Briefing 82 / Africa 16 November 2011 3 minutes 抵抗与否认:津巴布韦停滞不前的改革议程 Share Facebook Twitter Email Linkedin Whatsapp Save Print Download PDF Also available in English Chinese, Simplified English 概况 津巴布韦的过渡和改革呈现出僵局。2008年9月津巴布韦三大主要政党签署的《全面政治协议》还远未完全实施。要在预计将于20个月内举行的选举前应对和解决主要的安全和法律秩序的问题前景渺茫。2011年4月,《全面政治协议》的定期审议机制指出最突出的问题尚未解决,谈判达成的解决办法一再被拖延,且似乎成为一种难以改变的模式。自此之后的这半年来也未有任何重大变化发生。为可持续的政治和经济复苏奠定基础的机会不断被破坏。暴力和镇压成为迫切的问题,但警方似乎不愿或不能有效阻止这些事件发生或者对此进行补救,而要期待联合监督与执行委员会(JOMIC)更主动地参与解决政治暴力问题尚需时日。 地区组织南部非洲发展共同体(SADC),在3月31日发表其“政治、防务与安全合作机构”(Organ Troika on Politics, Defence and Security) 的公报后,表示将采取更为强硬的态度的承诺尚未兑现。争取民主变革运动(MDC)的两大竞争组织已经大力欢迎由南非总统雅各布·祖马领导的南非发展共同体调解小组更积极地参与到津巴布韦的事务中来。但是,在当前权力分配格局中仍占主导地位的总统穆加贝的津巴布韦非洲民族联盟-爱国阵线党(ZANU-PF)对调解小组进行阻挠,尤其是由于它希望保留其对于安全部门的垄断控制,因为它依赖安全部门作为其领导权的最终防线。 《全面政治协议》并没有明确如何最终进行选举。问题总是围绕着选举将于何时举行,在选举之前能完成怎样的改革展开。津巴布韦非洲民族联盟-爱国阵线宣称自由和平等的选举所需的条件已经或很快就能满足并要求在2011年举行选举。南非发展共同体对此进行否认,认为首先需要的是改革。津巴布韦非洲民族联盟-爱国阵线最近在九月份再次呼吁在2012年第一季度进行选举,似乎也同样不现实。大多数分析家一致认为,津巴布韦最早可能可以准备好进行选举也要到2012年年底。然而,宪法撰写的最终定稿以及对选举和媒体改革的实施可能会进一步被拖延,再加上安全和法律秩序等方面的考虑,2013年上半年是更为现实的举行选举的时间。 10月底和11月初政治暴力和镇压的高涨,以及津巴布韦非洲民族联盟-爱国阵线被指责联合警方共同进行政治镇压,已经被一些分析家解释为试图瓦解《全面政治协议》和尽早举行选举的又一次尝试。穆加贝最近表示他不能强行决定一个2012年的选举日期,表明他的党内正逐渐意识到不达成共识就进行选举将是适得其反的。但党内的强大力量,特别是那些推动穆加贝参加连任选举的力量,仍然致力于令投票尽快举行。津巴布韦非洲民族联盟-爱国阵线12月6日至10日在布拉瓦约的会议应该明确它到底将支持和推进什么选举政策。 南非发展共同体,与非盟一起作为《全面政治协议》的保证人,需要确保如果选举最终将在具有足够自由和平等的条件下举行,就要在一些关键问题上取得切实进展。党际谈判基本忽略了在安全与法律和秩序问题上存在的分歧。南非发展共同体需要找到改变这一状况的方法。其策略一直是将《全面政治协议》的改革议程减少到只包含更易管控的一系列优先事项,并加强对改革实施的监控。一个反映《全面政治协议》的尚待解决的问题的选举路线图草案已经制定,但有关政治暴力、安全部门改革、津巴布韦选举委员会(ZEC)构成和《全面政治协议》监控的关键分歧仍未解决。六月份,南非发展共同体批准了“政治、防务与安全合作机构”的建议,将部署一个技术小组与联合监督与执行委员会共同工作。增强南非发展共同体的眼线对其促进协议实施的能力至关重要,但目前有关部署尚未进行。 自《全面政治协议》签署以来,危机组织多次指出津巴布韦在过渡阶段的两大挑战是:建立一个成熟的政治体系,使政党间能够进行合作和负责任的竞争;以及应对可能破坏有意义的改革的安全问题。本简报评估了南非发展共同体在三月份之后的重新定位,以及与不断变化的安全形势有关的政治和体制发展。 约翰内斯堡/布鲁塞尔,2011年11月16日 Download pdf to continue reading the full report (English) I. Overview Transition and reform appear stalemated in Zimbabwe. Profound deficits remain in implementation of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) signed by Zimbabwe’s three main political parties in September 2008. Prospects are remote for engaging core security and law-and-order concerns before elections that are anticipated within twenty months. Nothing significant has changed in the half year since April 2011, when the GPA’s Periodic Review Mechanism reported that most outstanding issues were unresolved; that negotiated solutions are followed by interminable delays in execution appears to have become an entrenched pattern. Opportunities to build a foundation for sustainable political and economic recovery are consistently undermined. Violence and repression are pressing concerns; the police appear unwilling or unable to provide effective deterrence or remedy and the expectation of a more proactive engagement by the Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC) around issues of political violence has yet to bear fruit. The promise that the regional organisation, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), would take a more robust stand following the 31 March communiqué of its Organ Troika on Politics, Defence and Security has not yet been adequately borne out. The two competing formations of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) have largely welcomed the more proactive engagement of SADC’s facilitation team, headed by South African President Jacob Zuma. But President Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party, which retains the dominant role in the current power sharing arrangement, has frustrated it, not least because it wishes to preserve the monopoly control of the security sector it relies on as the ultimate line of defence for its hegemony. An election endgame was implicit in the GPA. The questions were always when would the vote be held, and what reform could be achieved beforehand. SADC rejected ZANU-PF’s claim that conditions for free and fair elections have or shortly can be met and its demand for a 2011 vote, saying that reforms were needed first. ZANU-PF’s most recent call, in September, for elections in the first quarter of 2012 seems equally unrealistic; most analysts concur that the earliest the country could conceivably be ready is late that year. The likelihood of further delays around finalisation of the constitution-writing process and implementation of election and media reform, as well as the security and law-and-order considerations, suggest, however, that the first half of 2013 is much more realistic. An upsurge in political violence and repression in late October and early November, compounded by allegations of ZANU-PF and police complicity, has been interpreted by several analysts as a renewed attempt to force collapse of the GPA and an early vote. Mugabe’s recent admission that he cannot force a 2012 date suggests the realisation is growing within the party that efforts to impose elections without consensus would be counter-productive, but powerful forces within it, especially those pushing for Mugabe’s re-election candidacy, remain committed to a vote sooner rather than later. ZANU-PF’s conference in Bulawayo on 6-10 December should clarify what it will push for. SADC, as guarantors with the African Union of the GPA, needs to secure tangible progress on several key issues if elections are ultimately to be held in conditions that are sufficiently free and fair. The divisive security and law and order issues have essentially been ignored or avoided in the inter-party negotiations. The regional organisation needs to find a way to change this. Its strategy has been to reduce the GPA’s reform agenda to a more manageable set of priorities and to strengthen monitoring of implementation. A draft election roadmap, reflecting unresolved GPA concerns, has been drawn up, but key disagreements on political violence, security sector reform, composition of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) and GPA monitoring remain unresolved. In June, SADC approved the Organ Troika’s recommendation to deploy a technical team to work with the JOMIC. Augmenting SADC’s eyes and ears is essential to its ability to facilitate agreements, but symptomatically the deployment has still not happened. Since the signing of the GPA, Crisis Group has continually identified two major transition challenges: to develop a mature political system that enables both cooperation and responsible competition between the political parties, and to cope with security issues that threaten to undermine meaningful reform. This briefing assesses SADC’s post-March repositioning, as well as political and institutional developments related to the evolving security situation. Related Tags More for you Q&A / Africa What to Expect from Zimbabwe’s Tilted Polls Briefing / Africa How South Africa Can Nudge Zimbabwe toward Stability