Rival assemblies agreed on roadmap for unity govt, although tensions remained amid lack of budget compromise; UN human rights chief criticised rise in detentions and disappearances.  

Rival authorities agreed on forming unity govt and organising elections. Around 130 members from east-based House of Representatives (HoR) and Tripoli-based High State Council (HSC) 18 July met in Egyptian capital Cairo and announced they agreed on forming unity govt and organising legislative and presidential elections. Doubts persisted, however, over whether political deadlock had actually been broken as it remained unclear whether HSC as a whole had sincerely agreed to roadmap or whether HoR would take process forward in absence of UN endorsement. Meanwhile, selection procedures for potential new govt and election laws remained in limbo. 

Budget deadlock continued despite attempts at compromise. HoR Speaker Aguila Saleh 7 July met Central Bank Governor Sadiq al-Kabir to discuss steps to unify budget. HoR 10 July approved additional budget of $18.3bn to finance country’s east-based institutions; HSC next day rejected budget, criticising unilateral approach and large size of additional funds. 

International actors criticised arbitrary arrests and disappearances. UN human rights chief Volker Türk 9 July lamented stalled political process and deteriorating human rights situation, highlighting “escalation in arbitrary arrests and detentions, enforced disappearances”, especially of civil society activists and political opposition. Unidentified armed men 8 July abducted political activist Moatassim al-Areebi in Misrata city, releasing him 11 July after UN and U.S. called for his release. Authorities 11 July detained journalist Ahmed al-Sanussi, who reported on allegations of govt corruption, in capital Tripoli; police 14 July released Sanussi after UN, EU and others criticised arrest. 

In other important developments. Amid Italian seizures in June of Russian shipment of Chinese-made drones headed to eastern port of Benghazi in violation of arms embargo, U.S. military delegation 16-18 July visited PM Dabaiba in Tripoli and representatives of eastern commander Khalifa Haftar to discuss unification of military institutions. Court 28 July sentenced 12 officials to prison terms between nine and 27 years for culpability in Sept 2023 dam collapses amid floods in Derna city that killed over 5,000.

Deadlock between rival govts continued including over economic matters, while Russia stepped up military assistance to eastern authorities. 

UN representative called out ongoing political deadlock between rival govts. Acting head of UN mission Stephanie Koury 19 June gave first briefing to UN Security Council, highlighting need for “inclusive Libyan-led process to overcome political impasse and support Libyan people” and noting “repetitive pattern” of abductions, arbitrary arrests and detentions. Despite broader political deadlock, High National Elections Commission 9 June launched voter registration process for elections in 60 municipalities due to be held sometime this year, later extending deadline to 7 July amid high voter demand to register. 

Financial management challenges persisted despite foreign mediation. U.S. Embassy in Tunis 11-12 June hosted Libya Economic Dialogue with representatives of political and financial bodies aligned with rival east and west govts, as well as World Bank, U.S. Treasury and UN; dialogue intended to facilitate agreement between parallel govts on 2024 budget, but despite participants welcoming opportunity for discussions, forum concluded without final budgetary accord. U.S. 12 June announced sanctions against Russian state currency-printing company Goznak for allegedly printing money for east-based authorities, including $1bn of “counterfeit Libyan currency”; move came amid Tripoli govt’s allegations that counterfeit money is in circulation although east-based officials continued to claim currency is legal, printed in 2020 through agreement with east-based head of Central Bank. 

Moscow’s military footprint grew. Two Russian warships 16 June arrived at eastern Tobruk Naval Base for three-day visit, during which eastern military authorities announced 250 students had been sent to Russia for training and called for closer partnership in training, maintenance, technical and logistical support and maritime security; U.S. 22 June expressed concern over Russia’s increased military activity in country. 

Govt delayed Tunisia border reopening. Libya and Tunisia 12 June signed agreement to reopen Ras al-Jedir border crossing for humanitarian and diplomatic needs, but Tripoli 24 June delayed full reopening amid presence of local militia from nearby Libyan city of Zuwara; crossing closed since March following clashes between Tripoli-based security forces and local armed groups. 

