Political positioning continued ahead of 2025 presidential election; govt discussed border incidents with Burkina Faso. 

Preparations for 2025 vote continued. Amid internal jostling within ruling-Rally of Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace’s (RHDP), Adama Bictogo, president of National Assembly and RHDP heavyweight, 16 April said President Ouattara was “natural candidate” for party. Meanwhile, former PM Guillaume Soro – in exile since 2019 and sentenced to life imprisonment in absentia in 2021 for endangering the state – 4 April confirmed late March calls with Ouattara after president pardoned several associates of Soro, welcoming “beginning of political relaxation”; however Soro, who is seeking to end exile, 23 April criticised govt’s “prerequisites” to allow him to return.

Defence delegation met Burkinabé authorities. Defence Minister Téné Birahima Ouattara 19 April travelled to Burkina Faso border town Niangoloko to discuss tensions with his counterpart Kassoum Coulibaly; meeting came after series of incidents along border including Ivorian soldiers late March arresting two Burkinabé security force members who had crossed border; troops subsequently exchanged fire, although no casualties reported.

Military stalemate persisted in North Kivu as security deteriorated in regional capital Goma; govt renewed scrutiny over supposed allies of rebels. 

Military front remained frozen but pervasive violence swept Goma city. Frontlines in North Kivu province stalled as govt forces held regional capital Goma but M23 rebels retained control of strategic areas near Sake town (25km north west of Goma) and foothills of Nyiragongo volcano; heavy gunfire continued, however, including 4 April mortar that killed three Tanzanian soldiers in Mubambiro area deployed as part of Southern African regional bloc (SADC) mission SAMIDRC, which Congolese army blamed on M23. Meanwhile, escalating insecurity gripped Goma with military and pro-govt Wazalendo militia groups blamed for surge in lawlessness that saw at least 22 civilians and one soldier killed in city during month; notably, alleged soldiers and Wazalendo members on motorbikes 10 April killed four civilians during armed robbery near provincial governorate building. Locals at times responded violently, leading to soldiers and Wazalendo casualties and raising tensions. In response, govt suppressed protests while also attempting to demonstrate accountability, including 15 April sentencing Republican Guard member to death for civilian shootings. Meanwhile, South African President Cyril Ramaphosa 24 April announced extension of troop contribution to SAMIDRC for unspecified time.

Govt continued to accuse former President Kabila of M23 support. Intelligence services 5 April released deposition video of Éric Nkuba, recently-arrested adviser to pro-M23 politico-military group Congo River Alliance, in which Nkuba implicated Kabila and several figures close to him as M23 supporters; next day, Kabila allies dismissed allegations and said Nkuba coerced into testimony.

Armed militias continued attacks against civilians in Ituri and North Kivu. In North Kivu, Islamic State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) rebels 2 April killed ten civilians in Mangina commune, Beni territory. In Ituri province, ADF 7 April killed eight civilians in Otomabert village, Irumu territory while ethnic Lendu militia CODECO members 14 April ambushed and robbed convoy of humanitarian workers on road to Fataki town, Djugu territory. In attempt to address violence, Defence Minister Jean-Pierre Bemba 19 April oversaw signing of agreement for immediate cessation of hostilities by various armed groups including CODECO.

African Union (AU) confirmed Eritrea is controlling territory in Ethiopia’s Tigray region; Asmara strengthened ties with Moscow and Beijing.

AU confirmed Eritrean presence in Ethiopia’s Tigray region. AU monitoring team 4 April confirmed Eritrean control over part of Zalambessa town in Ethiopia’s East Tigray Zone, though Eritrea continued to reject claims it is occupying Ethiopian territory. Meanwhile, Ethiopia’s dismantling of Amhara-established administrations in Ethiopia’s north – part of its plan to tackle Tigray-Amhara territorial dispute – could strain relations with Eritrea given alleged ties between Amhara nationalist militias known as Fano (who have been fighting insurgency in Ethiopia) and Asmara (see Ethiopia). 

