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Anti-Syrian violence erupted across country, inflammatory rhetoric over Cyprus and military manoeuvres in eastern Mediterranean slowed détente with Greece.
Violent anti-Syrian riots erupted. After nationalist mobs late June attacked Syrian-owned shops, homes and vehicles in Kayseri province amid reports of Syrian refugee sexually abusing child, riots early July spread to cities of Şanlıurfa, Hatay, Bursa, Kilis, Konya, Adana, Gaziantep, Izmir, and parts of Istanbul; no casualties reported. Calm returned around 2 July. In response to violence and talks of normalisation between Türkiye and Syria, large-scale anti-Türkiye protests 1 July erupted in Syria’s north west (see Syria). Nevertheless, President Erdoğan 7 July said Ankara will invite Syrian President Assad for talks to “restore Türkiye-Syria relations to the same level as in the past”.
Détente with Greece faced challenges. Erdoğan and Greek PM Mitsotakis 10 July met on sidelines of NATO summit in U.S. capital Washington, D.C., reportedly agreeing that positive momentum in Türkiye-Greece relations should prevail. Inflammatory rhetoric over Cyprus intensified, however, around 50th anniversary of Türkiye’s troop presence (see Cyprus). Tensions heightened in south-eastern Aegean Sea as Türkiye and Greece 22-23 July sent warships to disputed continental shelf after Greece announced exploratory work for future deployment of undersea electric cable in area; intense diplomacy between Ankara and Athens 25 July eased tensions.
Operations continued against Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Islamic State (ISIS). Amid ongoing operations against PKK in south-eastern Türkiye, northern Iraq and Syria, Erdoğan 13 July reiterated plans for major offensive, saying Ankara will soon be “locking down the area of operation in northern Iraq” and will complete “missing links of the security belt” along Syria-Türkiye border (see Iraq, Syria). Meanwhile, authorities in July detained at least 170 individuals on ISIS-linked charges. Notably, police 5 July detained 45 suspects in 16 cities, 25 July detained 72 across 13 provinces including suspected perpetrator of Moscow attack in March 2024.
In other important developments. Erdoğan 28 July for first time suggested Türkiye could consider using military force against Israel in support of Palestinians, sparking war of words with Israeli officials. Turkish and Armenian special envoys 30 July met at shared border to resume discussions aimed at normalising ties.
Fighting raged in eastern Donetsk region as Russian forces targeted Chasiv Yar and Pokrovsk towns, deadly airstrikes killed dozens of civilians across Ukraine, and NATO allies shored up military support.
Russian offensive in east continued, while northern frontline stabilised. Eastern Donetsk region saw fierce fighting, with Kyiv 4 July announcing troop withdrawals from Kanal district of Chasiv Yar as Russia pummelled strategically important town. Russian troops also pushed toward Pokrovsk town, a key logistics hub, while heavy fighting continued around Toretsk city. In southern Kherson region, officials 17 July announced troops had abandoned vulnerable bridgehead at Krynky village on eastern bank of Dnipro River. Meanwhile, President Zelenskyy 18 July announced that Russia’s diversionary offensive in north east Kharkiv region had “failed” as frontline stabilised, though fighting persisted.
Russia continued strikes across Ukraine and pulled its Black Sea fleet from Crimea. Moscow continued striking critical infrastructure, killing civilians across Ukraine and causing rolling blackouts. Notably, Russia 8 July launched massive aerial attack, killing at least 37 and striking children’s hospital in capital Kyiv; authorities 31 July said Russia earlier had launched most extensive drone attack on capital in 2024. Meanwhile, Ukrainian Navy 15 July announced Moscow had relocated its last remaining Black Sea Fleet patrol ship from Russian-annexed Crimea following Kyiv’s concerted military campaign there.
NATO allies drummed up support for Ukraine, Hungarian PM visited Kyiv. NATO summit propelled Zelenskyy back onto world stage as alliance 10 July declared Ukraine was on “irreversible path” to membership, pledged $43bn additional military aid and opened new coordination centre to provide more reliable flow of assistance. Kyiv 31 July received first batch of long-awaited F-16 fighter jets. Meanwhile, Hungarian PM Orbán, EU’s biggest sceptic of military aid to Ukraine, 2 July travelled to Kyiv for first time since full-scale invasion, calling for ceasefire during talks with Zelenskyy; Orbán also made surprise visits to Moscow and Beijing in proclaimed “peace mission” (see Russia).
