Tensions between Tripoli-based institutions reached new heights as country remained divided into two rival govts with no political solution in sight.

Rival institutions remained at odds on means to resolve political crisis. Tripoli-based advisory High Council of State (HCS) Chair Khalid al-Meshri 14 Nov accused militiamen affiliated with Tripoli-based PM Abdelhamid Dabaiba of “besieging” HCS headquarters; said HCS had convened session to follow up on tentative agreement with eastern-based legislature House of Representatives (HoR) to work toward forming new unity govt. Dabaiba, who is opposed to HoR-HSC negotiations, immediately denounced “incitement and exaggeration”, saying only “a few” protesters had gathered outside HCS building, accused Meshri of making secret “power-sharing” deals to delay elections. HoR Speaker Aguila Saleh same day condemned “threats and intimidation by armed groups using force” against HCS. Dabaiba 29 Nov reportedly accused Meshri and Saleh of “systematically obstructing elections”. East-based military commander Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar around 22 Nov weighed in on political crisis, saying “time has come for the Libyan people to put an end to failed experiments and dead ends”, accusing politicians of “worshipping their seats of power”.

Greek FM’s refusal to meet Tripoli-based govt minister sparked diplomatic spat. After Tripoli-based Govt of National Unity (GNU) in Oct signed deal with Türkyie on oil and gas exploration in areas of Mediterranean contested by Athens, Greek FM Nikos Dendias 17 Nov canceled Tripoli visit upon landing to avoid being welcomed by his Libyan counterpart, FM Najla al-Mangoush; Dendias claimed he had come to meet Tripoli-based Presidential Council head Mohamed al-Menfi. GNU subsequently recalled its ambassador from Athens and summoned Greek chargé d’affaires in Tripoli.

In other important developments. In his briefing to UN Security Council, UN sec-gen’s special representative for Libya, Abdoulaye Bathily, 15 Nov renewed call for legislative and presidential elections but did not articulate how he planned to address sources of friction over electoral roadmap. International Criminal Court (ICC) Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan early Nov met with Haftar during first ever visit to Libya, 9 Nov told UN Security Council he expects latter to cooperate with ICC investigations into alleged crimes committed by Haftar’s Libyan National Army.

Series of deals between Ankara and Tripoli inflamed internal and regional tensions; UN Security Council extended political mission’s mandate as new envoy took office in capital Tripoli.

Energy deals between Tripoli-based govt and Ankara triggered uproar. Tripoli-based govt 3 Oct signed preliminary economic and maritime agreements with Türkiye, opening door to joint oil and gas exploration and drillings in Libya-claimed Exclusive Economic Zone in Mediterranean, disputed by Egypt and Greece. East-based PM Bashagha and House of Representatives (HoR) Speaker Aguila Saleh immediately rejected deal as null and void, saying Tripoli-based govt’s term expired in Dec 2021. Egypt and Greece 3 and 9 Oct condemned hydrocarbon exploration deal as “illegal”, with Athens vowing to oppose it “with all legal means”. EU 3 Oct reiterated that it considers 2019 agreement demarcating Turkish and Libyan Exclusive Economic Zones (which latest oil and gas deal builds on) as infringement of sovereign rights of other states. Tripoli-based PM Dabaiba 25 Oct travelled to Türkiye and reportedly signed two military deals with Turkish govt with a view to strengthening military cooperation.

Rival camps held military parades, adopted bellicose rhetoric. On occasion of military parade in southern city of Sebha, East-based military commander Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar 17 Oct called for popular “rebellion” against “governmental failure”; said his forces “are ready to protect the people in their uprising”. Forces loyal to Tripoli-based govt 22 Oct held televised military exercise in Dabaiba’s presence. Aguila Saleh and Khaled al-Mishri, head of Tripoli-based High State Council, 20-21 Oct met in Morocco, said they had agreed to take steps to unify rival govts and resume dialogue on holding elections; Dabaiba 21 Oct rejected “parallel paths”.

UN renewed efforts to help break political stalemate. New UN Sec-Gen Special Representative Abdoulaye Bathily 14 Oct arrived in Tripoli to assume his duties and in following days held talks with rival leaders, including Dabaiba, Aguila Saleh, Presidential Council Chairman Mohammed al-Menfi, and National Oil Corporation chairman Farhat Bengdara. UN Security Council 28 Oct unanimously extended political mission UNSMIL’s mandate for another year, urged parties to agree on roadmap to presidential and parliamentary elections.

