CrisisWatch is our global conflict tracker, an early warning tool designed to help prevent deadly violence. It keeps decision-makers up-to-date with developments in over 70 conflicts and crises every month, identifying trends and alerting them to risks of escalation and opportunities to advance peace. In addition, CrisisWatch monitors over 50 situations (“standby monitoring”) to offer timely information if developments indicate a drift toward violence or instability. Entries dating back to 2003 provide easily searchable conflict histories.
Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders engaged in flurry of diplomatic activity amid ongoing tensions; PM Pashinyan met with Turkish President Erdoğan to discuss normalisation process.
Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders met in Prague for EU/French-mediated talks. Following border violence in Sept that killed almost 300 people, PM Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Aliyev 6 Oct met in Czech Republic’s capital Prague for meeting mediated by French President Macron and EU Council President Michel. Both leaders committed to respecting each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, agreed to two-month EU civilian mission to observe situation on Armenian side of border with Azerbaijan; first monitors 20 Oct deployed. Aliyev 6 Oct said sides were gradually moving toward peace, reiterated that Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) was Azerbaijan’s internal affair (see Nagorno-Karabakh).
Moscow held separate summit in Russia. Russian foreign ministry 6 Oct criticised West’s “not quite balanced” approach to reaching peace agreement; Russian President Putin 27 Oct said “so-called Washington option envisages recognition of Azerbaijan’s sovereignty over Karabakh” but emphasised that “if the Armenian people and leadership believe that Karabakh has its own specificities and these specificities must be taken into account, mentioned in a future peace agreement, this is also possible”. Putin 31 Oct hosted Azerbaijani and Armenian leaders at summit in Sochi city; sides, echoing part of outcomes from Prague, committed to respecting each other’s territorial integrity and emphasised “crucial contribution” of Russian peacekeepers.
Tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan persisted. Aliyev 14 Oct said Armenia had failed to provide access from mainland Azerbaijan to its exclave Nakhichevan or to pull troops out of NK, as agreed in Moscow-brokered deal to end 2020 war; Pashinyan same day rejected accusations and warned of “high risk” of new “military aggression” by Azerbaijan. Pashinyan 17 Oct accused Azerbaijan of violating Sept ceasefire and blaming Armenia as “pretext for new military aggression”, which Azerbaijan denied. Meanwhile, at Armenia’s invitation, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe sent mission 21-27 Oct to assess situation in certain border areas; Azerbaijan 20 Oct rejected “unilateral” mission.
In other important developments. Pashinyan 6 Oct met with Turkish President Erdoğan in Prague in highest-level meeting in over a decade to discuss normalisation process.
Clashes erupted along border with Azerbaijan, marking deadliest escalation since 2020 war as fighting spilled deeper into Armenian territory; fighting could escalate once more as negotiating positions harden. Renewed hostilities with Azerbaijan killed hundreds. Clashes 13 Sept erupted along border with Azerbaijan, marking deadliest violence between two countries since six-week war in 2020. Sides blamed each other for renewed fighting; defence ministry 13 Sept said Azerbaijani forces shelled 200km stretch of southern border in Syunik and Gegharkunik provinces, attacking civilian and military infrastructure in “unprovoked aggression” and moving deep inside Armenian territory; Baku same day rejected characterisation, saying its forces took action to prevent Armenian “saboteurs” from mining supply roads on border near Azerbaijani army positions. PM Pashinyan 14 Sept said Azerbaijani army had taken control of at least 10 sq km of Armenian territory. Yerevan and Baku 14 Sept issued statements committing to ceasefire, although both countries 14, 21, 23, 24, 28 Sept accused each other of violating it. Fighting in two days killed at least 207 Armenian and 80 Azerbaijani soldiers; Yerevan 19 Sept said four Armenian civilians were killed and that authorities had been forced to evacuate over 2,700 civilians from Syunik and Gegharkunik provinces. Addressing UN General Assembly (UNGA), PM Pashinyan 22 Sept said threat of new offensive remained “very high” and “Azerbaijan intends to occupy more territories of Armenia”. Clashes prompted flurry of diplomatic activity. Before fragile ceasefire was announced, Russia, U.S., EU and France 13 Sept called for peace and restraint, with Moscow announcing it had brokered ceasefire, though fighting persisted into following day. In rare show of unity, UN Security Council members 15 Sept condemned violence and urged talks. On sidelines of UNGA, U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 19 Sept brought together both Armenian and Azerbaijani FMs, urging “strong, sustainable diplomatic engagement” to reinforce fragile ceasefire. In less measured response, U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi blamed Azerbaijani forces for “illegal and deadly attacks on Armenian territory” during visit to Yerevan day before; Baku 18 Sept said Pelosi’s “groundless” accusations dealt blow to peace efforts.
