

annual
report
2006

review of 2005
plans for **2006**



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*as at 15 January 2006
from April 2006



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Front and back cover photos: Maoist soldiers in Nepal. © Tomas van Houtryve
Above photo: Ethiopian soldier overlooks Eritrean border, November 2005. © AFP/Marco Longari

From the Co-Chairs

Christopher Patten

It is, I know, counter-intuitive but the world has got a lot better at preventing conflicts and the horrors that can arise from them. When you skim the headlines in the morning's papers or surf the news channels in the evening, it doesn't seem like that – with the news of violence from Iraq to Sudan to West Africa to Colombia and back again. But the number of wars has fallen dramatically within the last fifteen years, plus the casualties resulting from these conflicts.

Why? Well, it's partly the result of the end of the Cold War, and all the proxy wars that it generated. But it's also because when we can summon the political will, leadership, commitment and resolve, we can actually prevent conflicts from starting and end the ones that have already begun.

That's where Crisis Group can and does help. Others do very valuable bits of the work we do: no one offers the whole package. Our experts on the ground in trouble spots around the world allow us to publish smart and knowledgeable analysis of what's going on, intelligent warnings of impending conflict, assessment of the options for preventing it and specific recommendations to leaders of the international community on how to snuff out the trouble. We don't just write academically respectable essays; and we don't trade in eye-catching headlines. Our speciality is sober and reasoned analysis, whether Sudan is the issue, Kosovo, Nepal, Iran or the other countries in which we operate: analysis and then practical recommendations for policy-makers.

As Europe's Commissioner for External Relations from 1999-2004, I was an enthusiastic user of Crisis Group's work. Having moved on from Brussels, I am proud now to be associated with the organisation. We provide a class act through over a hundred first-rate staff around the world. I hope through these pages, or through looking at our website, you'll be encouraged to find out more about us, to use what we produce and perhaps to give us your support.



Christopher Patten Co-Chair

Lord Patten of Barnes, Chancellor of Oxford University, is a former European Commissioner for External Relations, Governor of Hong Kong, and UK Cabinet Minister. He has been Co-Chair of Crisis Group since November 2004.

Thomas Pickering

It is a great honour to join the International Crisis Group as Co-Chair of the Board of Trustees. During my diplomatic career, I came to recognise that the capacity of policy-makers and diplomats to promote international peace and conflict prevention and resolution is only as good as the information they have at their disposal. This is where Crisis Group has its greatest contribution.

When Crisis Group came on the scene a decade ago, it filled a clear need for hard-hitting and tough-minded analysis and policy recommendations that draw on a wealth of practical experiences. Crisis Group researchers, analysts and advocates are smart, savvy, and sophisticated. Their counsel is given great credence in the corridors of power throughout the world.

There's ample evidence to show that this strategy of fact-based advocacy is improving the efforts of the international community in preventive diplomacy, conflict resolution, peacekeeping, and post-conflict reconstruction. Over the past year, Crisis Group has again demonstrated its worth: supporting peace processes in Africa and the Balkans; promoting good governance in Central Asia and Latin America; identifying threats to international peace from terrorists in South and Southeast Asia; and articulating a clear vision for resolving the nuclear standoffs in North Korea and Iran and the cross-Strait tension between China and Taiwan.

But no organisation can rest on its laurels – it must prove itself relevant to the emerging challenges every day. In the darkest corners of the world, Crisis Group must remain the eyes, the ears, and the conscience of the international community. From Afghanistan to Angola, from Congo to Colombia, from Pakistan to Philippines, Crisis Group must continue to provide real-time ground truth. I look forward to working closely with Chris Patten in helping lead this outstanding organisation to build on its record and remain, as UN Secretary General Kofi Annan said, "a global voice of conscience and a genuine force for peace."



Thomas R. Pickering Co-Chair

Ambassador Thomas Pickering is a former U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Ambassador to the UN, India, Russia, Israel, El Salvador, Nigeria, and Jordan, and Senior Vice President for International Relations at Boeing. He joins the Crisis Group Board as Co-Chair in April 2006.

The International Crisis Group has now firmly established itself as the influential conflict prevention and resolution organisation that our founders in 1995 wanted it to be. We have a truly global reach, with over 110 full-time staff, among them many of the world's foremost experts in their field, working on some fifty areas of actual and potential conflict across Africa, Asia, the Middle East, Europe and Latin America.

There is a large and rapidly growing international audience for the reports and briefings Crisis Group produces – 95 of them in 2005, plus the monthly CrisisWatch bulletin. That increased visibility is demonstrated most graphically by visits to our website, which jumped from 1.8 million in 2004 to an extraordinary 3.4 million (with each averaging over 15 minutes) in 2005. Our reports, sent directly to over 20,000 targeted policy-makers and those who influence them, and over 40,000 other subscribers, were cited over 10,000 times in the international media.

It is always difficult to measure the extent to which visibility translates into influence, but as this report documents, Crisis Group has had a major hand in shaping international policy over the past year in a wide range of conflict, and potential conflict, situations. For example:

- ✘ In **Darfur**, the **Democratic Republic of the Congo**, and **Northern Uganda** – the 'big three' African conflicts, as measured by continuing high war-related death rates – we worked intensively to sustain international attention on the first, and significantly increase it in the latter two;
- ✘ In **Somalia**, we played a central, and probably decisive, role in causing regional governments to step back from a rushed deployment of a highly controversial peacekeeping force, which almost certainly would have resulted in an explosive new civil war;
- ✘ In **Iraq**, our warning that the rushed and non-inclusive constitutional process could hasten the country's violent breakup without a last-ditch effort to bring Shiites, Kurds and Sunni Arabs together helped spur the U.S. to broker a crucial pre-election compromise;
- ✘ In **Central Asia**, we played a leading role in the **Kyrgyzstan** government's resistance of pressure from **Uzbekistan** to forcibly return the hundreds of refugees who had fled the May violence in Andijon; and in getting strong language into a U.S. Senate bill conditioning aid to, and in the EU's imposition of targeted sanctions on, Uzbekistan;
- ✘ In **Liberia**, our repeated calls for international revenue controls as critical for the peacebuilding transition were largely adopted by the international community and the transitional government;
- ✘ In **Kosovo**, our reporting and advocacy campaign encouraged the major Western countries to at last come to grips with the final status question and focus on how a conditional independence could be achieved;

From the President

- ✘ In **Nepal**, we played a leading role in generating international opposition to the royal coup and understanding of the conflict with the Maoist insurgents, publishing seven reports in 2005;
- ✘ In **Indonesia**, our work on radical Islamism remained required reading for donors, security and intelligence agencies inside and outside the country, and the diplomatic community; and
- ✘ In the southern **Caucasus**, we helped generate renewed momentum late in the year to resolve the long-running conflict between **Armenia** and **Azerbaijan** over Nagorno-Karabakh, probably the biggest obstacle to stability in this region.

It is a frustrating characteristic of conflict prevention effort that if you succeed nothing happens, and nobody notices – whether that effort is by governments or international organisations or NGOs, and whether in Burundi or Somalia or Kosovo or the Caucasus or Central Asia or anywhere else. But the fact is that the hard, grueling grind of conflict prevention and resolution efforts – week in, week out, using the whole toolbox of measures from diplomacy to development to the deployment of peacekeepers – really does work.

The landmark *Human Security Report*, published in 2005, has shown us that the number of conflicts and violent deaths worldwide has in fact dropped dramatically since the early 1990s, and this has been due more than anything else to international efforts, most of them led by the UN, in preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. NGOs and other civil society actors have, in turn, played a crucially important part in encouraging that effort, with Crisis Group's expert analysis, advice and advocacy generally acknowledged to be now leading the field.

None of the growth in our visibility and impact would have been possible without the continued support of our donors – governments and foundations, private individuals and public corporations. All of us at Crisis Group are deeply grateful for their confidence in our ability to make a difference.



Hon Gareth Evans AO QC President and CEO

Gareth Evans served as Australian Foreign Minister from 1988 to 1996. He has been President of Crisis Group since 2000.

Crisis Group's mission

Crisis Group was established in 1995 by a group of prominent international citizens and foreign policy specialists who were appalled by the international community's failure to act effectively in response to the crises in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda. Their aim was to create a new organisation, wholly independent of any government, which would help governments, international organisations and the world community at large prevent or at least contain deadly conflict – and, if and when prevention failed, try to resolve it.

Our primary goal is prevention – to persuade those capable of altering the course of events to act in ways that reduce tensions and meet grievances, rather than letting them fester and explode into violent conflict.

Crisis Group's approach has three basic elements:

Expert field research and analysis: Crisis Group's credibility is founded on its field-based research. Teams of Crisis Group analysts are permanently based in or near many of the world's trouble spots, where there is concern about the possible outbreak of conflict, its escalation, or its recurrence. Their main task is to find out what is happening and why. They identify the underlying political, social and economic factors creating the conditions for conflict as well as the more immediate causes of tension. They find the people that matter, and discover what or who influences them. They study the factors outside the country that may be contributing to the conflict. And they consider the actual and potential role for other countries and international organisations to help defuse the crisis. That knowledge then has to be converted into succinct, timely and readable reports and briefing papers.

Practical, imaginative, policy prescriptions: Crisis Group's role is not merely to understand conflict but to prevent, contain and resolve it. That means identifying the levers that can be pulled and those who can pull them. There are many different tools in the conflict prevention and resolution toolbox: diplomatic and political; legal; financial and economic; and ultimately, military. Some of these tools are applicable in-country, requiring action by the national government or local actors; others require the commitment of other governments or international organisations to be effective. Some need to be applied in the short term; for others the lead time is longer. Some will be within the current market place of received ideas; others will be over the horizon, too far away for many to be able or willing to reach but nonetheless the right way forward. But in every case the need is the same: to identify policy responses that are within the capacity of policy-makers to apply and that, if applied, will help to prevent or resolve deadly conflict.

Effective, high-level advocacy: Identifying the problem and the appropriate response is still only part of the story. Often the risk or reality of conflict will be known, and the policies that need to be applied to address the situation will also be reasonably well understood. The missing ingredient will be the "political will" to take the necessary action. Crisis Group's task is not to lament its absence but to work out how to mobilise it. That means persuading policy-makers directly or through others who influence them, not least the media. That in turn means having the right arguments: moral, political, legal or financial. And it means having the ability to effectively deploy those arguments, rationally or emotionally as the case may require, with people of the right credibility and capacity.

Crisis Group's method



Betty Bigombe and John Prendergast, Uganda



Crisis Group Board meeting, Washington DC, 2005

64 worked in the field, from fourteen major regional locations and a number of smaller ones: the others worked from our Brussels headquarters, and major-city advocacy offices. Between them, Crisis Group staff represented 44 nationalities and spoke 52 languages.

Based full-time on the ground in crisis areas, field staff develop, to the extent possible, important relationships with government and opposition sources, public servants, military and paramilitary leaders, municipal officials, academics, journalists and leaders of civil society. Security is often an issue, requiring, in some cases, operating on a non-disclosed basis.

Determining policy

In the initial drafting of reports and briefing papers, field analysts work with Crisis Group's capital-based regional program directors. A research team in Brussels also provides input, especially on EU and NATO developments, while our Washington and New York advocacy offices assist with U.S. and UN perspectives.

The policy prescriptions attached to nearly all Crisis Group reports are settled by the President with input from field and senior staff, program directors, Board members, and consultation with governments, inter-governmental organisations, academic specialists, think-tanks and other NGOs. The object is always to produce recommendations that are relevant, dispassionate, candid, sharply focused and capable of practical implementation, even if beyond current limits of political acceptability.

How does Crisis Group go about implementing its mission? What did the organisation do in 2005 to advance it?

Deciding on projects

Four basic criteria are applied – How serious is the actual or potential conflict? Can Crisis Group add value to international understanding and response in preventing and resolving it? Do we have, or can we raise, the necessary resources to employ new field staff? And do we have, or can we get, the necessary central resources to ensure high quality final reporting and effective follow-through advocacy?

In 2005 our presence in the Middle East continued to expand, with the basing of analysts in Jerusalem and Beirut. In Europe, by contrast, the Balkans project was further wound back with the closure of our Belgrade and Skopje offices, leaving Pristina as our sole Balkans presence - though we will continue to report on the wider region. In light of the more stable security situation in Colombia, our Colombia/Andes project office was moved from Quito back to Bogotá.

Operating in the field

Crisis Group's field analysts are experienced former diplomats, journalists, academics and NGO staff, often leading world experts in their fields. Of 110 full-time staff by the end of 2005,

Getting the story out

Strong advocacy means disseminating the product as widely and effectively as possible, making sure that policy-makers hear the message and then persuading them to take action. In 2005, basic distribution continued to expand: by direct mail to nearly 4,200 senior policy-makers and those who influence them; by email notification or attachment of reports and papers to over 17,000 targeted "influentials", and another 43,000 recipients subscribing through the Crisis Group website. All our publications were posted on our website, www.crisisgroup.org, which in 2005 received 3.4 million visitors, with 2.3 million reports being downloaded during the course of the year.

Media exposure is important for Crisis Group's effectiveness and has increased significantly each year since 2000. Monitored mentions in major international print and electronic media of Crisis Group reports rose significantly in 2005 to 4,332 (or 10,261 if repeats of the same story are counted). In addition, there were 128 Crisis Group tag-lined comment and opinion pieces in major national and international newspapers in 2005 (up from 105 in 2004).

High-level advocacy

Much of Crisis Group's most successful advocacy is done behind closed doors. Our major advocacy offices, in Brussels, Washington DC and New York, continued to ensure Crisis Group had the access and influence at the highest levels of the U.S. and European governments, the UN, EU and NATO; our London office continued to strengthen Crisis Group's high profile and influence in the UK; and our Moscow liaison office improved our access to Russian officials. All Crisis Group offices, both advocacy and field, receive a regular flow of senior political and official visitors.

