Opposition to Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) rule continued in east as Islamic State (ISIS) staged attacks, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) cracked down on protesters, and tensions surfaced among Türkiye-aligned groups.

In east, Iran-backed groups contested SDF rule, as ISIS escalated strikes. Amid months-long tensions between SDF and Arab tribes backed by govt and Iran, new militia Saraya al-Bu Shaaban 5 May joined uprising against SDF. SDF leader Mazlum Abdi same day met leaders from Baggara and al-Aqidat tribes to discuss regional security and administration. Meanwhile, Islamic State (ISIS) killed dozens; notably, 3 May killed fifteen National Defence Forces members near al-Sukhna town, Homs province. Car bomb 10 May killed three SDF members in al-Shuhayl. ISIS ambush 21 May killed three govt soldiers in Homs province.

In north west, HTS quashed protests; rifts surfaced between Turkish-backed forces. Protests 17 May erupted across towns in Idlib province demanding release of detainees and for HTS leader Abu Mohammed al-Jolani to step down; HTS cracked down with unprecedented force, injuring 36 in Binnish city, sixteen in Idlib city, and ten in Jisr al-Shughour city. Elsewhere, clashes between factions of Turkish-backed Syrian National Army broke out: fighting between Jaysh al-Islam and Ahrar Olan 7 May killed two in Al-Bab city, Aleppo province. Türkiye 10 May announced neutralising seven Kurdistan Workers’ Party militants (see Türkiye).

In south, Israel continued airstrikes. Israeli airstrike 2 May injured eight soldiers in Najha town. In response to missile launched from Nawa area towards occupied Golan Heights, Israel 5 May shelled launch area, killing govt forces member. Israeli airstrike 20 May killed at least six pro-Iran militants in Qusayr city, Homs province.

Govt appointed new loyalists to security and administrative positions. In ongoing effort to shore up control, govt 10 May appointed new heads of branches of Air Force Intelligence agency and 12 May appointed new governors in Rif Dimashq, Deir ez-Zor, Hama, and Suwayda provinces. President Assad 16 May attended 33rd Arab League Summit in Bahrain and discussed inter-Arab cooperation in meeting with Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

Tensions erupted as authorities launched string of arrests of journalists, lawyers and activists, provoking widespread uproar. 

Repression of civil society sparked protests and stretched political tensions. Wave of arrests and attacks on activists, journalists and lawyers – including several regime critics – highlighted govt’s authoritarian drift. Notably, police 11 May stormed lawyer association and arrested media commentator and lawyer Sonia Dahmani, and later same day arrested journalists Mourad Zeghidi and Borhen Bsaies; hundreds protested next day in capital Tunis, demanding their release and date for presidential election, mandated for Sept-Oct 2024 but as yet unscheduled. Police 13 May again stormed association and arrested lawyer Mehdi Zagrouba, known critic of President Saïed; lawyers and rights groups alleged security forces tortured Zagrouba while in custody 13-15 May. Lawyers 16 May staged general strike and protested in Tunis to denounce torture of Zagrouba, while Interior Ministry denied accusations. Court 22 May sentenced Zeghidi and Bsaies to one year imprisonment on charges of publishing false news, prompting hundreds to demonstrate in Tunis 24 May. Meanwhile, amid continued migration crisis, govt also cracked down on immigration NGOs. Police early May raided premises of organisations involved in defence of migrants and arrested affiliated activists, including head of Mnemty anti-racist organisation Saadia Mosbah 5 May and asylum rights activist Sherifa Riahi 7 May over supposed financial crimes. Earlier, several hundred people 4 May demonstrated in eastern city of Sfax, demanding departure of migrants, while concerns also grew over presence of vigilante groups. 

Crackdown provoked international backlash and forceful govt defence. After EU, France, U.S. and UN expressed concern over repression, Saïed 15 May ordered Foreign Ministry to summon several foreign ambassadors to protest against external interference; 850 people 19 May demonstrated in Tunis supporting govt and protesting against alleged foreign meddling in domestic affairs. Earlier, Saïed 6 May blamed Western NGOs for migration crisis.

In another important development. Interior ministers of Algeria, Libya and Tunisia 2 May met Italian counterpart Matteo Piantedosi as part of new three-party grouping (see Algeria).

Polisario attacked Morocco-controlled area; Algerian and Moroccan officials sparred at UN meeting over Sahrawi independence.