Azerbaijan launched military operation in Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) ahead of high-level meetings in Brussels and Moscow; opposition announced return to parliament after five-month boycott. After weeks of relative calm in NK, clashes erupted early Aug between Azerbaijani and Armenian forces answering to de facto authorities in NK, with Baku 3 Aug launching new military operation; both sides reported casualties, as international community called for end to hostilities (see Nagorno-Karabakh). EU Special Representative for South Caucasus Toivo Klaar 19 Aug met with senior representatives from Armenia and Azerbaijan in first senior bilateral meeting after escalation. Both countries’ leaders 31 Aug met in Brussels for EU-mediated talks, agreed to “step up substantive work to advance on the peace treaty”; deputy PMs of both countries 30 Aug met in Russian capital Moscow to discuss issues related to transport, communication and delimitation of international borders (see Nagorno-Karabakh). Azerbaijani foreign ministry 25 Aug criticised appointment of new U.S. co-chair of OSCE Minsk Group, saying “attempts to revive the almost defunct Minsk Group” could lead to sidelining of U.S. from normalisation process of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations. Armenian foreign ministry same day said OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs still had international mandate to support comprehensive settlement of NK conflict. Meanwhile, opposition leader Ishkhan Saghatelyan 23 Aug announced return of opposition MPs to parliament in Sept; opposition had boycotted parliamentary sessions since April and organised protests in bid to force resignation of PM Pashinyan over alleged compromises on NK’s independence.
Border with Azerbaijan remained calm as EU and Russia continued mediation efforts; govt and Türkiye took tentative steps toward normalisation. Despite occasional reports from Baku and Yerevan of shooting at tensest part of state border between Azerbaijan’s Kelbajar district and Armenia’s Gegharkunik region, calm largely persisted along front lines ahead of new EU-mediated summit, expected to take place in Aug. Meanwhile, thanks to EU and Russian mediation efforts, Azerbaijani and Armenian FMs 16 July met in Georgian capital Tbilisi, reconfirmed readiness for continued diplomatic engagement. U.S. Sec State Antony Blinken 25 July spoke with PM Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Aliyev separately about “historic opportunity to achieve peace” and urged “further progress towards peace and stability in the region” (see Nagorno-Karabakh). After six months of contact between Türkiye and Armenia, sides 1 July met in Austrian capital Vienna. In historic move, they agreed to open border crossings for foreign citizens and to open their countries’ airspace to cargo movement “as soon as possible”; their respective leaders 11 July confirmed deal in rare telephone call. President Khachaturyan 14 July appointed Maj-Gen Edvard Asryan, who was among senior officers who 25 Feb 2021 signed letter demanding PM Pashinyan’s resignation, as chief of general staff of armed forces. Meanwhile, opposition activist Armen Grigoryan, arrested in March 2022 during protests in capital Yerevan, 15 July died in courtroom of possible heart failure, following numerous reports that he had health problems. Human rights defender Kristina Grigoryan 16 July said his treatment was “absolutely unacceptable” and promised to investigate. Opposition same day dedicated its street rally to Grigoryan, accusing leadership of unfair detention and neglect contributing to his death. In surprise visit, U.S. CIA Director William Burns 15 July met with PM Pashinyan in Yerevan along with other govt officials; statement issued following meeting gave few details of what was discussed. Russian Foreign Intelligence Chief Sergei Naryshkin 19 July travelled to Yerevan and Azerbaijani capital Baku, respectively; visits prompted speculation about possible secret talks on war in Ukraine; Naryshkin same day refuted claims that there was any connection between U.S. and Russian trips.
Transport corridor remained central sticking point between Yerevan and Baku, while opposition continued protest over PM Pashinyan’s perceived readiness to soften stance on status of Nagorno-Karabakh (NK). Russia 3 June mediated talks on transport corridor between Deputy PM Mher Grigoryan and Azerbaijani counterpart Shahin Mustafayev in Russian capital Moscow, where pair agreed to continue efforts to unblock transport links. Russian FM Sergei Lavrov 9 June visited Armenia’s capital Yerevan, said that “simplified” border crossing procedures would be used on railway and motorway connecting mainland Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan exclave via Armenia. While providing few details, Lavrov did not exclude possibility of route being under Armenia’s jurisdiction. Pashinyan 14 June told media outlet Al Jazeera that “narrative about the so-called corridor [between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan exclave] is unacceptable”, referencing 2020 agreement that mentioned only Lachin corridor, which connects NK to Armenia via Azerbaijan. Azerbaijani President Aliyev 23 June again accused Armenia of failing to provide transport link connecting Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan exclave, as per 2020 agreement. Disagreements over status of NK persisted, hindering peace talks (see Nagorno-Karabakh). Speaking to local media, Pashinyan 27 June accused Azerbaijan of undermining diplomatic efforts in order “to legitimise a new war”. Meanwhile, defence ministry 20 June said one soldier was killed 18-19 June on border with Azerbaijan. Since mid-April, Armenia has reported two soldiers killed at military positions between Azerbaijan’s Kelbajar district and Armenia’s Gegharkunik region, which have seen particularly deadly skirmishes since 2020. Opposition leader Ishkhan Saghatelyan 14 June announced switch from daily anti-govt demonstrations, which opposition had been staging since late April, to weekly rallies, saying it will bring “new impetus” to “our resistance movement”; added that opposition’s main aim was still to ouster Pashinyan and prevent new “capitulation agreement” with Azerbaijan, referring to possible treaty on status of NK (see Nagorno-Karabakh). Pashinyan 15 June told parliament that “any status” guaranteeing security, rights and freedoms of NK people should be considered “real solution” and claimed alternative would be “annihilation not only of Nagorno-Karabakh, but of Armenia as well”.
Peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan gained momentum, triggering political backlash at home as opposition announced street protests to oust govt. After major flare-up in Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) in March that resulted in Azerbaijani forces taking control of strategic mountains inside Armenian-populated areas, EU 6 April facilitated third meeting between Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Aliyev; pair agreed to instruct respective FMs to work on peace treaty and convene joint border commission by late April (see Nagorno-Karabakh). In address to parliament, PM Pashinyan 13 April said Yerevan was facing international pressure to scale down demands on status of breakaway NK, that there was no alternative to peace with Azerbaijan, and expressed commitment to signing peace deal “as soon as possible”; Pashinyan also stressed that Karabakh issue was about rights, not territories, and peace negotiations should ensure security guarantees, rights and freedoms for Karabakh Armenians, as well as clarify territory’s final status. Momentum toward peace talks raised fears among political opposition that govt is preparing to cede NK’s control to Azerbaijan. Notably, opposition parties 5 April held large-scale rally in capital Yerevan against signing peace deal with Baku that would compromise Armenian-populated NK’s claim for independence from Azerbaijan. Opposition MPs 12 April brought breakaway NK flags to parliament before walking out of session and travelling to various villages in Armenia and NK; Russian peacekeepers in NK same day denied opposition MPs entry, prompting Armenian foreign ministry 12 April to claim lack of access contradicted Nov 2020 ceasefire agreement. Meanwhile, opposition MP and Deputy Parliament Speaker Ishkhan Saghatelyan 22 April announced start of “non-stop street struggle” to oust govt; leading opposition alliances, Armenia and I Have the Honour, 25 April began small-scale demonstrations ahead of mass protests aimed at toppling Pashinyan, accused PM of planning concessions to Azerbaijan over NK; rallies late April were held over multiple days in Yerevan, as Office of Human Rights Defender 27 April cited evidence of police using disproportionate force to detain some protesters.
Deadly clashes with Azerbaijan along state border resumed, jeopardising international efforts to reduce tensions, while authorities deployed peacekeepers to Kazakhstan. Azerbaijani defence ministry 8 Jan claimed that Azerbaijani positions in Kelbajar region were “subjected to fire”; Armenian defence ministry same day alleged accusation “does not correspond to reality”. Foreign ministry 11 Jan accused Azerbaijani forces of violating ceasefire using artillery and UAVs against positions in Gegharkunik region in clashes that killed three Armenian and one Azerbaijani soldiers; Azerbaijani defence ministry same day said Armenia “bears full responsibility”. Azerbaijani President Aliyev 12 Jan warned Armenia against not recognising Azerbaijani “territorial integrity”, said Baku would respond in kind. Russian FM Sergey Lavrov 14 Jan announced Armenia had submitted proposal on process of demarcation and delimitation of Armenian-Azerbaijani border, which he would share with Azerbaijan, and underscored importance of establishing agenda of priority issues. However, differences surfaced between Yerevan and Baku as FM Ararat Mirzoyan 19 Jan underlined need for “border stability and security”, and preventative mechanisms, whereas Azerbaijani FM Ceyhun Bayramov same day called Armenian preconditions “absolutely unacceptable”. In response, Armenian foreign ministry 20 Jan said that Yerevan had no preconditions for border demarcation. Regarding agreed corridor connecting Azerbaijan to its exclave Nakhichevan, Aliyev 12 Jan said main condition in negotiations with Armenia is that highway follow “shortest route” and remain “open in all seasons”. As current chair of Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Armenia 7-14 Jan deployed around 100 peacekeepers to Kazakhstan following Nur-Sultan’s request for CSTO assistance; parliamentary opposition bloc Gegham Nazaryan 7 Jan argued that “no Armenian serviceman should have left for that country” due to Kazakhstan’s alleged support to Azerbaijan (see Kazakhstan). Special envoys of Armenia and Turkey 14 Jan held first meeting for normalisation negotiations; after talks, foreign ministry described “positive atmosphere” and Turkish FM announced agreement “to continue negotiations without preconditions”. Armenian President Sargsyan 23 Jan announced his resignation, said he did not have “the necessary tools” to influence country’s domestic and foreign policies.
Receive the best source of conflict analysis right in your inbox.
This site uses cookies. By continuing to browse the site you are agreeing to our use of cookies. Review our privacy policy for more details.