Operations

Brussels, Belgium (HQ)

Established 1997: coordinates all Crisis Group field operations, research, report production and distribution, media relations, and European and international advocacy

London, UK

Established 2002: coordinates fund-raising with government and major foundations; advocacy base for visiting Crisis Group staff

New York, U.S.

Established 2001: advocacy with the UN Secretariat, diplomatic corps and media, liaison with the philanthropic community, and policy input

Washington DC, U.S.

Established 1997: advocacy with the Administration, Capitol Hill and the U.S. media, and policy input

Moscow, Russia

Established 2003: liaison office, and advocacy base for visiting Crisis Group staff

Balkans

Regional office: Pristina

Established 1996 in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Pristina office opened 1997. Covers Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia and Serbia and Montenegro.

Caucasus

Regional office: Tbilisi

Established 2003: focuses on security and governance in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.

Moldova

Established 2003: addresses the Transdnistria conflict and governance issues.

Egypt / North Africa

Regional office: Cairo

Established 1998 in Algeria: Cairo office opened 2003. Monitors developments in Egypt and across North Africa, with a focus on understanding variants of Islamism and political transition strategies

Arab-Israeli Conflict

Regional office: Amman

Established 2001: addresses the situation in Israel, Palestine, Syria and Lebanon, focusing on peace and political transition strategies

Iran / Iraq / Gulf

Regional office: Amman

Established 2002: addresses governance and security in Iraq and Iran, Islamism and political transition in Saudi Arabia and Gulf states, and sources of terrorism



North East Asia

Regional office: Seoul

Established 2002: covers the crisis surrounding North Korea's nuclear program and Taiwan Strait tensions

Central Asia

Regional office: Bishkek

Established 2000: addresses governance issues, Islamism and political transition strategies in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan

South Asia

Regional office: Islamabad

Established 2001: focuses on security and governance in Pakistan; peacebuilding in Afghanistan; and the conflicts in Nepal, Kashmir and Sri Lanka

South East Asia

Regional office: Jakarta

Established 2000: focuses on separatist and communal violence, governance issues, and sources of terrorism in Indonesia, Myanmar/Burma, the Philippines and Thailand

Covered by Field Analysts

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan (including Nagorno-Karabakh), Bangladesh, Bahrain, Bolivia, Burundi, Chad, China (Taiwan Strait), Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, DR Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Georgia, Guinea, Haiti, India (Kashmir), Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Liberia, Macedonia, Mauritania, Moldova, Morocco, Myanmar/Burma, Nepal, Nigeria, North Korea, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, the Sahel region, Saudi Arabia, Serbia & Montenegro, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Western Sahara, Zimbabwe

CrisisWatch Monitoring Only:

Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central African Republic, China (internal), Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Fiji, Guinea-Bissau, India (non-Kashmir), Kenya, Libya, Maldives, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Russia (Chechnya/North Caucasus), Spain (Basque Country), Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Togo, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom (Northern Ireland), Venezuela, Yemen.

★ Advocacy and Liaison Offices	■ Covered by Field Analysts*
★ Regional and Field Offices	■ CrisisWatch Monitoring Only

*Coverage in 2005 and Planned for 2006

Colombia/Andes/Caribbean

Regional office: Bogota

Established 2001: covers Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, focusing on ending the conflict in Colombia and containing its regional impact; and peacebuilding and political transition in Haiti

West Africa

Regional office: Dakar

Established 1995 in Sierra Leone: covers Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and the Sahel region

Southern Africa

Regional office: Pretoria

Established 2001 in Zimbabwe: Pretoria office opened 2004. Covers Angola, Zimbabwe and South Africa's continental role

Central Africa

Regional office: Nairobi

Established 1998: covers Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda

Horn of Africa

Regional office: Nairobi

Established 2001 in Sudan: focuses on Darfur and the north-south-east Sudan conflict, Somalia, Ethiopia/Eritrea and Chad

Crisis Group in Africa...

2005 saw discouragingly little progress in Africa's deadliest conflicts. The security and humanitarian situation in Darfur remained dire, thousands continued to die from war-related causes each month in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Uganda's peace process stalled.

Central Africa

In 2005, the transitional government in the **Democratic Republic of the Congo** made halting progress towards elections. Delays in the integration of armed groups and in the passing of key laws prompted parliament to postpone the polls until mid-2006, causing rioting in Kinshasa in June. None of the former belligerents relinquished full control of their administrations and armies, and corruption scandals dogged officials. Security improved modestly in Ituri, where MONUC troops launched joint operations against local militias with the newly formed Congolese army. Elsewhere in the east, however, abuses by Rwandan Hutu rebels and Mai-Mai highlighted the weakness of state authority.

Burundi took a major step towards peace with local, legislative and presidential elections ushering in a new government led by former rebel Pierre Nkurunziza. But the government still faced a violent insurrection by FNL rebels, who launched several attacks around Bujumbura. The elections also illustrated the tensions between the two leading Hutu parties, the ruling CNDD-FDD and FRODEBU.

In **Uganda**, talks between the government and LRA rebels stalled when the International Criminal Court unsealed arrest warrants for LRA leaders in October. Over 1.7 million people remained displaced in government-controlled camps in the north. Uganda and the SPLM signed an agreement for joint actions against the militia as the rebels widened their area of operation in southern Sudan and into the Congo. The government also faced stiff domestic opposition in the run-up to presidential elections in March 2006. Dr Kizza Besigye, the leading opposition candidate, was imprisoned on charges of treason and rape.

Crisis Group impact. Crisis Group played a key role in focusing international attention on the **Democratic Republic of the Congo** in 2005. On the heels of three Crisis Group reports on DRC (*The Congo's Transition Is Failing: Crisis in the Kivus*, March; *Solving the FDLR Problem Once and For All*, May; and *A Congo Action Plan*, October), we published a series of op-eds in the *Wall Street Journal*, *Boston Globe*, *Financial Times*, *Christian Science Monitor*, and *International Herald Tribune*. Our Congo action plan, in particular, received widespread coverage, both locally and internationally. Following its publication, Crisis Group was contacted for further discussion by representatives from Congolese political parties, ministers, parliamentarians,

“ Thanks to its distinguished trustees and experts the International Crisis Group has in the span of one decade become a widely respected and influential organisation for promoting conflict prevention and resolution. ”

Condoleezza Rice
U.S. Secretary of State, 28 November 2005

and advisers to President Kabila. The plan also strongly influenced U.S. legislation on the Congo submitted by Congressman Barack Obama. A briefing given by Crisis Group to the UN Security Council in preparation for its November mission to Central Africa led to the adoption of many of our recommendations as key aspects of the Council's agenda for that mission.

In **Uganda**, we met repeatedly with lead negotiator Betty Bigombe and President Museveni and contributed to advancing the peace talks with LRA rebels. We also used the international media to draw public attention to the brutal conflict and highlight opportunities for ending the violence. The U.S. television program ABC Nightline worked with us on a report on northern Uganda, in which Africa Adviser John Prendergast provided commentary alongside actor Don Cheadle. In October, our Africa program director briefed Security Council members on Uganda before their visit to the region in November.

Key issues for Crisis Group in 2006

Democratic Republic of the Congo

- ✘ **Security sector reform:** The newly created Congolese army and police are weak and still strongly influenced by former rebel leaders. Without international intervention, the army will become more a threat to security than its protector.
- ✘ **Elections and their security implications:** Many former belligerents stand to lose power if elections are held. Resort to force to contest the polls remains a risk, as does campaign violence provoked by hate speech and demagoguery.
- ✘ **Promoting good governance:** Stability in the Congo is sharply undermined by its weak institutions and rampant corruption. The international community will need a better developed strategy in engaging with the new government to promote good economic and general governance.

Burundi

- ✘ **Dealing with the FNL:** The FNL are the last remaining rebel group in the country and could become a magnet for various dissident groups. The new government will need to balance military and political incentives in dealing with them.

Uganda

- ✘ **Resolving the LRA conflict:** Military, diplomatic and international criminal prosecution strategies need to be harmonised, ending the violence and misery in northern Uganda once and for all.
- ✘ **Elections and regional stability:** Uganda's democratic process has been called into question by the constitutional amendment in 2005 allowing President Museveni to seek a third term. Regional as well as domestic harmony is in issue, with the president accusing Rwanda of supporting the Ugandan opposition and the Congo of harbouring Ugandan militias.

Horn of Africa

In Darfur, **Sudan**, the security and humanitarian situation remained dire. The African Union mission (AMIS) continued to deploy forces, but protection for civilians was fleeting and divisions among the rebel movements hampered efforts to broker a settlement. At year-end, moves gathered pace to 're-hat' the beleaguered AU force as a UN mission, with many more foreign troops. The January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) formally ended the war between the Khartoum government and the insurgent SPLM. However, implementation remained fragile and the sudden death of SPLM leader John Garang was a serious blow. Conflict simmered in eastern Sudan, where the planned withdrawal of SPLM forces in early 2006 threatened to leave a dangerous security vacuum.

More than a year since the formation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), the situation in **Somalia** remained highly unstable, with the TFG divided into two armed camps: one, led by the president and prime minister, based in Jowhar; the other, led by the speaker of parliament and a coalition of faction leaders, based in Mogadishu. In Somaliland, parliamentary elections on 29 September 2005 took place peacefully, reinforcing moves for the region's independence.

The border dispute between **Ethiopia** and **Eritrea** deteriorated steadily in 2005, with both sides increasing their military preparedness, and Eritrea escalating tensions late in the year by banning helicopter flights by the UN monitoring force and demanding that Western peacekeepers leave the country. Ethiopia's violent suppression of internal dissent weakened its international support.

Crisis Group impact. Crisis Group's reporting and advocacy in 2005 helped raise awareness and shape the international debate on **Darfur**. In March, the Security Council approved three resolutions incorporating many of our recommendations, including an International Commission of Inquiry into atrocity crimes and referral of those responsible to the International Criminal Court (ICC). Our advocacy in Washington played a significant role in overcoming U.S. opposition to an ICC referral. In *The AU's Mission in Darfur: Bridging the Gaps* (July), we called for a stronger mandate for the AU mission (AMIS), more troops, and a multinational bridging force. The report was influential in the ongoing debate about "re-hatting" and reinforcing AMIS. Many of our ideas regarding a political solution to the conflict were reflected in the Darfur Declaration of Principles signed by the parties in July. Crisis Group's role was confirmed by AU Commissioner for Peace and Security Said Djinnit, who remarked that our reporting on the crisis in Darfur had "galvanised" the AU to intervene, and had "profoundly influenced" AU decision-making. AU chief mediator in Darfur Dr Salim Ahmed Salim cited our October 2005 policy briefing, *Unifying the Darfur Rebels: A Prerequisite for Peace*, as required reading for those wishing to understand the complexities of the Abuja peace process.

...Africa

Crisis Group played a decisive role in **Somalia** in 2005. In February, our intervention, by way of targeted letters, press and personal advocacy in the region and New York, was influential in causing Somalia's transitional government to step back from the rushed deployment of a controversial regional peacekeeping force not approved by the Somali parliament. The parliamentary speaker, European Commission, U.S. Mission in Nairobi and Ethiopian sources all emphasised our major role in defusing an explosive situation. A second targeted intervention in July played a critical role in persuading the UN Security Council not to modify the arms embargo on Somalia to enable a regional military intervention. Two reports on Islamism in Somalia in 2005, *Counterterrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds* (July) and *Somalia's Islamists* (December), have since become acknowledged essential reference works for policy-makers and journalists.

Key issues for Crisis Group in 2006

Sudan

✦ **Security in Darfur:** The AU deployment has made only a limited impact, as violence against civilians continues. International political will must be mobilised to deploy a more effective multinational force.

✦ **Comprehensive peace in Sudan:** Peacemaking in Sudan has long suffered from a piecemeal approach. A common framework is required – building on the north-south agreement (CPA) as a point of departure – that addresses power and wealth-sharing across the country.

✦ **CPA update:** The implementation of the CPA lagged in 2005. More support is needed for the Government of Southern Sudan in 2006 in the development of basic administrative structures, representative institutions, revenue management, and demobilisation and reintegration of security forces.

✦ **Chad:** The Darfur conflict has spilled over into Chad and threatens to destabilise the regime in N'djamena. Internal dynamics in Chad are likewise complicating the pursuit of a political settlement for Darfur. Close attention is needed on the linkages between Darfur and Chad and how the deteriorating situation can be addressed.

Somalia

✦ **The Transitional Federal Government:** More than a year since the TFG was formed, a number of key obstacles are preventing progress, demanding attention from both local and international actors.

✦ **Somaliland and the African Union:** Somaliland is expected to apply for membership in the AU during the course of 2006: the merits of its claim to independent statehood will have to be squarely addressed by regional and international actors.

Ethiopia/Eritrea

✦ **Where next in the border dispute?** With the ever-present risk of war again breaking out, new international incentives and pressures will need to be devised to resolve the boundary demarcation issue once and for all and secure normalised relations.

Southern Africa

In **Zimbabwe**, flawed elections in March and November dimmed prospects for democratic reform and deepened political stalemate. The government's brutal Operation Murambatsvina to clear urban slums displaced hundreds of thousands, worsening the country's humanitarian and economic crises. The ruling ZANU-PF continued to snub peace initiatives by the African Union and other regional and international actors while repressing internal dissent. With the opposition splintering and the ruling party beset by in-fighting over the post-Mugabe succession the country's future looked very bleak.

South Africa took bold steps to stem corruption but made slow progress on land reform. The country continued to play an important role supporting African peace initiatives, including those of the AU and UN, but its cautious diplomacy proved unable to stem Zimbabwe's escalating crisis. In **Angola**, there were some advances in electoral and constitutional reform ahead of scheduled September 2006 elections, but the government's push for a military solution to the conflict in oil-rich Cabinda province hampered peace prospects. A new constitution for **Swaziland** did little more than entrench the powers and privileges of the country's absolute monarch, increasing popular frustration and the potential for political violence.