Polisario Front launched attack on Morocco-controlled city. Low-intensity nature of conflict continued as Polisario military units 18 May attacked Smara inside Morocco-controlled Western Sahara, third attack on city since Oct; rockets, however, fell 12km from city in area Morocco claimed is uninhabited, although Polisario argued they hit military targets.

Algeria and Morocco exchanged provocative remarks at international meeting. Algerian UN representative Amar Bendjema proclaimed support for Western Sahara’s right to self-determination at UN decolonisation committee 14-16 May in Venezuelan capital Caracas. In response, Morocco’s UN representative Omar Hilale highlighted his country’s support for same rights for Algeria’s Berber majority region Kabylia. Earlier, Algerian President Abdelmadjid Tebboune 8 May delivered speech reiterating Algiers’s steadfast commitment to Sahrawis right to govern themselves. 

In another important development. Over 30 UK lawmakers 23 May signed open letter calling on UK govt to support Moroccan autonomy plan for Western Sahara, which would give Rabat control over area’s national security and foreign affairs.

Houthis announced fourth phase of escalation in Red Sea crisis, while military build-up and clashes with govt forces along frontlines in Marib and Sana’a provinces pointed to possible offensive and escalation.

Houthis announced new phase of strikes on international shipping. Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi 2 May announced new round of attacks on international shipping, citing Israeli and U.S. “intransigence” (see Israel/Palestine); group next day said Houthis would target ships heading to Israel regardless of their nationality, including in Indian Ocean and Mediterranean, potentially threatening alternative Cape of Good Hope route used by shipping companies. Houthis 18 May struck Panama-flagged, Greek-owned oil tanker in Red Sea. Meanwhile, U.S. and UK continued strikes on Houthi targets: notably, 2 May reportedly targeted Houthi-controlled Hodeida airport. Houthis 17 May claimed downing U.S. drone over Marib province and 21 May claimed destroying another over al-Bayda province. Houthis 27 May announced missile attacks on three commercial ships and two U.S. destroyers in Indian Ocean and Red Sea; U.S. said group fired five anti-ship ballistic missiles. U.S. and UK forces 30 May struck thirteen Houthi targets in three areas of Hodeida; Houthis claimed attacks killed sixteen.

In north, Houthi and govt forces clashed in Marib. Despite de facto truce, Giants Brigades (aligned with govt) and Houthis 17 March clashed on southern Marib governorate front following Houthi attacks on govt forces in Marib’s Harib district; both sides sent reinforcements to consolidate positions, including districts in Sana’a governorate bordering Marib. Govt forces are preparing for Houthi offensive that may seek to seize oil sites in Marib to address economic hardship facing group and pre-empt potential U.S./Western support to govt forces as Red Sea crisis persists.

In south, Southern Transitional Council (STC) clashed with Houthis and Al-Qaeda. STC 18 May accused Houthis of launching drone attack on STC military position in Abyan province. STC and Al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula 11, 16 and 17 May clashed.

In Aden, security forces cracked down on protesters. Govt security forces 13-14 May cracked down on hundreds of demonstrators protesting electricity cuts in Aden city, 15 May deployed armoured vehicles across city. 

Jihadist violence continued to plague north.

In northern Alibori and Atakora departments, armed groups allegedly linked to Al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) 3-6 April killed two poachers and one Fulani pastoralist in National Park W. In Alibori, JNIM 3 April also reportedly abducted two men in Guenelaga and Garbey Koara towns and 13 April killed civilian in Gogounou commune. Meanwhile in Alibori’s Malanville commune, suspected JNIM gunmen 16 April killed two civilians and soldier at border crossing with Niger. 

Govt renewed mobilisation orders as new civil society group launched criticism of military authorities; civilians continued to suffer amid widespread violence. 

Govt extended mobilisation decree amid criticism from new civil society group. Concerns continued over authorities forcing opponents into security forces including civilian auxiliaries (VDPs) after govt 31 March announced year-long extension to “general mobilisation” protocols to combat terrorism. Although most civil groups remained hesitant or unable to criticise govt amid repression, new civil society movement Front pour la Défence de la République (FDR) 4 April called for dissolution of military junta, elections and civilian transition, and criticised military authorities’ failure to free territory from jihadists as promised; FDR reported to be comprised of former politicians, civil society leaders and security officers, many of whom have taken refuge in Côte d’Ivoire. 

