Crisis Group is monitoring the upsurge in violence in the country triggered by the military's 1 February 2021 coup d'état which deposed the Aung San Suu Kyi administration. The regime has brutally cracked down on protesters, killing hundreds and detaining thousands. Public sector strikes and other forms of civil disobedience have prevented the regime from consolidating its control, and plunged the country into deep economic crisis. Some of the country’s ethnic armed groups have gone on the offensive, and new forms of armed resistance by civilian militias and underground networks have emerged. Although Rakhine State has so far avoided some of the worst of the violence, the plight of the Rohingya remains unaddressed and the prospects for a return of almost one million languishing in camps in Bangladesh looks bleak. Through field research and advocacy, Crisis Group works to understand the new violent dynamics unleashed by the coup and mitigate the impact on the people of the country.
Ethnic armed groups have pushed the military out of most of Myanmar’s borderlands, putting the country on a path toward fracturing into self-governing statelets with the regime hanging on in the centre. Outside actors wishing to help Myanmar’s people should adjust to this new reality.
Armed ethnic groups renewed fighting, making critical headway against regime as army chief declared himself new acting president.
In west, Arakan Army (AA) made territorial gains. AA 5 July confirmed capture of Thandwe airport two days earlier, said clashes left 400 regime casualties, but did not reveal its own losses. AA 9 July captured Light Infantry Battalion 55 base, last military base in Ngapali town, Rakhine state. Despite gains, AA’s aim to capture Maungdaw town remained challenging, while its battlefield victories fostered tension with other rival ethnic groups, including Rohingya and Chin armed groups.
Three Brotherhood Alliance (comprised of TNLA, MNDAA and AA) made rapid advances. Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) and its allies 25 July claimed seizure of Lashio town in northern Shan State, including Northeastern Military Command headquarters and airport; fighting, however, continued across multiple locations in Lashio as MNDAA attempted to clear out significant numbers of regime troops dispersed throughout town. Tens of thousands of residents had fled Lashio ahead of offensive. Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) also had series of victories, 10 July capturing Nawnghkio and Kyaukme towns along with Gokteik Viaduct bridge in Shan state, 25 July announced capture of Mogok town in Mandalay Region, major ruby mining centre; social welfare groups reported heavy civilian casualties with almost 60 bodies cremated in Kyaukme. TNLA’s move into low-lying valleys and urban areas in Shan state has created conflict with Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) as TNLA continued to take territory beyond upland areas where Ta’ang populations mostly live. Consequently, SSPP 5 July responded with two deadly attacks against TNLA, killing several high-ranking officers.
In other important developments. Myanmar state-run MRTV 22 July reported acting president, Myint Swe is unable to perform his duties for medical reasons, with military chief Min Aung Hlaing appointing himself to role. Announcement came week before state of emergency was renewed on 31 July.
Myanmar’s ethnic armed groups are securing on the battlefield the autonomous homelands they have long sought.
Myanmar isn't a well-functioning, centralized state that has suddenly fallen into atomization… It's always been fragmented to some extent or another.
The [Myanmar] military is clearly facing significant manpower shortages, which is why it is introducing a draft for the first time in its history.
The military [in Myanmar] might not have the ability to vanquish its opponents, but it retains an enormous capacity for violence, especially against civilian targets.
When the Myanmar military feels under pressure, its normal response is to ramp up the level of violence.
Myanmar needs Russia because it doesn't want to be isolated ... and they also need an alternative to China in the region.
Why Outside Actors Should Work More Closely With Nonstate Groups
The Arakan Army has greatly expanded the territory it controls in Rakhine State, on Myanmar’s border with Bangladesh, seizing many areas inhabited by Rohingya Muslims. With the regime keen to foment inter-communal strife, Rakhine and Rohingya leaders should act swiftly to calm tensions.
In this online event, experts discuss the current state of China-Myanmar relations, Beijing’s tacit support for the rebel offensive launched on 27 October in Myanmar’s northeast, and the implications for international policy on Myanmar.
Beijing has more pull with Myanmar’s military rulers than any other outsider. While its influence has limits, it can help quiet border areas, by fighting organised crime and encouraging licit economies. Other powers should probe for areas of potential cooperation in resolving the post-coup crisis.
Nearly a million Rohingya remain stuck in Bangladesh, with little hope of going home soon, as violence rises in the camps and international agencies trim their assistance. Donors should scale the aid back up, while Dhaka should modify its approach to allow for long-term planning.
This week on Hold Your Fire!, Richard is joined by Crisis Group’s Myanmar expert Richard Horsey, to discuss ethnic armed groups’ offensive against Myanmar's military in northern Shan State, fighting between resistance forces and the army elsewhere, China’s response to the escalation and the humanitarian consequences.
Fighting has intensified greatly in Myanmar in recent weeks. Having started in northern Shan State, it is now spreading elsewhere. As Crisis Group expert Richard Horsey explains in this Q&A, the military is under significant pressure on the battlefield, with worrying humanitarian implications.
This event brings together analysts and prominent civil society members to discuss the evolution of governance in Myanmar and what this means for stakeholders inside and outside the country.
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