In another important development. FM Kuleba 23-25 July visited China to press for “ways to stop Russian aggression”, 24 July said Kyiv was open to talks but saw no readiness from Moscow to negotiate in good faith.
President Mirziyoyev attended various regional summits.
President Mirziyoyev 3-4 July attended two-day summit of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) – Eurasian regional security organisation – in Kazakh capital, Astana, which saw Belarus’ admittance into bloc; members also signed flurry of documents, including declaration lauding emergence of “fairer and multipolar world order”. Days later, Mirziyoyev 6 July attended summit of Organization of Turkic States in Azerbaijan’s Shusha city, which focused on deepening cooperation in defence, economy, energy and transportation between Turkic nations.
“Total peace” efforts continued to face ups and downs as govt ended ceasefire with one EMC faction and agreed to another with Segunda Marquetalia; President Petro addressed UN Security Council.
Govt ended ceasefire with EMC’s largest faction. Govt 16 July announced end to ceasefire with largest faction of FARC dissident group known as EMC, led by Iván Mordisco. Faction had been in talks with govt until March 2024, when latter partially suspended ceasefire in three departments along Pacific Coast; military operations will now resume in all areas where group operates. Ceasefire will remain in place with smaller EMC faction led by alias Calarcá until Oct and talks are set to continue, though they hit another snag on 23 July when military in Antioquia detained vehicle carrying Calarcá and one other commander. Parts of govt had been aware of convoy, but poor internal coordination meant local officers were not informed; EMC also broke protocol by transporting weapons in vehicle. Commanders were quickly released, but incident undermined trust between sides.
Peace efforts with Segunda Marquetalia and ELN continued. Late-June talks between govt and another dissident FARC group, Segunda Marquetalia, led to unilateral ceasefire commitment; Petro did not issue presidential decree to de-escalate military operations, however, resulting in continued hostilities throughout July. Meanwhile, UN Special Representative Ruiz-Massieu 16 July urged govt and ELN to renew ceasefire agreement, set to expire 3 Aug.
President Petro addressed UN Security Council (UNSC). Petro 11 July presented report on progress of Colombia’s 2016 Peace Agreement with FARC to UNSC; Diego Tovar attended, marking first time demobilised FARC member had physically joined UNSC meeting. Petro promised to strengthen cooperation among state institutions to advance implementation of key issues, such as rural reform and integration of rural territories, and proposed seven-year extension to implement deal.
In another important development. U.S. and Panama 1 July pledged to work on “closing” Darien Gap in order to curb influx of northbound migration from South America; announcement raised concerns that migrants stuck on Colombian side of Darien could be vulnerable to human trafficking and exploitation by armed groups.
Violence persisted in drug-trafficking hotspots along Pacific Coast, prompting stepped-up regional cooperation on organised crime.
Efforts to tackle criminal violence persisted. President Noboa 2 July decreed state of exception in six provinces and one municipality with high levels of criminal violence, 17 July announced major security operation in canton of Durán, Guayas province. Security forces 3 July rescued 49 miners kidnapped by Los Lobos gang in Azuay province. In spate of killings targeting public officials, gunmen 2 July killed former Portoviejo mayoral candidate in Manabí province; 8 July killed district authority in El Oro province; and 10 July killed official from Santa Elena province’s Public Prosecutor’s Office. Meanwhile, National Assembly 8 July reformed penal code, notably introducing tougher sentences for crimes like drug and arms trafficking.
Authorities suspended judicial personnel in corruption probe. Judicial Council 5 July suspended seven judges and one secretary from three provincial courts as part of “Plaga” investigation into high-level ties between organised crime and judiciary.
Quito signed deals with foreign partners to boost cooperation on organised crime. Govt and EU 3 July inaugurated “Europol Unit of the National Police of Ecuador”, aimed at better coordinating efforts to tackle transnational organised crime. Noboa and Peruvian President Boluarte 4 July signed agreement to strengthen bilateral relations, with emphasis on security and defence. European judicial coordination agency Eurojust 10 July signed working arrangements with Ecuador, as well as Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica and Peru, aimed at enhancing strategic cooperation in fight against organised crime.
