April 2024

South Africa’s president brokered talks between Kiir and Machar ahead of December poll, Murle youth from Jonglei State launched well-coordinated deadly attack, and economy worsened.

South African president held high-level political talks in capital Juba. South African President Ramaphosa 16-18 April visited capital Juba to mediate talks between President Kiir and VP Machar. Ramaphosa publicly emphasised need for govt to prepare for Dec elections, though mediation likely sought to broker pre-election deal that could see Machar rejoining Kiir’s Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM)as deputy; rank and file of Kiir and Machar’s parties showed discontent at secrecy of diplomacy amid deep polarisation.

International community reiterated concerns over election preparedness. Political Parties Council and National Election Commission – tasked with organising poll – 4 April received first batch of allocated funding, representing only fraction of requested money, leaving electoral process vastly underfunded. UN Sec-Gen Guterres 8 April transmitted letter to UN Security Council outlining over a dozen outstanding preconditions essential for holding fair election and emphasising urgent need for technical, legal and operational assistance. U.S. 16 April said South Sudan’s politicians so far have “failed to meet the standards necessary for genuine and peaceful elections”. UN Security Council 29 April renewed UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) mandate for one year.

Jonglei state saw worrying uptick in intercommunal violence. In one of the most serious escalations since 2020 war in Jonglei, armed Murle youth from Jonglei State’s Greater Pibor Administrative Area (GPAA) 26 April launched well-coordinated and well-armed attack on Toposa cattle keepers in Kapoeta East County (Eastern Equatoria state), killing unknown number and abducting scores of women and children; UNMISS 30 April deployed additional peacekeepers to Jonglei and Kapoeta East county to deter more violence. Meanwhile, former leader of Murle rebel group David Yau Yau 1 April defected from SPLM to join Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in Opposition, raising fears of electoral violence in GPAA, 29 April announced he had returned to SPLM. 

Pipeline rupture hurt economy. Main pipeline exporting South Sudan’s oil remained in disrepair, plunging country further into economic and fiscal crisis; Juba 25 April claimed oil exports through pipeline would resume within two months.

Fears of all-out intercommunal conflict in North Darfur escalated as paramilitary forces (RSF) and Darfuri armed groups prepared for war and Sudanese army (SAF) intensified bombings of Arab areas. 

RSF and Darfuri armed groups prepared for war, raising fears of ethnic conflict. Tensions in North Darfur escalated after three members of a coalition of non-Arab armed groups, Joint Force of Armed Struggle Movements, 12 April aligned with SAF against RSF. RSF-aligned Arab militias, meanwhile, torched villages around North Darfur’s state capital El Fasher in response to growing role of non-Arab populations in conflict, notably Sudanese Zaghawa of North Darfur, heightening fears of all-out ethnic warfare. U.S. 24 April warned of imminent RSF offensive on El Fasher, which hosts hundreds of thousands of displaced people; UN 26 April said RSF were reportedly encircling city and that attack “would have devastating consequences” for civilians. Meanwhile, SAF carried out airstrikes on RSF positions, reportedly killing scores. 

SAF-RSF fighting persisted in Bahri, Gezira and South Kordofan. Fighting continued in Omdurman and Bahri cities, with SAF making modest gains. SAF offensive to retake Wad Madani state capital in Gezira made no significant progress. In South Kordofan state, RSF-affiliated militias 5-6 April reportedly attacked villages in Qurdud Nyama region, killing scores.

International conference pushed for aid and greater mediation coordination. In international humanitarian summit for Sudan and neighbouring countries held in French capital Paris, various states 15 April pledged $2.1bn aid and reaffirmed commitment to peace initiatives; regional and international actors also convened ministerial meeting, calling for unhindered humanitarian access, cessation of hostilities and support for consolidated mediation and peace process. Saudi and U.S. committed to restart Jeddah process within three weeks. U.S. 29 April called for all countries to halt weapons’ exports to Sudan, warning El Fasher is “on the precipice of a large-scale massacre”. 

Civilian actors held meetings to discuss future political process. On Paris conference sidelines, EU brought together Sudanese civilian political actors to discuss ending conflict and prospects for political future. Promediation organisation, supported by Swiss govt, 20 April hosted meeting of Sudanese political actors to discuss ceasefire negotiations and political process; talks excluded representatives from former President Bashir’s National Congress Party.

Political tensions ran high amid vote for new constitution and holding of delayed polls; jihadist violence continued in north.