Political deadlock continued as parallel govts engaged internationally; corruption and insecurity persisted. 

Outgoing UN envoy decried stalemate amid Western officials’ visits to parallel govts. Abdoulaye Bathily, who resigned as head of UN mission in April, 14 May said Libyan leaders not interested in stabilising country or holding elections and had “fuelled rivalries” among armed groups to maintain status quo. However, deputy UN special representative Stephanie Koury 21 May launched new discussions with Libyan officials. Meanwhile, parallel administrations both engaged with Western officials. Tripoli-based PM Dabaiba 15 May met EU Council President Charles Michel and EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in Brussels to discuss migration issues and renewable energy, while earlier in month, Italian PM Giorgia Meloni 7 May visited Tripoli to sign agreements including on education and health; Meloni later same day met with eastern military commander Khalifa Haftar, whose entourage also received visits from other international officials including from EU and U.S.; engagement with Haftar occurred amid his growing military cooperation with Russia and proposal for Russian-built oil refinery in east announced 18 May. 

IMF noted positive economic prospects despite need for public sector reform. International Monetary Fund’s monitoring mission to Libya 13 May estimated GDP to grow by 8% in 2024 thanks to rise in oil exports, despite lack of budgeting accountability and high public sector wages and subsidies; IMF urged authorities to adopt governance reforms to fight corruption and called for reunification of central bank. Meanwhile, court 12 May ordered arrest of four customs officials accused of “conspiring to smuggle” 26 tonnes of gold worth over $1.8bn through Misrata airport in Dec 2023.

Insecurity persisted. Members of Stability Support Authority and First Support Force armed groups 18 May clashed in Al-Zawiya city, west of Tripoli, killing one and injuring six others. Benghazi MP Ibrahim al-Dressi went missing 16 May amid concerns he may have been kidnapped and calls for his immediate release.

In another important development. Interior ministers of Algeria, Libya and Tunisia 2 May met Italian counterpart Matteo Piantedosi as part of new three-party grouping (see Algeria).

UN Special Envoy resigned due to political deadlock; disputes over financial control continued as Russia delivered military materiel to eastern forces.

UN head of mission resigned amid ongoing political deadlock. UN Special Representative for Libya Abdoulaye Bathily 16 April resigned citing entrenched resistance among Libyan leaders and no appetite for negotiations or reunification among rival govts and military coalitions; Bathily also blamed international actors for meddling and attempting to carve out influence. Meanwhile, High National Elections Commission 16 April issued statement affirming readiness to conduct municipal and general elections, although notable gaps in electoral laws remained that would likely hamper any vote. 

Rival govts sparred over financial challenges. Tripoli-based Finance Ministry 9 April issued statement blaming current liquidity crisis on parallel spending by eastern authorities, accusing them of relying on counterfeit currency. Meanwhile, east-based House of Representatives 30 April passed 2024 budget for its govt amid uncertainty over whether Tripoli-based Central Bank of Libya would provide funds; earlier, eastern authorities 16 April published court order appointing guardianship committee over Libyan Investment Authority funds and accused Tripoli-based govt of “financial abuses, violation and embezzlement”. 

Russian equipment arrived in east. Russian navy vessels reportedly delivered armoured personnel carriers and rocket launchers to eastern military commander Khalifa Haftar-led forces; social media 14 April showed shipments unloaded in eastern port of Tobruk, marking Russia’s first openly conducted delivery of military material using navy vessel. Meanwhile, in continued insecurity, judicial police reportedly linked to armed group clashed with Stability Support Authority militia members in capital Tripoli 11 April, with no casualties reported. Tripoli govt 13 April dispatched members of Law Enforcement Administration to oversee maintenance work at Ras al-Jedir crossing with Tunisia, but border point remained closed amid unresolved disputes over who will manage security. Political activist Seraj Daghman reported dead in prison south east of Benghazi city 19 April, with some reports suggesting he may have been executed. 

In other important developments. Algerian, Libyan and Tunisian heads of state 22 April held high-level discussions in Tunisian capital Tunis over stronger regional integration (see Algeria).

Amid poor economic outlook and stalled political process, new feud emerged about currency depreciation. 