Clashes with jihadists continued, with high toll on civilians. Al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) militants clashed with govt forces and VDPs throughout month with major fatalities recorded across East, Boucle de Mouhoun, South-West, Sahel, Centre-East, North and Centre-North regions. JNIM militants 17 April attacked military near Barsalogho town, Sanmatenga Province (Centre-North), killing at least nineteen and wounding at least ten soldiers. Civilians continued to suffer; notably, JNIM militants 23 April launched attack on Séguénéma town (North) that killed 30 civilians; govt forces next day allegedly killed two civilians from same town. Islamic State Sahel Province militants also accused of launching attacks on civilians including 2 April assault on Woulmassoutou and Sakatemba villages in Seno province (Sahel), killing around twenty.

Govt expelled French diplomats, suspended broadcast of critical foreign channels. Foreign Affairs Minister 16 April expelled three French diplomats, including two political officers, for alleged “subversive activities”. After rights group Human Rights Watch 25 April released report alleging military “summarily executed” at least 223 civilians in two villages in Yatenga province (North) in Feb, govt in following days suspended various international media outlets including BBC and Voice of America for their coverage of report; U.S. and UK 29 April issued joint statement calling for investigation into allegations and reversal of media suspensions.

Church expressed concerns about political freedoms, opposition criticised new electoral code, and insecurity persisted. 

Catholic Church expressed profound concerns about state of nation. Church 14 April issued public declaration highlighting failures in justice system, economy and, most prominently, political freedoms; statement emphasised need for free legislative elections in 2025, cautioning against political exclusion in implicit reference to recent govt-sponsored efforts to dismantle opposition National Congress for Freedom (CNL) party; political party leaders, civil society and human rights activists broadly reacted in agreement with church’s analysis, while ruling CNDD-FDD party Sec Gen said statement was sign of “freedom of expression enjoyed by every Burundian citizen”. Meanwhile, CNL remained in disarray amid govt repression, with reports at least 100 party members have fled to Tanzania since mid-March.

Electoral law amendments stirred opposition. Parliament 9 April adopted new electoral code, raising costs of candidate deposits and establishing that funds only reimbursed upon winning 5% of votes. Opposition highlighted concerns that measures will prohibit many candidates from running. Code also stipulated two-year waiting period for those who leave a political party before they are able to stand as independents, effectively barring prominent opposition figure Agathon Rwasa – ousted as CNL head in March in govt-sponsored efforts – from standing as independent in 2025 polls.

Human rights abuses and insecurity persisted. Human rights group Ligue Iteka 9 April released monthly report detailing dozens of murders, abductions and arbitrary arrests, with police, intelligence agents, soldiers and ruling-party youth wing Imbonerakure suspected as main perpetrators. Meanwhile, CNDD-FDD members accused in cases of sexual assault and other violence throughout April. Concerns remained high over agitation within army related to troop deployment in eastern DRC amid reports of desertion over pay, as Imbonerakure members continued to be trained to be deployed. 

Anglophone separatists sought African Union (AU) support, enforced lockdowns and continued to clash with govt forces; jihadist attacks persisted in the Far North. 

Separatists pursued AU backing, clashed with govt forces. Anglophone separatist group Ambazonia Governing Council 3 April sent joint letter with Nigerian Biafra separatist group to AU Chairperson Mohamed Ould Ghazouani, urging body’s intervention in their independence causes, including leading dialogue and mediation initiatives and establishing fact-finding missions to investigate human rights violations. Separatist-enforced lockdowns continued to cause disruption in North West (NW) and South West (SW) regions as weekly “Monday ghost town” strikes halted public activities, including delaying school reopenings and threatening farming; in Nkambe city, Donga Mantung division (NW), separatist militia Ambazonia Defence Force 15 April burned dozen motorbikes as punishment for non-compliance with strikes. Separatists also clashedwith govt forces and detonated around dozen roadside bombs between March and April, mostly in NW, damaging military patrol vehicles and resulting in unspecified numbers of casualties. Govt forces 8 April killed two notorious separatist fighters in Bafut and Batibo areas (NW) and two others on 24 April near Kumba city (SW). Meanwhile, two prominent repentant separatist fighters mid-April criticised govt’s demobilisation program in viral video, denouncing unfulfilled promises.