Elections took place amid controversy over transition to parliamentary system. Amid rising political tensions, parliament 19 April gave final approval to new constitution that transitions presidential system to parliamentary one and creates new “President of Council of Ministers” role appointed by legislature; opposition remained concerned that President Gnassingbé, in place since 2005, will use new structure to extend stay in office and condemned moves as “power grab”. Legislative and regional elections – which govt 9 April delayed from 20 April date – 29 April took place peacefully; opposition had called for 11-13 April protests in response to reforms, initial vote delay and arrests of activists, but govt 9 April denied permits for demonstrations which failed to attract significant turnout. West African regional bloc ECOWAS 15 April sent delegation to capital Lome to facilitate govt-opposition dialogue.

Jihadist-related insecurity continued in north. In Savanes region, Al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) 2 April damaged military vehicle in Lalabiga village, while army helicopter 4 April reportedly crashed during counter-insurgency operations in region, injuring several soldiers.

Tax proposals and implementation of electronic tax system prompted nationwide strike amid opposition support; military operations against Islamic State-affiliated group continued. 

Suggested tax increases and regulations led to industrial action. Traders 16-25 April held nationwide strike in protest at potential new taxation measures and increases on items including fuel and building materials, which business associations also criticised. Opposition leaders Robert Kyagulanyi, alias ‘Bobi Wine’, and Kizza Besigye 15 April came out in support of strike which shuttered many businesses, while taxation may become key campaign issue ahead of 2026 general elections. In response, President Museveni 19 April met traders to hear complaints, and temporarily suspended penalties for non-compliance with electronic tax system.

Army continued anti-Allied Democratic Force (ADF) campaign. Military said army 4 and 8 April killed two top commanders from Islamic State-affiliated ADF in eastern DR Congo (DRC) during joint operation with Congolese forces; army 14 April released statement detailing continued pursuit of scattered ADF fighters, urging vigilance against potential attacks by those returning to Uganda. Meanwhile, newly appointed head of army and Museveni’s son Lt-Gen. Muhoozi Kainerugaba 17 April met delegation of Rwandan military chiefs, raising concerns over whether Muhoozi’s close ties to Rwanda would impact joint DRC-Uganda operations against ADF amid Congolese-Rwandan tensions. 

In other important developments. Parliamentary spending controversies continued as Parliamentary Speaker Anita Among 11 April blocked debate on March revelations of extravagant expenditures, while parliament 15 April proposed increase in budget to cover travel costs and salaries; UK 30 April announced sanctions on three politicians including Among over allegations of corruption related to housing aid project in Karamoja region. Constitutional Court 3 April upheld 2023 Anti-Homosexuality Act, straining govt’s relations with international donors and raising concerns over potential reduction in foreign aid.

Amid hunger crisis, govt used aid to intimidate opposition supporters; authorities launched new currency in bid to stabilise economy.   

Govt intimidated opposition through partisan distribution of food aid. Amid shortfall in grain caused by inflation and drought, President Mnangagwa 3 April declared national state of disaster to address widespread hunger, seeking $2bn from international actors. Concerns, however, increased over how govt will distribute aid after local NGO Zimbabwe Peace Project 17 April released monthly report recording increase in human rights violations, intimidation and harassment, including twelve alleged incidents where citizens affiliated with political opposition were denied food parcels. Notably, ruling party ZANU-PF MP distributed rations in Gobhi village, Matabeleland North province, while warning villagers to join party or face exclusion from aid; also, village head in ward fifteen, Masvingo province allegedly convened supporters of opposition leader Nelson Chamisa’s Blue Movement and threatened to remove them from beneficiary list. Meanwhile, ZANU-PF consolidated super majority in parliament with 27 April victory in two by-elections amid boycott by opposition parties.

Govt launched new currency. Central Bank 5 April announced new gold-backed currency Zimbabwe Gold (ZiG); ZANU-PF officials claimed ZiG will stabilise economy amid high inflation and volatile currency depreciation, although questions remained over whether authorities have sufficient gold, other minerals and foreign currency reserves to back ZiG. Govt and businesses reportedly refused to accept previous currency, leaving some citizens without cash due to insufficient circulation of ZiG. 

Islamic State’s local branch continued attacks, Taliban authorities restricted space for political activism, and tensions with Pakistan persisted amid concern over new wave of deportations. 

Islamic State’s local branch targeted minority groups and Taliban. Islamic State-Khorasan Province (IS-KP) claimed explosion of fuel tankers in capital Kabul on 9 April. Taliban forces 11 April reportedly killed two IS-KP members, arrested third, in Sawkay district, Kunar province (east). IS-KP 21 April claimed magnetic IED attack targeting bus carrying mostly Hazara civilians near security checkpoint in Kabul. IS-KP 30 April killed six worshippers at Shiite mosque in Guzara district, Herat province (west). Possible IS-KP gunmen 19 April killed senior Taliban figure and close advisor to Emir, Sheikh Omar Jan Akhundzada, in mosque in Pakistan’s Quetta city. 