Political process remained deadlocked despite nominal pledges to unify country. During meeting in Saudi Arabia’s capital Riyadh, foreign ministers of member countries of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 3 March expressed “support for the efforts of the United Nations to reach a political solution, hold elections and unify state institutions” in Libya. Libya’s Parliament Speaker Aghela Saleh, head of Presidential Council Mohamed Mnefi, and head of Tripoli-based High State Council Mohamed Tekkala 10 March met in Egypt’s capital Cairo under Arab League aegis, agreed to form “technical committee” to resolve contentious points of electoral legislation. Despite pledges to break deadlock, UN envoy’s efforts to resolve disagreements in draft electoral laws and address contentious issue of appointing new interim government stalled. 

Move to depreciate currency sparked political recriminations. In wake of rising foreign currency exchange rate on black market, Parliament speaker Aghila Saleh 14 March issued decree imposing 27% tax (labelled as fee) on foreign currency exchange, stating this was a means to raise money for “development projects and debt”. Move faced opposition in parliament, with deputy parliament speaker Fawzi Nuweiri 15 March declaring he opposed what amounts to devaluation of currency. In televised speech PM Abdul Dabaiba 18 March also rejected proposed tax on foreign currency exchange, claiming that Libya’s economy is strong with a surplus, low inflation, and high foreign reserves; accused Central Bank of mismanagement and blamed Speaker of Parliament for trying to cover costs of Khalifa Haftar’s spending in eastern Libya through tax. Central Bank 19 March, however, ordered banks to comply with imposition of tax on foreign currency purchases.

New initiatives to facilitate transfer of money from Tripoli to east reduced financial incentives to agree on political solution; Tripoli-based govt struck deal with militias for regular forces to police city.

Rival authorities continued to strike arrangements to maintain status quo. Eastern-based parliament, House of Representatives (HoR), 5 Feb established Libyan Development and Reconstruction Fund tasked with leading reconstruction efforts across country, and funded directly by Central Bank in capital Tripoli; HoR 19 Feb appointed at its helm east-based military strongman Khalifa Haftar’s son, Belqasem. HoR early Feb also established new financial committee that will sign off on countrywide budgetary disbursements; Tripoli’s position on move unclear. Meanwhile in address to UN Security Council, UN envoy Abdoulaye Bathily 15 Feb warned Libya could slide into “disintegration” if unable to form unified govt and move toward elections. UN Security Council 27 Feb reiterated call for elections “as soon as possible”.

Eastern forces reportedly prepared for show of force and received Russian tanks. Libyan news outlets 12 Feb reported 40 Russian T72 tanks were unloaded in eastern port of Tobruk, allegedly to support Haftar-led Libyan National Army (LNA). Pro-LNA official in following days confirmed reports, adding they expected to receive more fighter jets from Russia. Ahead of thirteenth anniversary of toppling of former leader Muammar Qadhafi on 17 Feb, Haftar-led forces reportedly dispatched military vehicles to Qadhafi’s hometown of Sirte (north) to conduct military exercises there, allegedly with Russia’s support.

Militias agreed to leave Tripoli after series of clashes in recent months. Tripoli-based Interior Minister Imad Trabelsi 21 Feb said at least five militias that have been controlling Tripoli for past ten years agreed to return to their barracks by 9 April; Trabelsi said regular forces will police Tripoli again. Earlier in month, inter-militia clashes continued in western Libya. Notably, apparent revenge attack against militiaman 17 Feb left ten people dead in Tripoli’s Abu Salim neighbourhood.

In another important development. Petroleum Facilities Guard militiamen 25 Feb shut down oil facilities across country in dispute over pay, next day suspended strike after Tripoli-based PM Dabaiba agreed to raise their salaries.

Tripoli-based govt’s decision to lift fuel subsidies sparked backlash, and latest UN-sponsored national dialogue initiative aimed at resolving political stalemate remained stalled.