Crisis of two rival govts remained intractable as Sirte-based PM Fathi Bashagha came out weakened of failed efforts to enter capital Tripoli.

PM Dabaiba continued to consolidate control in Tripoli. Militias aligned with Tripoli-based PM Abdelhamid Dabaiba early Sept reportedly took over security headquarters in Ain Zara town south of Tripoli after repelling forces loyal to rival Sirte-based PM Fathi Bashagha in late Aug. Situation inside Tripoli remained calm in Sept, but renewed clashes between rival armed factions 2-3 Sept broke out in Warshafana area west of Tripoli with reports of mortar fire. Fighting 25-26 Sept also erupted in Zawiya town, 40km west of Tripoli, allegedly over fuel trafficking; at least five people killed including ten-year-old girl; UN Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) next day “condemned the use of heavy artillery in densely populated neighbourhoods”.

Parties sought to strengthen relations with Ankara. Dabaiba and Bashagha, 31 Aug-1 Sept made parallel visits to Türkiye to seek Ankara’s support. Turkish FM Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu 14 Sept said Türkiye seeks to “build good relations” with various Libyan parties amid media reports that Turkish drones turned late-Aug clashes in Dabaiba’s favour.

New UN envoy appointed. UN Sec-Gen António Guterres 2 Sept appointed Senegalese diplomat and former govt minister Abdoulaye Bathily as special representative for Libya and head of UNSMIL after obtaining Security Council’s approval, ending nine-month search. Dabaiba, who in Aug had reportedly objected to Bathily’s nomination, 3 Sept assured envoy of his “full support”. Bathily, who 25 Sept officially assumed duties, will have to mediate between Libyan factions now divided between those adamant that Dabaiba stay on until elections, those proposing new power-sharing deal and govt reshuffle under Dabaiba, and those calling for entirely new “third” govt. Foreign capitals also split on path ahead.

In other important developments. After power struggle erupted in Aug between Supreme Court and Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR), HoR Speaker Aguila Saleh 15 Sept announced appointment of Abdullah Abu Razizah as new chief justice of Supreme Court to replace Mohammed Al-Hafi; Abu Razizah few days later took office.

Worst fighting in years broke out in capital Tripoli between forces loyal to rival govts, raising prospect of a return to full-blown war. Fighting 26-27 Aug raged across Tripoli as forces aligned with Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR)-appointed PM Bashagha failed to take control of capital and oust Tripoli-based govt of PM Dabaiba; 32 people reportedly killed and 159 injured. Flare-up followed days of escalating tensions between rival factions. Smaller-scale clashes 5-6 Aug opposed Bashagha-aligned forces and militia loyal to Dabaiba near airport road in Tripoli. Amid build-up of forces outside Tripoli, UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) 23 Aug called for “immediate de-escalation”, warned that “current political stalemate [...] cannot be resolved through armed confrontation”. Bashagha 24 Aug called on Dabaiba to step down and peacefully hand over power to avoid bloodshed; Dabaiba rejected call, denounced “threats to ignite war” and vowed that no one would be allowed to meddle with security of Tripoli. Dabaiba 25 Aug urged head of Tripoli-based consultative High State Council, Khalid Al-Mishri, and HoR Speaker Aguila Saleh to approve constitutional basis for elections. Meanwhile, Supreme Court 18 Aug announced decision to reactivate its Constitutional Chamber, which had been inactive since 2016. Dabaiba same day welcomed move, saying it could act as “deterrent” to “abuses and violations” of 2015 power-sharing agreement. Opponents however denounced political manoeuvring in reaction to HoR session held 16 Aug, during which lawmakers voted on amending statutes of Supreme Court and ruled it could appoint advisers to top court. After Dabaiba in July changed oil leadership, Central Bank 2 Aug reportedly disbursed 8.5bn dinars to National Oil Corporation as part of 15bn “urgent and temporary financial arrangement” concluded in mid-April. Libya’s envoy to UN, Taher El-Sonni, 15 Aug said Dabaiba’s govt had rejected UN proposal to appoint Senegalese former Minister Abdoulaye Bathily as new head of UNSMIL; move came after UN Security Council late July extended UNSMIL’s mandate for only three months amid Russian insistence that new UN mission head is chosen before it agrees to longer extension.