Eritrea bolstered ties with Russia and China. Russian Pacific fleet late March-early April visited Massawa port, marking growing defence partnership between two countries; Russian delegation led by deputy commander-in-chief of Russian navy, Vice Admiral Vladimir Kasatonov, 1 April met Eritrean army officials, 5 April met President Isaias Afwerki to discuss enhancing bilateral ties. Isaias 7 April met China’s Special Envoy to Horn, Xue Bing, and discussed expansion of economic cooperation.

Hostilities escalated between Tigray and Amhara forces over disputed territories, displacing thousands; insurgencies in Amhara and Oromia regions continued.

Tigray-Amhara clashes over disputed territories displaced thousands. As govt began implementing plan to address Tigray-Amhara territorial dispute (which paves way for return of displaced Tigrayans), hostilities escalated in disputed areas. Tigray forces and Amhara militants 13-15 April clashed in Alamata town and Raya Alamata, Zata and Olfa woredas of Southern Tigray Zone, displacing almost 50,000. Tigray interim President Getachew Reda 16 April blamed “anti-Pretoria deal elements”, while Amhara authorities next day accused Tigray region’s ruling party Tigray People’s Liberation Front of launching “full-scale war” against Amhara. Calm returned to area, though violence could resurge should federal govt proceed with plans to resettle people displaced from Southern or Western Tigray regions.

Security forces and Fano militants clashed in capital Addis Ababa. Security forces and Fano militants 12 April clashed in Addis Ababa, marking first such incident in capital, killing civilian and two militants; authorities accused Fano of planning “terrorist attack”. Meanwhile, violence continued in Amhara as authorities struggled to suppress Fano, who are scattered across region and enjoy considerable local support. Notably, grenade attack on school in Finote Selam town, West Gojjam Zone, 4 April injured at least 27; grenade 6 April targeted market in Finote Selam; three hand grenade attacks 22 April occurred in regional capital Bahir Dar. 

Insurgency in Oromia continued. Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) militants 4 April attacked Amaye Woreda, West Shewa Zone, killing twelve Amhara civilians. Govt forces same day killed twenty civilians in Tole Woreda, South West Shewa Zone, accusing them of links to OLA. Govt attempted to weaken OLA by: calling on fighters to surrender and reintegrate; attempting to exploit alleged divisions in OLA leadership; and training local militias. 

In other important developments. Donor conference 16 April raised $630mn for emergency relief in Ethiopia. Somalia 4 April announced expulsion of Ethiopian ambassador, ordered closure of two Ethiopian consulates in Somaliland and Puntland and recalled its ambassador to Ethiopia over Addis’ plans to build naval base in Somaliland (see Somalia).

Govt held national dialogue on transition to civilian rule.

Transitional President Nguema 2 April inaugurated national dialogue process as part of transition toward civilian rule; Catholic church 8-30 April led discussions in capital Libreville, convening over 600 delegates while Central African Republic President Faustin-Archange Touadera attended dialogue’s closing ceremony as facilitator for regional body Economic Community of Central African States. Report delivered to Nguema at end of dialogue process called for new constitution with balance of power between different arms of govt as well as review of country’s international cooperation, particularly with France. Meanwhile, opposition continued to raise concerns over inclusiveness and structure of dialogue.

Opposition demanded junta stick to timeline of return to civilian rule before end of 2024; social discontent continued over services and repression. 

Opposition called on authorities to stick to transition timeline. Concerns grew over potential delays to return to civilian rule after President Doumbouya late March dismissed members of communal councils and 9 April appointed delegates to fill these posts for six months, also after govt failed to publish draft of new constitution by promised March date. In response, coalition of opposition political parties and civil society groups Les Forces Vives de Guinée (FVG) 2 April called for “restoration of public liberties and return to constitutional order before 31 Dec 2024”, threatening to no longer recognise junta as legitimate govt after this date. Meanwhile, several political parties and civil society groups 22 April joined opposition party Union of Democratic Forces of Guinea (UFDG) to form Union Sacrée coalition, which also called for elections before 2025 in its first declaration.

