President Déby secured election win amid reports of voting irregularities and repression of opposition, tightening grip on power.

Déby clinched victory, cemented his control despite opposition challenges. Following 5-6 May presidential polls, electoral authority 9 May declared Déby winner with 61% of vote, marking end of transition period; rivals including former PM Padacké and incumbent PM Masra initially contested results, filing unsuccessful appeals with Constitutional Court which 16 May certified results. Déby 17 May rejected calls for national unity govt, further isolating opposition, as Masra same day acknowledged defeat and 22 May resigned as PM; Déby inaugurated next day and appointed Allamaye Halina as PM; Halina 27 May announced new govt formed of pro-Déby ministers and no opposition members. 

International actors welcomed vote amid reports of irregularities and repression. As military deployed significant presence around polling stations and in major cities, security forces 6 May detained 79 Masra supporters over alleged fraud. Reports of electoral irregularities emerged with some polling stations inadequately equipped or opening late while opposition observers reported under-age voting and regime supporters confiscating ballot boxes. Meanwhile, independent election observers faced restrictions, with civil society 5 May and EU 7 May condemning denial of access for 2,900 trained observers. Following vote, canton chief and aide 10 May assaulted opposition activist in Koumra town, while opposition journalist same day reported intimidation from armed men in capital N’Djamena and later went into hiding. NGO Human Rights Watch 13 May expressed concerns over political repression and govt’s consolidation of power. International actors largely welcomed Déby’s election, however. Regional body Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) 12 May congratulated Déby, as did French President Emmanuel Macron 17 May. U.S. 16 May acknowledged transition milestone but highlighted “troubling shortcomings”. Amid growing ties with Moscow, Russian President Vladimir Putin 14 May sent congratulatory message.

Banditry and herder-farmer-related insecurity persisted. Farmer and herder groups 9 May clashed in Lac-Iro area of Moyen-Chari region, killing at least five civilians and injuring others, after alleged cattle raid by herders. Governor of Ennedi-East region 17 May announced arrest of eight bandits on murder charges in Amdjarass city on Libyan border.

Political jostling continued ahead of 2025 presidential election; govt further deepened military ties with U.S.

Political focus remained on next year’s vote. At party convention in Abidjan city, opposition African People’s Party-Côte d’Ivoire (PPA-CI) 10 May officially declared former President Gbagbo as candidate for 2025 presidency polls; Gbagbo’s candidacy, however, faces major obstacles including his ineligibility due to 2018 criminal conviction for looting Central Bank of West African States during 2010-2011 post-electoral crisis and competition from several parties run by previous allies, including his former wife, that will be chasing similar parts of electorate. Meanwhile, former PM Soro – in exile since 2019 and sentenced to life imprisonment in absentia in 2021 for undermining national security – 8 May said he would continue dialogue with Ouattara on national reconciliation, amid his attempts to return from exile. 

Discussion with Washington over expanded security ties continued. After U.S. delegation led by head of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), Gen. Michael Langley, late April visited Ouattara to discuss establishment of American military base, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana 13-24 May jointly hosted annual AFRICOM-led special operations exercise featuring dozens of countries. 

In other important international developments. Relations with Senegal boosted by 7 May visit of new Senegalese President Faye. Tensions with Burkina Faso, however, remained high following series of incidents along border with reports of reciprocal security forces’ provocations during May.

Security and humanitarian situation worsened in east after deadly bombing of displacement camp as rebels took more territory; security forces thwarted apparent coup attempt. 

M23 crisis escalated following attack on IDP sites near North Kivu capital Goma. Rockets allegedly fired from rebel positions west of Goma 3 May struck Mugunga and Lac Vert displacement camps, resulting in 35 deaths, deadliest M23-related attack since Nov 2022. Govt and U.S. accused Rwanda, prompting Kigali to vehemently deny involvement. Meanwhile, M23 continued advance following late April capture of strategic mining town Rubaya. Violence also threatened South Kivu province, with 7 May M23-attributed rocket attack in Kisongati village, resulting in seven fatalities and six injuries; rebels may in June pose threat to pivotal town of Minova, possibly opening route to advance further into South Kivu. Southern African regional bloc (SADC) mission SAMIDRC 5 May announced plans to offensively counter M23 rebellion but faced persistent financial challenges.

Diaspora member orchestrated unsuccessful apparent coup in capital Kinshasa. Army 19 May claimed to have foiled coup attempt led by Christian Malanga – American resident and promoter of New Zaire movement – in Kinshasa’s Gombe district, resulting in death of Malanga, one other assailant and two police officers. Gunmen targeted largely symbolic locations – including residences of top officials and empty state house – prompting widespread questions about security protocols and motives of attack.

