Report 153 / Asia 09 June 2008 3 minutes 中国的石油政策 Share Facebook Twitter Email Linkedin Whatsapp Save Print Also available in English Chinese, Simplified English 执行摘要 中国能源需求的增长速度居世界首位。经济的快速增长导致国内能源供不应求,因此中国政府不得不把目光放到国外以确保国内经济发展和稳定。出于对全球石油市场的顾虑,中国国有石油企业在全球范围内,特别是西方公司唯恐避之不及的国家购买资产。这类投资是中国政府外交政策中的一个重要因素,但同时也引发了种种担忧。由于致力于占有能源资源,中国的投资举动引起或加速了发展中国家之间的冲突,同时也导致了中国与其他主要石油进口国之间的紧张关系。近年来,中国的能源需求使之在国际市场上的角色愈发突出,从而导致了国际社会对中国的种种担忧,例如中国对其他国家能源安全以及对全球和地区安全的潜在影响。这些担忧大有夸张成分;随着中国政策制定与执行能力的提高,中国可采取一系列措施,在能源和更为广泛的安全问题方面创造出更为有利的国际环境。 中国公司并非国际石油供应的主导力量,在中国境外他们只是小角色。它们所开拓的石油生产线扩大了全球供应量,所有消费者都从中受益。中国公司生产的大部分石油是在公开市场上出售的,而非运回中国。此外,中国政府关于能源安全的理念亦有进步的迹象,从最初的重商主义行为,即不信任国际市场并渴望实际控制石油资源,逐步演变为有益于国际能源市场及合作的开放做法。中国的领导人逐渐认识到,中国国有企业的海外投资不仅仅增加了企业的利润,还给国家的能源安全带来很多其他影响。 工业化国家对中国向国有石油公司发放的巨额贷款和为专制政权提供限制性援助与支持忧心忡忡。要根据世界银行和国际货币基金组织(IMF)的政策建议(尤其在透明度方面)协调本国海外投资和对外援助,中国还有很长的路要走。当然,这类的担忧通常也有夸张成分。虽然中国在发生或面临冲突的国家进行能源投资有时会延长冲突或导致冲突更加难以终止,然而,这些影响往往被夸大了。更何况采取此类政策的并非只有中国一个。 在有些情况下,中国对有些政权的支持的确增加了冲突解决的难度,因为这种帮助降低或弱化了国际社会行动的影响力。与此同时,中国开始在多边进程中扮演妨碍性较弱、甚至是建设性的角色,并向某些国际干预行动提供支持。中国政府发现,他们长期倡导的、“不干涉主权国家内政”的理念并非放之四海而皆准,也并非一直符合中国的国家利益。随着中国为其大国崛起寻求正当理由,中国也不希望被看成是全球独裁政权阵营的领头羊。在达尔富尔问题以及向问题政权提供援助一事上,中国政府遭遇了全球媒体的纷纷指责,令其尴尬不已。 直接的经济、政治和安全风险其重要性并不亚于国际形象方面的风险。尽管对苏丹等问题政权无条件的支持有利于中国国有企业与其签署初步能源协议,但同时却对确保中国的长期能源利益带来了阴影,尤其是它增加了中国在投资、公民和安全方面的风险。单纯地与该政权领导层建立联系而不与整个国家培养更广泛的伙伴关系会导致民众与精英的观念对立,甚至导致社会动荡不安,进而加剧对中国海外投资的威胁。例如在苏丹,中国投资的大部分油田位于南方地区,而2011年南方将就“民族自决”举行全民公决。如表决通过,该地区将正式从苏丹脱离出去。除在苏丹南部的投资外,中国最近亦在乍得进行了投资,因此该地区的稳定对于中国来说具有重大意义。随着中国与西方国家在防止核扩散、中东地区稳定等问题上达成共识,中国的海外投资面临着能源需求与外交目标两者间的冲突。 中国对海外资源的渴求亦与其国内能源政策紧密相连。为实现能源安全,中国领导层意识到,国内政策必须着重解决节约能源、提高能效、减少污染、多元化能源组合、升级洁净技术和及时向供应商和消费者反映能源价格等问题 。然而由于国内利益冲突,能源政策的制定与执行均遇到了来自中央、国家、省、当地以及个人的阻力,中央政策实行困难重重。今天中国的通货膨胀率以十年来的最高速度增长,中国政府还要努力控制能源与食品价格。确立长远的能源政策和制度管理机构已成为重中之中。 世界国家都有责任保证充足的石油供应、实现有利于经济增长的石油价格和创造稳定的国际环境。它们能够帮助塑造中国的行为模式,即,鼓励中国通过合作而非竞争逐步满足对能源安全的渴求。 2008年6月9日 首尔/布鲁塞尔 Executive Summary China’s need for energy is growing faster than any other country’s. Record economic growth results in demand that outstrips domestic supply, leading Beijing to look outward to ensure growth and stability. Concerns about the global oil market have led state firms to buy stakes around the world, often in countries shunned by Western firms. The investments are an important factor in Beijing’s foreign policy. They also drive concerns that China’s actions fuel or exacerbate conflict in the developing world and cause tensions with other major oil-importing countries as it locks up energy resources. China’s energy needs have led it to play a more prominent role in international markets in recent years. This has generated concerns about the potential impact on other countries’ energy security, and global and regional security generally. These are largely overstated, but China could take a number of steps, as its policymaking and implementation evolves, which would help create a more cooperative international environment on both energy and wider security issues. Chinese companies cannot dominate international oil supplies. They are small players outside of China, and the oil they bring online expands global supply, benefiting all consumers. The majority of oil they produce is sold on the open market, not shipped back to China. Furthermore, Beijing’s idea of energy security is showing signs of evolving from a mercantilist approach based on distrust of international markets, and therefore a desire for physical control of oil supplies, to a more open approach favouring international energy markets and cooperation. Chinese leaders are coming to understand that their state companies’ investments abroad have contributed far more to those companies’ profits than to improving the country’s energy security. Industrialised countries are also worried about China’s subsidised lending to its state-owned oil companies, use of tied aid and support for repressive regimes. China