Anti-Türkiye protests turned deadly in north west, where demonstrations against Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) continued; Iran-backed groups resumed attacks on U.S. bases.

In north west, anti-Türkiye protests turned deadly and protests against HTS continued. Following late-June attacks on Syrians in Türkiye, large-scale anti-Türkiye protests 1 July erupted in north west, with protesters removing Turkish flags and attacking Turkish military vehicles, bases, and checkpoints; Turkish forces killed seven protesters in Afrin city and one in Jarabulus city, both in Aleppo province. Amid widespread internet and communications’ service disruptions, Türkiye closed border for several days as military police of Türkiye-aligned Syrian Interim Govt 3 July launched arrest campaign (see Türkiye). Meanwhile, protests demanding resignation of HTS leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani and prison reform continued in Idlib and Aleppo provinces; notably, clashes 5 July erupted in Binnish town as HTS cracked down on protesters after they allegedly injured police officer. Protest movement, local community leaders and HTS-dominated Salvation Govt 17 July reached agreement to release some detainees and suspend protests in Binnish for three months; protests continued elsewhere.

Iran-backed groups and U.S. carried out tit-for-tat strikes. Iranian-backed groups 25-26 July fired missiles toward U.S. base at Conoco gas field, prompting U.S. to strike locations of Iranian-backed groups east of Deir ez-Zor city with heavy artillery shells. Meanwhile, Israel continued strikes, notably killing govt-affiliated business tycoon and militia leader Baraa al-Qaterji and his driver on Damascus-Beirut highway 15 July.

ISIS attacks persisted. U.S. Central Command 17 July noted uptick in Islamic State (ISIS) attacks in Syria and Iraq as part of group’s attempt to “reconstitute” capabilities. Notably, ISIS 3 July killed two shepherds and six govt forces searching for them in Raqqa province.

In other important developments. Clashes between local group Thuwar Kanaker and govt forces 2 July erupted in Kanaker town, Rif Dimashq province after latter arrested former commander of al-Furqan Brigades; govt forces same day shelled town, killing five civilians; parties next day reached ceasefire. Kurdish authorities in north east 17 July granted general amnesty to people “whose hands are not stained with blood of Syrians”, leading to release of hundreds of prisoners. Türkiye continued attacks on Kurdish militants (see Türkiye). 

President Saïed set October election date amid deteriorating political climate for polls as authorities arrested several opposition candidates.

President set presidential vote and announced his candidacy. Incumbent Saïed 1 July scheduled presidential election for 6 Oct and 19 July confirmed his own candidacy; Saïed said he was answering country’s “sacred call” to keep up fight toward “national liberation”, raising concern he may intend to forcibly secure election (see below). Earlier, Saïed 5 July called for vigilance against destabilisation attempts in pre-election period. In likely attempt to win public support, president 9 July made new social welfare announcement with 33% increase in allowance for poorest families, affecting 310,ooo beneficiaries. Hundreds of pro-Saïed demonstrators 25 July marched in capital Tunis, as families of political prisoners same day gathered in capital to demand their release.

Govt continued to disqualify and imprison opposition candidates. Prosecutor 12 July banned presidential hopeful Abdellatif Makki, former leader of Islamist-inspired An-Nahda party, from travel and media appearances due to alleged involvement in 2014 death of businessman when Makki was health minister. Authorities next day arrested Sec Gen of An-Nahda Ajmi Ouirimi and two party members, fuelling concerns authorities may attempt to dissolve still-popular movement ahead of election. Authorities 13 July also arrested Yadh Elloumi for allegedly buying sponsorship for runner-up in 2019 presidential election, Nabil Karoui, as campaign official. Court 19 July sentenced Lotfi Mraihi, candidate for left-wing opposition Republican People’s Union, to eight months’ imprisonment and ruled him ineligible to run for office for life on charges of corruption and vote buying during previous candidacy in 2019. Rejected candidate Abir Moussi 29 July began hunger strike to protest her exclusion, while candidate Nizar Chaâri next day announced his campaign manager and member of campaign team had been arrested on accusations of forgery. Rights group Amnesty International 16 July and main opposition coalition National Salvation Front next day denounced crackdown, with latter claiming measures create impossible conditions for holding democratic elections. Meanwhile, court 6 July sentenced Saïed critic and prominent lawyer Sonia Dahmani, arrested early May, to one year in prison for spreading “false news”.

Figures of pro-independence Polisario Front openly challenged leadership; France adopted Moroccan autonomy plan.