Popular unrest continued amid poor services and repression. Lack of services, particularly electricity and water, led to demonstrations including 15 and 25 April in Lero town, Kankan region, latter resulting in one death, seven injured and 56 arrests; director of company responsible for providing electricity 10 April said recent power cuts intentional and necessary to improve electricity network. Meanwhile, govt continued to target media; after authorities 17 April suspended media site inquisiteur.net on defamation charges, press associations requested audience with Doumbouya.

Al-Shabaab-related insecurity persisted, while police deployment to Haiti remained delayed.

Al-Shabaab militants remained threat in north east. Insurgents continued to stage attacks and ambushes, targeting civilians and security forces. Al-Shabaab militants 9 April attacked two vehicles travelling between Makowe and Garsen towns, Lamu county, killing civilian; suspected Al-Shabaab bomb 29 April killed at least five civilians and wounded five others in El Wak town, Mandera county. Meanwhile, amid Al-Shabaab cross-border attacks, Interior Principal Secretary Raymond Omollo 2 April said in interview govt would not yet reopen border points with Somalia due to “challenge of insecurity”.

Multinational security mission to Haiti continued to face delays. Although govt continued to insist Nairobi would still lead mission, deployment remained on hold. President Ruto 13 April welcomed official establishment of transitional presidential council in Haiti (see Haiti), seen as crucial step to allow deploying of force, and 25 April said “Kenya stands ready and willing” to give security support. Eight Haitian private sector organisations 15 April sent letter to Ruto expressing concerns over delays to security mission.

In other important developments. Amid struggling economy, doctors’ strike over pay and training that began in March continued as medical union 4 April rejected govt’s offer; Ruto administration insisted it did not have funds to pay more. Meanwhile, military chief General Francis Ogolla killed with nine others in helicopter crash 18 April in North Rift region. Unclear circumstances behind crash led to speculation that incident may not have been accident, heightening political tensions.

Political tensions surged as govt took series of authoritarian decisions, closing political space and putting inter-Malian dialogue at risk; civilians continued to be targeted by conflict actors.

Govt suspended civil society activities and elections. Series of decisions highlighted govt’s increasing authoritarian turn and caused tensions to soar. Authorities 10 April suspended all political activities of political parties and politically-oriented activities of associations until further notice; PM Maïga same day announced elections would be suspended until country regained political stability. Meanwhile, authorities following day announced suspension of all media coverage related to political parties. In response, numerous parties and civil society groups 22 April submitted appeal to Supreme Court, and others announced intention to boycott inter-Malian dialogue (see below) until restrictions removed.

Phase one of Inter-Malian dialogue commenced. Communal level discussions took place 13-15 April. However, concerns remained over inclusiveness and legitimacy of process with neither separatist armed groups of Permanent Strategic Framework (CSP) nor jihadist groups taking part, and other key political actors boycotting dialogue. 

Amid jihadist attacks and counterinsurgency operations, violence left high toll on civilians. Clashes between armed forces, Russian paramilitary Africa Corps (formerly known as Wagner Group) and militants continued. Notably, in centre, al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) 7 April attacked army and Russian paramilitaries near Sarakala village, Segou region, resulting in at least six militant fatalities. Govt forces 22-23 April conducted operation south of Kalifaré, Timbuktu region, killing 29 JNIM militants. In Menaka region, army 29 April announced killing of senior Islamic State Sahel province commander Abu Huzeifa near Indelimane village. Meanwhile, JNIM and CSP 5 April clashed near Nampala village, Mopti region, resulting in at least 23 CSP and nineteen JNIM fighters killed. Army and Africa Corps reportedly involved in several attacks against civilians with forces alleged to have killed up to 26 civilians in Mopti and Segou regions in incidents 3, 7 and 12 April. Suspected JNIM militants 16 April kidnapped 110 civilians aboard public bus between Bandiagara and Bankass towns, Mopti region; dozens of hostages reportedly released 24 April after local authorities allegedly signed informal agreements with jihadist group. 