Jihadist violence persisted in Far North. Boko Haram militants 6 April targeted Ngourkouma town, Logone-et-Chari division, but faced resistance from locals who seized weapons from assailants; militants 16 April issued ultimatum to residents, demanding return of seized weapons under threat of harm to their children, prompting hundreds from neighbouring fishing villages to flee to nearby Blangoua town over fear retribution would spread. Bakoura faction of Boko Haram 14-29 April carried out attacks on military positions in Magdeme, Mora, Kolofata and Zigue towns, raiding nearby villages for resources, and 29 April killed at least six civilians and two soldiers at Darak town. Meanwhile, soldiers and vigilantes 25 April freed around twenty women Boko Haram had kidnapped near Amchide town two days earlier. 

Preparations for 2025 presidential elections continued. Amid concerns over slow voter registration rate, ruling and opposition parties, alongside religious leaders, mobilised citizens to register.

Intercommunal violence escalated as govt allies responded firmly to cost-of-living protests.

Sectarian tensions rose in several regions. Series of incidents highlighted rising intercommunal tensions; rebels from Return, Reclamation, Rehabilitation (3R) group 2 April killed over twenty civilians 40km from Bohong town in Ouham-Pendé prefecture (north west). In Ouham prefecture (north), clashes erupted between Christian and Muslim communities in Bossangoa town 5 April following private dispute, highlighting ongoing divisions; in nearby Benzambé village, transhumant herders from West Africa same day killed child, leading villagers to lynch three residents they accused of witchcraft, while relatives of victim attacked and killed Fulani girl with machetes, as tensions remained high throughout month. Meanwhile, in Obo town, Haut-Mbomou prefecture (east) Russian paramilitary Africa Corps, formerly Wagner Group, initiated enlistment and training of fighters from Azandé Ani Kpi Gbé (AAKG) ethnic self-defence militia to confront Fulani-led armed group Unity for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC) rebels; moves heightened risk of further sectarian tensions in region should Azandé fighters target Fulani, and by association Muslim, civilians accused of backing rebels.

Govt supporters responded firmly to protests over cost of living. Crescent Beninga, spokesperson of Civil Society Working Group, 7 April called for peaceful protest against water and electricity shortages, but faced opposition from pro-govt factions; notably, Central African Youth Advisory Council 9 April denounced protest as political manipulation while National Coordination of Central African Students 11 April urged students to boycott march, branding it uncivil and unpatriotic. Around 100 demonstrators 12 April attempted to march in capital Bangui but security forces blocked them; activist Blaise Didatien Kossimatchi same day organised pro-govt counter-demonstration.

In another important international development. President Touadéra met with French counterpart Emmanuel Macron 17 April in France’s capital Paris in bid to ease tensions over govt’s growing ties with Russia; presidents agreed upon “roadmap” for “constructive partnership”.

Tensions continued to mount in lead-up to May presidential election as opposition disunity persisted; govt requested U.S. troops leave. 

Amid political tensions, opposition remained divided over boycott of polls. Ahead of May presidential vote, which includes transitional President Déby and recently-appointed PM Succès Masra as main contenders, opposition remained divided. Civil society opposition platform Wakit Tama 12 April endorsed boycott – which some parties including New Chad Artisans party and Chadian Liberal Party called for in March and early April – citing concerns over lack of electoral roll revision and timing during rainy season. Meanwhile, Union of Nationalists Party 3 April accused international community of financing flawed electoral process. Other opposition parties, however, formed alliances to contest vote and oversee electoral process; 34 parties 9 April formed Justice-Equality Coalition around Masra, partly in order to monitor polling stations nationwide; but alliance, as well as others including Coalition for Just and Equitable Republic created to support influential former PM Padacké’s candidacy, unlikely to defeat ruling party. Meanwhile, electoral authorities criticised perceived violations of electoral rules including supporters of Déby and Masra early April organising rallies and religious ceremonies across country, ahead of official 14 April campaign start date, and Masra 28 April urging supporters to monitor vote by taking photos of tally sheets.

Socio-economic crisis sparked civil unrest, insecurity continued in hinterland. Amid socio-economic deterioration including rising fuel prices and electricity shortages, various unions held protests including students 3 April in capital N’Djamena and textile workers 9 April in Sarh city (Moyen-Chari region). Inter-communal violence remained high, particularly in Moyen-Chari and Mayo-Kebbi Ouest regions.

Govt requested U.S. troop withdrawal. Letter from Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Idriss Amine Ahmed 4 April confirmed previous rumours that govt asked U.S. troops to withdraw from Adji Kosseï military base at airport in N’Djamena; Ahmed cited lack of legal basis for U.S. presence. U.S. military 25 April said Washington would reposition “some” troops but described it as “temporary step” as talks continue.