has a long way to go to harmonise its investments and foreign assistance practices with those recommended by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), particularly in regard to transparency. But such fears are often also overblown. While China’s energy investments in countries in or at risk of conflict have sometimes contributed to prolonging or making conflicts more difficult to end, their effect is exaggerated. Nor is China alone in these practices. In some cases, Chinese support to unsavoury regimes indeed makes conflicts more difficult to resolve, as it softens or thwarts international action. At the same time, China is starting to play a less obstructive, and even constructive, role in multilateral processes and supports some forms of international intervention. Chinese officials are finding that their long-cherished concept of non-interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign states is not always practical or in line with national interests. As it seeks increased legitimacy for its rise as a great power, China does not want to be seen as heading a league of the world’s worst dictatorships. It has been embarrassed by the levels of criticism it has faced in the world media over Darfur and for its backing of problem regimes more generally. The direct economic, political and security risks are at least as important as the reputational ones. While unquestioned support for problem regimes such as Sudan has been useful to state companies in signing initial energy agreements, it is less helpful in securing Beijing’s long-term energy interests, especially as it is confronted with mounting risks to its investments, citizens and security. Simply consolidating ties to the leadership of a regime without cultivating broader relationships in the country can alienate segments of both public and elite opinion, and lead to instability that threatens investments. In Sudan, for example, the bulk of the Chinese oil fields are in the South, which anticipates a self-determination referendum in 2011, following which it could secede. In addition to its stakes there, China’s new investments in Chad give it an even greater interest in the region’s stability. While Beijing’s interests also increasingly converge with the West’s on issues such as nuclear non-proliferation and stability in the Middle East, its overseas investments are exposing tensions between its energy concerns and diplomatic aims. China’s quest for resources abroad is also strongly linked to its internal energy policy. To achieve energy security, the leadership recognises that domestic policy must focus more on conservation, raising efficiency, reducing pollution, diversifying the energy mix, upgrading clean technologies and allowing energy prices to send proper signals to suppliers and consumers. However, both policymaking and implementation in China are hindered by competing interests at the central, state, provincial, local and private levels. The central government has great difficulty enforcing energy regulations and policies. With inflation expanding at its fastest pace in more than a decade, Beijing is also fighting to control the prices of energy and food. The need for a coherent energy policy and institutional apparatus to manage energy is more urgent than ever. All countries share an interest in ensuring an adequate oil supply, oil prices conducive to economic growth and a stable international environment. They can help shape the way in which China’s quest for energy security develops by encouraging cooperative rather than competitive behaviour. Seoul/Brussels, 9 June 2008 Related Tags More for you Op-Ed / United States Questioning the presumption of a US “consensus” on China policy Originally published in Brookings Op-Ed / Asia India’s Perilous Border Standoff With China Originally published in Foreign Affairs