Report 150 / Europe & Central Asia 3 minutes

Izgradnja Mostova U Mostaru

Neočekivano, ali posve opravdano, najnoviji pokušaj ujedinjenja podjeljenog Mostara našao se, tokom 2003 godine, u samom vrhu medjunarodnih prioriteta u Bosni i Hercegovini (BiH).

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SAŽETAK

Neočekivano, ali posve opravdano, najnoviji pokušaj ujedinjenja podjeljenog Mostara našao se, tokom 2003 godine, u samom vrhu medjunarodnih prioriteta u Bosni i Hercegovini (BiH). Pred kraj ljeta 2003 Visoki predstavnik Paddy Ashdown ga je uvrstio medju svoja četiri glavna projekta strukturalnih reformi. Za svaki od tih projekata, Visoki predstavnik imenovao je inozemne predsjedatelje koji će voditi komisije sačinjene od domaćih eksperata i zadužene za pronalaženje državotvornih rješenja u simbolično ili suštinski važnim oblastima odbrane, obavještajnih poslova, indirektnog oporezivanja i - Mostara. Svakim projektom nastoje se ujediniti podjeljene ili nefunkcionalne institucije. Prve tri komisije, koje su završile rad i čiji nacrti zakona su već u parlamentarnim procedurama, nastojale su osim toga i da osnaže državne u odnosu na entitetske nacionalne institucije.

Mostarska komisija, koja bi rad trebala završiti do 15 decembra 2003, ima naizgled skromniji i manje dalekosežniji cilj: da osmisli novi statut za jedan grad. U poredjenju s drugim komisijama, to možda ne izgleda toliko značajno. Ipak, Mostar već dugo predstavlja predmet posebnog interesa medjunarodne zajednice, ostajući nesvršeni posao koji se ne može ignorirati u vrijeme kada stranci razmatraju povlačenje iz faze nametljive implementacije mira u BiH. Osim toga, pravo rješenje za Mostar moglo bi poslužiti kao primjer i stimulans za reorganizaciju lokalne vlasti u cijeloj BiH - čemu se posebno nadaju zvaničnici Ureda Visokog predstavnika, koji razmatraju kako da ubrzaju reformu javne administracije koja je jedan od uslova za otpočinjanje pregovora o potpisivanju Ugovora o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju izmedju BiH i Europske Unije.

Kompromisni mirovni ugovor kojim je okončan rat izmedju onih koji su branili državu i onih koji su je nastojali uništiti ustanovio je u BiH čak šest nivoa administracije i četrnaest vlada s izvršnim i zakonodavnim ovlastima. No, ono što je 1994-95 bilo nužno ili čak poželjno - kako bi se prigušile tinjajuće žeravice rata - doima se nepodnošljivim i neodrživim bremenom deset godina kasnije, čak i za neke od onih istih političkih snaga koje su nekoć insistirale na ovakvoj organizaciji vlasti i od nje u medjuvremenu značajno profitirale. Kao što je Lord Ashdown primjetio, ove vlade progutaju preko 64 procenta ukupne javne potrošnje u BiH. Kao grad od tek nešto više od 100.000 stanovnika, podijeljen na šest općina i navodnu Centralnu zonu, Mostar predstavlja oličenje i uzroka i posljedica takve administrativne atomizacije u BiH. I upravo stoga što se radi o posebnom slučaju, racionalizacija Mostarske uprave mogla bi ukazati na model kako da se prevazidju etno-nacionalne barijere i nepotrebne administrativne strukture koje opterećuju BiH.

U Mostaru, dakle, medjunarodna zajednica nastoji pronaći model kojim bi se rješio problem nacionalno-administrativne podjele koji karakterizira post-ratni period, te takodjer odagnati sve strahove od svodjenja na status manjine - zahvaljujući kojima se ova podjela odžava i učvrsćuje. Upravo stoga što Mostar ostaje jedan od najpodjeljenijih gradova u BiH - i čak predstavlja simbol medjusobne netrpeljivosti, nepovjerenja i plemenskih politika - iskreni dogovor o novom statutu za ujedinjenu gradsku administraciju ponudio bi obrazac za sve ostale gradove u BiH i bio bi ohrabrenje za cijelu BiH. S druge strane, još jedan neuspjeh u Mostaru, takodjer bi imao izuzetno negativne efekte na ostale procese u BiH. Promatran na ovaj način, novi pokušaj ujedinjenja Mostara zaslužuje da bude u društvu najvažnijih projekata reforme u ovom trenutku.