Wave of protests highlighted popular frustration with political standoff; deadly clashes erupted between rival factions in capital Tripoli; and oil exports resumed after controversial oil leadership change. Series of spontaneous demonstrations – driven by difficult living conditions, including recurring electricity cuts, and political actors’ inability to form consensus on elections – early July rocked several cities across country. Notably, protesters 1 July stormed and set fire to House of Representatives building in eastern city of Tobruk. Under pressure from popular mobilisation and shrinking prospect of any political breakthrough, Sirte-based PM Bashagha 8 July said his govt would in following days attempt to take office in Tripoli with support of loyal armed forces; military commanders of Western region 13 July reiterated Tripoli is “a red line”, vowed to confront any attempts to sow discord among security components in capital. Deadly fighting between rival factions 21-22 July broke out in several Tripoli neighbourhoods, with 16 people reportedly killed; in response, Tripoli-based PM Dabaiba 22 July suspended Interior Minister Khaled Mazen, replacing him on an interim basis with local govt Minister Bader Eddine al-Toumi. Meanwhile, Dabaiba 12 July dismissed National Oil Corporation (NOC) Chairman Mustafa Sanalla, replaced him with former Central Bank Governor Farhat Bengdara. Sanalla next day rejected decision, said Dabaiba’s mandate to govern had expired. Militia loyal to Dabaiba 14 July deployed outside NOC headquarters in Tripoli and installed Bengdara as chairman. NOC’s new leadership 15 July lifted force majeure which was declared in April at several oil facilities, enabling oil production and exports to resume in following days; NOC 31 July said crude production had returned to pre-force majeure levels of 1.2mn barrels per day. Arabic language media outlets Al Jazeera Arabic and Al-Araby Al-Jadeed in July reported growing convergence between Dabaiba and eastern strongman Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. Notably, Lt-Gen Abdelrazzak Al-Nadhouri, second in command of Haftar-led forces, 18-19 July reportedly met with Lt-Gen Muhammad Al-Haddad, chief of staff of Libyan army, to discuss unification of military institution. Meanwhile, U.S. judge 29 July found Haftar liable for war crimes over alleged extrajudicial killings and torture in Libya, paving the way for plaintiffs to seek compensation.

Crisis of two govts dragged on as UN-led talks failed to forge consensus on constitutional basis for elections. House of Representatives (HoR) 15 June passed Sirte-based PM Fathi Bashagha’s proposed govt budget. Bashagha unlikely to be able to tap into state funds, however, as Tripoli-based Govt of National Unity (GNU) immediately rejected budget, and Central Bank of Libya Governor Siddiq Elkebir, who is in charge of making disbursements into govt accounts, did not signal he would recognise budget. Bashagha’s efforts to win international support remained unsuccessful. UN Sec-Gen office 23 June said UN would continue to recognise Tripoli-based PM Abdelhamid Dabaiba as legitimate PM until elections are held. Delegates of HoR and Tripoli-based High State Council 12-20 June met in Egypt’s capital Cairo for third round of UN-sponsored political talks, failed to find agreement on constitutional basis for elections; new UN-convened talks between rival assemblies’ chairmen 28-29 June took place in Switzerland, failed to make breakthrough. Simultaneously, some politicians in recent weeks tried to forge consensus for “third” govt to replace both Bashagha and Dabaiba-led executives, while eastern strongman Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar and Dabaiba aides in June allegedly met outside Libya to negotiate deal aimed at persuading Haftar to drop support for Bashagha in favour of Dabaiba. Politically driven closures of oil sector throughout June persisted, with production fluctuating between 600,000-900,000 barrels/day, equivalent to 50-75% of country’s total oil production before closures; National Oil Corporation 30 June declared force majeure on oil terminals of Sidra and Ras Lanuf in Gulf of Sirte region due to shutdown of oilfields. Meanwhile, security situation in capital Tripoli remained tense. Notably, rival western militias 10 June clashed in Souk el-Tlath neighbourhood, leaving at least one dead; UN Support Mission in Libya next day expressed concerned and urged restraint, also reported mobilisation of armed groups from areas surrounding Tripoli. Heavy fighting between rival GNU-affiliated militias 22 June left three combatants and one civilian dead in Zawiyet Al-Dahmani neighbourhood. Pan-Arab media 23 June reported clashes at military base in Tripoli as 22 June transitional phase deadline set by 2020 roadmap passed.