Armed group violence plagued Ituri and North Kivu. In North Kivu, seven suspected victims of Islamic State-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) rebels found 3 May along Mangina-Mantumbi road in Beni-Mbau sector. In Ituri, ADF 6 May killed three in Kianangazi village, Irumu territory, abducting one child. Subsequent attacks 9, 12 and 13 May in both provinces resulted in further casualties and abductions, raising doubts about efficacy of joint Congolese-Ugandan anti-ADF operations. 

Ruling party faced discord over formation of new administration. President Tshisekedi 29 May announced new govt – rewarding loyalists and campaign organisers with top jobs while axing foreign and defence ministers – following months of intense haggling amongst his political coalition. Meanwhile, opposition warned against potential power grabs amid concerns over Tshisekedi’s 3 May proposal to overhaul constitution.

Ethiopia’s efforts to settle Tigray-Amhara territorial dispute continued to fuel security concerns in Asmara.

Ethiopia-Eritrea relations remained riddled with tensions. Amid concern in Asmara that Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) may return to administer Western Tigray Zone in Ethiopia, Tigray region’s interim VP Tadesse Worede 2 May said federal efforts to dissolve local Amhara administrations and resettle displaced persons in disputed areas – part of Addis Ababa’s plan to settle Tigray-Amhara territorial dispute – would be completed by late June. Ethiopia’s ruling Prosperity Party and TPLF 15 May convened third round of party-to-party political dialogue in Tigray’s capital Mekelle as part of efforts to address political issues underlying conflict in Tigray, deepening Asmara’s fears that Ethiopia’s PM Abiy may be consolidating alliance with TPLF. 

U.S. bodies criticised Eritrea’s human rights record. Embassy of Eritrea to U.S. 2 May dismissed as “fallacious” U.S. State Department’s 2023 Human Rights Report published late April, which documented “significant human rights issues” in Eritrea. U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom 13 May said religious freedom conditions remain “extremely poor” in Eritrea, urged U.S. President Biden to pressure Asmara to end persecution of unregistered religious communities and release religious prisoners.

In another important development. Eritrea 24 May celebrated 33 years of independence with official gathering in capital Asmara. Anniversary gave rise to scuffles between pro-regime and anti-regime Eritreans living abroad, leaving one killed and several wounded 27 May in Israel’s Tel Aviv city.

Govt’s plan to address Tigray-Amhara territorial dispute continued to fuel tensions in Western Tigray; federal forces pursued efforts to stem insurgencies in Amhara and Oromia regions.

Tensions lingered over Tigray-Amhara territorial dispute in Western Tigray. Implementation of Addis Ababa’s plan to address Tigray-Amhara territorial dispute continued, with Tigray’s interim VP Tadesse Worede 2 May saying dissolution of local Amhara administrations and resettlement of displaced Tigrayans in Southern and Western zones would be completed by late June. Plan fuelled more violence, however; notably, skirmishes 3 May broke out between Ethiopian military and Amhara nationalist militias known as Fano on outskirts of Maksegno Gebeya town in Western Tigray Zone after Fano militants previous day briefly entered town. Tigray’s interim President Getachew Reda 24 May announced withdrawal of Tigray’s forces from two villages near Alamata town (Southern Tigray Zone), in move designed to ease tensions with Amhara administrations and facilitate return of Tigrayans.

Fighting continued between federal forces and Fano militias in Amhara. After easing of hostilities early May between federal forces and Fano militias, fighting picked up toward end of month, with clashes reported in North Shewa, East Gojjam, West Gojjam, North Gojjam, North Gondar, South Wollo and North Wollo zones. PM Abiy 12 May visited Amhara capital Bahir Dar, called on insurgents to lay down arms and reintegrate into civilian life. Adding to region’s instability, thousands of Sudanese refugees late April-early May fled Kumer and Awlala camps in West Gondar Zone after kidnappings for ransom and armed robberies late April left at least one person injured.

Army intensified counter-insurgency operations in Oromia. Federal forces conducted operations against Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) in East Wollega, West Wollega, Horo Guduru Wollega, West Shewa, Arsi, West Arsi and East Borena zones. Notably, regional broadcaster 2 May reported joint operation by federal and regional security forces in East Borena; Addis Ababa claimed to have inflicted heavy OLA casualties. In rare visit to rebel stronghold of western Oromia, PM Abiy 8 May attended pro-govt rally in Nekemte town, East Wollega, in attempt to shore up Oromo support amid deepening unpopularity and OLA insurgency. 