Authorities renewed state of exception amid continued concern about arbitrary detention, torture and other ill-treatment under measure.
Authorities renewed state of exception amid allegations of human rights violations. Legislative Assembly 8 July extended state of exception for 30 days as concerns about abuses continued. Notably, NGO Human Rights Watch 16 July released report documenting “severe” human rights violations under state of exception, including “arbitrary detention, torture and other forms of ill-treatment against children”. NGO Cristosal 10 July said at least 261 people have died in custody since measure came into place. Meanwhile, Minister of Security 24 July called upon Legislative Assembly to enact more reforms to penal code, including extension of pre-trial detention.
Bukele made threats in response to steep inflation. President Bukele 5 July warned that heavy-handed approach used to address gang violence could be applied to wholesalers and distributers, who he blamed for sharp rise in prices of basic goods. While these increases are not enough to jail individuals under state of exception, Bukele alleged wholesalers engage in bribery, contraband and tax evasion, which could justify jail time.
Kenya-led security mission continued deploying to Haiti as debates about talks with gangs heated up; tensions rose between PM Conille and Transitional Presidential Council (TPC).
Kenya-led security mission continued to deploy without major spike in violence. Following late-June arrival of 200 Kenyan officers from foreign security mission, second contingent 16 July landed in capital Port-au-Prince and began conducting joint patrols and targeted missions against gangs. While their deployment triggered no major gang offensive, violence nonetheless persisted in several areas. Notably, mayor of Gressier town, south west of Port-au-Prince, 8 July stated that gangs now control around 75% of town amid ongoing clashes. In Ganthier town east of capital, members of 400 Mawozo gang 21 July set fire to police station, forcing thousands to flee. Meanwhile, PM Conille 17 July announced state of emergency in 14 gang-controlled communes in Ouest and Artibonite departments; police chief Rameau Normil 30 July announced police had subsequently killed 104 gang members during security operations in these areas.
Gang spokesperson floated possible dialogue with govt. Spokesperson for Viv Ansanm gang coalition, Jimmy ‘Barbecue’ Chérizier, 5 July said gangs would consider laying down arms and choosing one citizen from diaspora to facilitate dialogue with authorities; five prominent civil society organisations 11 July voiced opposition to any dialogue between govt and gangs. Meanwhile, gang leaders from capital’s Cité Soleil neighbourhood who are part of Viv Ansanm 24 July claimed to have reached peace agreement with Ti Gabriel, leader of Nan Brooklyn gang, which had cooperated with Viv Ansanm gangs but not fully integrated into the coalition; following agreement, gangs removed walls separating their territories.
Tensions grew between PM Conille and TPC. Public dispute erupted between TPC and Conille around latter’s 28 June-5 July travel to U.S., where he met several top officials, including Sec State Antony Blinken, and addressed UN Security Council; when Conille 8 July met with TPC upon his return, members reportedly insisted diplomatic duties fall within remit of presidency, not prime minister. Meanwhile, secretariat of TPC around 8 July started sending letters to religious groups, workers and other civil society associations, asking them to nominate representatives for provisional electoral council.
President-elect Claudia Sheinbaum began appointing ministers as ruling MORENA party pushed for constitutional reforms; U.S. authorities apprehended Sinaloa Cartel leaders.
Sheinbaum began selecting candidates for key ministerial positions. Following her landslide electoral victory on 2 June, President-elect Sheinbaum 4 July designated Omar García Harfuch, public security secretary in Mexico City under Sheinbaum’s mayorship, as future security minister. Other key appointments reflected efforts to satisfy different MORENA factions and keep party stable after outgoing President López Obrador’s departure. Meanwhile, López Obrador and Sheinbaum continued work to enact constitutional reforms, which include overhaul of judiciary and eradication of several autonomous oversight bodies. While MORENA won majorities in both houses of legislature, it is three seats shy of super majority in senate needed for constitutional reforms, prompting party leaders in July to begin negotiations with opposition senators to secure votes.
