Report 172 / Africa 04 April 2011 4 minutes 新南苏丹的政治与过渡 Share Facebook Twitter Email Linkedin Whatsapp Save Print Download PDF Also available in English Chinese, Simplified English 执行摘要与建议 苏丹南部公投现已完成,其将完全并且正式地独立于苏丹北部,政治焦点必将逐渐转向南苏丹国内政治议程。一个新的过渡政府将从2011年7月9日起在一个固定期限内执掌大权,在此期间,一个永久性宪法将通过广泛磋商产生。当前以及独立后将立即采取的一些关键决策决定着这个即将成为世界最年轻国家的民主制度是否健全及其发展轨迹。其中,相对于其它因素来说,有两大因素可能对于塑造即将来临的过渡期的作用更加明显。第一,在南苏丹执政的苏丹人民解放运动(SPLM) 能够允许多党制体系成长的政治空间放开到何种程度;第二,由于党内政治将在近期继续主导政治舞台,因此在苏人解(SPLM)内部开展民主改革的意愿也是要素之一。在现阶段就在党内和党外注重多元化将为今后的长期稳定奠定基础。以上任一方面的失败都可能导致重建一个过度集权和独裁以及高度不稳定的国家,而这正是苏丹南部现在终于已经摆脱的国家模式。 公投后,苏人解和全国大会党(NCP)继续进行谈判,为实现南北和平分离以及建立建设性的南北关系而努力。虽然谈判消耗着苏人解领导者相当一部分的精力,但苏丹南部的政治环境已经开始改变。从2005年签署《全面和平协议》(CPA)后,苏丹南部的不同种族和政治团体就被一个共同的目标团结在一起:民族自决。在目标达成之前,许多被压抑着的不满都选择保持平静。现在,票已经投了,公投结果也获得支持,共同点已经不复存在,长期酝酿的政治分歧也将开始重新浮出水面。同样,一系列的武装叛乱,近期的民兵活动以及军队倒戈都突显了内部隔阂以及在安全部门中潜在的不满。持续的对抗向政府控制国内冲突的能力提出了挑战,也加剧了民族群体及其政治领袖进一步两极分化的危险,有可能引发更广泛的动乱。 苏人解和南部反对党之间针对过渡政府的组成和权力以及过渡期限方面的争夺加剧。在独立之前必须完成的事项中,苏人解急切希望先尽快制定过渡宪法,而反对党则担心苏人解是在操纵这一过程以巩固其权力。苏人解强硬的做法破坏了2010年底一个重要的政党大会所建立的友好关系。被遏制的争论和整个过程中的政治管理不善加剧了反对党对抗的风险,尤其是当下,实现独立和保证国内安全面临挑战,这使得南部团结显得尤为重要。苏人解必须意识到,反对派的参政,包括对过渡政府以及一个具有广泛基础的政府的参与不是对自己权力的威胁,而是对稳定和统治合法化有利。从长远来看,独断专权的政治反而可能削弱一些党内强硬派试图巩固的权力。 管理苏丹南部的民族区域多样性仍将是一项艰巨的任务。无论过渡政府采取何种形式,政治妥协都是必要的。苏人解的领导层要掌控这盘艰苦的棋局,为各方(包括许多刚回国的成员)、军队以及反对党成员分配角色;必须避免“赢家通吃”的心态,不能将设立一个具有广泛代表性的政府只是视为缓和政策,而是对南部苏丹多元化特征的反映。 民族解放的斗争已经结束,全国大会党的时代即将完结,这也标志着苏丹人民解放运动发展史的新篇章。苏人解若想保持凝聚力,巩固合法性并将其传承至政府,重新审视政党的工作方式是必要的。政党的改革应旨在治理内部分歧,削弱自上而下的军事文化,并将管理和贸易约束专业化,从而加强内部对话。同时,无可否认南方反对党势力薄弱;其资源、成员和结构都很单薄。虽然苏人解必须创造一个有利环境,但反对党也应在追求共同的国家利益,肩负国家责任和发展其它可靠平台来建立全国选区时承担着同等的责任。持续的国家和国际支持对于政党的发展是必不可少的。 一旦过渡期开始,对于几个关键政治领域及其战略的审视将塑造这一新兴国家的政治和经济结构,并且有助于确定如何回应南苏丹人民对于他们年轻的政府在独立后所抱有的高预期。地方分权制这一说法被拥护但在实践中却被忽略。对当前模式的审视已就绪,因为中央政府及其首府仍然在政治、经济和发展方面得到过多的重视。对于改善普通南方民众生活发展和服务的期望将迫使权力进一步下放到州县,从而避免导致苏丹民族灾难核心的过于集权的情况。 《全面和平协议》后关于石油收入在南北方分配的安排已在政治话语中占据突出地位,但南苏丹内部未来的石油收入分配政策还远未得到足够重视。考虑到苏丹几乎完全依赖于石油收入,如何对石油收入进行管理和分配也许将在国家政治中很快占据突出地位。所有权、在全国范围内进行收入分配的模式以及相应的监管机构必须建立。如果管理完善,石油部门可能成为一个关键手段,用以分散集权和赋予国家和地方政治权力,并加速新南苏丹的发展。若非如此,腐败和管理不善将可能促使民族分裂,让苏丹成为又一个遭到资源诅咒的国家。 过渡期将随南苏丹首次独立的大选而终止。接下来,必须对选举制度进行审视,通过确保公平的竞争环境,尽可能为多样化、负责任和真正具有代表性的机构提供最佳机会,从而克服2010年选举的不足。 无论公平与否,即将独立的南苏丹共和国在未来一段时间内都会受到来自各方的批判,这些批判的展开背景就是其做出的从北方分离的决定。一党专政、以部族为本的政治,或重大的治理举措,或内部安全失效都将引来认为该地区无法自治的怀疑者的批评。如今有机会证明这些人是错误的,但这取决于南苏丹人是否能把握机会。 朱巴/内罗毕/布鲁塞尔, 2011年4月4日 Download pdf to continue reading the full report (English) Executive Summary Now that South Sudan’s referendum is complete and its independence from the North all but formalised, focus must increasingly shift to the political agenda at home. A new transitional government will preside over a fixed term from 9 July 2011, during which a broadly consultative review process should yield a permanent constitution. Critical decisions taken now and immediately after independence will define the health and trajectory of democracy in what will soon be the world’s newest state. Two factors may shape the coming transition period more than any other; first, the degree to which the South’s ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) allows an opening of political space in which a vibrant multi-party system can grow; secondly, the will to undertake democratic reform within the SPLM, as intra-party politics continue to dominate the political arena in the near term. Embracing pluralism now – both inside and outside the party – would lay a foundation for stability in the long term. Failing on either front would risk recreating the kind of overly centralised, authoritarian and ultimately unstable state South Sudan has finally managed to escape. Post-referendum negotiations continue between the SPLM and the National Congress Party (NCP) toward a peaceful separation and a constructive North-South relationship. While they consume considerable attention of the SPLM leadership, the political landscape in South Sudan has begun to transform. From the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in 2005, South Sudan’s divergent ethnic and political communities were united behind a common goal: self-determination. Many suppressed grievances, choosing not to rock the boat until that objective was achieved. Now that the vote has been cast and its results endorsed, the common denominator is gone, and long-simmering political disputes are beginning to re-surface. Likewise, a series of armed insurgencies, recent militia activity, and army defections highlight internal fault lines and latent grievances within the security sector. Continued fighting has challenged government capacity to manage domestic conflict, risks further polarisation of ethnic communities and their political leaders and could stoke broader insecurity. Jockeying has intensified between the SPLM and Southern opposition parties over the composition and powers of a transitional government and duration of the transitional period. The