Crisis Group impact. In the wake of **Zimbabwe's** flawed March parliamentary elections and Harare's massive forced urban evictions 48 days later, Crisis Group's President wrote to world leaders setting out steps needed to protect the people of Zimbabwe. In line with our recommendations in *Post-Election Zimbabwe: What Next* (June), the EU and U.S. tightened sanctions on the Zimbabwean leadership, with the U.S. also pegging resumption of normal relations with Harare to genuine political reform. A second report, *Zimbabwe's Operation Murambatsvina: A Tipping Point?* (August), called for greater involvement of former African heads of state in devising a post-Mugabe transition plan. Former Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda held consultations with President Mugabe in December, while South Africa's President Thabo Mbeki also signalled support for our recommendations, albeit without result.



Key issues for Crisis Group in Southern Africa in 2006

✦ **The changing political landscape:** The battle to succeed Mugabe has intensified factional in-fighting within the ruling ZANU-PF, Zimbabwe's military is restive in the face of shrinking incomes, and the MDC has split into rival factions: analysis is needed as to how these factors will combine to reshape Zimbabwe's politics in 2006.

✦ **The future of the African Union:** The AU is at a crossroads, with its standby force delayed, Sudan's chairmanship looming again in 2007, and its underfunded and weakly mandated mission in Darfur hoping to hand off to the United Nations.

✦ **South Africa as peacemaker?** In the face of continuing conflict, autocracy, and instability across Africa, it will be important for South Africa – if it can – to step up its peacemaking efforts, enhance the capacity of the AU, and increase its role in UN missions in Africa.

...Africa

West Africa

The situation in West Africa, though relatively stable, remained fragile in 2005, especially in **Côte d'Ivoire** – where the uneasy stand-off continued between President Gbagbo and his Forces Nouvelles opponents. **Liberia's** prospects looked promising, with transparent, representative elections in November and the Governance and Economic Management Assistance Plan setting the scene for tackling government corruption; President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf's inauguration in January 2006; and training of a new Liberian army commencing. In **Sierra Leone**, the situation had stabilised sufficiently for the UNAMSIL peacekeeping mission to be replaced with the United Nations Integrated Office for Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), which will be responsible for promoting governance and economic growth agendas.

The situation in **Guinea** inched forward, with a number of reforms demanded by the political opposition and donors implemented, in law if not always in practice, and culminating in December municipal elections. The health of President Lansana Conté remained a preoccupation, and the military was widely believed to be poised for a takeover in the case of a power vacuum.

In the **Sahelian region**, U.S. counter-terrorism operations expanded with the Trans-Saharan Counter Terrorism Initiative, adding Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Senegal and Nigeria to the original four countries – Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Chad. **Nigerians** were preoccupied by periodic internal violence, the question of whether President Obasanjo will run for a third term, and whether his anti-corruption program will produce results.

Crisis Group impact. Crisis Group's December 2004 report, *Liberia and Sierra Leone: Rebuilding Failed States*, continued to resonate in 2005, greatly influencing donor policy toward **Liberia**. Key recommendations relating to economic governance were subsequently reproduced in the Economic Governance Action Plan drafted in mid-2005 by the World Bank and the group of International Partners to Liberia. A second report, *Liberia's Elections: Necessary but Not Sufficient* (September), emphasised that elections marked the starting point, not the end point, of the country's struggle to rebuild.

Two reports were published on **Côte d'Ivoire** in 2005: *Côte d'Ivoire: The Worst May Be Yet to Come* (March), and *Côte d'Ivoire: Halfway Measures Will Not Suffice* (October). They were described by one EU official as "the best I have read on Côte d'Ivoire", while UN Special Representative Pierre Schori told Crisis Group that he and the Security Council would be implementing many of the recommendations outlined in the October report. UN Special Advisor on Genocide Juan Mendez noted that Crisis Group was one of only a small number of NGOs whose reporting provided him with the type of information that he requires in order to effectively fulfil his mandate.

A June report on **Guinea**, *Stopping Guinea's Slide*, was widely read within the Guinean government, and many of our recommendations, from opening up freedom of the airwaves to forming an electoral commission to holding communal elections, were subsequently implemented.

Key issues for Crisis Group in West Africa in 2006

Côte d'Ivoire

✦ **Performance of the new government:** Close attention will need to be focused on how the Banny government performs, and can be most effectively supported, in achieving disarmament, revision of electoral lists, and territorial reunification ahead of October 2006 elections.

Liberia

✦ **Liberia's challenges:** Rebuilding shattered infrastructure, full application of the economic governance oversight plan, training a new Liberian army, and addressing the pressing need for judicial reform are the key issues on which President Johnson-Sirleaf must remain focused in 2006.

Guinea

✦ **Building momentum for reforms:** The great challenge will be to continue advancing on reforms made in 2005 under diplomatic and donor pressure, including the opening of airwaves and the constitution of the country's first ever electoral commission.

Nigeria

✦ **President Obasanjo's future:** Key issues affecting stability in 2006 will be President Obasanjo's approach to constitutional changes allowing him to stand for a third term in 2007 elections, and his ability to press his anti-corruption agenda.



Refugees at Intifada IDP camp, Darfur. © D. Mercado



Demonstration in Mogadishu, Somalia. © AFP/A. Musa



Military police unit, Kampala, Uganda. © AFP



Liberians cheer new president Johnson-Sirleaf. © AFP/K. Sia

“The very impressive work that you and your team have carried out over the last decade has allowed the Crisis Group to become a highly influential and inspiring voice in the field of conflict prevention... Your country and regional reports and the monthly Crisis Watch have become documents of reference.”

José Manuel Barroso

President of the European Commission, 9 June 2005

Crisis Group in Asia...

2005 saw mixed results in Asia. A peace agreement in Aceh gave new hope to Indonesians, while Afghanistan held historic elections marking the end of the political transition, if not of its security problems. But there was also a coup in Nepal, growing sectarian violence in Pakistan, a brutal government crackdown in Uzbekistan, a continuing nuclear stalemate with North Korea and no end in sight to the conflict in Sri Lanka.

Central Asia

2005 was a turbulent year in Central Asia. In March, anger over rigged parliamentary elections in **Kyrgyzstan** led to the overthrow of the country's long-serving president Akayev. The administration of his successor Bakiyev has since been paralysed by internal rivalries, as politicians, organised crime leaders, and others have engaged in a chaotic, and sometimes violent, struggle over the country's limited economic assets.

In late May, the trial of 23 local businessmen accused of Islamic radicalism in **Uzbekistan's** city of Andijon ended violently when an armed group stormed a prison and occupied government buildings. Security forces used indiscriminate force to suppress the uprising, and hundreds of unarmed civilians were killed. Several hundred refugees fled to neighbouring Kyrgyzstan. In the wake of the uprising, Uzbek authorities launched a harsh crackdown on human rights activists, journalists, and NGOs.

2005 also saw major geopolitical shifts in the region. Following the Andijon massacre, Uzbekistan, angered by Western calls for an independent inquiry into the events, ordered the U.S. to abandon the airbase it had been using since 2001. With relations with the U.S. and Europe souring, especially after the EU imposed a visa ban on Uzbek officials, Uzbekistan formed a strategic alliance with Russia.

Crisis Group impact. Crisis Group's *Uzbekistan: The Andijon Uprising* (May) was the first major report on the **Uzbekistan** events to appear, and received wide media coverage, including citations in some 46 international newspaper articles and in journalists' questions to U.S. State Department and White House spokesmen. Recommendations on an international investigation into the massacre were incorporated into statements by U.S. Senators and a Senate bill conditioning assistance to Uzbekistan.

Crisis Group played a leading role in influencing the EU to take punitive action, albeit belatedly, against Uzbekistan for the Andijon massacre, with months of sustained advocacy, coordinated with other NGOs, including letters to UK Secretary of State Jack Straw, EU Special Representative to Central Asia Jan Kubis, and EU High Representative Javier Solana. A senior official from Javier Solana's cabinet specifically acknowledged the utility of Crisis Group's pressure and recommendations in the deliberations leading to the sanctions.

“ For 10 years Crisis Group has undertaken the task of predicting and resolving deadly conflicts worldwide - from North Korea, where the group's analysts are widely considered to be the foremost experts on the opaque nation's economic and political maneuvers, to the nuclear-tinged relations between Pakistan and India... Crisis Group's grassroots approach to resolving long-running conflicts is what sets it apart from other think tanks. ”

Time Magazine

“Asia Heroes 2005: International Crisis Group”, Asia Edition, 10 October 2005

As hundreds of refugees from Uzbekistan headed into **Kyrgyzstan**, we worked intensively to raise the profile of the situation in Washington and European capitals, urging Western governments to help Kyrgyzstan resist pressure from Tashkent to forcibly return the refugees. The U.S. State Department included our warnings in internal briefings and issued instructions to its ambassador in Bishkek to make clear U.S. opposition to Uzbek demands for the refugees' involuntary return. Our advocacy efforts culminated in the July 2005 announcement by the Kyrgyz government that it would allow almost all the refugees to be sent to a third country, Romania, rather than be sent back to Uzbekistan.

Key issues for Crisis Group in 2006

- ✦ **Instability in Uzbekistan and the region:** The risk of further unrest in Uzbekistan remains. Neighbouring states will need the assistance of the international community to strengthen their capacities to cope if unrest in one country is not to lead to instability in the wider region.
- ✦ **Reform in Kyrgyzstan:** Kyrgyzstan's new government faces a daunting series of challenges, including constitutional reform, reform of its penal system, and regaining the confidence of investors and its own populace.
- ✦ **Terrorism and organised crime:** Instability, weak states, endemic corruption, and porous borders create ample opportunities for criminal and militant groups throughout the region. Continued attention to security and judicial sector reform, improved border management, and regional cooperation will be essential.
- ✦ **Geopolitical rivalry:** Russia and China have both sought to turn the weakened position of the U.S. in Central Asia to their advantage. Yet if the mutual regional concerns of Russia, China, the U.S. and the EU, particularly drugs trafficking and terrorism, are to be combated effectively, all four sides will need to find avenues of cooperation.

North East Asia

The **North Korean** nuclear crisis ended the year where it started, with Pyongyang refusing to take part in negotiations over its nuclear activities. While there had been some forward momentum during the summer and a glimmer of hope when the countries participating in the six-party talks - the two Koreas, China, Japan, Russia and the United States - issued a statement of principles for resolving the standoff, this was quickly dashed when the North abruptly issued new demands. The talks reached an impasse when Washington subsequently imposed financial sanctions.

Age-old territorial and historical disputes between **Japan, China** and **South Korea** resurfaced in 2005, fueled by rising nationalism. A war of words erupted between South Korea and Japan over Japanese claims to a pair of small islets, while Japanese businesses and diplomatic missions were attacked in China over a controversial Japanese history textbook and government leaders' continuing enthusiasm for visiting the Yakusuni shrine.

Tensions eased across the **Taiwan Strait**, as Beijing cultivated relations with Taiwanese opposition parties and Taiwan's president, Chen Shui-bian, weakened by stinging electoral defeats, backed away from moves to have Taiwan declare its independence from China.

Crisis Group impact. Our Seoul office established itself in 2005 as a leading voice on **North Korea** and the wider region. The October issue of *Time* magazine described Crisis Group's North East Asia analysts as “widely considered the foremost experts on the opaque nation's [North Korea's] economic and political maneuvers.” We used a report on the North Korean economy, *North Korea: Can the Iron Fist Accept the Invisible Hand?* (April), to raise awareness about profound economic changes taking place in the country and to highlight how international assistance could increase the chances of successful economic transition. The report is widely considered a definitive source on North Korea's economy.

Our December report, *North East Asia's Undercurrents of Conflict*, offered concrete recommendations aimed at resolving several complex territorial and historical disputes between **China, Japan** and **South Korea**. The report received extensive coverage in the international press, including *The Financial Times*, *South China Morning Post*, *Asahi Evening News* in Japan and *JoongAng Daily* in Korea, and its recommendations were well received in high-level policy circles in South Korea and the U.S., with very senior officials seeking briefings on it.

Key issues for Crisis Group in 2006

- ✦ **The nuclear talks:** The North Korean nuclear standoff will remain the key issue in 2006. Prospects for progress in the six-party talks are slim, but neither North Korea nor Washington is prepared for a confrontation.
- ✦ **Regional conflicts:** Tensions between Japan and China and South Korea are likely to get worse before they get better. The issue is whether the leaders of these three countries will continue to stoke nationalist sentiment to bolster their domestic positions, thereby risking a serious escalation in tensions, or move in a more conciliatory direction.

...Asia

South Asia

2005 was a landmark year for **Afghanistan**. National Assembly and Provincial Council elections marked the formal end of the political transition, but the inclusion in parliament of human rights abusers stood testament to the climate of impunity. Disarmament and demobilisation of some 60,000 former fighters was declared complete, but reintegration had yet to take place. Despite the expansion of NATO peacekeeping operations to western Afghanistan, the insurgency reached its highest intensity since the Taliban's fall, claiming over 1,000 lives: security anxieties are increasing rather than diminishing.

Nepal experienced major upheaval in 2005. In February, King Gyanendra seized power, justifying the coup on the government's failure to contain the Maoist insurgency and hold elections, but failed to deliver any solutions himself. The major political parties reached an agreement with the Maoists in November, with the rebels committing to join the political mainstream and abandon violence. But the king's failure to reciprocate a unilateral Maoist truce or to offer serious talks stalled progress towards peace.

Rigged local elections deepened internal divisions in **Pakistan**, where the continuing alliance between the military and radical mullahs was evident in the involvement of banned extremist groups in earthquake relief efforts and in the government's decision to offer madrasas legal status without official oversight. Bloody sectarian conflict intensified, and a low-level insurgency in Balochistan threatened to evolve into a full-blown conflict. Meanwhile, the India-Pakistan dialogue process on **Kashmir** continued, but was threatened by continued Line of Control attacks by Pakistan-based insurgents.