Taliban authorities intensified crackdown on Islamist and social groups. After Taliban late March forced leader of Hizb-e Islami Hekmatyar – one of few prominent non-Taliban politicians to stay in country following Taliban takeover – to vacate his Kabul compound, son of leader 2 April claimed Taliban was protecting and supporting Al-Qaeda and Pakistani Taliban in Afghanistan. Ministry of Justice 7 April referred two political parties and 76 social and charitable institutions to security authorities for alleged illegal activism. Following months of pressure to stifle activities by Hizb ut-Tahrir – primarily consisting of young, urban and educated Salafist-leaning Islamists – Taliban 18 April reportedly arrested group’s spokesman. Ministry of Information and Culture 16 April announced shuttering of two television stations owned by Islamist groups Hizb-e Islami and Jamiat-e Islami. 

Tensions between Taliban authorities and Pakistan persisted. Following cross-border hostilities in March, Taliban 30 March claimed U.S. drones flew inside Afghan airspace in south west, allegedly entering from neighbouring countries; Taliban previously accused Pakistan of permitting U.S. drones to enter Afghanistan. Anticipation grew over Pakistan’s announced intention to initiate Phase Two of the Illegal Foreigners’ Repatriation Plan, launched in Nov 2023 to forcibly deport millions of Afghans in country; Phase One deported around 500,000, while Phase Two could target some 800,000 Afghan Citizen Card holders or 1.3m with Proof of Residence. Such moves could further fuel tensions between two countries. 

Surge in ethnic armed group attacks in south east prompted major security operation and derailed fledgling peace talks; opposition announced boycott of local polls in May, as country felt spillover of Myanmar’s conflict. 

In Chittagong Hill Tracts, ethnic armed group stepped up raids and attacks. Kuki-Chin National Front (KNF) – which claims to represent six Kuki-Chin subgroups, largest of which is Bawm – 2-3 April attempted three bank robberies in Bandarban district, two of which were successful; group 4 April reportedly fired on police station in Thanchi upazila and 5 April attacked checkpoint in Alikadam upazila; hundreds of KNF militants took part in operations across towns 20-30km apart, suggesting growing operational capacity. In response, security forces 5 April launched major operation against KNF, arresting in subsequent days up to 100 suspected members, including alleged KNF key leader; further raids 22 and 28 April killed three KNF members. KNF robberies and attacks derailed peace talks between group and govt delegation, which were scheduled for 22 April; some community leaders in Chittagong Hill Tracts called for renewed dialogue with KNF.

Main opposition party announced boycott of local elections in May. Opposition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) 15 April opted to boycott upcoming local elections, which will take place in 150 of 495 upazilas (sub-districts) on 8 May; delayed decision signalled likely internal BNP divisions, with some activists seeking to participate to revitalise grassroots mobilisation. BNP refrained from launching major anti-govt activities since end of Ramadan in mid-April.

War in Myanmar spilt over border, raising prospect of new refugee influx. Heavy fighting in Myanmar’s Rakhine state – where Arakan Army continued its offensive against military – prompted increasing numbers of military personnel and Rohingya civilians to cross border into Bangladesh. Bangladesh 25 April repatriated 288 regime officials, mainly Border Guard Police members, to Myanmar. Additionally, communal tensions rose significantly between Rakhine and Rohingya communities over military’s alleged forced recruitment of Rohingya and collaboration with Rohingya armed groups Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army and Arakan Rohingya Army, both of which are predominately based in refugee camps in Bangladesh (see Myanmar). 

China maintained naval activity in East China Sea amid tensions with Japan over disputed islands, while Tokyo and U.S. strengthened alliance with series of defence agreements. 

Beijing continued maritime presence. As of 25 April, Japan reported 98 Chinese vessels in Japan’s contiguous zone, while nine vessels were detected within Japan’s territorial sea, representing slight increase from March. Chinese coast guard ships 5-6 April entered Japan’s territorial sea off disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which Japan claims as its territory, in East China Sea and attempted to approach Japanese fishing boat. Japanese coast guard 12 April requested four Chinese coast guard vessels to leave “our territorial waters” in disputed area off Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Japan 25 April detected one Chinese coast guard vessel that entered Japanese territorial waters off coast of Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. China’s coast guard 28 April claimed it took law enforcement measures against inspection mission of Japanese lawmakers near Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands – reportedly marking first such mission since 2013. Japan 2 April detected Chinese military ships and surveillance aircraft active in waters between Taiwan and Japan, as well as Russian surveillance ship off Japanese coast.

