Crisis Group has worked in Türkiye for well over a decade, engaging the government and a range of other stakeholders in order to develop analysis of the country's domestic and regional concerns and to advocate for ways of ending, mitigating or preventing conflict. At home, these concerns include the threat of escalated fighting with Kurdistan Workers’ Party militants and the uncertainty presented by jihadists returning from foreign battlefields, as well as the political, economic and social strains of hosting over four million refugees. In its immediate neighbourhood and beyond, Ankara has become a crucial player whose alliances and geopolitical ambitions are shaping various conflicts and prospects for their resolution. As Türkiye finds its place in a changing world order, Crisis Group provides insights into how its policies, and those of its partners, may better contribute to peace and stability.
Low-cost and high-performing, Turkish-made armed drones are capturing an increasing share of the global market. This success comes with risks, including escalation of conflict and reputational damage, but there are several ways for Ankara to manage them.
Anti-Syrian violence erupted across country, inflammatory rhetoric over Cyprus and military manoeuvres in eastern Mediterranean slowed détente with Greece.
Violent anti-Syrian riots erupted. After nationalist mobs late June attacked Syrian-owned shops, homes and vehicles in Kayseri province amid reports of Syrian refugee sexually abusing child, riots early July spread to cities of Şanlıurfa, Hatay, Bursa, Kilis, Konya, Adana, Gaziantep, Izmir, and parts of Istanbul; no casualties reported. Calm returned around 2 July. In response to violence and talks of normalisation between Türkiye and Syria, large-scale anti-Türkiye protests 1 July erupted in Syria’s north west (see Syria). Nevertheless, President Erdoğan 7 July said Ankara will invite Syrian President Assad for talks to “restore Türkiye-Syria relations to the same level as in the past”.
Détente with Greece faced challenges. Erdoğan and Greek PM Mitsotakis 10 July met on sidelines of NATO summit in U.S. capital Washington, D.C., reportedly agreeing that positive momentum in Türkiye-Greece relations should prevail. Inflammatory rhetoric over Cyprus intensified, however, around 50th anniversary of Türkiye’s troop presence (see Cyprus). Tensions heightened in south-eastern Aegean Sea as Türkiye and Greece 22-23 July sent warships to disputed continental shelf after Greece announced exploratory work for future deployment of undersea electric cable in area; intense diplomacy between Ankara and Athens 25 July eased tensions.
Operations continued against Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Islamic State (ISIS). Amid ongoing operations against PKK in south-eastern Türkiye, northern Iraq and Syria, Erdoğan 13 July reiterated plans for major offensive, saying Ankara will soon be “locking down the area of operation in northern Iraq” and will complete “missing links of the security belt” along Syria-Türkiye border (see Iraq, Syria). Meanwhile, authorities in July detained at least 170 individuals on ISIS-linked charges. Notably, police 5 July detained 45 suspects in 16 cities, 25 July detained 72 across 13 provinces including suspected perpetrator of Moscow attack in March 2024.
In other important developments. Erdoğan 28 July for first time suggested Türkiye could consider using military force against Israel in support of Palestinians, sparking war of words with Israeli officials. Turkish and Armenian special envoys 30 July met at shared border to resume discussions aimed at normalising ties.
This is strategically important for the EU. It is necessary to avoid causing Turkey to drift further to other places.
Especially after the elections in Turkey, the EU is looking for new ways of having a more constructive and less acrimonious relationship with Turkey.
The success of Ankara's mediation [over Gaza] will depend on how much influence the political wing of Hamas has on the armed wing.
Ankara remains intent on further pushing back against the PKK [Kurdistan Workers' Party] and its affiliates in the region.
If the UN fails to extend its operation [in Syria] via these [Turkish border] crossings, donor states should bypass the UN and do bilateral assistance themselves.
Less escalation in the conflict with the PKK may give authorities [in Türkiye] struggling with how to respond to this unprecedented crisis one less thing to worry about.
This week on Hold Your Fire!, Richard speaks with Crisis Group’s Türkiye director Nigar Göksel about Türkye’s policy in its neighbourhood as Ankara seeks to defend its interests in a region caught up and reshaped by recent wars.
Relations between Ankara and Brussels have been warming despite democratic backsliding in Türkiye. In this excerpt from the Watch List 2023 – Autumn Update, Crisis Group explains how the EU and its member states can deepen this trend, cooperating with Türkiye in areas of mutual interest.
UN diplomacy aimed at reunifying Cyprus has been drifting since talks broke down in 2017. The Secretary-General should appoint an envoy to draft a roadmap with sufficient incentives to bring both Greek and Turkish Cypriots back to the table.
Since the Syrian uprising began in 2011, Ankara has been drawn ever deeper into the crisis. Its approach will likely hold steady for now. But the choices it makes next matter for the fate of millions of Syrians.
In this online event, Crisis Group’s experts and external speakers discussed the extent to which hydrocarbons have shaped conflict dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean and the prospects for effective gas diplomacy, in particular.
This week on War & Peace, Olga Oliker speaks with Crisis Group’s Türkiye Director Nigar Göksel about the Turkish elections and how President Erdoğan’s new term might shape the country’s domestic and foreign policy.
Major gas finds in the eastern Mediterranean seabed over the last ten years have fuelled ambitions to link the region’s energy markets and, in turn, bring its countries in conflict to the negotiating table. These great expectations have proven outsized, but smaller-scale objectives are achievable.
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