Political crisis took violent turn as forces loyal to rival govts clashed in capital Tripoli amid lack of substantial progress in UN-led negotiations; oil and gas fields and export terminals remained closed. Tobruk-based PM Fathi Bashagha 17 May entered Tripoli in bid to install his govt in capital city; armed groups loyal to Tripoli-based PM Abdelhamid Dabaiba mobilised and opened fire, leaving one person killed; Dabaiba’ camp reportedly granted Bashagha safe passage out of Tripoli following mediation by local actors and members of 5+5 Joint Military Commission – comprising representatives of Libya’s two rival military coalitions. In televised addresses same day, Dabaiba condemned “coup project”, said Bashagha “committed suicide politically”, while Bashagha said his govt would be based in central city of Sirte but claimed Dabaiba had “lost control” of Tripoli. Reports in following days emerged that Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) Speaker Aghela Saleh and head of Tripoli-based High State Council (HSC) Khaled Mishri mid-May met in Egypt, agreed to work together toward “third way” including new govt that would replace Dabaiba and Bashagha’s; latter’s entourage however denied Saleh had dropped his support for Bashagha. UN-led negotiations made little substantial progress in charting way out of political impasse. UN Acting Special Representative for Libya Stephanie Williams 15-20 May convened second round of talks between representatives of rival assemblies in Egypt’s capital Cairo; participants reviewed 2017 draft constitution and found consensus on two thirds of articles, but failed to concretely discuss roadmap to elections and crisis of two rival govts; talks to resume 11 June. Oil and gas fields and export terminals – shut down in mid-April by pro-Libyan National Army head, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, and pro-Bashagha constituencies to weaken Dabaiba’s access to oil revenues – remained closed; crude oil exports down to approximately 700,000 barrels/day, one third less than normal, with estimated $40mn daily loss of foregone oil sales revenues. As part of U.S. efforts to persuade rival authorities to accept “financial mechanism” to oversee disbursement of govt funds, U.S. ambassador to Libya, Richard Norland, 26 May met in Tunisia with various state institution representatives.

Political feud engulfed country’s economic and financial institutions as rival authorities sought to secure access to oil revenues; UN efforts to negotiate way out of political impasse remained vain. Five military officers loyal to eastern strongman Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar 9 April withdrew from UN-backed so-called 5+5 Joint Military Commission (comprising representatives of country’s two rival military coalitions), urged Haftar to shut down oil production to prevent Tripoli-based PM Abdulhamid Dabaiba from accessing oil revenues; move came after National Oil Corporation (NOC) transferred oil sales revenues to Tripoli-based Central Bank of Libya (CBL), whose governor has remained loyal to Dabaiba, despite promising in March to abide by Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) order not to do so. NOC mid-April declared force majeure and suspended operations at Al-Feel and Sharara oil fields, Zuwetina and Brega oil terminals, after local protesters allegedly backed by Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) entered sites; all sites remained closed by month’s end. Clashes between two rival militias allied with Dabaiba’s govt 22 April disrupted operations in Zawiya oil facility (west). Meanwhile, delegates from HoR and rival Tripoli-based consultative High State Council (HSC) 13-18 April attended UN-backed political talks on legal framework for elections in Egypt’s capital Cairo; participants failed to make breakthrough but agreed to resume talks in May (after Muslim holy month of Ramadan). HoR-appointed PM Fathi Bashagha 21 April presided over his first cabinet meeting in Sebha city (south); govt renewed commitment to pursuing “peaceful option” to assume duties in Tripoli. Meanwhile, Islamic State (ISIS) 19 April claimed responsibility for previous night car bomb attack targeting LNA camp in Umm al-Aranib town (south); no casualties reported. LNA said it repelled 25 April attack by armed group, reportedly affiliated with ISIS, in Ghadwa area near Sabha city. British daily newspaper Financial Times 28 April reported some 1,000 pro-Moscow Syrian mercenaries and about 200 operatives from Russian private military company Wagner Group, who had been stationed alongside Haftar-led forces, pulled out of Libya in recent weeks; also said some 5,000 pro-Moscow mercenaries allegedly remain in country.

