Briefing 122 / Asia 18 April 2011 3 minutes 东帝汶:和解与难民回国 Share Facebook Twitter Email Linkedin Whatsapp Save Print Download PDF Also available in Portuguese, Portugal Chinese, Simplified Portuguese, Portugal Indonesian English 概况 1999年东帝汶独立公投之后上千名前东帝汶难民逃离边境,这些难民问题目前尚未解决,这对于东帝汶的长期稳定依旧是个挑战。许多难民从未融入过所在的西帝汶社区,并且由于新东帝汶具有相对稳定的经济和政治环境,回到东帝汶的难民逐渐增多。难民回国应受到两国鼓励,因为这是促进边界两边社区和解的好机会。鼓励难民回国将暴露围绕1999年公决发生的暴力事件免受惩罚的成本,并突出东帝汶政府未能真正实施其两个真相委员会,即真相与和解委员会(CAVR)以及真相与友谊委员会提出的实际建议。东帝汶的领导者可能仍认定某种形式的大赦是解决难民问题的最佳方式,但国家已承受不起对解决方案进行广泛讨论的继续拖延了。 25万人在1999年公决后逃离东帝汶省,许多人在印尼安全部队和民兵的迫使下流离失所。上千名难民仍滞留在西帝汶,他们中的一些人由于经济原因而待在那里,而其他很多人则是迫于家庭成员和社区领导者的压力。后者依旧很难融入所在社区,拒绝离开老难民营,并对官方援助的终止感到沮丧。东帝汶的政治稳定和政府给与的获得土地的承诺使得回国的前景更具吸引力。但是一些因素,诸如错误的信息,对于离开印尼缺乏明确的法律依据,以及担心不能获得财产和基本的政治权利,都阻碍着他们回国。 几百名前民兵和前支持统一派领袖中的一小部分人已经将难民回国问题政治化。他们寻求不会因反对人权罪名而受到指控的保证,并且想获得由于印尼从东帝汶撤出而成为“政治受害者”的身份。虽然前民兵对于东帝汶来说不再具有任何安全威胁,因为他们没有武装,并且也私下承认独立已是不可逆转的事实。但是难民回国的前景可能会给东帝汶带来政治动荡,特别是在这些人不受到指控的情况下。即使东帝汶政治领袖一直强调“大门永远敞开”,警方和社区领导者也承认需要保证归国难民的安全,但有迹象表明要维护前统一派支持者的基本权利存在困难。 与印尼共同设立一个正式流程将是把难民回国的本质非政治化的最好方式,同时也可以减小前民兵和赞成自治的领导人仍然拥有的政治影响力。即使是在东帝汶两个真相委员会提出的实际建议一直未能实施的情况下,这也将有助于长期和解的努力。这将需要重新努力在社区层面取得和解,以及对难民回国进行有力监控,以保证卷入过低级别暴力或其逃亡可能招致怀疑的人可以重新融入社会。此外,也需要就如何处理起诉和未完成的调查出台明确的政策。 对于目前的司法与和解僵局,不应只由东帝汶政府一方承担责任。印尼一直通过拒绝与东帝汶法庭合作,来阻挠对于其军事人物及生活在西帝汶的前东帝汶民兵给予法律制裁。联合国在其仍具有影响力的时候也未能帮助确保司法公正。而承担这些代价的却是东帝汶。通过议会,东帝汶政府必须制定政策,研究如何在常设起诉书的基础上进行下一步。国际法庭仍然不可指望,脆弱的国内法庭则是进行未来起诉唯一的可能场所。任何重新推动大赦的努力将会推进得很快;主要政党正在讨论的一个方案就是“选择性大赦”。如果不是基于明确的法律标准,这可能是现有最坏的选择,因为它将不只去掉了对许多罪行给予法律制裁的可能性,也将使整个过程进一步政治化。如果决定不进行起诉,则仍存在导致对犯罪嫌疑人进行暴力报复的风险。更为肯定的是,将使建立法律规则及保障人权的努力更加复杂化。 对于司法与和解的政治共识一直难以达成,但却是迫切需要的。东帝汶议会和政府应采取以下步骤: 与印尼政府签订谅解备忘录,明确在东帝汶出生的人自愿归国的正式程序。 出台支持自愿归国的官方政策,包括向归国人员提供有限援助,在一定时期内给予食品援助和调解支持,并且加强福利监控以及详细制定他们回国后的权利。 在议会中对真相与和解委员会的报告和赔偿受害者的法律草案进行辩论,并且有计划的创立接替真相与和解委员会的机构,其任务应包括支持社区和解进程; 重新努力与印尼一起实施真相与友谊委员会的建议; 公开承诺在国内法院根据现有起诉书提起诉讼。 危机组织亚洲简报N°122, 2011年4月18日 Download pdf to continue reading the full report I. Overview The unresolved status of thousands of former refugees who fled across the border following a 1999 vote for independence remains a challenge to Timor-Leste’s long-term stability. Many were never well integrated into host communities and are being drawn back across the border in small but increasing numbers by relative economic and political stability in the new state. These returns should be encouraged by both countries as a good opportunity to promote reconciliation between the two communities divided by the border. Doing so will expose the costs of impunity for the violence that surrounded the 1999 referendum and highlight the failure to implement practical recommendations from its two truth commissions, the CAVR and the Commission on Truth and Friendship. Timor-Leste’s leadership may yet decide that some form of amnesty is the best way forward, but the country cannot afford to further delay broad discussion on solutions. A quarter of a million people fled the province of East Timor after the 1999 referendum, many forcibly displaced by Indonesian security forces and militia. Some of the thousands remaining in West Timor are there for economic reasons; many others because of pressure from family members and community leaders. This latter group are still poorly integrated into their host communities, refuse to leave old refugee camps, and are frustrated by the end of official assistance. Political stability in Timor-Leste and the promise of access to land are making the prospect of return more attractive. But misinformation, an unclear legal basis for leaving Indonesia, and fear that their access to property and basic political rights will not be upheld are holding them back. A small minority of several hundred former militia and former pro-integration leaders have politicised the question