to destabilise Niger. After Cotonou 17 June gave three of the detainees 18-month suspended sentence, two former Beninese presidents 25 June travelled to Niger in attempt to ease tensions, though oil exports remained on hold (see Benin). 

Supporters of former president Bazoum launched attacks. Patriotic Liberation Front, pro-Bazoum armed group, 12 and 16 June attacked Niger-Benin pipeline in Dosso region, killing six soldiers in first attack and reportedly putting it out of commission in second; another group supporting Bazoum, Patriotic Front for Justice, 21 June kidnapped regional official and four others, reportedly killing another, in Bilma city, Agadez region; both groups called on China to cancel oil exports until Bazoum freed. Meanwhile, supreme court 14 June lifted Bazoum’s immunity in treason case.

Jihadist violence persisted in Diffa and Tillabery regions. In Diffa, military 11 June reportedly clashed with Boko Haram near Bagara village, six militants killed. In Tillabery, Islamic State Sahel Province 9 June killed 24 civilians in two attacks in Tera department, while militants likely affiliated with al-Qaeda 25 June killed at least 20 soldiers and one civilian near Tassia village.

Govt continued military and international realignment. Russian Deputy Defence Minister 3 June met President Gen. Tiani and PM Zeine to discuss defence and energy cooperation. Withdrawal of U.S. troops formally began 7 June, to be completed by 15 Sept. Meanwhile, authorities 2o June revoked French company Orano’s operating permit for uranium mine.

Insecurity remained widespread as jihadist, bandit and separatist violence persisted despite security forces’ operations against armed groups.

Army reported gains against jihadists in North East, but groups remained threat. Govt’s “clearance campaign” against Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) and Boko Haram militants around Lake Chad and Sambisa Forest in Borno state made some gains including troops 2-6 June raiding four ISWAP camps in Bama, Marte and Ngala areas, reportedly killing over 100 insurgents; soldiers 15 June destroyed multiple ISWAP camps around southern shore of Lake Chad, rescuing 34 women and children held captive by group. ISWAP, however, continued attacks on civilian population in north east of Borno in attempt to reassert control. Notably, militants 10 June abducted unconfirmed numbers of travellers along Maiduguri-Damaturu highway. Three suspected female suicide bombers 29 June attacked several locations in Gwoza town, near Cameroon border, killing 32 people and wounding 42.

Banditry remained widespread in North West and North Central zones. Security forces continued ground and air campaign against armed groups including Kaduna state govt 13 June saying it had killed notorious bandit leader alias Buharin Yadi and almost 40 others in Giwa and Sabuwa areas, while airstrikes 15 June killed over 80 armed group members in Katsina state’s Faskari area. Despite military operations, armed groups continued attacks and abductions including in Kaduna, Katsina, Niger and Sokoto states. Notably, in Katsina, gunmen 4 June killed at least 30 in several villages in Dutsin-Ma and Safana areas, while in Kankara area bandits 9 June killed 26 people including four police officers and kidnapped dozens in two villages. In Sokoto, armed group 16 June attacked village in Gwadabawa area, killing six and abducting over 100. 

South East recorded uptick in violence between security forces and separatists. In Abia state, troops 8 June raided camp of separatist group Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) armed wing Eastern Security Network (ESN) in Arochukwu area, killing six. Authorities blamed IPOB/ESN for 11 June killing of two police officers and one civilian in Ikeduru area, Imo state. 

Govt continued bellicose rhetoric against DR Congo (DRC), as leaked UN report suggested Kigali’s heavy involvement in neighbour’s security crisis; diplomatic initiatives remained moribund.

Kigali maintained criticism of Kinshasa govt. During 20 June press interview, President Kagame accused Congolese President Tshisekedi of reviving “genocidal ideology” targeting Congolese Tutsis and asserted govt “ready” to engage in conflict with DRC, but refused to confirm presence of Rwandan troops in neighbouring country; comments came in response to Tshisekedi’s repeated accusations since Dec 2022 of Rwanda’s support to Congolese M23 rebels and involvement in “genocide” in eastern DRC. UN Panel of Experts report leaked early June reiterated Rwandan military involvement in DRC, reporting Kigali had at least 4,000 troops in North Kivu province; report also highlighted increased Rwandan support for Burundian RED-Tabara rebels following Burundi’s troop deployment in DRC. 

Regional diplomacy continued to stall. Luanda process to bring DRC and Rwanda to negotiating table remained moribund with little sign of improvement; Angolan President João Lourenço 27 June said he was negotiating to organise meeting between Kagame and Tshisekedi “very soon”, but Congolese PM Judith Suminwa same day during visit to displacement camp in eastern DRC said Kinshasa would not negotiate with Kigali.

In another important development. National Electoral Commission 14 June announced Kagame, Frank Habineza of Democratic Green Party and independent Philippe Mpayimana as candidates for 15 July presidential election.

Al-Shabaab conducted large-scale assault on central town while Jubaland forces took back area outside Kismayo city; clan violence persisted while tensions remained high with Ethiopia. 

Militants conducted attack in centre, security forces advanced in south. In most significant attack in Galmudug state (centre) since March, Al-Shabaab 8 June launched assault on govt forces in Ceel Dheere town; militants initially overran army positions and entered town but troops forced them back and regained some territory toward Ali Yabal village; authorities claimed to have killed 47 militants and reported loss of five soldiers. In Jubaland state (south), security forces began clearing road between Kismayo and Kulbiyow towns, 10 June seizing Buulo Xaaji town. As drawdown of AU mission (ATMIS) continued, AU Peace and Security Council 20 June endorsed post-ATMIS mission to focus on securing key urban centres and logistical nodes. Concerns remained high over Islamic State (ISIS)’s growing profile after U.S. in May conducted first anti-ISIS operations in country since Jan 2023 with airstrike in Bari region (Puntland state).

Clan violence erupted, notably in Galmudug. Clashes between Marehaan and Dir sub-clans 8 June erupted in Laandheere village, Abudwaq district, Galgaduud region, killing over 50. Other clashes reported in June between various clans in Galgaduud, Lower Shabelle and Mudug regions as govt’s previous reconciliation efforts appeared to have failed to resolve grievances or stem violence.

Ethiopia-Somaliland port deal continued to aggravate govt. Despite reported Turkish attempts to mediate between Mogadishu and Addis Ababa and Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani 12 June speaking to President Mohamud and Ethiopian PM Abiy in separate calls, little progress made towards rapprochement. Concerns grew over impact of tensions on security as govt officials late May-early June asserted Ethiopian forces would not be part of security picture post-ATMIS unless Addis Ababa retracts deal with Hargeisa; govt’s ambassador to UN 24 June accused Ethiopian troops of cross-border “incursion” into Hiraan region.

In other important developments. Puntland President Said Deni 15 June declared readiness for direct talks with federal govt over issues of contention. UN Security Council 6 June elected Somalia to non-permanent seat for two-year term starting Jan 2025.