Govt defended stalled transition, while crackdown on protests continued.

As opposition continued calling for elections, PM Bah justified transition delays. Bah 10 May responded to demands from opposition urging regime to respect timetable for restoration of civilian govt, claiming transition’s objective was not just to organise vote but to lay foundations for “institutionalisation to stabilise country and consolidate unity”; PM declared “things are progressing”. Opposition calls to progress transition, however, grew louder; coalition National Alliance for Alternation and Democracy (ANAD) 18 May urged govt to restore constitutional order before 31 Dec 2024, and said it “vigorously denounces junta’s renunciation” of its “commitments”; ANAD threatened to organise protests if timetable not respected. Meanwhile, opposition grouping National Front for the Defence of the Constitution (FNDC) 21 May announced it will oppose any extension of transition timetable, and also threatened to resume demonstrations. 

Popular protests continued amid crackdown and media repression. Police 3 May arrested 126 people after demonstrations took place over ten days in late April in Lero town (Kankan region) protesting against employment practices of local gold mining company and lack of public services including water and electricity. Also, authorities 14 May arrested spokesperson for victims of Dec gas depot explosion in Conakry that killed at least 23 and 17 May gave him three months suspended sentence for defaming govt; hundreds on same day demonstrated in capital in support of spokesperson. In continued repression of media, authorities 22 May withdrew six radio and television stations licences, with govt 24 May blaming outlets’ “regular abuses”; Union of Guinean Press Professionals 27 May said they were preparing calls for a general strike. 

In another important development. Small fires reported throughout month in capital Conakry including at headquarters of Culture Ministry and public energy company; official state media 7 May attributed cause of fires to “acts of sabotage”, but much remained unclear about incidents.

Al-Shabaab-related insecurity continued in north east while govt burnished international standing including through security mission to Haiti and President Ruto’s visit to U.S. 

Militant activity persisted in several areas. Notably, Al-Shabaab 10 May killed border police officer in attack in Garissa county’s Yumbis village near border with Somalia. Meanwhile, military 1 May said forces had killed six Al-Shabaab fighters during operation in Kumba area of Lamu; operation follows stepped-up troop deployment in late April to address insecurity amid reported increases in attacks in Garrissa, Lamu and Mandera counties in recent months.

Police mission to Haiti delayed again as Ruto visited U.S. As part of UN-mandated Nairobi-led multinational security force to combat gang violence in Haiti, high-level Kenyan delegation including mission commander 20 May arrived in Haitian capital Port-au-Prince to assess preparations for force arrival; Ruto 24 May said first batch of police would arrive in three weeks, in further delay to deployment amid reports of logistics issues (see Haiti). Meanwhile, Ruto 22-24 May took high-profile trip to Washington, marking first African state visit to U.S. in sixteen years, with Kenya being given Major Non-NATO Ally status, allowing govt increased access to defence cooperation with U.S. 

In another important development. Following severe floods that began in April that killed hundreds and exposed gaps in govt preparedness for natural disasters, residents decried forceful eviction of people living in settlements next to rivers in capital Nairobi as part of authorities’ evacuation orders.

Amid political tensions, inter-Malian dialogue ended and recommended extension of transition; conflict persisted in centre and north. 

Inter-Malian dialogue concluded, recommending transition extension. Final stage of national dialogue took place in capital Bamako 6-10 May as key armed groups remained outside of the process and several opposition parties and civil society groups boycotted initiative. Concerns grew that military would use process to prolong hold on power as consultations concluded with report recommending three-year extension of transition and allowing transitional President Col. Goïta to be presidential candidate when elections held; opposition grouping 12 May called dialogue “grotesque political trap” while leader of opposition African Socialist Democratic Party said dialogue only “about securing benefits for ruling junta”. Meanwhile, in continued suppression of civil and political freedoms, court 21 May sentenced university professor to two years imprisonment for harming state’s reputation and defamation over criticism of govt.

Violence remained widespread in centre and north. Clashes between armed forces, Russian paramilitary Africa Corps (formerly Wagner Group) and militants continued. In centre, al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) militants 3 May attacked base in Diafarabe town, Segou region, killing at least ten soldiers. In north, jihadists attacked civilians in Gao region including Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel) 22 May killing at least three civilians in Balga village, Ansongo commune. Reports of killings of civilians during anti-jihadist operations persisted; notably army and Russian paramilitary patrol 16 May allegedly killed nine civilians in Tahaganet village and same day two in Jenchichi village in Kidal region (north). Meanwhile, following April clash between JNIM and armed groups of Permanent Strategic Framework (CSP), reports emerged 17 May that CSP leadership was seeking non-aggression pact with JNIM. 