Islamic State militants remained active in northern Cabo Delgado province, amid faltering security operations and gradual withdrawal of international troops; preparations for Oct general election continued. 

Jihadist activity continued to plague Cabo Delgado, including targeting civilians. Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISMP) attacks remained at low-level following fasting for religious month of Ramadan from March to early April. Incidents of violence, however, continued including group 9 April beheading four people caught making alcoholic drinks in Namaluco village, Quissanga district, and kidnapping several others. Govt early April launched anti-militant operations with some success in dispersing insurgents from Mucojo and Quissanga districts, although ISMP fighters, who may now total 350-500, continued to have free movement in much of province; meanwhile, locals accused military of killing several civilians in helicopter fire in Mucojo town 6 April, with accusations army unable to differentiate between insurgents and civilians worsening relationship between local communities and security forces. In neighbouring Nampula province, local sources reported insurgents 25-26 April carried out assault on three villages in Eráti district, reportedly killing at least one civilian in first attack in province in several years. Meanwhile, Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) continued gradual drawdown of troops from Cabo Delgado with Botswana 5 April and Lesotho 14 April completing withdrawals. South Africa 22 April announced extension of 1,500 strong force deployment until end of year on bilateral basis, although concerns remained over security gaps in province ahead of 15 July deadline for formal withdrawal of all SAMIM forces.

Preparation for Oct polls continued with jostling for presidential candidacies. Ruling-FRELIMO party central committee 5-6 April met and although no candidate yet decided, four potential names considered included former PM Diogo. Meanwhile, main opposition RENAMO 15 April announced preconditions for competing for its presidency that included holding senior role in party; move in effect bans Venâncio Mondlane, primary opponent of party chief Ossufo Momade, from running for opposition candidacy. Final decision on both parties’ candidates expected after respective general congresses in May. Parliament 30 April began discussing several electoral bills put forward by opposition parties.

As U.S. military prepared to withdraw, govt strengthened military relations with Russia and held initial security discussions with China. 

Govt formed closer ties with Russia as U.S. troops began withdrawal preparations. Following severing of military accords with Washington in March, civil society groups 13 April organised protest in capital Niamey in support of govt and demanding immediate departure of U.S. military personnel, attended by thousands; hundreds 21 April also demonstrated in Agadez town – where U.S. base located – ahead of 25 April arrival of Washington delegation to arrange withdrawal. Meanwhile, highlighting shifting military alliances, some 100 Russian military instructors and material 10 April arrived in Niamey with mission of training Nigerien forces in using new equipment including anti-aircraft systems; troops possibly affiliated with Russian paramilitary Africa Corps, formerly known as Wagner Group, who 12 April announced presence in Niger via social media. Additionally, officials 23 April discussed strengthening defence cooperation with Chinese ambassador.

Junta consolidated power as case against former President Bazoum set to begin. Transitional President Gen. Tiani 4 April dissolved regional, municipal and local councils, replacing officials with military authorities-chosen special delegates, majority of whom are military personnel. Next day, court announced it would rule in May on case of Bazoum’s political immunity on charges of conspiracy against state, “high treason” and support of terrorism. 

Jihadist-related violence persisted in Tillabery and Diffa regions. In Tillabery (south west), suspected Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel) explosive device 8 April killed six soldiers near Tin Gara village; armed forces same day responded with airstrikes near village, killing at least ten alleged IS Sahel militants. Meanwhile in Diffa (south east), Boko Haram 23 April wounded four soldiers near Lada village. 

In another important development. Amid economic challenges, govt deepened energy ties with key partners, notably 12 April announced $400mn loan from China National Petroleum Corporation as advance on future oil sales and 16 April finalised gas deal with Mali, in part motivated by latter’s energy crisis.