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Talks between interim junta leader Konaté, junta leader Dadis Camara and regional mediator Burkina Faso President Campaoré held in Ouagadougou mid-month, before breakthrough “Ouagadougou Agreement” deal announced 15 Jan, creating unity govt led by PM from civilian opposition coalition Forces Vives, and elections within 6 months in which no junta members eligible to stand. Dadis earlier arrived in Ouagadougou still visibly injured, with several tense days in Conakry including pro-Dadis demonstrations. Dadis agreed to support transition and remain in Burkina Faso. AU 16 Jan hailed deal, though AU Peace and Security Council stressed Guinea’s suspension from body would remain until constitutional order fully restored. Opposition figure Jean-Marie Doré appointed PM 18 Jan (sworn in 26 Jan) and Rabiatou Serah Diallo (union leader) and Mamadouba Toto Camara (junta VP) appointed Vice-PMs. Talks between new interim govt, UN, ECOWAS started 21 Jan in Conakry to discuss, inter alia, ECOWAS military and civilian deployment. Prior to deal, U.S. 1 Jan suspended Guinea from trade preferences and U.S./French delegates 4 Jan held talks with Konaté.
Junta leader Dadis Camara 3 Dec shot and wounded by senior presidential guard member Aboubacar “Toumba” Diakité at military HQ in Conakry. Camara flown to Morocco 4 Dec for treatment amid speculation he was seriously injured, denied by ruling CNDD. Diakité 16 Dec admitted shooting, citing moves by Camara to blame him for Sept massacre. Dozens arrested in connection with shooting, also reports of killings and torture. Defence Minister Konaté took up temporary leadership of junta, 9 Dec urged military unity. Talks between junta and regional leaders resumed 13 Dec after hiatus, but without breakthrough. Opposition coalition Forces Vives continued strong criticism of Burkinabe president Compaoré’s mediation. Police 29 Dec announced all 12 soldiers jailed Dec 2008 for resisting Camara coup had been released. UN commission of inquiry into Sept massacre issued report 21 Dec calling for ICC trials for Camara and aides. Conakry tense, with “red beret” presidential forces reportedly targeting Peuhl ethnic group in suburbs. CNDD officials accused France of orchestrating Camara attack, prompting angry exchanges between capitals. Regional, international condemnation of junta remained strong; U.S. 23 Dec ended Guinea trade preferences.
10 activists arrested in Conakry late Oct following 5-day hunger strike, calling for justice for victims of 28 Sept violence and dialogue to resolve political crisis. Regional mediator Burkina Faso President Compaoré starting 3 Nov held separate meetings with delegations from ruling CNDD council and opposition/civil society coalition Forces Vives in Ouagadougou, 19 Nov recommended formation of 10-month transitional power-sharing govt with junta leader Camara as interim president and retaining right to stand in presidential polls. Proposal accepted by CNDD junta, strongly opposed by Forces Vives. Reports emerged late Oct junta imported $45m in arms from Ukraine, allegedly linked to support from South African mercenaries protecting Presidential Guard and training ethnic militia; U.S. urged South Africa to remove mercenaries, Pretoria pledged to investigate. Sanctions regime expanded as AU 7 Nov imposed targeted restrictions on junta leaders. UN International Committee of Inquiry into Sept atrocities began investigation 25 Nov.
At least 157 killed when security forces opened fire on large demonstrations in capital 28 Sept protesting junta leader Dadis Camara’s candidacy in upcoming presidential polls and military govt; reports of extreme sexual violence by security forces against protesters; several opposition figures, including presidential contender and former PM Cellou Dalein Diallo, reportedly arrested. Authorities banned “subversive” gatherings in wake. UNSC, AU, EU, France and U.S. condemned violence. Rallies followed mid-month announcement by Rally for Defence of the Republic party, formed to back Dadis after Dec 2008 coup, nominating Dadis as candidate in Jan election; now widely believed he intends to run. International Contact Group 3 Sept called on Dadis not to stand, while AU 18 Sept threatened to impose sanctions in Oct. Up to 20,000 rallied in earlier anti-Dadis protests in Diallo’s former stronghold of Labe, north of Conakry, 23 Sept; Diallo, expected to stand for opposition United Democratic Forces of Guinea (UDFG), earlier welcomed back from European trip by large crowds in Conakry. 300 demonstrated in Conakry 23 Sept against AU sanctions.
Junta leader Dadis Camara 17 Aug announced presidential elections would be held 31 Jan 2010 (pushing back initial Nov date) and parliamentary elections March 2010; later stated his candidacy depends on “will of the people”. U.S. embassy expressed disappointment over postponement, called on junta members not to contest poll; ruling CNDD denounced statement as external interference. Several hundred rallied in Conakry 22 Aug in support of Dadis. New group - Dadis Must Stay – formed early month.
Military junta 11 July placed army on maximum alert at all border posts, alleging drug traffickers based in neighbouring countries preparing attack on Guinea; Liberia, Guinea-Bissau and Senegal dismissed accusations, while several national and international observers, including AU, expressed scepticism over alleged plot as possible diversion from transition process. Junta leader Dadis Camara threatened to arrest anyone publicising doubts about credibility of threats.
Junta chief Moussa Dadis Camara 11 June announced presidential elections would be held as scheduled in Nov and that he would not stand despite earlier indications. Armed forces chief in 8 June televised statement requested Camara delay vote. Over 300 judiciary staff 8 June launched general strike to protest parallel military tribunals under Camara; minister for conflicts sacked 13 June. 20 people, including army chief General Camara, his son and other exsenior officers, arrested for drug trafficking 11 June. Ex-PM Souare reportedly arrested late month for embezzlement. International Contact Group meeting 20-21 June in Conakry condemned deteriorating security and economy.
Junta leader Capt Camara, seeking to ease fears ahead of early-May International Contact Group meeting, announced he would not stand in Dec presidential and legislative elections. Contact Group welcomed electoral preparations, but amid concerns over the govt’s capacity to meet its side of financial contributions and delays in agreed creation of transition oversight council. Signs of increasing dissatisfaction with Camara govt: over 1,000 protested in Conakry 6 May, with 2 wounded in gunfire by security forces; justice officials 13 May threatened to strike unless govt halt parallel military justice system. Govt announced $38m recovered in anti-corruption campaign, pledged to extend reform effort. 30 ambassadors recalled and 2 ministers fired early-month.
Fears for stability increased with further strong-arm tactics by ruling CNDD junta and signs “interim” leader Captain Dadis Camara preparing to hang on to power. Camara in angry 15 Apr speech threatened to leave military to stand in next elections, called on politicians to respect CNDD authority. Over 20 soldiers arrested 23 Apr for alleged coup plot; troops earlier deployed across capital and shots fired at Conakry military camp. National audit commission VP arrested as CNDD continued popular anti-corruption drive. Rights groups expressed concerns over arbitrary detentions, attacks on civilians since installation of new junta Dec 2008.
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