Criminal violence persisted at high levels following election. Violence continued to intensify in some areas, notably Guerrero state, as criminal groups and state forces renegotiated power arrangements following poll. Notably, National Public Security System data released 9 July found that June was deadliest month in 2024, with 23% increase in homicides since May; Acapulco city saw heavy violence amid competition between Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) and Los Rusos criminal group. In Michoacán state, journalists and inhabitants early July denounced repeated CJNG drone attacks in Aquila municipality; clashes between soldiers and alleged criminals 6 July killed seven in Tangancícuaro municipality. In Sinaloa state, confrontations 8 July between security forces and Sinaloa Cartel left four dead in Badiraguato municipality, Cartel’s core turf.
U.S. arrested two Sinaloa Cartel leaders. U.S. authorities 26 July detained Vicente “El Mayo” Zambada, head of Sinaloa Cartel, and Joaquín Guzmán López, son of former Sinaloa leader Joaquín Guzmán Loera, in state of Texas, U.S., where they had flown by private jet. With Mexican govt 27 July saying it had no prior knowledge of U.S.’s plans, rumours began circulating about how arrests materialised, including possible betrayal from within cartel or pre-arranged surrender. Arrests could trigger factional fighting in coming weeks and months, particularly if narrative of an internal betrayal gains traction.
Govt continued to target civil society, journalists, political opponents and Indigenous communities.
Clampdown on political figures continued. President Ortega’s political purges persisted, targeting not only opponents but individuals previously considered loyal to regime; notably, authorities mid-July arrested several high-ranking officials on corruption charges, including Vice Chancellor Arlette Marenco. Meanwhile, Mechanism for the Recognition of Political Prisoners 16 July reported that Nicaragua holds at least 147 political prisoners and that they are living in “deplorable” conditions.
Crackdown on civil society, press and Indigenous communities persisted. Regime 9 July shuttered one Catholic radio station and 12 NGOs. Foundation for Freedom of Expression and Democracy’s 10 July report documented 34 cases of attacks on press freedom and 17 journalists exiled April-June 2024. According to watchdog Reporters Without Borders (RSF), authorities 12 July raided home of journalist and activist Fabiola Tercero Castro, who had been under house arrest; RSF said Castro was still missing by end of month. In session with Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Indigenous rights groups 11 July reported 643 violations of Indigenous rights, including forced displacement, arbitrary detentions, torture and killings, in first half of 2024.
Nicolás Maduro claimed victory in presidential election, triggering fraud allegations, international outcry and protests that turned deadly; popular unrest could rise in coming weeks, increasing risk of violent repression.
Maduro claimed victory in presidential poll disputed by opposition. Venezuelans 28 July cast ballots following weeks of intense campaigning by President Maduro and opposition candidate, Edmundo González, who was leading in polls despite govt’s unrestrained use of state resources and deliberate efforts to hinder opposition campaign. After polls closed, govt-controlled electoral authorities (CNE) went silent for hours before 29 July announcing that Maduro had secured over 51% of vote compared to 44% for González, but did not release vote tallies. Opposition later that day dismissed result as fraudulent, with González and banned winner of opposition primary María Corina Machado saying voting tallies gathered by opposition gave González a sweeping victory with over 70% of vote.
Chorus of international voices called for transparent vote count. Actors from region and beyond, including Brazil, Colombia, Chile and U.S., called for transparency in vote count and urged CNE to publish precinct-by-precinct polling results; several international bodies echoed these appeals, including UN and EU. U.S.-based Carter Center, invited by govt to monitor elections, 31 July said election “did not meet international stands of electoral integrity and cannot be considered democratic”. Caracas 29 July recalled diplomats from Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Perú, Panamá, Dominican Republic and Uruguay in response to their scepticism about results and demanded they reciprocate. Meanwhile, Cuba, Nicaragua, Russia, Bolivia and Honduras congratulated Maduro on his victory.
Protests erupted but were forcefully put down by security forces, leaving 17 dead. Spontaneous demonstrations 29 July erupted across country in response to disputed result, with protesters reportedly toppling statues of former President Hugo Chávez, burning campaign posters of Maduro and attempting to block roads. Protesters also flooded streets of capital Caracas as police and military deployed in large numbers, accompanied by pro-govt para-police forces known as “collectives”; mostly peaceful demonstrations turned violent as police used tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse crowds heading for presidential palace. As of 31 July, 17 deaths had been reported along with over 1,000 arrests. State repression will likely intensify in coming weeks should protests persist.
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