Internal divisions within Polisario laid bare. Bachir Moustafa, brother of Polisario Front founder and candidate in latest leadership election in Jan 2023, 7 July publicly called for general congress to “take emergency measures” to save Front from downfall, heavily criticising Polisario leader Brahim Ghali and demanding more intransigence towards Morocco. Main Polisario body did not reply to attack or congress calls. Meanwhile, Oubi Bouchraya, Polisario representative in Geneva, 6 July took to social media to highlight growing tensions and protests in Tindouf refugee camps and denounced Polisario’s security-minded approach to protests, marking first time Polisario official admitted public security issues in camps. Over 100 Polisario fighters 16 July laid down weapons in front of Polisario general secretariat in Rabouni refugee camp in protest at corruption and leadership decisions regarding military appointments, further signalling rising discontent within independence movement.

France adopted Moroccan autonomy plan, shifting Western Sahara stance. In letter to Moroccan King Mohammed VI made public 30 July, French president Macron called Moroccan autonomy plan, which would give Rabat control over Western Sahara’s national security and foreign affairs, “only basis” to solve conflict; Polisario same day condemned move, saying it deprived Sahrawi people of “right to freedom and independence”; move marked notable policy shift and drew anger from Algeria which supports Western Saharan independence (see Algeria). Earlier, outgoing U.S. ambassador to Algeria Elizabeth Moore Aubin 18 July also reaffirmed U.S. support for autonomy plan.

Regional tensions remained elevated as Israel launched retaliatory airstrikes on Hodeida port after Houthi drone killed Israeli in Tel Aviv; govt and Houthis agreed on de-escalatory measures.

Israel struck oil and energy infrastructure in Hodeida after Houthi drone targeted Tel Aviv. Houthi drone 19 July struck Israeli city Tel Aviv, killing one Israeli and injuring at least ten. In response, Israeli airstrikes next day struck oil and energy infrastructure in Hodeida port, killing nine and injuring 87. UN Sec Gen Guterres 21 July warned of further regional escalation, calling for “utmost restraint” while Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi same day threatened “more attacks targeting Israel” (see Israel-Palestine, Iran). Meanwhile, Houthis in July stepped up attacks on shipping in Red, Arabian and Mediterranean seas, and Indian Ocean; notably, Houthis 1 July claimed four operations against U.S., UK, and Israeli ships; 15 July claimed attacks targeting three ships in Red Sea and Mediterranean.

Govt and Houthis agreed to de-escalate tit-for-tat banking restrictions. Govt-controlled Central Bank 7 July revoked licenses of six commercial banks for failing to relocate offices from Houthi-controlled capital Sana’a to Aden. Houthis around same day accused Saudi Arabia of being behind govt-imposed banking restrictions, threatening to resume cross-border attacks if they were not overturned (see Saudi Arabia). Govt and Houthis 22 July informed UN envoy Hans Grundberg that they had agreed to lift tit-for-tat banking restrictions and expand national airline Yemenia flights. 

Parties made progress on prisoners’ swap and UN renewed monitoring mission. Govt and Houthi representatives 6 July attended meeting of Supervisory Committee on the Implementation of the Detainees’ Agreement in Omani capital Muscat and reached “breakthrough” preliminary agreement on release of govt-aligned political leader Mohamed Qahtan, who has been detained by Houthis since 2015. UN Security Council 8 July extended mandate of UN Mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNHMA) until 14 July 2025; mission plays vital role in monitoring Hodeida port and implementation of Houthi-govt ceasefire and could potentially facilitate de-escalation in Red Sea.

Humanitarian situation continued deteriorating. World Food Programme 1 July said “severe food deprivation” had reached unprecedented levels in both northern and southern Yemen since May. 

Would-be assassin injured Republican candidate Donald Trump, and President Biden ended his re-election bid.

Trump survived assassination attempt at campaign rally. Lone gunman 13 July shot at former president and Republican party nominee Donald Trump during campaign event in state of Pennsylvania. Shooter, whose motives remain unclear, pierced Trump’s right ear, killed one spectator and injured two others before being killed by snipers. Trump steered clear of escalatory rhetoric in immediate aftermath of attack, 14 July saying “it is more important than ever that we stand united”, but subsequently resumed confrontational attacks on his opponents; President Biden, meanwhile, 14 July urged country to “lower the temperature” amid deepening polarisation ahead of Nov presidential election.

Biden abandoned his presidential campaign. Biden 21 July announced he was withdrawing from presidential race and immediately endorsed VP Harris as his successor. Announcement followed weeks of mounting pressure to step down amid concerns about his fitness for another term. In 24 July address, Biden said move was “the best way to unite our nation”, while vowing to see out his term.

Detention of Nigerien nationals ratcheted up bilateral tensions; threat of jihadist spillover from neighbouring countries remained high.