Crisis of two rival govts raised spectre of renewed localised clashes and tug of war over control of state’s resources, putting 2020 ceasefire at risk. Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) 1 March endorsed PM Fathi Bashagha’s 39-member cabinet in controversial vote of confidence marred by procedural shortcomings. Bashagha same day vowed to install his govt in capital Tripoli “peacefully and securely”. Tripoli-based incumbent PM Abdulhamid Dabaiba immediately condemned “fraudulent vote”, refused to cede power and said he will “hold accountable anyone who dares to approach any government building” in Tripoli. Armed groups loyal to Tripoli-based govt 3 March shut down airspace and detained two ministers of Bashagha-led govt to impede them from attending swearing-in ceremony in Tobruk city (east); ministers released next day, domestic flights between east and west resumed 22 March. Pro-Bashagha forces 10 March deployed on eastern edges of Tripoli, raising fears of confrontation with pro-Dabaiba forces. U.S. Ambassador Richard Norland immediately warned against escalation, while UN mission same day called on parties to “refrain from any action that could lead to armed clashes”. Bashagha next day said forces had withdrawn and assured “there will not be a war”. Field Marshall Khalifa Haftar’s forces 15 March stormed Dabaiba’s Government of National Unity (GNU) headquarters in Benghazi city (east) and dismissed all employees; later handed building over to Bashagha’s govt deputy PM Salim Al-Zadma. UN Under Sec-Gen for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Rosemary DiCarlo 16 March warned Security Council that “political polarization” in Libya “risks dividing the institutions once again”; also highlighted recent increase in human rights violations, hate speech and political violence. After UN Special Adviser on Libya Stephanie Williams 4 March asked HoR and Tripoli-based consultative High State Council (HSC) to nominate six delegates each to form “joint committee” to resolve political impasse, HSC 15 March nominated representatives, but HoR failed to appoint representatives and did not attend UN-backed HoR-HSC Joint Committee talks in Tunisia 22-24 March. Bashagha 22 March banned implementation of GNU-issued decrees or instructions; next day accused GNU of usurping power and occupying state institutions’ headquarters in Tripoli; 26-28 March repeatedly vowed to enter Tripoli in next few days.

House of Representatives appointed Fathi Bashagha as new PM, increasing polarisation and raising risk of institutional division; vote of confidence in new govt could result in two rival govts vying for power. Unidentified gunmen 10 Feb attacked incumbent PM Abdulhamid Dabaiba’s convoy in capital Tripoli; sources close to Dabaiba denounced “assassination attempt”. Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) hours later appointed former Tripoli-based Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha as PM-designate and tasked him with forming new govt by late Feb. HoR same day postponed elections indefinitely by passing new political roadmap stipulating HoR and rival Tripoli-based assembly, High State Council, will task experts committee with amending never-adopted 2017 draft constitution; amendments to be subjected to referendum prior to elections. Bashagha’s appointment follows 2021 deal with his past foe, Libyan National Army head Khalifa Haftar, providing that in case of failure to hold presidential election in Dec 2021, Haftar would support Bashagha as head of new govt in return for concessions in cabinet line-up and on condition that Bashagha increase funds allocated to Haftar-led military forces. Dabaiba immediately rejected HoR’s move, vowed to remain in post until national elections are held. Hundreds 11 Feb demonstrated in Tripoli and Misrata city against HoR; military brigades loyal to Dabaiba next day converged on Tripoli from other towns to “secure the government headquarters and key sites in the capital”. Dabaiba 21 Feb announced multi-track plan leading to parliamentary elections in June and postponing constitutional review and presidential election to after new parliament is seated; also reiterated elections “sole solution” to political crisis. HoR 28 Feb postponed vote of confidence in Bashagha’s proposed govt citing need for more consultations on cabinet line-up. Foreign powers remained divided on way forward, with several foreign capitals adopting wait-and-see attitude while Egypt and Russia supported Bashagha’s bid to premiership. Dabaiba’s Govt of National Unity 17 Feb criticised UN Special Adviser Stephanie Williams for allegedly making contradictory statements on political crisis.