Crisis Group impact. In **Afghanistan**, Crisis Group's warning of the risk in deploying U.S.-sponsored warlord militias against the Taliban attracted widespread attention and contributed to the proposal being quickly dropped. Following the publication of *Afghanistan: Getting Disarmament Back on Track* (February), donors reconfigured aspects of the DDR process in light of the report's recommendations. In November, we released a major report examining the EU role, *Rebuilding the Afghan State: The European Union's Role*, which was received favourably by EU officials. One direct result of our recommendations was for the EU special representative and the European Commission head of delegation to begin meeting frequently to better coordinate EU policy.

We maintained a vigorous research and advocacy effort on **Nepal** throughout 2005, publishing a total of seven reports and enhancing understanding of Nepal's conflict and the implications of the February royal coup. *Nepal's Maoists: Their Aims, Structure and Strategy* (October) was widely praised within Nepal and beyond as the most useful guide yet to the Maoist movement and its politics.

A Crisis Group report on judicial reform in **Pakistan** (*Building Judicial Independence in Pakistan*, November 2004) continued to resonate in 2005, with several recommendations picked up by the Pakistani parliament. Our April report, *The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan*, became the primary reader on sectarian conflict in Pakistan for international policy-makers. The findings of a follow-up report, *Authoritarianism and Political Party Reform in Pakistan* (September), were endorsed by the major pro-democracy Pakistani alliance. Crisis Group advocacy at the U.S. Congress helped ensure conditions on governance and education issues were attached to funding for Pakistan in FY2006.

Key issues for Crisis Group in 2006

Afghanistan

- ✦ **Addressing narcotics production:** As producer of 87 per cent of the world's opium, Afghanistan risks becoming a fully-fledged narco-state, with serious security implications both for itself and the world.
- ✦ **Countering the insurgency:** The deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan highlights the importance of understanding domestic sources of the insurgency, cross-border sources from Pakistan, and the involvement of international elements.

Pakistan

- ✦ **Centralisation and the conflict in Balochistan:** Authoritarian central rule and ethnic conflict are intrinsically linked in Pakistan. In the absence of a functioning democracy and the decentralisation of power, Balochistan's crisis could deteriorate further.

Nepal

- ✦ **Key actors in the conflict:** Crisis Group will continue to focus on all the parties to the conflict: the palace, the Royal Nepalese Army, the mainstream political parties, and the Maoists. Themes will include security sector and political party reform.

Kashmir

- ✦ **Sustaining the normalisation process:** Close attention needs to be paid to threats to that process, including the apparent lack of will or ability by Pakistan to end cross-Line of Control attacks by Islamic radicals.

Sri Lanka

- ✦ **Making peace:** Crisis Group will commence a new project in 2006, evaluating peace efforts so far under way and endeavouring to identify ways forward.



“The United Nations has for some time been engaged in efforts to encourage a peaceful and negotiated political solution to the problems that beset Nepal... As we intensify our efforts, your valuable recommendations will be of considerable help.”

Kofi Annan
UN Secretary-General, 28 February 2005

...Asia

“ I am simply amazed and delighted at Crisis Group’s quality, scope, depth, relevance, timeliness, and on-site helpfulness. ”

Fidel Ramos

Former President, Republic of the Philippines, 8 March 2005

South East Asia

In **Indonesia**, the once intractable conflict in Aceh appeared to be nearing an end after the government and guerrillas of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) signed a peace agreement in Helsinki in August. By year’s end, the decommissioning phase was complete, the peace was holding, and hopes were high that remaining hurdles would be overcome.

Elsewhere in Indonesia, Central Sulawesi, site of a major communal conflict in 2000-2001, remained wracked by violence, including two bombings and the beheadings of three schoolgirls, with militant Islamists suspected. In Maluku, a network was discovered of militant Islamists and local criminals responsible for a string of attacks going back years. Terrorists continued to be active outside the conflict areas as well, with three suicide bombers killing themselves and 20 others in Bali in October.

The low-level insurgency in **Thailand’s** Muslim south continued, with civilians increasingly targeted. The government sent mixed signals, establishing a National Reconciliation Commission in March, and then replacing martial law with a controversial state of emergency in July. In the southern **Philippines**, the peace process between the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the government inched forward but continued to be complicated by changing alliances between foreign jihadist elements, mostly Indonesian, and their local counterparts.

Crisis Group impact. In **Indonesia**, Crisis Group’s report, *Aceh: A New Chance for Peace* (August), published on the day the peace agreement was signed, was used as essential background reading for international monitors deployed there; it was also serialised in the Indonesian press. An October analysis of the jihadist networks in Poso and Maluku (*Weakening Indonesia’s Mujahidin Networks: Lessons from Maluku and Poso*) became a reference both for journalists covering violence there as well as donors looking for non-security approaches to counter-terrorism.

Our work on radical Islam in Indonesia remained required reading for donors, security and intelligence agencies inside and outside Indonesia, and the diplomatic community. During the year, Project Director Sidney Jones briefed senior officials from Indonesia, Singapore, the U.S., Japan, Australia, Russia, the Netherlands, Britain, and other EU countries. She continued to be in demand as a speaker in the region, particularly in the aftermath of the second Bali bomb.

Crisis Group’s first report on the violence in southern **Thailand**, *Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad* (May), was widely regarded as the best available in print. Veteran Asia analyst Philip Bowring wrote in the *International Herald Tribune*, “Thais and non-Thais who would like to learn from history and avoid repeating it would do well to read this report.” It was serialised in the Thai language press, and its title and basic theme, “Insurgency, Not Jihad” was picked up extensively by journalists covering the issue.

Key issues for Crisis Group in South East Asia in 2006

Indonesia

✦ **Aceh:** Given reluctance on the part of some Jakarta politicians to fully embrace the peace accord, complex reintegration issues, and a variety of issues related to local elections scheduled for June 2006, analysis is needed on how to ensure the peace process succeeds.

✦ **West Timor-East Timor border:** Challenges include resolving issues related to territorial claims and demarcation controversies; the consequences of Dili’s neglect of Oecusse, the enclave of Timor Leste surrounded by West Timor; and the politics of accountability for past human rights abuses.

✦ **Papua:** Tensions related to decentralisation and a 2003 division of the territory, and the pressures these place on a new institution, the Papuan People’s Council, bear close monitoring in 2006.

✦ **Terrorism:** Crisis Group will keep track of changing dynamics and shifting alliances within local jihadist organisations, and assess government counter-terrorism efforts, including the effort to counter jihadist teachings.

✦ **Poso and Maluku:** Evaluating the success of law enforcement efforts in these two conflict areas is crucial, given their continued attraction for local jihadists as areas to foster or try to revive communal conflict.

Thailand

✦ **Violence in the south:** More attention must be focused on analysing the efficacy of government attempts to control the insurgency, as well as alternative strategies.

Burma/Myanmar

✦ **Political developments:** Crisis Group will examine developments since the arrest of former prime minister Khin Nyunt - including new political restrictions, the government’s move to a new capital, and the contraction of already limited humanitarian space - and analyse prospects for political change.

“ Your Southern Thailand report continues Crisis Group’s reputation for the absolute best stuff on Islam in SEA (and also elsewhere). ”

Bill Paterson

Australian Ambassador to Thailand, 26 May 2005


North Korean observation post. © AFP/Jung Yeon-Je



Uzbek refugees in Kyrgyzstan, May 2005. © AFP/P. Gromsky



Indian soldier in Srinagar, Kashmir. © B. Walicki



There was positive momentum in the Balkans in 2005, with progress on Kosovo's final status, important reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and some – although not enough – cooperation from Serbia with the Hague tribunal. But 2005 was a troubling year for democracy in the Caucasus.

Balkans

In April, the Contact Group narrowed choices for Kosovo's final status by excluding partition, union with another state, or a return to the pre-1999 situation. The UN Security Council gave the go-ahead for a comprehensive review of democratic standards implementation to determine if Kosovo was ready for final status talks. UN envoy Kai Eide concluded that foundations for a multi-ethnic society had not been built, but recommended that talks start: former Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari (and Crisis Group Chairman Emeritus) was appointed to mediate the process.

Within Kosovo, former KLA commander Ramush Haradinaj made a dignified exit from his post as prime minister when indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal on the Former Yugoslavia for alleged war crimes, and feared violence did not break out. His small AAK party and President Rugova's larger LDK party continued their narrow coalition, despite international pressure for a renewed grand coalition. At year-end the UN mission (UNMIK) launched preparations to delegate police and justice powers to the provisional government. Kosovo's divided northern city of Mitrovica continued to mark a security fault-line, above which Serb parallel structures frustrated UNMIK control.

Serbia continued sending mixed signals, with little movement on the reform front. It maintained a hard line on Kosovo, while promoting the undefined slogan "more than autonomy, less than independence" as its official policy. Cooperation with the Hague tribunal improved in the first half of the year, but halted in the second. The initial cooperation enabled Serbia to receive an EU feasibility study and begin negotiations on a stabilisation and association agreement. But attacks against ethnic minorities continued in Vojvodina, and high national unemployment and inflation contributed to an increasing sense of economic and social distress.

Bosnia and Herzegovina made further progress towards a self-sustaining peace, with High Representative Paddy Ashdown succeeded by Christian Schwarz-Schilling at the start of 2006. Particular progress was made in the area of police reform. **Macedonia** was granted EU candidate status following the implementation of most of the outstanding points from the Ohrid Agreement which ended its 2001 conflict, and a significant improvement in the inter-ethnic climate. But the year was marred by irregularities during March local elections and by continuing economic stagnation.

"I consider your involvement an asset that can provide fresh and innovative thinking to our efforts to solve the regional problems."

Vlado Buckovski

Prime Minister of the Republic of Macedonia, 8 March 2005

Crisis Group impact. In January, Crisis Group launched a fresh advocacy campaign focusing on resolving Kosovo's final status, releasing a major report, *Kosovo: Toward Final Status*. U.S. officials engaged with Crisis Group on alternative policy options, and statements by the Contact Group and the EU in April, ruling out partition and union with any other state, lifted text directly from the report's recommendations.

An 18 May statement by U.S. Under-Secretary Burns to a Congressional committee likewise contained multiple references to our work on Kosovo. The report had a tangible galvanising effect on the final status debate, with Belgrade reacting by recalibrating its position on the issue. The Contact Group's settlement parameters essentially reflect long-argued Crisis Group positions.

Kosovo after Haradinaj (May) drew the international community's attention to the relative instability and immaturity of Kosovo Albanian politics, and the report was praised by non-partisan groups. *Bridging Kosovo's Mitrovica Divide* (September) proposed a course of action to reintegrate this Serb-dominated territory into Kosovo without exposing its inhabitants to Albanian domination.

The publication of an extensive report on Serbia's ethnically mixed Sandzak region (*Serbia's Sandzak: Still Forgotten*, April) helped draw regional and international attention to an under-reported potential trouble spot. Since its publication, the Serbian government has implemented the majority of the report's recommendations. Our December report on *Montenegro's Independence Drive* made a strong case for the EU not to continue resisting the breakup of Serbia and Montenegro if that was the freely expressed will of its people.

In **Bosnia**, a report on stalled police reform (*Bosnia's Stalled Police Reform: No Progress, No EU*, September) made major waves, creating the political climate for the cooperation by Bosnian Serbs, finally achieved in October, and a reshaped future EU mandate. Our reporting and follow-up advocacy on **Macedonia** (*Macedonia: Not Out of the Woods Yet*, February) helped produce EU agreement regarding the extension of the EU police mission mandate for another year.

Key issues for Crisis Group in 2006

Kosovo

- ✘ **Resolving final status:** Most see conditioned independence as the only viable solution. But does imposing this offer a better chance of lasting stability than finessing an ambiguous outcome to which Serbia can agree?
- ✘ **Rule of law:** UNMIK has not rooted out organised crime structures, and Kosovo's young police and judiciary will need assistance. The EU is preparing such a mission. Should it attempt to wield executive powers or would this stifle Kosovo's own institutional development?

- ✘ **Improving democratic accountability:** During UNMIK's rule Kosovo politics has been less a contest of ideas and more a resource competition between different parties' patronage networks.

Serbia and Montenegro

- ✘ **Serbia's Kosovo policy:** Serbia will continue to work towards a partition of Kosovo in the event its former province is granted independence. No Serbian politician will agree to a loss of Serbian sovereignty, and it should be expected that Belgrade will pull out of negotiations if the sovereignty issue begins to go against it.
- ✘ **Serbia's radicalisation:** As Serbia begins Kosovo future status negotiations, the position of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) is increasingly becoming an international concern. It is the largest party in the Serbian parliament, and polls show it growing in popularity.
- ✘ **Montenegro's future:** The conduct and aftermath of the independence referendum will have wider regional implications if mishandled.

Caucasus

Georgia's President Saakashvili and his administration wavered in 2005 between hard-line and conciliatory stances toward its breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Tbilisi presented a detailed Peace Plan for South Ossetia in the second half of the year, but continued to issue bellicose statements while increasing military expenditure. Russian forces began to pull out from their two remaining bases in Georgia, but the Georgian parliament set deadlines for Russian peacekeepers also to withdraw from South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

2005 was a discouraging year for democracy in **Armenia** and **Azerbaijan**. Fraudulent parliamentary elections, use of excessive force by police to disperse opposition activists, and the arrest of several high-level government officials demonstrated a stalling in the democratisation process in Azerbaijan. In Armenia, a constitutional referendum in November was marred by inflation of turnout numbers, ballot-stuffing and intimidation of observers.

Little concrete progress was made in resolving the **Nagorno-Karabakh** conflict, though the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia met twice, and their foreign ministers repeatedly, in the context of the Prague Process - with some signs of optimism emerging at year-end. For the first time in eight years, the OSCE High Level Planning Group travelled to the region, ostensibly to assess possibilities for the deployment of an international peacekeeping mission. Armenian negotiators seemed more amenable to a step-by-step approach to resolving the conflict, while Azerbaijan officials, despite a hard-line stance in public, appeared to be warming to the notion of a self-determination referendum.

...Europe

“As a foreign minister of a country which is paying great attention to the situations in the Western Balkans and in the Eastern European neighbourhood, and as someone who values thorough and comprehensive research, I very much appreciate the effort of Crisis Group’s team around the world.”