Diplomatic standoff with Niger continued with arrest of Nigerien oil workers. Bilateral tensions persisted as Niger refused to reopen its land border and oil exports through shared pipeline faced blockages from both govts. Authorities 5 June arrested five Nigeriens working for Chinese-Nigerien operator of pipeline (WAPCo), alleging they fraudulently attempted to access oil terminal and accusing them of spying; in response, Niamey next day blocked oil exports from their side and 8 June denounced “kidnapping” of workers (see Niger). Govt 13 June released two of those detained but 17 June convicted other three, including WAPCo deputy director general, of falsifying data, giving them 18-month suspended sentence; relatively lenient sentence seen by many as attempt at compromise while former presidents Bony Yayi and Soglo 25 June travelled to Niger and met Nigerien President Gen. Tiani and PM Zeine in attempt to ease tensions; oil exports, however, remained on hold. 

Jihadist violence continued in north. Pendjari National Park and others including W Park remained vulnerable to jihadist infiltration from Burkina Faso and Niger despite ongoing deployment of troops in area. Notably, gunmen 4 June killed seven soldiers in ambush near Tanguieta town in Pendjari park in Atacora department near Burkina Faso border.

Jihadists launched one of deadliest attacks on military to date, amid reports of mutiny attempt within army, raising significant stability concerns.

Major assault shook military as security situation remained perilous. In what could amount to deadliest attack on army since country began anti-jihadist operations in 2015, al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) 11 June raided military base in Mansila town, Sahel region, near Niger border; JNIM claimed to have killed 107 soldiers, while local sources reported over 100 dead and others taken hostage. Attack reportedly fuelled divisions within military, leading to speculation of threats to regime’s grip on power (see below). Security forces and militants conducted other deadly attacks during month, with high toll on civilians. Notably, JNIM 6 June raided Dasse village, Boucle du Mouhoun region, reportedly killing 63; group next day killed around 30 civilians and military auxiliaries (VDPs) in Kossodougou village, East region. In North region, soldiers 11 June allegedly killed around 24 civilians in Ouahigouya area, Yatenga province.

Rumours of mutiny attempt surfaced. Artillery fire 12 June hit state television headquarters near presidential residence in capital Ouagadougou, injuring two; military authorities stated incident was mistaken launch by soldier. Media reports, however, alleged previous day’s Mansila attack had provoked mutiny in army, which President Capt. Traoré 20 June denied on state television. Govt also refuted news outlet Radio France Internationale’s claims that dozens of Malian soldiers and Russian Africa Corps (formerly Wagner Group) paramilitaries 18 June arrived in Ouagadougou. 

Govt continued to limit international press. French network TV5Monde 18 June aired interview with Newton Ahmed Barry, journalist and former electoral commission president, where he openly criticised regime’s inability to combat jihadism since taking power in Sept 2022. Govt same day announced six-month suspension of TV5Monde for “intention to deceive public opinion”.

Diplomatic relations deepened with Russia, Sweden closed embassy. Russian FM Lavrov 4-5 June visited Ouagadougou, emphasised Moscow will continue to supply military equipment and training. Meanwhile, Sweden 20 June announced closure of embassies in both Ouagadougou and Malian capital Bamako and establishment of new embassy covering regional activity in Senegalese capital Dakar.

Amid continued political tensions, govt clamped down on press while security forces’ abuses remained prevalent.

Political tensions remained high ahead of 2025 legislative elections. As electoral commission continued preparations for polls, opposition Frodebu party – primarily ethnic Hutu party that held power briefly in 1993 – 2 June held meeting in capital Gitega; conference’s combative tone toward govt suggested party may attempt to compete strongly in next year’s polls, despite widespread political repression. Meanwhile, Supreme Court 27 June upheld life sentence of former PM Bunyoni on several charges including attempting to overthrow govt, amid reports authorities may fear his continued influence.

Govt escalated media intimidation and harassment. Political reporter for independent Iwacu outlet 4 June reported he escaped attempted arrest by two policemen in largest city Bujumbura; Iwacu 6 June said it had received warning from press regulator against breaching media guidelines after series of critical articles including on economy. Regulator 11-12 June also prohibited rebroadcast of radio debate featuring opposition leader Agathon Rwasa that focussed on national budget. Human rights group Ligue Iteka 14 June called on govt to stop harassment and intimidation of press and journalists. 

Alleged abuses by security forces remained widespread. Targeting of those linked to opposition figure Rwasa continued to cause concern after series of late May arrests and beatings by police and ruling-party youth wing Imbonerakure of Rwasa supporters in Cankuzo, Rutana and Ruyigi provinces.

In other important developments. Amid economic crisis and worsening fuel and power supply, govt 13 June passed two-year budget that observers saw as overly optimistic; National Assembly president same day threatened to reprimand MPs commenting on current crisis. Leaked UN report early June alleged Rwanda has increased backing to RED-Tabara rebel group, in line with govt’s allegations. SOS Media Burundi 25 June reported military court in Rutana 18-22 June imprisoned or fined hundreds of soldiers for allegedly refusing to fight M23 rebels alongside Congolese army in eastern DRC.