SPLM desires to move expeditiously toward a transitional constitution amid all that must be done before independence, while the opposition fears it is manipulating the process to entrench its power. A domineering approach from the SPLM has jeopardised the goodwill created by an important political parties’ conference in late 2010. Stifling debate and poor political management of such processes unnecessarily risk further antagonism among opposition parties, particularly at a time when the challenges in realising independence and managing domestic security concerns make Southern unity all the more important. The SPLM must recognise that meaningful opposition participation – including in defining the transition and in a broad-based government – is not a threat to its power but an investment in stability and legitimate rule. A politics of exclusion may in the long run undermine the very power some party hardliners are trying to consolidate. Managing South Sudan’s ethno-regional diversity will continue to be a tall order. Political accommodation is a necessity regardless of what form the transitional government assumes. The SPLM leadership will have a difficult chessboard to manage, finding roles for a wide range of party (including many members now returning home), army and opposition elements. It must avoid a “winner-takes-all” mindset and view the appointment of a broadly representative government not as appeasement alone but as recognition of Southern Sudan’s pluralist character. The liberation struggle is over, the CPA era is coming to a close, and it is thus time for the SPLM to mark a new chapter in its evolution. A review of the party’s modus operandi is necessary if it is to maintain cohesion, consolidate its legitimacy and deliver in government. Party reforms should aim to manage internal divisions, erode a top-down military culture, professionalise operations and trade coercion for enhanced internal dialogue. Meanwhile, there is no denying that Southern opposition parties are weak; their resources, membership and structures are thin. While the SPLM must engender a conducive environment, opposition parties are equally responsible for pursuing shared national interests, shouldering national responsibilities and developing credible alternative platforms that target a national constituency. Continued national and international support for political party development is essential. Once the transition period commences, reviews of several key policy areas and resultant strategies will shape the political and economic structure of the emerging state and help determine the response to the high post-independence expectations that Southerners have placed on their young government. Decentralisation has been championed in rhetoric and neglected in practice. Examination of the current model is in order, as there remains a disproportionate focus on the central government and its capital city, in political, economic and development terms. Expectations for improved development and service delivery in the lives of ordinary Southerners will necessitate increased devolution to states and counties so as to avoid the very centre-periphery dynamic that lay at the heart of Sudan’s national woes. Post-CPA arrangements on oil revenue sharing between North and South have occupied a prominent place in political discourse, but far less attention has been paid to future revenue sharing policy within South Sudan. Given almost exclusive dependence on oil money, decisions as to how petrodollars are managed and shared may soon occupy a prominent place in national politics. Ownership rights, a nationwide revenue allocation model and a corresponding regulatory architecture must be established. If well administered, the oil sector can be a key instrument for decentralising authority, empowering state and local politics and accelerating development in the new South. If not, corruption and mismanagement could prompt national division and surrender another victim to the resource curse. The transition period will be capped by the country’s first independent elections. The electoral system must accordingly be reviewed so as to overcome the shortcomings of the 2010 polls by ensuring a level playing field and providing the best possible opportunities for diverse, accountable and genuinely representative institutions. Fair or not, the soon-to-be independent Republic of South Sudan will for some time be judged in the context of its decision to separate. One-party rule, tribal-oriented politics or significant governance or internal security failures would generate criticism from sceptics who argued the region could not govern itself. The opportunity now presents itself to prove them wrong; it is up to the South Sudanese to take it. 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