Mihai-Razvan Ungureanu
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Romania, December 2005

Crisis Group impact. Crisis Group helped generate renewed momentum in late 2005 - both internationally and, to a certain extent, within the region itself - to resolve the long-running conflict in **Nagorno-Karabakh**, probably the biggest obstacle to stability in the Caucasus. We published in quick succession two companion reports: the first, *Nagorno-Karabakh: Viewing the Conflict from the Ground* (September), explored how Armenians and Azeris from Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding districts live and how they view the resolution of the conflict; the second, *Nagorno-Karabakh: A Plan for Peace* (October), examined the causes of the conflict and identified the necessary elements of an achievable peace plan.

Both reports received considerable attention in the region, and were widely cited and their recommendations reproduced in the regional and international media. Shortly after its release, our peace plan received a strong endorsement from the U.S. special envoy, Ambassador Steve Mann, who said: “The Crisis Group report on Nagorno-Karabakh is well compiled and detailed. Heads and foreign ministries of both countries [should] look through the recommendations...in the report. If they do so, then a positive result can be achieved in the resolution of the Karabakh conflict.”

Encouragingly and defying expectations, both Armenian and Azerbaijani governmental officials have reacted in a relatively positive manner to the reports. It was immediately clear that the reports helped shape the public debate and, encouragingly, stimulate discussion on both sides of issues hitherto considered taboo.

Crisis Group continued to have a considerable input into discussions - in **Georgia** and beyond - regarding ways to resolve the South Ossetian conflict. Several high-level government officials in Tbilisi underlined how recommendations of our first report (*Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia*, November 2004) continued to influence the Georgian government’s peace proposals. Since the publication of a report on the return of refugees (*Georgia-South Ossetia: Refugee Return the Path to Peace*, April 2005), we have worked closely with the government as well as the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission on a new law on property restitution and compensation for the victims of the conflict, which is expected to pass into legislation in early 2006.

Key issues for Crisis Group in the Caucasus in 2006

Georgia:

- ✦ **A Settlement with Abkhazia?** UN-facilitated negotiations may lead to an agreement on non-resumption of hostilities and on the return of internally displaced. This, together with hopes for increased economic cooperation, could set the foundation for improved Georgian-Abkhaz dialogue, and potentially, a settlement.
- ✦ **Relations with South Ossetia:** Discussions could begin in 2006 on a joint plan for conflict resolution; there will likely be new donor support for confidence building measures; and a law on property restitution for war victims is planned. The issue is whether these potential positives will be translated into tangible results in the peace process.
- ✦ **Decentralisation and local self-governance reform:** Georgia plans to hold municipal elections in October 2006 and to implement a new law on local self-government: what matters is whether these reforms increase minorities’ sense of belonging and diminish their grievances vis-à-vis the state.

Nagorno-Karabakh:

- ✦ **Opportunity knocks:** With the Prague Process set to continue in 2006 - a year without elections in Armenia and Azerbaijan - the sides have a window of opportunity to come to a peace deal. But negotiations on the withdrawal of Nagorno-Karabakh forces from Azerbaijani territory and the deployment of international peacekeeping troops will be delicate and require international engagement.

North Caucasus

- ✦ **Continuing conflict:** Crisis Group remains acutely concerned at the ongoing, and in some respects worsening, conflicts in Chechnya and its north Caucasus neighbours and will continue to explore ways of overcoming the security and other barriers to reporting on them.

Moldova

Moldova saw elections but no change of government in 2005, with the Communists returned to power in Chisinau despite a lower vote in March, and the separatist regime in Transdniestria losing its parliamentary majority in December. A settlement seems no closer, despite the deployment of a new EU customs support mission on the border with Ukraine.

Crisis Group did not report on Moldova in 2005, but continued to conduct advocacy in Western capitals on the back of our previous reporting. The hardening positions of the local players has meant that few of our specific recommendations in *Moldova: Regional Tensions over Transdniestria* (June 2004) and *Moldova: No Quick Fix* (August 2003) have been implemented. Crisis Group plans to publish new research on Moldova’s peace prospects in mid-2006.



Kosovar refugees at camp in Kukes, Albania. © Washington Post/C. Guzy



Opposition protesters in Skopje. © AFP/R. Atanasovski



South Ossetian soldiers. © AFP

Crisis Group in Latin America

2005 saw no breakthroughs in Colombia's civil war, and rising violence in Haiti. Tensions in Bolivia subsided with the election of the country's first indigenous president.

Colombia/Andes

In **Colombia**, President Alvaro Uribe's administration continued its large-scale military offensive against the insurgent FARC, and the demobilisation of fighters of the paramilitary AUC. While there were no breakthroughs in the struggle with the rebels, a Justice and Peace Law for the demobilisation of irregular armed groups was enacted mid-year, though it was criticised by those concerned it would not assure the dismantling of illegal organisations and by human rights advocates for lax provisions regarding the punishment of grave crimes and reparations for victims. President Uribe announced his candidacy for May 2006 presidential elections after the constitutional court cleared him to run for a second term. His administration also established direct talks in Cuba with the smaller ELN rebel group.

Evo Morales of the left-wing Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) party won an historic victory in December general elections in **Bolivia**, following the forced resignation of President Carlos Mesa in June. Although tensions had subsided by year-end, considerable uncertainty remained over how the new government would handle issues such as energy and coca production, as well as relations with Venezuela and the United States. President Hugo Chavez's administration in **Venezuela** stepped up its verbal confrontation with the Bush administration and secured control of the National Assembly in December elections boycotted by the opposition.

Crisis Group impact. In **Colombia**, the Uribe administration's moves to create a legal framework - the Justice and Peace Law - for the demobilisation of the paramilitary groups came shortly after the publication of a Crisis Group report, *Colombia: Presidential Politics and Peace Prospects* (June). The release of the report was accompanied by advocacy meetings with high-level government officials in Bogotá and with Spanish officials in Madrid ahead of President Uribe's visit to Spain. Within days of the report's release, the Colombian government amended the legal framework, including by extending the timeframe for investigating past crimes committed by ex-combatants, in line with our recommendations.

Our recommendations for improving Colombia's Justice and Peace Law were picked up by the U.S. Congress, which voted to condition bilateral support to Colombia on demonstrated progress on demobilisation and disarmament, especially the dismantlement of paramilitary command structures and identification of illegal assets. The adoption of this measure followed advocacy meetings with Members of Congress and their staff as well as with U.S. State Department officials.

In two complementary reports on drugs and social and political unrest in **Colombia, Bolivia and Peru** (*War and Drugs in Colombia*, January; and *Coca, Drugs and Social Protest in Bolivia and Peru*, March), Crisis Group sought to draw attention to the shortcomings of existing U.S. and local counter-narcotics strategies in the Andean region. We discussed the reports' findings and recommendations in numerous high-level meetings in Bogotá, La Paz, Washington DC, Ottawa and Brussels, emphasising the relationship

“ [Crisis Group's] reports and policy briefings are widely read and valued. With the backing from the foreign ministries of so many of our friends and allies and with such an impressive list of present and former government officials from a host of nations on its Board and Executive Committee, the ICG enjoys a great deal of influence throughout the world. ”

U.S. Senate Minority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) and Ranking Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee Carl Levin (D-MI) in a letter to President Bush, 28 September 2005

between existing counter-narcotics strategies and social protest. Following our advocacy in Bogotá, the Uribe administration implemented a manual coca eradication program. The release of *Bolivia at the Crossroads: The December Elections* (December) and associated advocacy helped inform both local and international media coverage of Bolivia's historic 18 December presidential election and the challenges for the Morales administration.

Key issues for Crisis Group in 2006

Colombia

✘ **DDR:** Pressure is needed to move the Uribe administration toward the rigorous and transparent application of the Justice and Peace Law, the dismantlement of paramilitary structures, and full demobilisation and reintegration of paramilitary troops.

✘ **Negotiations with ELN and FARC:** 2006 will be a critical year for peace negotiations with the rebels. International involvement is needed to facilitate a hostages/prisoners swap between the government and the FARC and negotiations with the ELN.

Bolivia

✘ **Dealing with energy and constitutional issues:** The government's key challenge will be to design a new hydrocarbon management strategy that helps reduce poverty and inequality but does not alienate foreign investors, and achieve consensus on the rewriting of the constitution and departmental autonomy.

Venezuela

✘ **Elections:** The conduct and results of presidential elections scheduled for late 2006 could have a major impact on stability in Venezuela and the broader region, as well as relations with the United States.

Haiti

2005 saw rising violence in Haiti, even as local and international efforts to support the transition to a new government and calls to disarm illegal armed groups intensified. Despite increases in UN peacekeepers, the security situation deteriorated, particularly in the capital, Port-au-Prince, while levels of crime and corruption remained high. The international community's failure to control the partisan forces within the provisional electoral tribunal and shortcomings in planning by the OAS and UN resulted in delays at every stage in the electoral process, which, by December, had seen four announced postponements of parliamentary and presidential polls originally scheduled for November. At year-end, elections were on track but concerns remained over their conduct, and the lack of public debate on the priorities of the next government.

Crisis Group impact. Crisis Group reporting in the first half of the year (*Haiti's Transition: Hanging in the Balance*, February; and *Spoiling Security in Haiti*, May) focused on the continued violence and presence of spoilers and criminals within the Haitian National Police (HNP). Measures taken to improve security in Haiti closely reflected our recommendations, including a change in the police chief, a reinvigorated inspector general, and the joint development of a reform strategy by UN police and the HNP. In the second half of 2005, our reporting concentrated on the elections themselves, identifying the conditions that would help guarantee their credibility and produce a legitimate government (*Can Haiti Hold Elections in 2005?*, August; and *Haiti's Elections: The Case for a Short Delay*, November). The reports were credited with forcing a much more intense review of electoral preparations and influencing subsequent decisions to postpone the vote.

Key issues for Crisis Group in 2006

Haiti

✘ **Eliminating the spoilers:** Without help, Haiti is not capable of fighting off the spoilers who have maintained a predatory state throughout the country's history. Identifying and implementing strategies to incorporate, intimidate, dominate or destroy the spoilers should be the foremost priority of the international community.

✘ **Rule of law:** The new government needs assistance in reforming the police and judiciary, creating transparency in government, and disarming and reintegrating members of illegal armed groups.

✘ **Economic infrastructure:** Given the levels of poverty and unemployment in Haiti there is a need to establish conditions that encourage private sector investment and the expansion of jobs and opportunities for those who live in urban and rural poverty.



Bolivia protests, May 2005. © AP/Wide World



Haitians demonstrate near UNHQ in Port-au-Prince. © AP/Wide World

Crisis Group in Middle East & North Africa...

Tensions were high in the Middle East in 2005. The Iranian nuclear issue rose to the top of the international agenda, and looked likely to come to a head in 2006. The insurgency in Iraq raged on. Israel's unilateral disengagement from Gaza did little to raise the prospect of a comprehensive peace with the Palestinians. And Lebanon was thrown into turmoil by the assassination of its former prime minister.

Arab-Israeli Conflict

In 2005, the Arab-Israeli arena was dominated by Israel's unilateral disengagement from the Gaza Strip in August. Conceived as an alternative to negotiations, it resulted in the most significant Israeli withdrawal from occupied Arab territory in decades even as it reduced prospects for a resumption of the peace process. Israel eschewed negotiations with its Palestinian and Arab neighbours as settlement expansion continued at an accelerated pace, while the international community seemed to have renounced any intention to implement its own framework for Middle East peace. Israeli unilateralism reflected the emergence of a new Israeli consensus: shortly before his incapacitation in early 2006, Ariel Sharon left the Likud to establish the Kadima party, which immediately became Israel's largest. How this consensus would survive Palestinian elections in January and Israeli elections in March 2006 remained to be seen.

Palestinian politics were dominated by Mahmoud Abbas's increasingly frail efforts to consolidate his rule. His main achievement, the March Cairo Declaration, resulted in a unilateral Palestinian ceasefire until year's end and integration of the Islamist Hamas into the political system. Performing beyond all expectations, Hamas took control of most cities in municipal elections and stood poised to become a major force in parliament as the dominant Fatah seemed increasingly overwhelmed by growing lawlessness in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The international community was much more active in the **Syrian-Lebanese** theatre, where the February killing of former prime minister Rafiq Hariri set off a chain of events resulting in the withdrawal of Syrian forces and the establishment of an international commission to investigate Hariri's murder. Plagued by a series of further assassinations and growing tensions with Syria, Lebanon became increasingly unstable, while Syria grew progressively isolated, with deteriorating relations with the U.S., Europe, and Arab states.

Crisis Group impact. Our report on **Lebanon** (*Lebanon: Managing the Gathering Storm*, December) generated considerable attention in Beirut, where it featured prominently in most major newspapers. Crisis Group Middle East Program Director Robert Malley presented and discussed the report with President Emile Lahoud, Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, as well as most of Lebanon's key political leaders, virtually all of whom praised its

"I found your report on Jihadists and Islamists in Jordan superb... What I love, among other things, about the ICG reports are their footnotes: they're often like gold dust."

Xan Smiley

Middle East and Africa editor, *The Economist*, 17 January 2006

balance. In Damascus, high-level Syrian officials urged Crisis Group to play a role in defusing the growing crisis in relations between **Syria** and the rest of the international community.

Crisis Group reporting on the **Arab-Israeli** conflict was widely cited in 2005, confirming that we remain a leading analyst of developments in the region and of the measures required to resolve the crises these engendered. *Disengagement and After: Where Next for Sharon and the Likud* (March) examined the emerging paradigm in Israel's approach to its relations with the Palestinians and what this might hold in store once Israel had withdrawn from the Gaza Strip. *Mr. Abbas Goes to Washington: Can He Still Succeed?* (May) analysed the growing difficulties encountered by Abbas and predicted further trouble ahead if significant movement on the peace process and domestic reform continued to be postponed. *Disengagement and its Discontents: What Will the Israeli Settler Movement Do?* (July) correctly predicted the inability of the settler movement to prevent disengagement, and placed this reality within the broad-based Israeli support for the Sharon government's approach to permanent status issues. Finally, *The Jerusalem Powder Keg* (August) provided a detailed investigation of the darker side of unilateralism, namely an acceleration of Israeli settlement expansion that was systematically undermining the prospects for a two-state solution. An EU report on Jerusalem that the European Commission declined to publish repeated Crisis Group's analysis virtually verbatim.