Instability remained widespread in North West (NW) and South West (SW) regions as Anglophone crisis continued, attracting increasing domestic and international attention. 

Govt and Ambazonia rebels continued to clash. Separatists 5 June ambushed and killed municipal councilor in Zhoa commune, Menchum division (NW). Combined militias under Ambazonia Peoples Liberation Council 8 June ambushed army patrol between Muyuka and Kumba towns, with unspecified casualties. Clashes between govt forces and separatists 14-18 June in Ekondo-Titi, Mundemba and Isangele areas in Ndian division (SW) caused unknown casualties. Gunmen 17 June attacked checkpoint at entrance to Buea city (SW) killing at least one civilian. Conflict took increasing toll on taxi drivers; separatists banned taxis in Bamenda city (NW), burning down at least seven vehicles during standoff partly in response to govt’s 31 May suspension of night-time circulation of motorcycles to limit gunmen’s movements. Some drivers and bike riders in Bamenda 21 June protested against separatist violence. Meanwhile, amid confusion over one separatist faction’s call for all yellow taxis in Anglophone areas to switch to blue and white colours of Ambazonia flag, bitter wrangling erupted, with many faction leaders condemning policy and violence against taxis.

International actors sounded alarm over Cameroon’s conflicts. NGO Norwegian Refugee Council 4 June ranked Cameroon’s displacement crisis second most neglected worldwide, highlighting prolonged Anglophone conflict and jihadist insurgency in Far North (see below). At UN Security Council briefing 10 June, Russia and Japan expressed concern at violence in NW and SW, France called on parties to Anglophone crisis to pursue dialogue while South Korea called for Cameroonian-led conflict resolution initiative in Anglophone regions.  

Jihadist violence persisted in Far North. Multinational Joint Task Force continued Operation Lake Sanity to reclaim territory. In Mayo-Sava division, insurgents 6 June killed one soldier near Mora town, while troops 15 June killed two Boko Haram combatants in Amchide town. In Mayo-Tsanaga division, militants 12 June clashed with national army in Koza town, leaving one dead on each side, and soldiers 13-14 June arrested 12 Boko Haram fighters in Moskota town. Islamic State West Africa Province fighters 17 June abducted local head of fishermen’s association in Chahack area, Logone-et-Chari division. 

Govt continued campaigns against rebels and strengthened its political hand ahead of local elections; foreign nationals faced repression. 

Large-scale offensives against rebels continued. Govt, supported by Russian paramilitary Africa Corps (previously Wagner Group) and ethnic Azandé militia, continued operations that began late May against Fulani-led Unity for Peace in Central African Republic (UPC) in Haut-Mbomou prefecture; army drove UPC from area it had controlled for five years, captured two key leaders and by 8 June seized approximately 100 weapons and disarmed 80 UPC soldiers. Offensive raised concerns over increased insecurity in Haut-Mbomou as UPC fighters crossed into neighbouring DR Congo – potentially reorganising for counterattack – and of possible targeting of Fulani and Muslim civilians accused of backing rebels. Civilians suffered collateral damage from other govt-rebel conflicts. In Haute-Kotto prefecture, Coalition of Patriots for Change rebels 2 June burned houses in three villages in Ouadda sub-prefecture, forcing residents to flee after accusing them of supporting army. Meanwhile, 115 anti-Balaka militia fighters 22 June voluntarily disarmed in Kouango town, Ouaka prefecture, amid army-Russian paramilitary deployment.

Political tensions continued as govt pursued manoeuvres to solidify control. Discontent remained high in some areas like Haut-Ubangi region, where opposition enjoys support, after President Touadéra 30 May bypassed constitutional requirement to hold elections for regional governors, citing electoral commission’s financial difficulties, and appointed them directly. Opposition alliance 13 June reiterated it would boycott municipal elections due in Oct; earlier, French Ambassador to Bangui 6 June urged participation, warning of risk of permanent exclusion from political landscape, causing discontent within opposition. UN electoral adviser 4-14 June led delegation to capital Bangui to assess preparations.

Amid Russian influence, foreign nationals faced repression. Court 21 June charged Belgian-Portuguese national working for American NGO with six crimes, including terrorism, following his May arrest in Zemio town, Haut-Mbomou, reportedly ordered by Russian paramilitaries. Authorities 10 June arrested two French-Algerian nationals in Bangui as prosecutors charged them with mercenary activities; Russian propaganda networks widely broadcasted arrest. Civil society platform led by pro-Russian figure following day organised demonstration attended by around 100 in capital to condemn foreign interference and express solidarity with army.