[Translated from French]

What’s new? Farmer-herder conflict in Chad has reached unprecedented levels during the political transition following the former president’s death in 2021, leaving more than 1,000 people dead and more than 2,000 injured. This violence is exacerbating the country’s perceived north-south divide.

Why does it matter? A growing number of cattle owners are from the north. The sedentary populations of the south and centre see the northerners as protected by the central authorities, fuelling resentment. The farmers’ grievances, sharpened by May’s disputed presidential election, could lead them to take the law into their own hands.

What should be done? President Mahamat Déby should make resolution of farmer-herder conflict a priority during his term. His government should provide security and impartial justice in the affected areas, involving residents in mediation efforts to help restore their confidence in the authorities.

The southern and central provinces of Chad have seen some 100 clashes between sedentary farmers and groups of herders in the last three years, with the country undergoing a political transition following the death of the long-time president, Idriss Déby Itno. The violence has left more than 1,000 people dead and over 2,000 injured, also exacerbating food insecurity in the affected regions and the country’s perceived north-south divide. Driven by identity-based demands, the multi-faceted conflict continues to intensify, with some groups of pastoralists now taking up automatic rifles. If left unchecked, the intercommunal strife could lead farmers to form militias, which would risk widening the divisions among Chadians even further. The current president, Mahamat Déby Itno, should make resolving farmer-herder conflicts a priority. He should rapidly introduce measures to curb the use of firearms and prevent the emergence of self-defence militias. He should also support initiatives to prosecute perpetrators and facilitate conflict mediation, enlisting the aid of community representatives. 

On 6 May, Mahamat Déby won 61 per cent of the vote in a presidential election marred by numerous irregularities, ending a three-year transitional period. A junta had installed him at the country’s helm in April 2021, after his father Idriss, who had held power for three decades (1990-2021), died. After first opening political space for the opposition and convening a national dialogue, the transitional government reversed course, launching a bloody crackdown in October 2022 on demonstrators demanding the return of civilian rule. More than 100 people were killed in the protests and several opposition figures went into exile.

When the transition began, many people in the south, who make up around 60 per cent of Chad’s population, pressed for change at the top of the state, which had been dominated since the 1980s by northern elites, particularly from the Zaghawa (to whom both Débys, father and son, belong), Gorane and Arab ethnic groups. Such a change, southerners hoped, would bring greater autonomy for Chad’s various regions or even be a first step toward federalism. The southerners also saw an opportunity to put an end to what they perceived as the clannish and nepotistic practices by which northerners exercised a monopoly on the state apparatus.

But the transitional authorities did not move in this direction. The new constitution, approved by referendum in December 2023, kept a unitary, centralised model for the state, though the revised basic law introduced a small measure of decentralisation. None of the three southerners appointed as prime minister during the transition – Albert Pahimi Padacké, Saleh Kebzabo and Succès Masra – did much to address the grievances of their communities of origin. Nor did any of them serve as a counterbalance in a power structure whose political and administrative personnel were still overwhelmingly from northern Chad.