Public debate revolved around financial and economic feuds. Tripoli-based PM Abdulhamid Dabaiba 10 Jan announced controversial plan to remove fuel subsidies, in likely attempt to curb smuggling of subsidised fuel. Move created uproar among constituencies and politicians who have ties to smuggling rackets, and eastern-based govt in following days called decision “null and void”. Amid opposition and concern that removal of subsidies without proper compensation plans could cause significant inflation and impact ordinary Libyans, Dabaiba 17 Jan said issue will be put to referendum. 

More controversies affected oil sector. National Oil Corporation (NOC) 7 Jan declared force majeure at Sharara Oil Field after protesters closed site in uproar over deteriorating economic conditions in southern region; NOC 21 Jan lifted force majeure after deal with protesters.

UN envoy initiative to resolve political stalemate found no traction. U.S. ambassador to Libya, Richard Norland, in Jan visited capital Tripoli and eastern city of Benghazi to mobilise support for UN envoy Abdoulaye Bathily-sponsored meeting of Libya’s five main political stakeholders to settle “issues impeding progress toward elections”. Speaker of eastern-based House of Representatives (HoR), Aguila Saleh, 23 Jan met with Norland in Benghazi and confirmed rejection of Bathily’s invitation, insisting that first step toward unification should be appointment of new unity govt. Norland same day also met with Libyan National Army (LNA) leader Khalifa Haftar in Benghazi to discuss political stalemate. Following meetings with Norland, Dabaiba and head of Tripoli-based advisory body High Council of State, Mohamed Takala, around 25 Jan announced accepting Bathily’s invitation. Bathily also held series of meetings, including with Haftar 30 Jan and Saleh next day, who reiterated his side would not attend UN-brokered political dialogue unless govt appointed by east-based parliament was present, or both govts were excluded. Meanwhile, Presidency Council pushed separate initiative, National Reconciliation Conference, with preparatory committee meeting held 14 Jan in Zuwara city; conference would supposedly be held in Sirte city in April and include members of former Qadhafi regime. 

UN-led push to convene meeting of five major political stakeholders faced setbacks as disagreements persisted on whether new govt or elections should come first.

UN envoy’s initiative to convene stakeholders’ meeting faced obstacles. UN Special Representative for Libya, Abdoulaye Bathily, 18 Dec briefed members of UN Security Council on his latest initiative to convene meeting of Libya’s five main political stakeholders, said all invitees had submitted names of their respective delegations but lamented that “Libyan leaders show no commitment to ending the long-standing stalemate”. Stakeholders have reportedly stated irreconcilable conditions for their participation. Notably, eastern-based House of Representatives (HoR) Speaker Aguila Saleh conditioned attendance to focusing discussions on formation of “new govt for elections” and rejected participation of Tripoli-based PM Abdelhamid Dabaiba on grounds that he is no longer legitimate. Meanwhile, Dabaiba, while ready to discuss outstanding issues in electoral laws, categorically rejected any discussions on “new govt”. Libyan National Army (LNA) chief Khalifa Haftar conditioned Dabaiba’s Govt of National Unity (GNU) participation to inclusion of HoR-appointed govt, or exclusion of both govts.

Drone allegedly targeted Russian military cargo in country’s east. Local media reports suggested drone mid Dec targeted Russian Ilyushin military cargo aircraft in Jufra airbase in central Libya; U.S. Africa Command denied involvement. Cargo plane could have presumably been used to deliver equipment to Haftar or to his allies as Jufra airbase falls under LNA’s authority; base is also known, however, to be transit point for Russian military activity in neighbouring African states. Some foreign analysts suggested strike could be work of Tripoli-based authorities who possess armed drones but whether these have sufficient autonomy to carry out strike in Jufra, some 500 kilometres from capital, is unclear.

In other important developments. UN Mission 21 Dec expressed concern over death in custody of former Defence Minister Al-Mahdi al-Barghathi after authorities in Oct arrested him in Benghazi city, demanded independent investigation. Presidency Council early Dec expressed concern after Niger in Nov repelled law that criminalised transportation of irregular migrants to neighbouring Libya and Algeria for onward travel to Europe, while GNU reportedly appealed for urgent EU support to secure country’s southern border.

Attempts to break political deadlock and unify state institutions continued to fail as distrust between rival authorities remained high.