Key issues for Crisis Group in 2006

Arab-Israeli conflict

- ✦ **Middle East peace process:** Resuming negotiations to achieve a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace settlement and implementing eventual agreements remains the international community's key challenge in this volatile region.
- ✦ **Palestinian politics:** The ascendancy of Hamas and the growing crisis within Fatah are having a structural impact on the Palestinian political system, producing both challenges and opportunities that need to be addressed.
- ✦ **Israeli politics:** Ariel Sharon's departure and the installation of a new Israeli government after the March 2006 elections raises questions about whether Israel will proceed along its unilateral path or if leadership changes will have a more far-reaching impact on its relations with the Palestinians and Arab states.

Lebanon and Syria

- ✦ **Instability in Lebanon and Syria:** Growing instability in both Lebanon and Syria requires judicious crisis management by all concerned. Crisis Group will report more intensively on the major issues involved.

Iran/Iraq/Gulf

The year in **Iraq** was bracketed by parliamentary elections in January and December, the first free votes in the country's history. With large turnouts, the polls helped legitimise Iraq's troubled political transition and institutions. But a boycott by most Sunni Arabs undermined the January elections and led to their exclusion from critical negotiations over the new constitution, which was ratified in an October referendum despite Sunni Arab opposition. Growing sectarianism in 2005 marred the second vote in December, whose results promised to return to power the same Shiite-Kurdish alliance that had governed in 2005, and with it further sectarian strife. U.S. calls for a government of national unity - the necessary way forward - were undermined by escalating violence.

2005 brought with it the surprise election of hard-line Tehran mayor Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad as **Iran's** new president. Constitutional authority continued to lie in the hands of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, but the new president appeared to have an unexpected impact on the country's foreign policy: following his inauguration, 40 of Iran's top diplomats were removed and its nuclear negotiating team was replaced with a more uncompromising one. The nuclear crisis continued to escalate toward a UN Security Council showdown in 2006.

After two years of violent militant activity, **Saudi Arabia** seemed to stabilise in 2005, suffering no major militant attacks. It was unclear if the absence of terrorism was the result of efforts by Saudi security services or the preference on the part of would-be jihadis to operate in Iraq, where a large contingent of Saudis have taken part in the insurgency. There was good news as the kingdom held its first nation-wide elections in four decades for local municipal councils. Reform efforts appeared to receive an additional boost in August when King Abdallah, widely considered a reformer, succeeded to the throne after the death of his ailing brother Fahd. A wave of violence between restless Shiite youths and the police took place in **Bahrain**, as sectarian tensions continued to simmer.

Crisis Group impact. With access to **Iraq** complicated by growing violence, Crisis Group put out four reports in 2005, two of which focused on the constitutional process. In *Iraq: Don't Rush the Constitution* (June), we warned that a hasty, non-inclusive process would yield a weak constitution lacking public support. A second report, *Unmaking Iraq: A Constitutional Process Gone Awry* (September), concluded that the process had in fact been rushed and non-inclusive, and predicted that if the U.S. failed to make a determined last-ditch effort to bring Shiites, Kurds and Sunni Arabs together, the country could break apart. Shortly afterwards, U.S. officials did broker an important compromise in Baghdad to open the constitution for early review, ensuring Sunni Arab participation in December elections. We were told that our paper was discussed at the highest levels of the U.S. National Security Council. It was also endorsed by Senators Harry Reid and Carl Levin, who referred to it in an open letter to President Bush.

...Middle East & North Africa



Israeli settlers, Gaza Strip, August 2005. © AP/D. Furst



Coffin of Lebanon's Rafiq Hariri, Beirut. © AFP/J. Barrak



U.S. soldier near Mosul, Iraq. © AFP/M. Lima



Car bomb explodes in Mosul, Iraq. © AFP/M. Lima

Crisis Group continued to be among the very few Western NGOs working in **Iran** in 2005, publishing two Iran-related reports and conducting considerable follow-on advocacy in Western capitals. The first, *Iran in Iraq: How Much Influence?* (March), examined one of the most talked about but least understood aspects of post-war Iraq, the degree of Iranian influence. The second, *Iran: What Does Ahmadi-Nejad's Victory Mean?* (August), examined the unexpected election of Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad as Iran's president in June, and discussed the likely impact of his presidency on domestic policies, the ongoing nuclear negotiations, Iran's role in Iraq, and relations with the West.

Our reporting on **Saudi Arabia**, which was accompanied by a discreet advocacy effort in Washington, was followed by more insistent calls from Washington for political reform in Saudi Arabia, as we had urged, although the U.S. message has been inconsistent. We published our first report on **Bahrain** in May (*Bahrain's Sectarian Challenge*). While Bahrain has yet to act upon recommendations for an acceleration of the reform process, the Bahraini foreign minister invited Crisis Group to discuss the report's findings in greater detail, and opposition groups picked up several of our recommendations. Following the report's release and a high-level U.S. visit to Bahrain, the State Department moderated its praise for the country, in line with our recommendations. In Brussels, the head of the European Commission Gulf Countries Unit told us that the report was a catalyst for EU debate on engagement with the region.

Key issues for Crisis Group in 2006

Iraq

✦ **Government stability:** The priority in the coming year will be the formation of a government of national unity and a fundamental review of the constitution, yielding a true national compact. The international community will have to make every effort to produce a government and security forces that are representative.

✦ **Accommodation between Arabs and Kurds:** One of the most sensitive issues is the disposition of territories claimed by the Kurds and the delineation of the border of the Kurdish region more generally. The question of Kirkuk is particularly inflammatory, given its oil wealth.

✦ **The regional context:** The posture of neighbouring states may well determine whether sectarian and ethnic conflict will spiral into civil war, which in turn may draw military intervention and Iraq's violent break-up.

Iran

✦ **The nuclear predicament:** With Iran's nuclear activities likely to be referred to the United Nations Security Council, the international community is debating various measures to persuade Tehran to abandon its ambitions to enrich uranium, from economic incentives and security assurances to the threat of sanctions and even military force. Alternative diplomatic strategies need to be closely examined.

Saudi Arabia and the Gulf

✦ **Oil revenues and reform:** Political reform has stalled in Saudi Arabia, paralysed at least partially by the renewed confidence and false sense of security bestowed by the recent rapid rise in oil revenues. But high oil revenues offer an opportunity for much needed reform that the Saudi leadership has so far either failed to appreciate or refused to embrace.

✦ **Islamists in Kuwait/Oman:** Kuwait and Oman both faced serious security challenges as a result of jihadi violence in 2005, challenges that the two countries met. It is far from clear, however, that the roots of potential violence have been addressed or that the long term threat has been diminished.

Egypt/North Africa

Egypt experienced a tumultuous year in 2005, holding controversial elections and suffering the worst terrorist attack in its history at Sharm el-Sheikh in July. In February, facing U.S. pressure for political reform, the government unexpectedly announced its intention to revise the constitution to allow multi-candidate presidential elections, but severe restrictions on eligibility alienated opposition parties, and low turnout and claims of fraud marred President Mubarak's landslide victory in September. The protracted parliamentary elections held in November and December saw the ruling NDP in disarray and unprecedented gains by the banned Muslim Brothers, followed by violence and a dozen deaths when state security troops prevented electors from voting in order to stop the Muslim Brothers from winning more seats.

In **Algeria**, President Bouteflika's draft Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation was approved in a referendum, granting amnesty to both insurgents and government security forces believed to be responsible for over 6,000 disappearances in the 1990s, but the armed Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) continued its sporadic attacks throughout the year. In the Berber-speaking Kabylia region, where unrest had continued since lethal riots in 2001, local elections were held in accordance with an agreement between the regional protest movement and the government and passed off peacefully.

Mauritania experienced dramatic change with the ouster of its unpopular president, Maaouya Ould Sid' Ahmed Taya, in an August coup. But the military junta behind the takeover maintained stability and said it would hold multiparty elections following a two-year transition period. There was little progress on the issue of **Western Sahara**. UN Special Envoy Peter van Walsum held talks with the separatist Polisario Front and Morocco's King Mohammed VI in November, but concluded that a compromise remained far off.

Crisis Group impact. In March, Crisis Group published *Understanding Islamism*, a groundbreaking study of the different streams of Islamic activism both in North Africa and more generally across the Muslim world. Western policy-makers have praised the study as a model for how to understand and engage with the challenges of Islamism. The report has since become one of Crisis Group's most popular, downloaded from our website over 37,000 times in 2005.

Our report on **Egypt**, *Reforming Egypt: In Search of a Strategy* (October) triggered widespread debate among the opposition, who united ahead of the parliamentary elections, in line with our recommendation. Some officials privately praised the report, saying it could help their own reform efforts. In 2005 we published our first report on **Mauritania**, *The Islamist Challenge in Mauritania: Threat or Scapegoat?* (May), as part of our series on Islamism in North Africa.

The government of **Algeria**, no doubt also spurred by the implications of the coming into force of Algeria's Association Agreement with the EU, has begun to act in accordance with Crisis Group recommendations made in *Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria: Turning the Page* (July 2004), particularly those relating to the customs service and counter-smuggling operations.

Key issues for Crisis Group in 2006

Egypt

✦ **Normalisation of the Muslim Brothers:** The electoral success of the Muslim Brothers is likely to place the process of political reform under considerable strain, since it is unclear that the regime will be able to normalise the banned Brothers' position in political life and the governing NDP has no experience of dealing politically with parliamentary opposition.

✦ **Sectarian tensions:** The rise of Islamist politics may also exacerbate sectarian tensions between the majority Muslim and minority Christian elements of the population.

Algeria

✦ **Politics after Bouteflika:** Should President Bouteflika be forced to leave office for health reasons, Algeria's army commanders could very well resume their prominent role in the country's politics. Such a development could also compromise the prospects for an effective end to the violence in the framework of the 'national reconciliation' for which the president has continuously campaigned.

Western Sahara

✦ **Breaking the impasse:** Western Sahara will require increased attention in 2006, especially in the light of repeated unrest in the territory in 2005 and the apparent impasse in efforts by both regional and international actors to find a way forward.




Egyptian women supporters of Muslim Brotherhood during elections, November 2005. © AFP/C. Bouroncle

“ I should like to take this opportunity to congratulate the International Crisis Group on the valuable work it has undertaken over the last decade... Your reports and our consultations have always been a valuable source of information for us. ”

Terry Davis

Secretary General, Council of Europe, 4 May 2005

CrisisWatch & Thematic Issues



CrisisWatch

CrisisWatch is a monthly bulletin designed to provide busy readers in the policy community, the media and the business world, as well as the interested general public, with a regular update on the state of play in all the most significant current and potential conflicts around the world.

CrisisWatch is one of Crisis Group's most widely read products, and many politicians, diplomats and their advisers regard it as an indispensable resource for its succinct and timely reporting.

Thematic Issues

In addition to country or region-specific reports, Crisis Group also produces from time to time reports on thematic issues, combining the resources of our field staff and capital-based research teams. In 2005 we continued our series of reports on the role of Islamist movements in Muslim societies and the relationship between Islamism, violence and political reform pressures. Work also continued on the European Union's crisis response mechanisms and capabilities, and the compilation of a 'Toolbox' report on our experience with the effectiveness of various conflict prevention and resolution measures.

Islamism, Violence and Reform

Crisis Group's reports frequently deal with the role of Islamist movements in Muslim societies and the relationship between Islam, Islamism, violent conflict and pressure for reform. Far from being homogenous, Islamism (or Islamic activism) is the subject of internal debate in the Muslim world and takes a variety of different forms with a variety of different agendas – political, missionary and jihadist, only a few elements violent and justifying a confrontational response. Crisis Group's reports assess these differences, putting current highly visible Islamic activism into political, social and historical context.

In 2006 Crisis Group will publish the first of an intended series of reports on the impact of Islamism in Western Europe, beginning with France.

Democratisation

The transition to a representative, democratic political system is an important aspect of both conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding. Many of Crisis Group's reports and briefing papers consider various aspects of democratisation. This project brings together our most useful resources on the topic.

European Union Crisis Response Capability

Building on our previous research into EU crisis response capabilities, Crisis Group in 2005 launched the Conflict Prevention Partnership, together with International Alert, the European Policy Centre and the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office. The Partnership's aim is to work to prevent conflicts worldwide by helping improve the European Union's conflict prevention, crisis management and peacebuilding capacities. It is funded by the European Commission. In the framework of the Partnership, Crisis Group published four reports in 2005 and held a number of advocacy events in Europe. More about the Conflict Prevention Partnership can be found at www.conflictprevention.net.



This partnership is
financed by the
European Union



“CrisisWatch is superbly designed - sheer genius by your team. Nothing I saw in government was as good as this.”

Richard Holbrooke

Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations,
2 August 2005

Crisis Group's Media Visibility

Crisis Group's presence in the media expanded dramatically in 2005, in both major national and international media outlets.

The number of Crisis Group citations in significant print and electronic media worldwide nearly doubled the 2004 figure, from 5,419 to 10,261 (including reprints, e.g. of wire copy). The number of opinion pieces and commentary articles published by Crisis Group staff and Board members has also been increasing rapidly year on year: from 63 in 2003, to 105 in 2004, to 128 in 2005. Crisis Group published pieces in all the major newspapers around the world: *Asharq Al Awsat*, *Boston Globe*, *Business Day* (South Africa), *Chicago Tribune*, *Christian Science Monitor*, *Corriere della Sera*, *Le Figaro*, *Financial Times*, *The Guardian*, *Al Hayat*, *International Herald Tribune*, *Liberation*, *Los Angeles Times*, *Le Monde*, *El Mundo*, *The Nation* (Kenya), *New York Times*, *South China Morning Post*, *Wall Street Journal*, *Washington Post*, and *Washington Times* among many others.