Govt strengthened ties with Sahel neighbours, tensions persisted with Mauritania. Foreign Ministers of Alliance of Sahel States (AES) 17 May convened in Niger to finalise alliance documents; AES 20 May began joint military exercises alongside Chadian and Togolese troops in western Niger. Tensions, however, persisted with Mauritania over cross-border incidents (see Mauritania) as govt remained agitated by alleged presence of rebel groups and jihadists on Mauritanian side of border. 

Security deteriorated in northern Cabo Delgado province as Islamic State militants launched assault on strategic town; attacks may continue in June amid upcoming withdrawal of regional troops. 

Jihadists carried out large-scale attack, displacing thousands. Over 100 Islamic State Mozambique Province (ISMP) militants 10 May launched attack on strategic Macomia town that lies on main road connecting northern and southern districts of Cabo Delgado province; insurgents engaged govt and South African troops in clashes lasting almost two days before returning to their base near Mucojo town. Attack came days after Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in Mozambique (SAMIM) had left town, as militants ambushed South African troops who provided reinforcements to Macomia during attack. Number of casualties unknown but local sources reported between ten and 23 killed, while civilians fled into bush. Militants also stole equipment and goods including vehicles and medicines. Several NGOs suspended operations in town following attack, including Médecins Sans Frontières 13 May, adding to existing shortages. Rights group Human Rights Watch 15 May said ISMP had used children to raid town, while UN 22 May reported 4,500 displaced 10-21 May in Macomia and nearby Quissanga district. Attacks also continued in other areas of Cabo Delgado including Ancuabe and Chiúre districts. Timing of Macomia attack after SAMIM troop movements raised further concerns; scale of ISMP attacks may increase in June as SADC pulls out mission by 15 July, with Islamic State propaganda explicitly referring to SAMIM withdrawal. EU 14 May, however, announced extension of training mission until June 2026 and Rwanda 27 May said it had deployed extra 2,000 troops to Cabo Delgado, boosting security presence in province; Rwandan and govt soldiers 29 May reportedly repelled attack on Limala village, Mocímboa da Praia district.

Main parties announced candidates for Oct general elections. After months of uncertainty, ruling-FRELIMO 5 May announced governor of southern Inhambane province Daniel Chapo as presidential candidate. Meanwhile, main opposition party RENAMO 17 May re-elected Ossufo Momade as leader following April moves that prevented his main opponent Venâncio Mondlane from running; party officials 20 May said Momade would be presidential candidate.

U.S. troops announced Sept withdrawal date, govt strengthened ties with Sahelian neighbours amid tensions with Benin, and jihadist violence persisted. 

Govt and Washington agreed for U.S. troop withdrawal by mid-Sept. U.S. delegation 15-19 May met with Nigerien officials in capital Niamey to plan formal withdrawal of around 1,000 U.S. military personnel, agreeing to complete manoeuvres by 15 Sept; PM Zeine 14 May stated lack of U.S. military support in combating jihadists had led to severed security ties but also welcomed engagement with U.S. on economic investments. Meanwhile, EU 27 May announced military mission would end 30 June but Germany 29 May announced temporary deal allowing its troops to remain at air transport base outside Niamey while new agreement on presence negotiated.

Row with Benin prompted Chinese mediation and threatened oil exports. Amid continued dispute as govt maintained closure of border with Benin, Beninese authorities 6 May announced they would prevent Niger using its port to export crude oil through March inaugurated 2,000km-long Niger-Benin pipeline. PM Zeine 11 May announced border would remain closed for supposed security reasons. However, following mediation efforts by China – whose state oil company owns shares in Niger’s oil – Beninese President Patrice Talon 15 May reversed decision to block exports and agreed to hold dialogue with govt, although 27-28 May dialogue attempt in Niamey faltered. Meanwhile, Foreign Ministers of Alliance of Sahel States (AES) 17 May convened in Nigerien capital Niamey to finalise alliance documents; AES 20 May began joint military exercises alongside Chadian and Togolese troops in west. 

Jihadists conducted attacks in Diffa and Tillabery regions. In Diffa (south east), military 1 May clashed with militants likely from Boko Haram JAS faction near N’Guigmi town, killing three jihadists. In Tillabery (south west), hundreds of al-Qaeda-affiliated Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM) militants 20 May attacked Boni military post, as govt reported seven soldiers killed, while Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel) same day allegedly killed around twenty civilians in Diambala village.

In another important development. State court decision on immunity of former President Bazoum originally scheduled for 10 May delayed to 7 June.