U.S. condemned Kim Jong-un’s 1 Jan claim that DPRK will soon test-fire an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), warned against “provocative actions and inflammatory rhetoric”. Beijing said it hoped “all parties will refrain from words and deeds that lead to the escalation of tension”. U.S. state department 3 Jan said it did not believe DPRK could mount a nuclear warhead on a ballistic missile. U.S. 5 Jan said DPRK had shown “qualitative” improvement in nuclear and missile capabilities following unprecedented level of tests – 24 missile and two nuclear – in 2016; said vital for U.S., Japan, South Korea and other countries to cooperate against threat, sustain pressure through sanctions. DPRK state media 8 Jan warned Pyongyang could launch ICBM test “any time” from any location, blamed hostile U.S. policy for arms development. Outgoing U.S. sec defense called DPRK weapons capabilities and missile defence programs “serious threat”, said U.S. prepared to shoot down any missile launch or test coming toward U.S. or an ally that posed a threat, or monitor for intelligence. Outgoing U.S. Sec State John Kerry 10 Jan said situation could get dangerous, “getting close to it right now”. ROK intelligence agencies 18 Jan reported they had seen possible ICBM parts being transported, suggesting preparations for new missile test-launch underway. New U.S. administration 20 Jan said it would develop “state of the art” missile defence system to protect against attacks from DPRK and Iran; no details provided. U.S. think-tank 39 North said satellite imagery from 22 Jan suggested nuclear reactor at DPRK’s Yongbyon nuclear facility “very likely operating”; operations at facility previously suspended since late 2015. ROK Acting President Hwang 23 Jan said deployment of U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile defence system could not be delayed, despite Chinese opposition; U.S. President Trump in 30 Jan phone call to Hwang reiterated “ironclad” commitment to defend ROK. Senior DPRK defector Thae Yong-ho 25 Jan said country’s elite increasingly expressing discontent toward regime, with low-level dissent.

Leader Kim Jong-un in New Year address 1 Jan said preparation in “last stage” for test launch of inter-continental ballistic missile. Thae Yong-ho, DPRK diplomat who defected to ROK in Aug and reportedly most senior govt official ever to do so, 27 Dec said Pyongyang had no intention to give up nuclear programs and believed 2017 would provide best opportunity for advancement given leadership changes in U.S. and ROK. Following new UNSC sanctions 30 Nov, Pyongyang responded 1 Dec with massive artillery drill. State-run media reported drill, observed by Kim Jong-un, simulated strikes on military targets in ROK, including five border islands and “reactionary ruling organs” in Seoul and other cities. Similar drill took place 11 Dec simulating strike on ROK’s presidential Blue House. Beijing said new UNSC resolution demonstrated “uniform stand” of international community against DPRK’s nuclear and missile programs, but urged countries to implement it in “balanced way” to avoid humanitarian fallout and negative impact on “normal economic activities”. Tokyo and Seoul 2 Dec both announced additional sanctions, expanding blacklist of DPRK individuals and entities; Beijing said it opposed any unilateral sanction outside UNSC framework. Beijing 15 Dec said Chinese defence cooperation with ROK should be based on respect for “each other’s security interests”; followed ROK media reports that Beijing ignored request by ROK navy to visit Qingdao port as punishment for planned deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system. ROK President Pak Geun-hye impeached 9 Dec over corruption scandal; acting President Hwang Kyo Ahn 18 Dec said he would carry through existing foreign policies, including THAAD deployment. Michael Flynn, U.S. President-elect Trump’s pick for national security advisor, 21 Dec called THAAD deployment “appropriate”.

Responding to North Korea’s (DPRK) Sept nuclear test, UNSC 30 Nov unanimously passed resolution approving new sanctions on DPRK, capping coal exports at 7.5mn metric tonnes (less than half previous level), banning exports of several metals, and blacklisting eleven people and ten entities. Resolution also clarified that use of “livelihood” exemption, which Beijing previously cited in response to U.S. criticism of China’s ongoing coal trade with DPRK, should exclusively intend for livelihoods of DPRK nationals and not involve individuals or entities related to DPRK weapon programmes. South Korea (ROK) and Japan 23 Nov signed General Security of Military Information Agreement to share intelligence on DPRK’s nuclear activities. ROK opposition parties resistant to closer ties with Japan criticised deal, saying it enforces “Japan’s military rise”. Pyongyang strongly criticised agreement. Beijing said deal reflected “deeply entrenched Cold War mentality” and would “only worsen the confrontation”. Commander of U.S. forces in ROK 4 Nov announced planned deployment of Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system within eight to ten months. Chinese and U.S. presidents 19 Nov met on sidelines of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Peru; President Obama said both countries committed to intensify efforts toward de-nuclearisation of Korean peninsula. Japan 24 Nov announced plans to study deployment of THAAD system on its soil, dedicated panel to deliberate measures to strengthen missile defence system by summer 2017. Beijing urged Tokyo to adhere to political and diplomatic means “instead of making use of” tensions on peninsula.