Rival authorities remained at loggerheads on new unified executive and elections. Heads of rival assemblies, Aghela Saleh of eastern-based House of Representatives (HoR), and Mohamed Takala of Tripoli-based High State Council (HSC), around 8 Nov met in Egypt but failed to reach breakthrough; Saleh continued to back HoR-approved election laws and called for formation of interim unity govt, while Takala insisted that his assembly did not approve final version of laws and allegedly refused to back new govt formation. Taking stock of impasse, UN envoy Abdoulaye Bathily 23 Nov invited key stakeholders – Presidential Council, HoR, HSC, Tripoli-based govt and Libyan National Army – to attend meeting to reach settlement on outstanding issues pertaining to electoral process. Eastern-based govt of Osama Hamad immediately denounced its exclusion from UN-led talks, said Bathily has “entrenched division among Libyans” and called on UN Sec Gen António Guterres to “appoint a new UN envoy”.

Unified mechanism to lead reconstruction of flood-hit city of Derna remained elusive. Eastern-based govt headed by Osama Hamad 1-2 Nov hosted international conference for reconstruction of Derna city following September devastating floods; over 70 foreign companies and handful of diplomats attended, but Tripoli-based authorities were not invited and western diplomats, who do not recognise eastern-based govt, boycotted. UN mission (UNSMIL) continued to call for unified and coordinated mechanism for reconstruction, warning that unilateral initiatives risk deepening existing rift between rival administrations.

In other important developments. Tensions remained elevated in eastern city of Benghazi and western city of Gharyan following deadly fighting in October; separate incidents were triggered by return of two military commanders to their hometowns, and served as reminder that perceptions of hostile movement by rival forces can fuel localised violence. Meanwhile, dispute between Tripoli-based PM Abdulhamid Dabaiba and Central Bank Governor Seddiq al-Kebir early Nov reached new peak, allegedly over latter’s plan to meet eastern-based authorities; following spat, al-Kebir reportedly left Tripoli and flew out to Türkiye. Turkish Parliament 30 Nov approved extension of military mission in Libya for additional 24 months.

Parliament passed election laws, but major obstacles to holding votes remained; deadly clashes erupted between rival forces in eastern city of Benghazi and western city of Gharyan.

Election laws continued to spark controversy. Eastern-based House of Representatives (HoR) early Oct approved revised versions of presidential and parliamentary election laws and referred them to High Electoral Commission for implementation. Mohamed Tekala, new head of rival Tripoli-based High State Council (HSC), in following days rejected laws and scrapped cooperation with HoR; some HSC members contended that move did not reflect HSC’s stance, but just that of Tekala-aligned members. In briefing to UN Security Council, UN Special Representative for Libya Abdoulaye Bathily 16 Oct welcomed “some progress” in electoral process, but noted most politically contentious issues remained unresolved, with mandatory second round of presidential election and linkage between presidential and parliamentary elections putting electoral process at “high risk of disruption”; Bathily also noted negotiations between rival authorities required to form new govt ahead of elections remain elusive.

Rival forces engaged in deadly clashes. Former Tripoli-based Defence Minister al-Mahdi al-Barghathi early Oct travelled to his home city of Benghazi, allegedly alongside 40 of his followers. Claiming that Barghathi’s return had not been pre-approved and could be first step in plot to mobilise anti-Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar forces in Benghazi, forces aligned with Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) 6 Oct attempted to arrest him in Salmani district, sparking firefight that allegedly left at least 17 people dead, including one of Barghathi’s sons; LNA also cut off all communication in Benghazi for over a week. Meanwhile, clashes 29 Oct erupted in western city of Gharyan between Tripoli-based govt-affiliated militia and forces loyal to militia leader Adel Daab (who was expelled from Gharyan in 2019 by forces affiliated to former Tripoli-based govt after he handed control of city to Haftar’s forces); local sources reported eight people killed and 27 injured.

In other important developments. After flooding in Sept devastated eastern city of Derna, anger continued to simmer among locals who blame disaster on poor governance. Total death toll still uncertain: local authorities confirmed retrieving over 4,000 bodies, but number of missing is unclear.