Ovaj izvještaj ukazuje na krucijalna pitanja koja moraju biti razriješena u ovoj rundi razgovora o Mostaru ukoliko se ovaj grad zaista želi ujediniti. Izvještaj sadrži kratak presjek ranijih pokušaja ujedinjenja grada; razmatra najznačajnije probleme koji izviru iz sadašnje fragmentiranosti grada; nastoji pružiti objašnjenje zašto je Mostar upravo sada postao problem čije se rješenje ne može odlagati; te, predstavlja različite prijedloge o kojima se trenutno raspravlja u političkim i intelektualnim krugovima.

U završnom poglavlju, izvještaj skicira osnove za organizaciono rješenje, koje uključuje promjene u sistemu izbora za Gradsko vijeće kao i unaprijedjenje zakonskog koncepta gradova u Bosni i Hercegovini. Ovo rješenje ima potencijal da osigura ponovno radjanje Mostara i kao funkcionalne jedinice lokalne samouprave i kao multinacionalne zajednice u kojoj će interesi gradjana svih nacionalnosti biti pošteno zastupljeni.

Sarajevo/Brussels, 20 novembar 2003.

Executive Summary

Making another attempt to unite the divided city of Mostar has become, unexpectedly but appropriately, a very high international priority in Bosnia & Herzegovina (BiH) in 2003. By late summer, it had come to be ranked by High Representative Paddy Ashdown among his four major projects for structural reform. In each case, the High Representative appointed a foreign chairman to lead commissions composed of domestic representatives and charged with finding state-building solutions in the symbolically or substantively important realms of defence, intelligence, indirect taxation – and Mostar. All aim to unify divided and dysfunctional institutions. The first three commissions, which have already reported and whose draft legislation is proceeding through the various parliaments, have also sought to empower the state over the entities and their respective national establishments.

The Mostar commission, which is due to report by 15 December 2003, has a seemingly more modest and less far-reaching goal: to devise a new statute for a single albeit emblematic city. In comparison with the other commissions, this might not seem so significant. Yet Mostar has long been a particular concern of the international community, representing a piece of unfinished business that cannot be ignored as the foreigners contemplate their withdrawal from intrusive peace implementation in BiH. Moreover, the right solution in Mostar may serve both as an example of and stimulus for local government reorganisation in the country at large – a hope underlined by officials in the Office of the High Representative (OHR) contemplating how to jump start the reform of public administration required if BiH is to make its way towards a Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the European Union.

The compromise peace that ended the war between those who had fought to defend the state and those who had sought to destroy it left BiH with, in places, up to six separate layers of authority and fourteen different governments with taxing and law-making powers. But what was necessary or even desirable to smother the embers of war in 1994-95 appears an intolerable and unsustainable burden nearly ten years on, even to some of those same political forces that once insisted upon and have since benefited from the power and patronage this system provides. As Lord Ashdown has observed, all these governments devour more than 64 per cent of public spending in BiH. A city of just over 100,000 inhabitants divided into six municipalities and an ostensible Central Zone, Mostar epitomises both the causes and consequences of such atomisation. And just because it is a special case, the rationalisation of Mostar’s governance could point the way towards overcoming the ethno-national barriers and redundant administrative structures that plague BiH.

In Mostar the international community is thus seeking to facilitate local remedies to the national-administrative partition that has characterised the post-war period, as well as to assuage those fears of relegation to minority status on which this partition has thrived. Yet just because Mostar remains one of the most divided cities in BiH – and has come to symbolise mutual intolerance, distrust and tribal politics – any genuine agreement on a new statute for a unified city administration would offer both a template for other segregated towns and encouragement for BiH in general. On the other hand, yet another failure in Mostar would also have disproportionate effects. Viewed in this light, the new attempt to reunify the city deserves to keep company with the other reform projects currently underway.

This report points out the crucial issues that must be settled in the current round of talks if Mostar is to be made whole. It provides a brief sketch of previous attempts to unite the city; discusses the major problems arising from its continuing fragmentation; seeks to offer an explanation of why Mostar has emerged once more as a problem requiring an urgent solution; and introduces the various proposals currently being canvassed in political and intellectual circles.

Its concluding section outlines the rudiments of an organisational solution, involving changes to the electoral system for the Mostar council and a reform of the legal concept of the city in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This has the potential to ensure that Mostar can be reborn – both as a functional unit of self-government and as a multinational community in which all citizens feel themselves to be fairly represented.

Sarajevo/Brussels, 20 November 2003

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