of return. They seek assurances that they will not be prosecuted for standing charges of crimes against humanity and want recognition as “political victims” of Indonesia’s withdrawal. The former militia no longer pose any security threat to Timor-Leste as they are unarmed and privately acknowledge independence as an irreversible truth. But the prospect of their return could be politically explosive for the country, particularly in the absence of prosecutions. Even though the Timorese political leadership has consistently underscored that the “door is always open” and police and community leaders acknowledge the need to ensure the security of returnees, there are signs that it will be difficult to uphold the basic rights of former integration supporters. Working with Indonesia to set up a formal process would be the best way to de-politicise the nature of return and lessen what political leverage the former militia and pro-autonomy leaders still hold. It would support longer-term reconciliation efforts even as implementation of the practical recommendations from Timor-Leste’s two truth commissions have stalled. It will need to be accompanied by renewed efforts at community-level reconciliation and vigorous monitoring of returns, to ensure those involved in low-level violence or those whose absence may have engendered suspicion are able to reintegrate. It will also require a clear policy on how to handle prosecutions as well as incomplete investigations. The Timorese government does not bear sole responsibility for the current impasse over justice and reconciliation. Indonesia has consistently blocked efforts to bring to justice its military figures and ex-Timorese militia living there by refusing to cooperate with Timorese courts. The UN failed to help ensure justice while it still had influence. It is Timor-Leste that bears the costs. With parliament, the government must work to develop policy on how to move forward with the standing indictments. An international tribunal remains a non-starter and weak domestic courts are the only possible venue for any future prosecutions. Any renewed efforts to push through an amnesty could move quite quickly; one option being discussed by the leading political parties is a “selective amnesty”. If not based on clear legal criteria, this could prove the worst option on the table as it would not only close off the possibility of justice for many crimes but also further politicise the process. There remains a risk that a decision not to prosecute could lead to violent retribution against suspects. More certain is that it will further complicate efforts to build the rule of law and guarantee rights for all. Political consensus on justice and reconciliation has been elusive but is urgently needed. The parliament and government of Timor-Leste should take the following steps: clarify with the Indonesian government through a memorandum of understanding the formal procedures for voluntary returns by those born in East Timor; develop an official policy supporting voluntary returns, including limited assistance to returnees, through food assistance and mediation support during a provisional period as well as strengthened welfare monitoring and elaborating their rights upon return; debate in parliament the CAVR report and draft laws on reparations for victims and the creation of a planned successor institution to the CAVR, whose mandate should include supporting community reconciliation processes; renew efforts to implement with Indonesia the recommendations of the Commission for Truth and Friendship; and publicly commit to the prosecution of existing indictments in the domestic courts. 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