U.S. and Japan struck agreements to boost alliance. U.S. President Biden 10 April hosted Japanese PM Fumio Kishida for official visit and state dinner, as leaders announced scores of agreements and initiatives for defence cooperation and to counter perceived threats from China in East and South China Seas, which Biden described as “most significant upgrade in our alliance since it was first established”; notably, pair agreed new joint military command structure in Japan, new air missile defence network with Australia, and Japanese participation in NASA moon missions, reflecting Japan’s growing international role following changes to its pacifist constitution.

Japan, U.S. and South Korea held joint exercises. Japan, U.S. and South Korea 11-12 April conducted trilateral maritime exercise in East China Sea, including anti-submarine warfare drills and search and rescue operations, in bid to enhance deterrence vis-à-vis China and North Korea (see Korean Peninsula). 

Govt’s inflammatory rhetoric stoked religious and political tensions as national polls commenced, ethnic conflict in Manipur state in north east derailed voting and security forces killed dozens of Maoists in centre.

Amid govt’s divisive electoral rhetoric, concern grew over new ruling party term. First phase of election for national parliament 19 April began, with voting scheduled to run until 1 June, against backdrop of mounting tensions over arrest of opposition leaders and allegations of electronic voting manipulation. Addressing rally in Rajasthan state (north west), PM Narendra Modi 21 April deployed Islamophobic rhetoric by referring to Muslims as “infiltrators” and asserting that opposition Congress party would seize wealth of Hindus and redistribute it among community with “more children”; remarks prompted outrage. With ruling Bharatiya Janata Party seeking to implement range of Hindu majoritarian policies, critics such as historian Ramchandra Guha fear another BJP term could weaken India’s status as secular republic; Guha warned “stigmatisation of Muslims will continue, and perhaps even sharpen” with BJP’s third term.

In Manipur state, insecurity prevented free and fair polls. As voting in national polls commenced in Manipur state (north east), extremist Meitei militia Arambai Tanggol 19 April captured polling stations, damaged voting machines and tampered with votes, forcing Election Commission to void results of at least seventeen of 3,000 polling stations across state. In sign of unending conflict, gunmen in camouflage 13 April killed two Kuki men at border of Kangpokpi and Imphal East districts before mutilating bodies; gunfight between gunmen of Kuki-Zo and Meitei communities 28 April killed one in same location. Suspected militants 27 April killed two central security forces personnel and injured two others in Bishnupur district.

Security forces launched large-scale anti-Maoist operation in centre. In Chhattisgarh state (centre), security forces 2 April killed thirteen Maoists in Bijapur district. Security forces during operation 16 April killed 29 Maoists in Bastar region, which marks state’s most lethal anti-Maoist operation ever; Maoists claimed that seventeen of 29 were slain in cold blood, which security forces rejected. Maoists 26 April killed opposition Congress member Joga Podiyam in Bastar region. Security forces 30 April shot dead ten Maoists in Bastar region.

PM Narendra Modi promised to restore statehood and hold elections in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) during visit ahead of national elections, while militant attacks and security operations resumed after winter lull. 

Modi visited J&K and promised to restore statehood and hold regional polls. PM Modi 12 April visited Udhampur area of J&K and addressed rally, announcing that “people will soon have their ministers and legislators” and promising to restore statehood in first direct reference since Aug 2019. Ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 16 April indicated that it decided not to take part in general election in three predominantly Muslim constituencies in Kashmir, preferring to support regional parties perceived as BJP proxies; former Chief Minister of J&K Omar Abdullah 19 April asserted “the [party’s] 2019 decisions have made people angrier and more alienated”. 

After winter respite, militant attacks and security operations resumed in J&K. In Jammu’s Rajouri district, security forces 2 April busted suspected module of militant group Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, arresting three. In Kashmir’s Baramulla district, security forces 5 April killed two militants allegedly infiltrating from Pakistan. Security forces 11 April killed militant in Kashmir’s Pulwama district and arrested three alleged member associates linked to Lashkar-e-Tayyaba in Baramulla town. Militants 17 April shot dead non-local worker in Kashmir’s Anantnag district. Security forces 26 April killed two militants in Baramulla district.

Authorities detained Kashmir’s chief cleric and prohibited congregational prayers. Authorities 6 April again placed Kashmir’s chief cleric and moderate party Hurriyat leader Mirwaiz Umar Farooq under house arrest, despite J&K administration in March declaring him “free man”; Farooq 7 April accused authorities of “spiritual oppression” and of attacking “religious freedom and rights of Kashmiri Muslims”. Authorities 10 April disallowed congregational prayers at Srinagar’s Jamia Masjid for fifth time in row.

Protests in Ladakh continued. Protestors continued relay hunger strike in Leh city to demand statehood for union territory and inclusion in Sixth Schedule of the Constitution to regain protections and privileges lost after reorganisation of J&K’s constitutional status in 2019.