Africa’s second most populous country is in the midst of an increasingly rocky political transition that began in 2018, with the ascent of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. At first, the change seemed to hold great promise, but fissures have grown, partly between and among the country’s numerous ethnic groups. At stake is the state’s stability and the post-1991 ethno-federalist system, which many Ethiopians support as guaranteeing local autonomy, and many others oppose as sowing division and undermining effective central government. War between the federal and Tigray governments broke out in the northern region in late 2020 as these tensions came to the fore. Through its research and advocacy, Crisis Group works to end the fighting and ward off similar conflict elsewhere, with the long-term goal of encouraging comprehensive and inclusive national dialogue about the country’s political future.
A preliminary agreement with Somaliland giving landlocked Ethiopia access to the Gulf of Aden has heightened tensions in the Horn of Africa, a region already in turmoil. In this Q&A, Crisis Group experts explain the implications of the controversial accord.
Fano militias continued to wreak havoc in Amhara, thousands of displaced Tigrayans returned to areas disputed between Tigray and Amhara, and Oromia insurgency took heavy toll on civilians.
Amhara insurgency continued despite peace initiative. After late-June formation of Regional Peace Council to facilitate talks with Fano militias, some factions 16 July formed Amhara Fano Popular Organization and elected as leader former journalist Eskinder Nega, who in June stressed need for united front before talks with govt can begin. Meanwhile, clashes between security forces and Fano continued in East, West and North Gojjam, North Shewa, North and South Wollo, and North, Central, South and West Gondar zones. Violence 5 July also broke out between Fano and ethnic Agaw militias in Quara woreda (West Gondar) after Fano asked Agaw to hand over weapons and stop supporting govt; Fano 9 July reportedly took control of area, while local authorities reported over 80 civilians killed and 10,000 displaced.
Tensions persisted over return of displaced Tigrayans to disputed territories. Some 15,000 internally displaced persons late June-early July returned to Tselemti district in Tigray’s North Western Zone after removal of Amhara administration, and to Alamata town in Southern Tigray Zone, sparking two-day protest from Amhara residents who said Tigray soldiers were among returnees. Resettlement in Western Tigray likely to face resistance from well-armed militias associated with Amhara administration there. Meanwhile, tensions between Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and federal govt, and divisions within TPLF leadership came to fore. Notably, PM Abiy late July threatened war if TPLF does not register with election board before it holds party congress, while Tigray Interim Administration President Getachew Reda 29 July accused TPLF leadership of corruption, mismanagement and jeopardising regional security.
Mass kidnapping highlighted insecurity in Oromia region. Clashes between Ethiopian military and Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) persisted across Oromia, including East and West Wollega, Horo Guduru Wollega, South West, West and North Shewa, Sheger City areas, and Guji zones. Assailants believed to be OLA members 2 July kidnapped over 160 students near Gebre Guracha town (North Shewa), though many were reportedly released in following days; OLA 11 July denied involvement and blamed govt.
The big question many have is if [Ethiopian Prime Minister] Abiy Ahmed could position himself as a mediator between [Sudan's army chief] Burhan and the UAE.
Any serious failure in implementing the agreements [between Ethiopia's federal government and Tigrayan leaders] raises the risks of a disastrous return to large-scale war...
The deal [with Tigrayan leaders] was a huge diplomatic and political victory for the [Ethiopian] federal government.
Now Tigrayan reports ... of a large-scale incursion into Tigray from the north by Eritrean and federal forces. So, it is evident that the conflict is now seriously escala...
This week on The Horn, Alan speaks with Ethiopia scholar Christopher Clapham about Addis Ababa’s bid for its own seaport, including its controversial recent deal with Somaliland, as well as the many internal crises facing Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.
This week on The Horn, Alan speaks with Michael Woldemariam, associate professor at the University of Maryland, about the new crisis engulfing Ethiopia’s Amhara region and escalating tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
A rebellion in the Amhara region risks plunging Ethiopia into wider conflict. The federal government should seek talks with the militants as part of efforts to resolve the country’s interlocking crises. Outside powers should keep nudging Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed to take this conciliatory tack.
This edition includes entries on Bangladesh, DR Congo, Ethiopia and Somaliland, offering a snapshot into emergent conflicts and crises in the next three to six months in a clear, accessible format, identifying triggers, key dates to watch and potential behaviour of conflict actors, to support global conflict prevention efforts.
The CrisisWatch Digest Ethiopia offers a monthly one-page snapshot of conflict-related country trends in a clear, accessible format, using a map of the region to pinpoint developments.
A victim’s relative is among those accusing Meta in a Kenyan court of failing to adequately police incendiary speech on Facebook during Ethiopia’s civil war. Much greater effort from the company is warranted. But Meta’s task is hardly straightforward.
In this video series, Crisis Group's Senior Analyst for Ethiopia William Davison explains the context surrounding the recent truce that put a stop to the fighting in Ethiopia's Tigray region. He discusses the situation preceding the ceasefire, what it looks like, and the challenges it faces in its implementation.
Ethiopia’s federal government and leaders in the war-torn Tigray region signed a peace accord on 2 November, followed by an implementation deal ten days later. After making these steps toward ending the conflict, all parties must act responsibly to build a solid foundation for peace.
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