Events on the Korean peninsula are among the most dramatic on the world stage. Amid cycles of rapprochement and disaffection between North and South, relations between Pyongyang and Washington careen back and forth from bellicosity to detente. At stake are not just North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs but also peace and security in North East Asia. China, the North’s most important ally, has cooperated in enforcing strict sanctions in an attempt to temper its partner’s bravado. But ultimately it prefers the status quo to the instability that would follow radical change. Crisis Group works to decrease the risk of war on the peninsula while advocating for creative solutions for all parties to implement as they pursue their long-term goals.
Russia used its Security Council veto to terminate a UN panel monitoring sanctions on North Korea, complicating efforts to contain Pyongyang’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. In this Q&A, Crisis Group experts Christopher Green, Richard Gowan and Maya Ungar delve into the consequences.
Russian President conducted first state visit to North Korea, signalling strengthened security partnership; in response, Seoul issued strong condemnations, including threats to arm Ukraine.
Russia and North Korea entered new strategic partnership. Russian President Putin 18-19 June paid “friendly state visit” to Pyongyang for first time in 24 years; Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un 19 June signed new bilateral treaty to strengthen “defence capabilities” and promote science and technology cooperation; leaders signed mutual defence article binding both parties to “provide military and other assistance immediately using all available means” should either party be “attacked and finds itself in a state of war”, in accordance with Article 51 of UN Charter and consistent with both countries’ laws; observers raised alarm over possible violations of UN Security Council resolutions by expansion of alleged North Korean weapons transfers to bolster Russian war in Ukraine, and transfers of Russian military technologies to North Korea.
Seoul responded to Russian-North Korea treaty with threats to arm Ukraine. South Korea 20 June condemned new Russian-North Korea treaty, insisting that it threatens their security and violates UN Security Council resolutions; Seoul warned that it would consider sending arms directly to Ukraine in contravention of its long-standing position of not supplying weapons to countries actively engaged in conflict. South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol 24 June called for “robust security readiness” during meeting of senior secretaries.
Tensions rose at border as sides used loudspeakers, balloons and other means to show protest. Seoul 9 June resumed broadcasting international news and K-pop via loudspeakers on inter-Korean border; move in retaliation to North Korea floating south 1,000 balloons filled with trash and manure in May. Kim Yo Jong, sister of North Korean leader 10 June warned loudspeakers could spark “very dangerous situation” and risked provoking “crisis of confrontation”. After South Korea detected two separate incursions of North Korean troops crossing Military Demarcation Line, a third saw 20-30 North Korean soldiers 18 June cross Military Demarcation Line, retreating after South Korean military fired warning shots; incidents mark pattern of behaviour that implies potential desire to slowly escalate.
We are in a situation where North Korea can rely on Russia and China more than has been the case in decades.
Politics is a full-contact sport in South Korea and there is no sign of any sort of balanced politics at the moment.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has announced that he will no longer support the longstanding goal of eventually reunifying the two Koreas. The change of position, coupled with Kim’s flexing of his country’s military muscle, has troubling implications for the Korean peninsula’s stability.
On 31 May, Pyongyang tried – and failed – to send a military reconnaissance satellite into space. In this Q&A, Crisis Group expert Chris Green explains why it took this action and what can be done to keep regional tensions from rising.
On 9 March, South Koreans voted a conservative, Yoon Suk-yeol, into the presidency to replace the left-leaning Moon Jae-in. Yoon has taken a harder rhetorical line than his predecessor toward Pyongyang. But a dramatic shift in North Korea policy is unlikely.
Pyongyang’s string of missile tests at the turn of 2022 indicates its discontent with how diplomacy has sputtered on the Korean peninsula since the 2019 summit. Fresh overtures may fall short of bringing it back to the table, but they are worth a try.
The latest five-day plenum of North Korea’s ruling party focused on food insecurity, chief among the nation’s challenges. With the pandemic not yet tamed and other uncertainty on the international scene, Pyongyang may continue refraining from major provocations into 2022, but for how long is unclear.
North and South Korea have recently staged displays of military prowess, causing some to worry about an accelerating arms race. But both countries were playing politics. Any uptick in tensions is likely to come after the Beijing Olympics and South Korean elections in March 2022.
On 24 June, Pyongyang abruptly stopped threats it had been making at Seoul for weeks, although the underpinnings of inter-Korean friction remain. Peninsular tensions could stay on simmer or escalate depending on how the parties manage an uncertain time before the U.S. election.
Two years have passed since U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un's historic Singapore summit. But nuclear diplomacy remains stuck and the 2018 June Singapore Joint Statement has not been implemented. The coronavirus pandemic and U.S. presidential elections in November might convince both capitals to kick the can down the road until next year, at the earliest. But Pyongyang's nuclear weapons capability continues to advance without restrictions.
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