U.S. Deputy Sec State Antony Blinken 29 Oct said China’s imports of North Korean coal violate global sanctions by using UNSC Resolution 2270 exemption for “livelihood purposes” as loophole. Chinese Vice FM Liu Zhenmin arrived in DPRK 24 Oct to discuss border issues, first high-ranking Chinese visit since Feb 2016. ROK and U.S. 19 Oct vowed to leverage “full breadth of national power” against DPRK’s nuclear threat, but failed to agree on permanent deployment of U.S. strategic assets in ROK. DPRK tested two intermediate-range Musudan missiles on 15 and 20 Oct; ROK and U.S. officials said both missiles exploded on launch. U.S. 10 Oct said ROK’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system would soon be redeployed at more isolated location, following protests from local residents near original site. China and Russia 11 Oct announced second round of joint anti-missile drills to be held in 2017; first exercises took place May 2016 as U.S. and ROK were negotiating THAAD. Tensions between ROK and China rose after Chinese fishing vessel 7 Oct rammed and sank South Korean coast guard speedboat off ROK’s west coast. Incident followed killing of three Chinese fisherman by ROK coast guard 30 Sept in action against illegal fishing.

Following international condemnation of recent missile tests, DPRK 5 Sept fired three more medium-range Rodong missiles from western town Hwangju; ROK said at least one landed in Japan’s air defence identification zone. UNSC next day condemned test as “grave violation” of international obligations. DPRK 9 Sept conducted its fifth and largest nuclear test at Punggye-ri nuclear test site, causing 5.3-magnitude artificial earthquake. China condemned test, “strongly urged” DPRK to adhere to denuclearisation goals. U.S. sec defence urged China to use its influence to promote denuclearisation; Beijing said U.S. should shoulder “due responsibility” for tensions in Korean peninsula. U.S. envoy 11 Sept said U.S. pushing for new sanctions against DPRK; Chinese FM Wang Yi 13 Sept told ROK counterpart China would consider taking part in discussions on new sanctions. Two U.S. B-1 bombers 13 Sept flew over ROK in apparent show of force; U.S. Air Force (USAF) B-1B Lancer strategic bomber 21 Sept performed aerial patrol over demilitarised zone (DMZ), reportedly closest USAF bomber has ever flown to DPRK border. Senior U.S. military official said flight demonstrated “ironclad” bond between U.S. and ROK, and U.S. commitment to “defend and preserve the security of the Korean Peninsula and the region”. U.S. President Obama and Chinese Premier Li 19 Sept agreed to step up cooperation in UNSC and “law enforcement channels” to push forward denuclearisation on peninsula. China reported it had opened investigation into Dandong Hongxiang Industrial Development Company, Chinese conglomerate with extensive trading ties with DPRK, over allegations of “serious economic crimes”; reportedly followed warnings of illegal activities from U.S. officials, who sanctioned the same entity 26 Sept; investigation into other Chinese companies also underway.

DPRK 3 Aug test-launched ballistic missile into Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) off coast of N Japan; PM Abe called test “serious threat” to Japan. U.S. Strategic Command and ROK military said second missile was fired simultaneously, exploding immediately after launch. DPRK 24 Aug test-fired third missile from waters off NE coast; reportedly first instance of DPRK missile landing in Japan’s air defence identification zone (ADIZ), prompting further condemnation from Japan; ROK FM said ROK prepared to “thoroughly respond” to any provocation from DPRK. UNSC 26 Aug issued unanimous statement condemning DPRK’s missile launches. In first ever response to foreign media inquiries, Pyongyang 17 Aug confirmed resumption of plutonium production in interview with Japan’s Kyodo News. U.S. responded same day, calling DPRK’s plutonium production “clear violation of UN Security Council resolutions”, urged DPRK to cease uranium enrichment. Following 24 Aug trilateral meeting in Tokyo, FMs of China, Japan and ROK urged DPRK “to exercise self-restraint regarding its provocative action, and to observe the UN Security Council's resolutions”. ROK unification ministry 17 Aug confirmed defection of DPRK deputy ambassador to London, Thae Yong Ho, to South Korea, reportedly most senior DPRK official to defect since 1997; 31 Aug reported that DPRK had executed high ranking Minister Kim Yong-jin and banished two others for re-education in July.