We have also developed long-term relationships with the editorial boards and prominent commentators at these newspapers and others, and we have thus

helped to guide their own editorials on a significant number of occasions. Although we try to avoid “talking-head” instant commentary not directly related to our reports, our staff and Board members appeared frequently on broadcast interviews in 2005 for ABC (U.S.), ABC (Australia), Al Arabiya, Al Jazeera, BBC World Service radio, BBC World TV, BBC Radio 4 (domestic), BBC 1 (domestic), CBC radio (domestic), CBC TV (domestic), CBS, CNN, CNN International, Deutsche Welle, NBC, NPR, PBS, Radio Canada International, Radio France Internationale, Radio Netherlands, SABC (South Africa), TV1 (France), TV5 (France), and many others. We also worked intensively on the ground with ABC News Nightline in Darfur, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda to bring those conflicts to mass audiences in the U.S.

Crisis Group in the news...

- ✦ “authoritative”
Agence France Presse
- ✦ “influential”
CNN
- ✦ “a leading authority on Darfur”
The Washington Post
- ✦ “well-respected”
The Economist
- ✦ “independent”
The New York Times
- ✦ “highly-regarded”
The Independent
- ✦ “leading political think tank”
UN Integrated Regional Information Networks
- ✦ “one of the leading NGOs for conflict prevention”
The Christian Science Monitor
- ✦ “shames the international community for its lack of political will”
Financial Times
- ✦ “globally recognised conflict policy institute”
The Australian
- ✦ “a highly respected institution”
The Globe and Mail



Crisis Group

Reports & Briefings

Published in 2005

AFRICA

CENTRAL AFRICA

- ✘ *Peace in Northern Uganda: Decisive Weeks Ahead*, Africa Briefing N°22, 21 February 2005
- ✘ *The Congo's Peace is Failing: Crisis in the Kivu*, Africa Report N°91, 30 March 2005
- ✘ *Shock Therapy for Northern Uganda's Peace Process*, Africa Briefing N°23, 11 April 2005
- ✘ *The Congo: Solving the FDLR Problem Once and for All*, Africa Briefing N°25, 12 May 2005
- ✘ *Building a Comprehensive Peace Strategy for Northern Uganda*, Africa Briefing N°27, 23 June 2005
- ✘ *Elections in Burundi: A Radical Shake-up of the Political Landscape*, Africa Briefing N°31, 25 August 2005 (full briefing only available in French)
- ✘ *A Congo Action Plan*, Africa Briefing N°34, 19 October 2005

HORN OF AFRICA

- ✘ *Darfur: The Failure to Protect*, Africa Report N°89, 8 March 2005 (also available in Arabic)
- ✘ *A New Sudan Action Plan*, Africa Briefing N°24, 26 April 2005
- ✘ *Do Americans Care About Darfur?*, Africa Briefing N°26, 1 June 2005
- ✘ *The AU's Mission in Darfur: Bridging the Gaps*, Africa Briefing N°28, 6 July 2005
- ✘ *Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?*, Africa Report N°95, 11 July 2005
- ✘ *The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement: Sudan's Uncertain Peace*, Africa Report N°96, 25 July 2005
- ✘ *Garang's Death: Implications for Peace in Sudan*, Africa Briefing N°30, 9 August 2005 (also available in Arabic)
- ✘ *Unifying Darfur's Rebels: A Prerequisite for Peace*, Africa Briefing N°32, 6 October 2005 (also available in Arabic)
- ✘ *The EU/AU Partnership in Darfur: Not Yet a Winning Combination*, Africa Report N°99, 25 October 2005
- ✘ *Somalia's Islamists*, Africa Report N°100, 12 December 2005
- ✘ *Ethiopia and Eritrea: Preventing War*, Africa Report N°101, 22 December 2005

SOUTHERN AFRICA

- ✘ *Post-Election Zimbabwe: What Next?*, Africa Report N°93, 7 June 2005
- ✘ *Swaziland: The Clock is Ticking*, Africa Briefing N°29, 14 July 2005.
- ✘ *Zimbabwe's Operation Murambatsvina: The Tipping Point?*, Africa Report N°97, 17 August 2005

WEST AFRICA

- ✘ *Côte d'Ivoire: The Worst May Be Yet to Come*, Africa Report N°90, 24 March 2005 (full report only available in French)
- ✘ *Islamist Terrorism in the Sahel: Fact or Fiction?*, Africa Report N°92, 31 March 2005
- ✘ *Stopping Guinea's Slide*, Africa Report N°94, 13 June 2005 (also available in French)
- ✘ *Liberia's Elections: Necessary But Not Sufficient*, Africa Report, 7 September 2005
- ✘ *Côte d'Ivoire: Halfway Measures Will Not Suffice*, Africa Briefing N°33, 12 October 2005 (full briefing only available in French)

ASIA

CENTRAL ASIA

- ✘ *The Curse of Cotton: Central Asia's Destructive Monoculture*, Asia Report N°93, 28 February 2005 (also available in Russian)
- ✘ *Kyrgyzstan: After the Revolution*, Asia Report N°97, 4 May 2005 (also available in Russian)
- ✘ *Uzbekistan: The Andijon Uprising*, Asia Briefing N°38, 25 May 2005 (also available in Russian)
- ✘ *Kyrgyzstan: A Faltering State*, Asia Report N°109, 16 December 2005

NORTH EAST ASIA

- ✘ *North Korea: Can the Iron Fist Accept the Invisible Hand?*, Asia Report N°96, 25 April 2005 (also available in Korean and in Russian)
- ✘ *Japan and North Korea: Bones of Contention*, Asia Report N°100, 27 June 2005 (also available in Korean)
- ✘ *China and Taiwan: Uneasy Détente*, Asia Briefing N°42, 21 September 2005

- ✘ *North East Asia's Undercurrents of Conflict*, Asia Report N°108, 15 December 2005 (also available in Korean)

SOUTH ASIA

- ✘ *Nepal's Royal Coup: Making a Bad Situation Worse*, Asia Report N°91, 9 February 2005
- ✘ *Afghanistan: Getting Disarmament Back on Track*, Asia Briefing N°35, 23 February 2005
- ✘ *Nepal: Responding to the Royal Coup*, Asia Briefing N°35, 24 February 2005
- ✘ *Nepal: Dealing with a Human Rights Crisis*, Asia Report N°94, 24 March 2005
- ✘ *The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan*, Asia Report N°95, 18 April 2005
- ✘ *Political Parties in Afghanistan*, Asia Briefing N°39, 2 June 2005
- ✘ *Towards a Lasting Peace in Nepal: The Constitutional Issues*, Asia Report N°99, 15 June 2005
- ✘ *Afghanistan Elections: Endgame or New Beginning?*, Asia Report N°101, 21 July 2005
- ✘ *Nepal: Beyond Royal Rule*, Asia Briefing N°41, 15 September 2005
- ✘ *Authoritarianism and Political Party Reform in Pakistan*, Asia Report N°102, 28 September 2005
- ✘ *Nepal's Maoists: Their Aims, Structure and Strategy*, Asia Report N°104, 27 October 2005
- ✘ *Pakistan's Local Polls: Shoring Up Military Rule*, Asia Briefing N°43, 22 November 2005
- ✘ *Nepal's New Alliance: The Mainstream Parties and the Maoists*, Asia Report N°106, 28 November 2005
- ✘ *Rebuilding the Afghan State: The European Union's Role*, Asia Report N°107, 30 November 2005

SOUTH EAST ASIA

- ✘ *Recycling Militants in Indonesia: Darul Islam and the Australian Embassy Bombing*, Asia Report N°92, 22 February 2005
- ✘ *Decentralisation and Conflict in Indonesia: The Mamasa Case*, Asia Briefing N°37, 3 May 2005
- ✘ *Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad*, Asia Report N°98, 18 May 2005
- ✘ *Aceh: A New Chance for Peace*, Asia Briefing N°40, 15 August 2005
- ✘ *Weakening Indonesia's Mujahidin Networks: Lessons from Maluku and Poso*, Asia Report N°103, 13 October 2005 (also available in Indonesian)
- ✘ *Thailand's Emergency Decree: No Solution*, Asia Report N°105, 18 November 2005
- ✘ *Aceh: So Far, So Good*, Asia Update Briefing N°44, 13 December 2005

- ✘ *Philippines Terrorism: The Role of Militant Islamic Converts*, Asia Report N°110, 19 December 2005

EUROPE

BALKANS

- ✘ *Kosovo: Toward Final Status*, Europe Report N°161, 24 January 2005 (also available in Russian, Serbian and Albanian)
- ✘ *Macedonia: Not out of the Woods Yet*, Europe Briefing N°37, 25 February 2005 (also available in Macedonian)
- ✘ *Serbia's Sandzak: Still Forgotten*, Europe Report N°162, 7 April 2005 (also available in Serbian)
- ✘ *Serbia: Spinning its Wheels*, Europe Briefing N°39, 23 May 2005 (also available in Serbian)
- ✘ *Kosovo After Haradinaj*, Europe Report N°163, 26 May 2005 (also available in Serbian, Russian and Albanian)
- ✘ *Bosnia's Stalled Police Reform: No Progress, No EU*, Europe Report N°164, 6 September 2005
- ✘ *Bridging Kosovo's Mitrovica Divide*, Europe Report N°165, 13 September 2005 (also available in Albanian, Serbian and Russian)
- ✘ *EU Visas and the Western Balkans*, Europe Report N°168, 29 November 2005
- ✘ *Montenegro's Independence Drive*, Europe Report N°169, 7 December 2005 (also available in Serbian)

CAUCASUS

- ✘ *Georgia-South Ossetia: Refugee Return the Path to Peace*, Europe Briefing N°38, 19 April 2005 (also available in Russian)
- ✘ *Nagorno-Karabakh: Viewing the Conflict from the Ground*, Europe Report N°165, 14 September 2005 (also available in Armenian, Azeri and Russian)
- ✘ *Nagorno-Karabakh: A Plan for Peace*, Europe Report N°167, 10 October 2005 (also available in Armenian, Azeri and Russian)
- ✘ *Azerbaijan's 2005 Elections: Lost Opportunity*, Europe Briefing N°40, 21 November 2005 (also available in Russian)

LATIN AMERICA / CARIBBEAN

- ✘ *War and Drugs in Colombia*, Latin America Report N°11, 27 January 2005 (also available in Spanish)
- ✘ *Haiti's Transition: Hanging in the Balance*, Latin America/Caribbean Briefing N°7,

- 8 February 2005 (also available in French)
- ✘ *Coca, Drugs and Social Protest in Bolivia and Peru*, Latin America Report N°12, 3 March 2005 (also available in Spanish)
- ✘ *Spoiling Security in Haiti*, Latin America/Caribbean Report N°13, 31 May 2005
- ✘ *Colombia: Presidential Politics and Political Prospects*, Latin America Report N°14, 16 June 2005 (also available in Spanish)
- ✘ *Can Haiti Hold Elections in 2005?*, Latin America/Caribbean Briefing N°8, 3 August 2005 (also available in French)
- ✘ *Haiti's Elections: The Case for a Short Delay*, Latin America/Caribbean Briefing N°9, 25 November 2005 (also available in French)
- ✘ *Bolivia at the Crossroads: The December Elections*, Latin America Report N°15, 8 December 2005 (also available in Spanish)

MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA

ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT

- ✘ *Disengagement and After: Where Next for Sharon and the Likud?*, Middle East Report N°36, 1 March 2005 (also available in Arabic and in Hebrew)
- ✘ *Syria After Lebanon, Lebanon After Syria*, Middle East Report N°39, 12 April 2005 (also available in Arabic)
- ✘ *Mr Abbas Goes to Washington: Can He Still Succeed?*, Middle East Briefing N°17, 24 May 2005 (also available in Arabic)
- ✘ *Disengagement and Its Discontents: What Will the Israeli Settlers Do?*, Middle East Report N°43, 7 July 2005 (also available in Arabic)
- ✘ *The Jerusalem Powder Keg*, Middle East Report N°44, 2 August 2005 (also available in Arabic)
- ✘ *Lebanon: Managing the Gathering Storm*, Middle East Report N°48, 5 December 2005 (also available in Arabic)

EGYPT/NORTH AFRICA

- ✘ *Understanding Islamism*, Middle East/North Africa Report N°37, 2 March 2005 (also available in Arabic and French)
- ✘ *Islamism in North Africa IV: The Islamist Challenge in Mauritania: Threat or Scapegoat?*, Middle East/North Africa Report N°93, 10 May 2005 (full report only available in French)
- ✘ *Reforming Egypt: In Search of a Strategy*, Middle East/North Africa Report N°46, 4 October 2005

IRAQ/IRAN/GULF

- ✘ *Iraq: Allaying Turkey's Fears Over Kurdish Ambitions*, Middle East Report N°35, 26 January 2005 (also available in Arabic)
- ✘ *Iran in Iraq: How Much Influence?*, Middle East Report N°38, 21 March 2005 (also available in Arabic)
- ✘ *Bahrain's Sectarian Challenge*, Middle East Report N°40, 2 May 2005 (also available in Arabic)
- ✘ *Iraq: Don't Rush the Constitution*, Middle East Report N°42, 8 June 2005 (also available in Arabic)
- ✘ *Iran: What Does Ahmadi-Nejad's Victory Mean?*, Middle East Briefing N°18, 4 August 2005
- ✘ *The Shiite Question in Saudi Arabia*, Middle East Report N°45, 19 September 2005
- ✘ *Unmaking Iraq: A Constitutional Process Gone Awry*, Middle East Briefing N°19, 26 September 2005
- ✘ *Jordan's 9/11: Dealing With Jihadi Islamism*, Middle East Report N°47, 23 November 2005 (also available in Arabic)

THEMATIC ISSUES REPORTS

EU

- ✘ *EU Crisis Response Capability Revisited*, Europe Report N°160, 17 January 2005




Measuring progress

Measuring the progress of an organisation such as Crisis Group – whose mission is to help prevent and contain as well as resolve deadly conflict – is inevitably an inexact science. Quantitative measures provide some sense of the level of activity of the organisation, and of others' response, but have their limitations. Qualitative judgements are necessarily subjective: it is difficult for anyone to establish a close causal relationship between any given argument and outcome, particularly if the desired outcome is for something – here, conflict – not to happen. Nevertheless, judgements do have to be made. What indicators are available, and what do they tell us about Crisis Group's progress in 2005?