ROK and U.S. 8 July announced decision to deploy Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) anti-missile system in ROK, solely to counter DPRK threat; ROK defence officials said system expected to be operational end-2017 at latest, foreign ministry 13 July said system to be deployed in SE Seongju county in order to protect “one half to two-thirds of citizens”. Chinese foreign ministry summoned ROK and U.S. diplomats, issued statement expressing “discontent” and opposition to deployment, urged ROK and U.S. terminate process. DPRK 9 July test-launched KN-11 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM); ROK joint chiefs of staff reported test failed. DPRK 19 July launched three projectiles, believed to be Scud-type short-range ballistic missiles, into Sea of Japan. U.S. Treasury 6 July announced sanctions against DPRK leaders including Kim Jong-un for human rights abuses; sanctions are first to directly target Kim and regime officials, include asset freezes within U.S. jurisdiction and prohibition of transactions involving designated persons. DPRK 7 July said measures constituted “open declaration of war”, threatened to cut off all diplomatic contact. Chinese foreign ministry stated opposition to unilateral sanctions.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 6 June reported DPRK’s Yongbyon nuclear facility appeared to be reactivated, with satellite imagery indicating resumption of activities related to five-megawatt reactor, expansion of enrichment facilities, activities related to reprocessing. IAEA chief said Pyongyang’s unwillingness to comply with March UNSC resolution “deeply regrettable”, urged implementation of relevant IAEA and UNSC resolutions; qualified that IAEA only observing through satellite imagery. U.S. State Dept official 7 June suggested Pyongyang repeating process by which it obtained plutonium for previous nuclear tests. DPRK 22 June launched two mid-range ballistic missiles from eastern coast; first launch failed, ROK media reported second launch likely most effective to date. UNSC 23 June condemned launches. U.S. Treasury Dept 1 June designated DPRK “primary” money launderer, said it would seek secondary sanctions cutting off banks or companies conducting transactions with Pyongyang from U.S. financial system; sanctions expected to primarily affect Chinese banks. Beijing said it opposed unilateral sanctions, 14 June released list of goods banned for export to DPRK. EU Council 6 June decided to impose additional restrictive measures against DPRK. ROK 13 June said DPRK hacked over 140,000 computers at 160 firms and govt agencies, planted code laying groundwork for major cyber-attack. Chinese President Xi 1 June received DPRK Worker’s Party Vice Chairman Ri Su-yong in first meeting with senior DPRK official since 2013. Ri same day said DPRK would continue to build nuclear force. DPRK convened fourth session of thirteenth Supreme People’s Assembly 29 June.

DPRK 9 May concluded 7th Workers’ Party Congress; leader Kim Jong-un 8 May stated nuclear weapons program to be continued “permanently”, added would use weapons only if attacked. Chinese President Xi 9 May reportedly sent congratulatory letter to Kim on latter’s election to chairman of party, stated appreciation for bilateral ties. Following DPRK’s 23 April submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) test, U.S. and ROK officials concluded DPRK could mount small nuclear warhead on short- and medium-range missiles capable of reaching much of Japan and ROK. ROK 31 May reported failed DPRK ballistic missile launch attempt off east coast. U.S. think-tank 10 May reported decline in visible activity at Punggye-ri nuclear test site; satellite imagery taken 8 May showed four vehicles recently observed at site had departed. ROK 23 May rejected DPRK proposal for military talks, cited lack of plan to end DPRK nuclear program. Russia and China 5 May announced first joint computer-assisted anti-missile drills in apparent response to proposed U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system deployment in ROK. DPRK 16 May informed UK that chief nuclear negotiator and former ambassador to UK Ri Yong-ho to be new FM.

DPRK 1 April launched short-range ballistic missile off east coast, 15 and 28 April failed in three attempts to launch medium-range missiles, reportedly including inaugural test of Musudan missile with range of over 3,000km. U.S. military said unusual launch site indicated road-mobile missile. Responding to launch, Chinese foreign ministry said all parties should respect UNSC decisions. China 5 April announced embargoes on imports of coal and mineral ores from DPRK, halted sale of jet fuel to DPRK except for civilian aviation. DPRK 1 April said state of “semi-war” exists on Korean peninsula, jammed GPS signals in ROK and blocked multiple social media and ROK media websites. DPRK 23 April fired submarine-launched ballistic missile off east coast; UNSC condemned “another serious violation” of UN resolutions. Satellite imagery indicated “continued activity” at Punggye-ri nuclear testing site, amid speculation from observers that failed Musudan launch increased likelihood of fifth nuclear test. ROK 11 April reported defection of senior DPRK military officer who oversaw spying operations. G7 countries 11 April issued joint communiqué condemning DPRK nuclear tests and missile launches. DPRK 27 April announced first ruling Workers’ Party of Korea congress in 36 years to take place 6 May.