Operations

Crisis Group continued to grow in 2005, albeit at a slower pace than in recent years. Our field offices now cover over 50 areas of actual or potential conflict worldwide. We took steps to open a new office in Abuja, Nigeria, to enable us to report on the instability in that country, and to provide us with an advocacy voice in one of Africa's most influential countries. In Europe, the Balkans project was further wound back with the closure of our Belgrade and Skopje offices, leaving Pristina as our sole Balkans presence – though we will continue to report on the wider region. In light of the more stable security situation in Colombia, our Colombia/Andes project office was moved from Quito back to Bogotá. Our presence in the Middle East continued to expand, with the basing of analysts in Jerusalem and Beirut. Core full-time positions held steady at 110, with staff representing between them 44 nationalities and speaking 52 different languages.


NUMBER OF COUNTRIES OR ENTITIES COVERED BY CRISIS GROUP FIELD REPORTING



Output

Crisis Group published 95 reports and briefing papers in 2005, up from 80 in 2004. (In addition, Crisis Group publishes translations of its reports into relevant languages, including Albanian, Arabic, Bahasa Indonesia, Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian, Dari, French, Hebrew, Korean, Macedonian, Russian and Spanish.) Briefing papers, generally 8-16 pages in length, and reports, generally 16-36 pages, are sent out in printed form to some 4,200 policy-makers and those who influence them. A further 17,000 targeted recipients are sent our publications by email notification or attachment, while another 43,000 have subscribed directly through our website. All Crisis Group publications are posted on our website: 2.3 million copies of reports and briefing papers were downloaded from www.crisisgroup.org in 2005.

NUMBER OF REPORTS & BRIEFING PAPERS ISSUED, 1995-2005



Media exposure

Crisis Group's reports and analysts are widely used as sources of information and comment by major national and international media outlets. The number of comments, interviews, and other Crisis Group media citations rose to 4,332 in 2005 (up from 3,166 in 2004, 2,503 in 2003 and 1,832 in 2002) and to 10,261 if republications are included. Local press, radio and TV are also extremely important in advancing Crisis Group's policy ideas, with new Crisis Group reports on a country usually treated there as a significant news story, and our field analysts often asked for interviews. Crisis Group staff and Board members also regularly write opinion pieces (op-eds) in the editorial pages of major papers – 128 were published in national and international newspapers in 2005 (up from 105 in 2004 and 63 in 2003).

Support

Crisis Group's income rose in 2005 by 2.2 per cent to U.S. \$11.84m, compared with \$11.59m in 2004. With expenditure for 2004 finishing at \$11.84m, the results for the year were in balance. 22 governments supported Crisis Group in 2005 (2 more than in 2004) and collectively, they provided \$4.8m, or 41 per cent of available funds. Foundations contributed \$4.7m in 2005 (down slightly from \$4.95m in 2004), or 39 per cent of the total. Other sources – mainly private individuals and family trusts, and a small number of companies – made up the balance, contributing \$2.34m in 2005 (up from \$1.95m in 2004), or 20 per cent of the total. In 2005, some 66 per cent of all available income was unrestricted, while 34 per cent was earmarked for specific projects.

Thanks to two major pledges made to Crisis Group in late 2005, we expect to be able to cover expenditures for 2006. Our fundraising efforts were also boosted by the proceeds – some \$500,000 net income – from our Tenth Anniversary Award Luncheon in November, which will be attributed to supporting our operations in 2006. However, our longer-term stability is not yet assured and effective fundraising will need to remain one of Crisis Group's highest priority activities.

Outcomes

Crisis Group tabulates and tracks as best it can the fate of its policy recommendations. The pattern continued of some 30-40 per cent of our recommendations being achieved, in whole or in part, within a year: some examples are set out in the geographical sections of this report. But causality is obviously a matter of judgement in each case, and we acknowledge that Crisis Group's voice is often only one of many. Moreover, there may be many reasons other than wrong-headedness why policy prescriptions are not implemented: they may be overtaken by events, not yet timely, be accepted but meet a resource constraint or, while not being accepted, play a major role in stimulating rethinking of an important issue. To judge how well we do our job, Crisis Group relies heavily on feedback from the policy-makers at whom our publications are targeted: in 2005 that feedback continued to be extremely positive.


Judgements

Anecdotal evidence abounds – some of it reflected in the quotations throughout this report – that Crisis Group's reporting is highly regarded by policy-makers, the media and other analysts. 2005 was marked by some notable public recognition of Crisis Group's role, with a special £100,000 award from the Rausing Trust in September for "leadership in the advancement of human rights", and our identification among "Asia's Heroes 2005" and "European Heroes 2005" in special editions of *Time* magazine in October devoted to "extraordinary" individuals and organisations.

We continue to explore ways in which feedback – both solicited and unsolicited, and from both donors and our main target audiences – can be more systematically evaluated. More specifically, Crisis Group uses an internal assessment process, in which field personnel, program directors and Crisis Group leadership work together to produce analytical memoranda and address the following criteria:

- ✦ The fit between Crisis Group activities and conflict prevention goals
- ✦ Relevance and utility of reports in the policy cycle for different actors
- ✦ Impact of advocacy of specific Crisis Group recommendations on policy
- ✦ Impact of policy changes we achieve on conflict prevention/containment

These memoranda form the basis for systematic annual management and Board assessment, through candid roundtable discussion, of what is being done right, what needs to be improved, and what should have greater or lesser emphasis.



Crisis Group's website

www.crisisgroup.org

A critical advocacy tool

Crisis Group's website is one of our most important advocacy tools. In 2005 we had 3.4 million visits to our website (up 83 per cent from 1.85m in 2004), during which some 2.3 million reports were downloaded (up from 1.9m in 2004).

All Crisis Group reports and briefing papers are available on the website, and are free to download. While visitors to our website are mainly interested in our publications, the website includes a number of additional features that have helped make it one of the world's leading internet resources on conflict.

These include :

- ✘ **Priority advocacy pages**, highlighting conflicts we have selected for particular advocacy attention – such as Darfur, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nepal and Afghanistan. The pages contain a wealth of information, including Crisis Group reporting and comment pieces, maps and statistics, relevant news sources, important documents and information on what people can do to help resolve the conflict.

- ✘ **Conflict histories database**, providing a brief but detailed historical overview of some 50 conflicts covered by our analysts.

- ✘ **CrisisWatch database**, which complements the Conflict Histories database by providing a month-by-month report of developments in current or potential conflict situations around the world. Users can search by country or keyword all monthly CrisisWatch bulletins since the series started in September 2003.

- ✘ **Research resources and links page**, which provides ready access to reports and resources on conflict issues, peacekeeping missions, international and regional organisations, news sources, links to other NGOs in the field and much more.

- ✘ **Maps database**, providing quick and easy access to all Crisis Group country maps.

- ✘ **Text only version**, allowing users with slow internet connections easier access to reports and resources.

- ✘ **Downloads to Palm or other handheld computers**, allowing users to download the executive summaries and recommendations of Crisis Group's recent reports, opinion pieces and CrisisWatch bulletins to their Palm or other handheld device.

Facts and figures

- **3,382,000 visits*** during 2005 (up from 1,852,000 in 2004)
- **2,335,000 reports downloaded** during 2005 (up from 1,887,000 in 2004)
- **281,800 visits on average per month** in 2005 (up from 154,300 in 2004)
- **15:00 minutes average length of visit**

* Visit : an individual user session, made up of a varying number of "hits", depending on how many text, graphics or link elements the user requests. In 2005, the website had over 75 million hits.

STATEMENT OF ACTIVITIES

For financial years ended 30 June 2005 and June 2004 (in U.S. dollars). Full audited financial statements are available on request, and accessible on Crisis Group's website, www.crisisgroup.org.

Revenues and Other Support :

	Year ended 30 June 2005	Year ended 30 June 2004
Contributions	10,349,955	11,773,366
Investment income	128,037	94,753
Miscellaneous income	-	201
Total-Revenues and other support	10,477,992	11,868,320

Expenses : Africa Program

	Year ended 30 June 2005	Year ended 30 June 2004
Central Africa	709,908	717,353
Horn of Africa	461,900	324,191
South Africa	384,472	131,564
West Africa	363,835	373,004
Total-Africa Program	1,920,115	1,546,112

Asia Program

	Year ended 30 June 2005	Year ended 30 June 2004
Myanmar/Burma	16,866	73,071
Central Asia	479,832	631,220
Indonesia	397,652	398,320
North East Asia	461,811	29,249
Pakistan/Afghanistan	416,056	488,921
Nepal	248,762	170,885
Total-Asia Program	2,020,979	1,791,666

Europe Program

	Year ended 30 June 2005	Year ended 30 June 2004
Bosnia	46,096	170,882
Caucasus	301,312	232,960
Macedonia	77,535	102,131
Moldova	11,404	30,243
Kosovo	355,232	346,907
Serbia	287,948	297,693
Cyprus	9,039	-
Total-Europe Program	1,088,566	1,180,816

Middle East Program

	Year ended 30 June 2005	Year ended 30 June 2004
Iran/Iraq/Gulf	625,286	556,018
N. Africa	225,359	237,605
Israel/Palestine Conflict	485,932	523,222
Total-Middle East Program	1,336,577	1,316,845

Latin America Program

	Year ended 30 June 2005	Year ended 30 June 2004
Colombia	392,804	293,228
Haiti	168,549	-
Total-Latin America Program	561,353	293,228

Thematic Research

	Year ended 30 June 2005	Year ended 30 June 2004
Total-Program Expenses	35	16,849

Advocacy

	Year ended 30 June 2005	Year ended 30 June 2004
Total-Administration	3,128,393	3,046,941

Administration


	Year ended 30 June 2005	Year ended 30 June 2004
Fundraising	553,958	615,347
Administration	1,042,842	977,265
Other	(263,023)	(433,351)
Total-Administration	1,333,777	1,159,261

Total expenses

	Year ended 30 June 2005	Year ended 30 June 2004
Total expenses	11,389,795	10,351,718

Changes in net assets	(911,803)	1,516,602
Net assets at beginning of the year	10,494,247	8,977,645
Net assets at end of the year	9,582,444	10,494,247

Number of visitors per month to Crisis Group's website (thousands)



** from 1996 to 1999 inclusive, monthly figures are for January of the relevant year.

Crisis Group's funding

Maintaining a strong and diverse financial base is crucial to preserving Crisis Group's independence and credibility. In 2005, 41 per cent of Crisis Group's funds came from governments, 39 per cent came from foundations, and 20 per cent came from private individuals and corporations. Of all those funds, around 66 per cent were available for spending on an unrestricted basis, providing welcome flexibility, while 34 per cent were earmarked for particular programs or projects.

Overall, Crisis Group raised some U.S.\$11.84m in 2005, compared with \$11.59m in 2004. While the total increase in funding was small, especially in comparison with previous years, it did reflect Crisis Group's efforts to consolidate a broader funding base.

Crisis Group gratefully acknowledges and thanks the 22 governments and 21 major charitable foundations who supported us in 2005, and whose names are listed below. We are also profoundly grateful to the International Advisory Council members, who were major benefactors in 2005, and to our Patrons, Contributors and Donors, also listed below. New supporters are extremely welcome: Crisis Group's membership categories, and the benefits associated with each, are set out below.

Governments

- ✘ Australia (Agency for International Development)
- ✘ Austria (Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
- ✘ Belgium (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
- ✘ Canada (Department of Foreign Affairs; International Development Agency)
- ✘ Czech Republic (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
- ✘ Denmark (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
- ✘ European Union (European Commission)
- ✘ Finland (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
- ✘ France (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
- ✘ Germany (Foreign Office)
- ✘ Ireland (Department of Foreign Affairs)
- ✘ Japan (Japan International Cooperation Agency)
- ✘ Liechtenstein
- ✘ Luxembourg (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
- ✘ The Netherlands (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
- ✘ New Zealand (Agency for International Development)
- ✘ Norway (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
- ✘ Sweden (Ministry for Foreign Affairs)
- ✘ Switzerland (Federal Department of Foreign Affairs)
- ✘ Taiwan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
- ✘ United Kingdom (Foreign and Commonwealth Office; Department for International Development)
- ✘ United States (U.S. Agency for International Development)

Foundations

- ✘ Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation
- ✘ Carnegie Corporation of New York
- ✘ Charles Stewart Mott Foundation
- ✘ Compton Foundation
- ✘ David and Lucille Packard Foundation
- ✘ Ford Foundation
- ✘ Flora Family Foundation
- ✘ Fundacion DARA Internacional
- ✘ Hunt Alternatives Fund
- ✘ John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
- ✘ Korea Foundation
- ✘ Moriah Fund
- ✘ Open Society Institute
- ✘ Pierre and Pamela Omidyar Fund
- ✘ Ploughshares Fund
- ✘ Rockefeller Foundation
- ✘ Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors
- ✘ Sigrid Rausing Trust
- ✘ Sarlo Foundation of the Jewish Community Endowment Fund
- ✘ Viva Trust
- ✘ William and Flora Hewlett Foundation

Becoming a Crisis Group Supporter

International Advisory Council Member

Supporters who contribute more than U.S.\$25,000 p.a. are offered International Advisory Council membership, in which capacity they are invited to join the Board of Trustees as observers at its twice yearly meetings. They also receive private policy briefings by visiting experts from Crisis Group field offices, have direct access to staff and analysts, are invited to roundtable dinner discussions, fundraising and promotional events and field trips and are sent all Crisis Group publications.

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